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Foreword
It would be difficult to find more important or controversial economic variables
than economic growth and structural change. Growth and change are generally
related to each other in many disciplines. However, it is sometimes argued that,
in economic theory and practice, the interdependence of growth and change is
less well understood than in biology, for example. It was precisely this fact that
presented a challenge to Professor Krelle and his collaborators and led them to
select this topic for the joint nASA-Bonn University research project.
The merging of economic growth and structural change per se may be con-
sidered an exciting approach. Here, even more interesting is the fact that the
approach was applied to economies on a global scale, fully integrating of socialist
countries. The researchers who comprised the nASA-Bonn University core were
able to stimulate their colleagues in several different countries and, as a result of
the ensuing collaborative effort, it was possible to overcome many methodologi-
cal difficulties. In the course of the research, detailed economic data were col-
lected and consistent data bases created that permitted comparative analyses to
be carried out.
This book contains the basic findings of this international study, which
were discussed at the final conference, held at nASA in November 1986.
These findings, relevant to medium-term forecasting, are application-
oriented. They describe the likely path of the forces behind economic growth
and structural change and their causal relationships. As a consequence, they are
important not only to researchers in econometrics, but also to those who must
make important decisions relating to this time frame.
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It is most gratifying to be able to note that IIASA was instrumental in ini-
tiating this complex and important project. It is an illustration of how much can
be accomplished on a collaborative basis. Nonetheless, it must be recognized
that none of this work would have been possible without the personal efforts,
involvement, and dedication of Professor Wilhelm Krelle.
Robert H. Pry
Director
International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis
Preface
In this book the results of the Bonn-nASA Research Project on Economic
Growth and Structural Change are presented to the public. The project was ini-
tiated in June 1983, when the former director of nASA, Professor Holling, asked
me to draft a research plan on this subject and to act as program leader. It was
his intention that this project should become one of nASA's central research
programs. I agreed to draft such a research plan, to start the project and to act
as a program leader, if I could find sufficient support from collaborating research
groups in the most important countries. The research was to cover the whole
world, and it was clear that a project such as this one could not succeed without
the whole-hearted support of outstanding scholars in the most important coun-
tries and from national and international institutions as well.
The original research program was outlined in the "nASA Research Plan
1985" (April 17, 1984, ECO I, pp. 1-7). The plan provided that a central group
at nASA would build a highly aggregated world model to relate the results of
parallel research in a consistent way. Then collaborating groups in different
countries would prepare detailed forecasts of economic development and struc-
tural changes in their countries. Similarly, the most important commodity
markets would be analyzed as well. Finally, there would be related special stud-
ies on the driving forces of economic development, on the statistical and
econometric identification and treatment of structural change, on linking
input-output models to the world model, and on the world steel industry.
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From February to June 1984, I stayed at nASA to organize the project, to
draft a detailed research plan and to see whether enough international support
could be obtained. In March 1984, I presented the plan (and some related
research of my own) to several Institutes of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow
[All-Union Research Institute for Systems Studies (VNIISI) , Central
Economic-Mathematical Institute, Institute of World Economic and Interna-
tional Affairs and others], and again, in May 1984, at an nASA workshop at
Albena (Bulgaria), and finally at the IIASA Conference on the Analysis and
Forecasting of Economic Structural Change, May 14-16, 1984, in Laxenburg.
This conference was organized to bring together the leaders of research groups
willing to cooperate in order to discuss the research plan. If we could find
enough support, the project would start. We found it, but unfortunately the
director of IIASA informed me shortly afterward that IIASA could not finance
the project owing to unforeseen financial constraints. It would have been a pity
to bury the project after all this preparation and given the enthusiasm from so
many sides that became evident at the conference. Thus, I sought the necessary
additional support from German funds. I succeeded, and the Bonn-IIASA
Research Project was born.
My first duty is to thank all those institutions that supported the project.
Of course, these thanks belong first and foremost to nASA, but also to a large
extent the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German National Science Founda-
tion), the Sonderforschungsbereich 303 (Special Research Unit 303) at Bonn
University, the Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultlit (Faculty of Law
and Economics) of Bonn University, and Bonn University itself. For financial
reasons, it was natural for the central group to become established at Bonn
University. It worked intensively during 1985 and 1986 (with five scholars) and
during the first half of 1987 in reduced form (with two scholars). Thus, so far as
Part I of the book is concerned, it presents the work of two and a half years of a
small, very efficient and highly motivated group of scholars.
The links to nASA were maintained by regular seminars at the Institute,
where some of the results of the project were presented and discussed. Anatoli
Smyshlyaev and, later, Tibor Vasko represented the project in Laxenburg and
were most helpful in organizing the workshops in which the central group and
the collaborating country groups met and coordinated their work. These
workshops were held in Lodz, December 9-10, 1985, and in Sofia, June 24-25,
1986. The final conference, where earlier versions of the chapters of this book
were read and discussed, took place in Laxenburg, November 24-25, 1986.
The members of the central group are the authors of the chapters of Part I
of the book. In addition, Professor Dubovsky, Dr. Eismont and Dr. Vasilyev
[from the Institute for Systems Studies (VNIISI), Moscow] and Dr. Gajda, Dr.
Sztaudynger and Dr. Czyzewski (from the University of Lodz) have been working
for some time in the central group at Bonn University. Of course, we also had
many visitors from all over the world. I wish to thank all the collaborators in
the central group for their full commitment to the project and for their successful
work. I extend these thanks to all collaborating scholars and groups all over the
world. Most of them appear as authors in Parts n to IV of the book. There are
some exceptions, notably Lawrence Klein, who fully backed the project and was
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present at almost all the meetings and conferences so that the project could
profit from his experience and advice. The same applies to Jean Waelbroeck.
As may be seen from the contents, the Bonn-nASA Research Project cov-
ers only part of the originally planned research. Some parts had to be dropped;
but one other part has survived: the research of the statistical and econometric
identification of structural change, headed by Professor Peter Hackl of the
University of Vienna. The results of this research should have been used in this
project, and the experiences of this project might well have inspired statisticians
and econometricians to look for more appropriate estimation procedures. But
this was not possible. As a substitute, there was a parallel Bonn research pro-
gram on time-dependent parameters and latent variables in econometric models
and on estimation procedures in models with errors in the variables. The results
are in part reflected in our research. It was fortunate that Peter Hackl reported
on the work of his group at the final conference, in November 1986, and
Johannes Ledolter presented a paper on adaptive estimation and structural
change in regression and the time series models, so that at least part of their
message would inform this volume. The results of the statistics group will be
published separately, as Professor Hackl mentions in his "Methodological Note"
to this book.
I wish to thank the present director of nASA, Professor Robert H. Pry; the
former director of nASA, Professor Thomas Lee; and especially the former
deputy director, Vitali Kaftanov, and the nASA Council representative of the
Federal Republic of Germany at nASA, Wolf Hafele - all of whom encouraged
the project from start to finish, visited the central group at Bonn and furthered
our work through their sympathy and interest. Thanks, too, to the following
members of the Publications Department at nASA - Robert A. Duis (Head),
Betsy Schmidt (Senior Editor), and Ewa Delpos (Graphic Artist) - all of whom
helped to make a unified book out of a complex, disparate set of manuscripts.
I hope that the scientific community as well as the political authorities find
the methods and the results stimulating and useful.
Wilhelm Krelle
Institut fur Gesellschafts- u.
Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Universitat Bonn

Methodological Note
At the planning stage of the University of Bonn-nASA Research Project on
Economic Growth and Structural Change, it became clear that the methodologi-
cal side of the task would be crucial for the strength and credibility of its results:
As a consequence, it was decided to create an informal Methodological Research
Group at nASA on the statistical analysis of structural change. Experienced
statisticians and econometricians in this field were invited to contribute to the
aims of this group according to a research plan.
As mentioned in Professor Krelle's preface, the idea of transferring
knowledge or results of the nASA Methodological Research Group into the cen-
tral and local groups of the University of Bonn-nASA Project could not be real-
ized. Reasons - among others - were limitations of financial resources, and
difficulties in organizing communication with the various research groups in East
and West.
Nevertheless, some 50 statisticians and econometricians contributed to the
results of the nASA Methodological Research Group. Meetings took place in
Lodz, Poland (May 1985), Berlin, GDR (June 1986), and Sulejov, Poland (Sep-
tember 1986). A selection of the papers presented at these meetings, together
with some invited papers, is to be published by Springer-Verlag as a multi-
authored volume entitled Statistical Analysis and Forecasting of Economic Struc-
tural Change; it is scheduled to appear in the 1988-1989 academic year. In 1985,
nASA published Collaborative Paper 85-31, Statistical Analysis of "Structural
Change" - An Annotated Bibliography, by P. Hackl and A. Westlund, which con-
tains about 300 references on formal aspects of the analysis of structural change.
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The volume Statistical Analysis and Forecasting of Economic Structural
Change documents the status of the art in this field, which has recently attracted
the interest of both statisticians and economists. The authors give insights into
available methods and highlight new developments and trends. It is hoped that
the volume will further stimulate the interest of statisticians and make econo-
mists aware of available methods and their relevance and importance. The four
sections of the book are as follows:
(1) As an introduction, a chapter on "What can statistics contribute to the
analysis of economic structural change?", tries to bridge the gap between
the ways of thinking and approaches of economists and statisticians. The
chapter deals with the terminology of "structural change", discusses the
process of model building for nonexperimental data and particularly the
role of significance testing.
(2) "Identification of structural change" encompasses chapters that are con-
cerned with the detection of parameter nonconstancy. The procedures dis-
cussed cover a broad spectrum of techniques from classical methods, such
as the CUSUM test, to new concepts, e.g., tests based on nonparametric
statistics. Several chapters treat the robustness of the procedures with
respect to such conditions. Many of the chapters are illustrated by numeri-
cal data analyses.
(3) "Model building in the presence of structural change" discusses various
generalizations of constant-parameter models. Specification of models, esti-
mation of parameters and forecasting in the presence of structural change
are treated.
(4) "Data analysis and modeling" deals with "real-life" structural change situa-
tions, such as analysis of the poverty structure in a society, the notion of
technical progress, the dynamics of the IS-LM concept, Lucas's critique,
and changing causality. The application of suitable statistical methods and
the interpretation of the results exemplify the relevance and difficulties.
The authors are: Y. Abrahamsen (St. Gallen, Switzerland), L.D. Broemel-
ing (Washington, USA), M. Deistler (Vienna, Austria), F.X. Diebold (Washing-
ton, USA), J.-M. Dufour (Montreal, Canada), J. Dziechciarz (Bremen, FRG), V.
Fedorov (Laxenburg, Austria), A.C. Harvey (London, UK), M. Huskova (Prague,
Czechoslovakia), W. Katzenbeisser (Vienna, Austria), A. Keller (Paris, France),
J. Kleffe (Berlin, GDR), W. Kramer, (Hannover, FRG), J. Ledolter (Iowa City,
USA), H.-J. Lenz (Berlin, FRG), J. Lukashin (Moscow, USSR), G.E. Mizon
(Southampton, UK), T. Ozaki (Tokyo, Japan), V. Ozaki (Tokyo, Japan), P.
Pauly (Philadelphia, USA), G.D.A. Phillips (Manchester, UK), W. Ploberger
(Vienna, Austria), W. Polasek (Vienna, Austria), J. Praagman (Eindhoven,
Netherlands), P. Robinson (London, UK), B. Schips (St. Gallen, Switzerland),
P.K. Sen (Chapel Hill, USA), P.H. Tong (Canterbury, UK), B. Tornkvist (Ume!,
Sweden), H. Tsurumi (New Brunswick, USA), Z. Wasilewski (Lodz, Poland), and
A. Westlund (Stockholm, Sweden).
Methodological Note xix
Although collaboration between the University of Bonn-nASA Research
Project on Economic Growth and Structural Change and the nASA Methodolog-
ical Research Group could not be established as closely as was planned, the
results of the whole project will surely interest both economists and statisticians.
I hope that many economists find our volume Statistical Analysis and Forecast-
ing 0/ Economic Structural Change useful and stimulating. The present book,
which reports on a very ambitious and rather unique modeling task, can inform
statisticians of the needs and problems of economists. For the authors of the
book, particularly Professor Wilhelm Krelle, I hope that statisticians as well as
economists will invest their efforts and profit from reading it.
Peter Hackl
Institut fUr Statistik,
Wirtschaftsuniversitat Wien
and nASA, Laxenburg
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PART I
Analysis and Forecast of
Economic Growth and Structural Change
on the Basis of a World Model:
Results of the Central Research Group

CHAPTERl
Growth, Decay and Structural Change
Wilhelm Krelle
Summary
We attempt to show the historically unique situation in which mankind now
finds itself, which forces are working and what may be expected in the future.
These general considerations are then used to study economic development up to
the year 2000. The driving forces are identified and their development explained
by a latent variable called "degree of economic activity". This chapter provides
the philosophical background for the understanding of the following chapters.
1.1. Introduction: The Background of the Bonn-IIASA
Research Project
We are lucky and privileged to live in an extraordinary period of the 2 million or
so years of the history of man. Mankind experienced only two real revolutions of
its way of life in its history. The first happened about 4000 to 6000 years ago
when mankind succeeded in taming domestic animals, growing corn, and
invented spinning, weaving, pottery, smelting and casting copper, bronze and
iron, wheeled vehicles and sailing boats. This was accomplished at different
places, but in the short span of about 2000 years. It took some 1000 years for
this knowledge to spread from its places of origin over the world. This first agri-
cultural and artisan revolution radically changed the way of life of mankind.
Instead of living in small nomadic tribes, gathering food and hunting, man set-
tled in permanent houses, cities came into being, large empires developed, writ-
ing, reading, calculating, and all kinds of cultural activities emerged. The size of
the world population increased by a factor of six between 4000 and 2000 B.C.
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Figure 1.1. World population. Sources for (a): (1) W. Fucks, Uber die Zahl der Men-
schen, die bisher gelebt haben, Z.f.d. ges. St. W. 107 (1951), pp. 440-450. (2) Carr-
Saunders, World Population, Oxford (1936), Tab. 8, p. 42. (3) UN, Demographic Year-
book (1959), Tab. 2, p. 127. (4) UN, The Future Growth of World Population, New York
(1958), p. 23. Sources for (b): (1) See above. (2) Forecasts from R. Freeman and B.
Berelson, The Human Population, Scientific American (Sept. 1974), pp. 36-37.
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Figure 1.£. Regional distribution of world population. Sources: (1) Q.H. Stanford, The
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Yearbook (1956 and 1978).
As far as technology is concerned nothing much happened after this until
the industrial revolution started in the 18th century in Great Britain. Living in
Goethe's time in Germany was not much different from living in emperor
Augustus' time. But our current way of life is simply incomparable to that. The
industrial revolution is now spreading very fast around the world - fast indeed if
one compares this with the hundreds or thousands of years it took for the use of
a new tool or knowledge to spread over the world in former times; cr. the details
given in the Oxford History of Technology. The world is now capable of support-
ing a much larger population. Figure 1.1 shows the singularity of our period
graphically. Figure 1.2 illustrates that the population explosion followed the
path of the industrial revolution: first the European population expanded sub-
stantially, increasing from 20% to 36% of the world population. This trend is
now being reversed. Of course, world GDP per capita increased substantially
from $200 in 1775 to $1800 in 1975 (see Figure 1.9) and will increase further if
the growth process can be continued. This assumption is not unrealistic. If the
growth process continues with a per capita growth rate of 1%, the world average
income per capita in about 200 years would be that of people in the Federal
Republic of Germany, or France, or Japan today. If this increases by only 0.5%,
world average income in 200 years would be comparable to that of the citizens of
Portugal and Greece today. This, of course, is not a forecast but simply a trend
extrapolation. We do not need it further. But it is interesting that it does not
yield unreasonable and unacceptable results.
The industrial revolution not only increased the average world per capita
income enormously (it grew by a factor of 9 in 200 years), it also substantially
widened the difference in per capita income between nations. This is intuitively
clear: if some nations succeed in extending their GDP per capita and others stay
at the old level, world income distribution must become more unequal. The
imbalance is now substantial, as may be seen from Table 1.1. Average GDP per
capita was $9440 in the OEeD countries and $230 in the low income countries in
6 The Future of fk World Economy
1984
I .
/
_ estImate of
Herman Kahn
1_ average growth rate =
average growth rate
from 1775-1975
= 1.098%
21752075
Italy
UK
F.R. Germany
France
f,
I!
1/
h/
I/+-- average growth rate
II, 1%
~/
}/
j/
/
/
/
/ /
/ //-average growth rate =
A/ ,/ 0.5%
ff /I' ,/
yY ,/
./
/
--
Greece
USA
1~75
2000
Year
Japan
For comparison:
GDP/capita 1984
(in purchasing power
of 1980)
Portugal
19000
18000
17000
16000
15000
14000
13000
., 12000
~
's.
., 11000c.>
--I:l.Q 10000
0
"0 9000;:;
0
~ 8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
1775
Figure 1.9. Actual development of average world GDP per capita and conditional fore-
casts. Sources: (1) Statistisches Jahrbuch 1986, for the Federal Republic of Germany, p.
717; a DM/$ exchange rate of 2 has been assumed. (2) Herman Kahn, World Economic
Outlook, 1979 and Beyond, New York (1979), p. 66. (3) Our calculations.
Wilmlm Krelle 7
1979. The OECD countries comprise about 16% of the world population, the
low income countries about 53%. The Lorenz curve of world income distribution
(with respect to groups of countries in Table 1.1) is given in Figure 1.4. The
degree of inequality is comparable to that of Great Britain in 1801, though the
British income distribution at that time was more unequal in the higher income
brackets and less unequal in the lower ones than the world distribution today. It
is also apparent from Figure 1.4 that world income distribution became more
unequal from 1960 to 1984. This unfortunate trend will continue until birth
rates are reduced in the low income countries and the wave of industrialization
reaches them fully. But after that the developing countries will catch up to the
average level of the presently industrialized ones. This will reduce the inequality
of world income distribution. It may become comparable to the domestic income
distribution of an industrialized nation now; see the Lorenz curve for the Federal
Republic of Germany in Figure 1.4.
There are people who think that the developing nations do not have the
chance to reach the level of the developed ones since there are not enough
natural resources left to them. This argument takes no consideration of the
working of the price system with respect to exhaustible resources. The price of a
commodity rises and its consumption per unit of output is reduced if its supply
declines. Figure 1.5 shows this for crude oil. The actual figures of total supply
of crude oil, of crude oil price and of the depletion rate (= ratio of extraction to
known extractable reserves) are represented for the years 1900-1985 or
1950-1985, respectively [1]. Since about 1965 the depletion rate has stayed con-
stant in spite of rising extraction because prospecting for new sources has stayed
in fixed relation to the exhaustion of the old ones. This will continue until all
extractable resources are known, say in the year T. Up to that year the real
price of crude oil will increase at an average rate approximately equal to the rate
of growth of world GDP, and total deliveries will stay approximately constant.
After the year T the Hotelling rule applies: the real oil price will increase at the
real rate of interest (about 5%), and total supply will decline at the rate of deple-
tion (about 3%). The year T might lie well beyond the year 2000.
With increasing prices of a resource, substitutes become economically feasi-
ble, e.g., for crude oil: atomic energy, wind, geothermal energy, solar energy,
perhaps later fission energy. Moreover, the demand is reduced. Resource saving
is also enforced by the declining proportion of manufacturing in GDP. This fol-
lows from the changing demand structure if real income per capita increases
(Fourastie's law). Figure 1.6 shows this trend for the USA in the past. Of
course, total energy and raw material consumption on the world scale will still
increase until the developing countries are fully industrialized. The decline
starts after that.
The spearhead of scientific, economic and cultural development which is
connected with the center of political power will change as well, as it did in the
past: see Figure 1. 7. Between 4000 and 100 B.C. the most advanced centers of
human culture were in China, India, Mesopotamia and Egypt. These centers
developed more or less independently of each other. Nevertheless, a slow flow of
information from one center to the other took place. Europe was touched very
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Figure 1.7. Changes of the centers of culture in the world.
late. First Greece became a center (600-200 B.C.), then Rome (200 B.C.-500
A.D.)' Western and Northern Europe (Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, Great
Britain, 500-1900), and finally North America and Russia (1900-?). Now the
wave is turning back to Japan and China (1980-?). Of course the old centers (as
a rule) kept part of their cultural inheritance and influenced other countries.
But they lost their superiority. It is interesting to note that the centers of cul-
ture and power have existed only in the northern hemisphere and have moved
predominantly from East to West (ex oriente lux), with the notable exception of
Russia, where Czar Peter the Great opened the country to western influence. In
these centers of culture new knowledge was created. It spread with greater or
lesser speed (in fact very slowly in the past, but now rather faster) to other coun-
tries through scholars coming to learn in these centers, by trade, traveling,
books, and other means of information. It takes time for new insights into forms
of social organization and behavior to be taken up by other nations.
Assume that the rate of change i in the number of x of people who know of
a certain new discovery (or who conform to a new behavior or take up a new
production process which has proved to be more advantageous to society) is pro-
portional to x (since the more people that are informed, the more likely it is that
they "infect" the uninformed ones) and to the number of those who are not
informed (because the more people that are not informed, the more likely it is
that one of the set of uninformed people will be informed). Thus we have
i = QX(x - x), Q > 0
a proportionality factor, where x is the total population. This is the differential
equation of the logistic curve which describes the spread of an epidemic disease.
The solution of this differential equation is
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b
where x = aj b, ax = d, and c = a constant determined by the initial condition.
Figure 1.8 shows the graph of a family of these functions. It shows that
there is a hierarchy of regions. It takes about T years for the new knowledge (or
behavior or production process) to spread to the periphery of the development
area. Thus there will always be a difference between the degree of development
of nations though the center of gravity of culture may (and will) change [2].
1.2. Explaining Long-Term Development with the
Latent Variable "Degree of Activity"
Mankind is organized in societies which are now mostly equivalent to nations.
There are "active" societies which are striving for achievements in different fields
(political dominance, economic efficiency, cultural and scientific accom-
plishments) and "passive" ones which do not move. They are trapped in a
repetitive behavior pattern and from outside they seem to be petrified. It is clear
that active societies will dominate in one form or another over those passive ones
which are "near" to them, if they are not too small and if their state of technol-
ogy in relevant fields is superior enough. Thus other societies are incorporated
into or affiliated with or subdued by the active ones, and large empires arise.
They may survive for centuries if they provide some advantages to the depen-
dent societies as well. This superposition of one active society over one or
several passive ones may well be one reason for the formation of a class structure
within the society, as Alexander Riistow (1950) suggests, but there are others.
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After a while the "active" society becomes saturated. Its success seems to
indicate that no further change is necessary. The degree of activity declines and
other societies take over the leadership.
This picture has to be modified today. There are no isolated regions of the
earth anymore. The world will become an interdependent network of centers
rather than a hierarchical order of nations as far as science and technology is
concerned. One nation may be leading in one field, others in other fields. The
technological "distance" between them may become a matter of weighing
different fields. Of course, larger nations will have the chance of being in the
leading position in more fields than smaller ones. The fast flow of information
allows for only small and temporary advantages of one nation with respect to
others. Thus the industrialized centers of the world will move nearer together
and the developing countries will catch up after a while, though not in the time
span we are considering [3]. Of course, there will always be an uneven distribu-
tion of income and wealth between countries as well as within countries. The
gap in GDP per capita between developed and developing countries will widen
further in the next 20 years. Later one may expect a tendency to a more even
distribution on the world scale.
A similar development is to be expected as far as political power is con-
cerned. There will be several centers, but the predominances and alliances will
change. As far as one can see now, China may become one of the leading centers
in the next century.
We explain these secular changes by relative movements of the degree of
activity of a society. This is a latent variable comparable to "intelligence" or
"willpower" on the individual level or to "entropy" in thermodynamics. These
concepts describe the state of a complicated system in an aggregated way
without going into detail and without (by themselves) explaining the reasons for
this state. The explanation is left to a second stage of research which, of course,
must follow. But first the latent variable "degree of activity" of a society should
be filtered out from a set of appropriate indicators, just as, for example, the
"intelligence" of a person may be measured by a system of tests comprising his
(or her) ability to read, to write, to find out patterns etc.
Degrees of activity may be measured in different fields: political, military,
economic, research, the arts and others. These are interrelated. Political and
military activities yield power which (as with economic activities) in turn pro-
vides financial means for cultural and scientific activities. Thus in the long run
the centers of political power will coincide with the centers of cultural and
scientific activities. In the following chapters we only consider the degree of
economic activity, but here we reflect on the degree of activity "in toto" .
When does a society have momentum? The answer is: when a large
number of individuals in the population are willing to work hard and to make
sacrifices to achieve the same goal, and if these efforts are coordinated. Coordi-
nation may be achieved by a strong leadership but also by an appropriate incen-
tive system, e.g., an appropriate religion or an ideology which provides a com-
mon value system and psychological rewards for activities in this direction. Of
course, there are also "passive" religions and ideologies which put brakes on all
or many secular activities. In modern societies the coordination of economic
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activities is largely performed by the price system. But there are limits to both
approaches: too many and too stringent a set of regulations hinder or even de-
stroy individual activity. Conversely, if the price system is the only regulator of
economic activities, there will be monopolies and an unequal and unjust distribu-
tion of income and wealth and, as a consequence, class struggle and internal
social unrest which will also reduce the degree of activity. There is an inter-
dependence between the "ideological superstructure" of a society (i.e., its reli-
gious and other ideas and ideologies) and the actual situation: the value system
determines the actions which in turn codetermine the actual situation, and the
value system itself is heavily influenced by the actual situation. This is Hegel
and Marx united. There is nothing mystical about such interdependencies.
It is difficult to keep a society on the track of a high degree of activity for a
long time. There is always a nonzero probability of falling off one of two preci-
pices: too many regulations and overly rigid organizations which yield a
petrification of the society; or too few regulations and organizations which result
in a disintegration of society. In both cases competing societies with a higher
degree of activity will eventually take over the leadership. This was the case in
the past and will happen in the future. The transition need not come by force.
The old leadership may simply fade away, as the British Empire did. This seems
to be more likely than World War III. There are no economic reasons for a
long-term breakdown of human society.
This is the (somewhat optimistic) background for the Bonn-IIASA
Research Project. It deals with economic growth and structural change over the
relatively small time span of about 20 years. This allows a much more detailed
use of the available economic theories, and may give more specific hints as to the
appropriate economic policy in each country. But the results should fit into the
broader picture of historical development and of very long-term projections.
It is a control theoretical problem to keep a society on the path of a rela-
tively high degree of economic activity. If the society shows signs of weakness
because it moves too much in one of the two dangerous directions, efforts will be
made to correct the aberration. Thus we may expect cyclical movements of the
degree of activity. We shall show later that these cycles may be identified with
the long-term Kondratieff cycle. Our own projections are based on this
approach. But before coming to this we shall briefly review other long-term pro-
jections.
1.3. Some Other Long-Term Projections
There are other long-term projections which come to similar conclusions and
those which come to quite different ones from ours. We shall start with the more
"philosophical" approaches.
Marx (1894, Ch. 15) projects the "end of the historical epoch of capitalism"
(which may be interpreted as a breakdown of the market economies) whereas the
communist economies would fully enjoy the blessings of technical progress and
growth. Spengler (1919) finds a "Decay of the West" (which may be interpreted
as a decline of European and American economies in absolute or relative terms
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compared to the Asian or African countries). He thinks of a culture as behaving
in an analogous way to an individual: it passes through a period of youth, full
development of its abilities and of old age and death. Toynbee (1947) comes to
similar conclusions, but for different reasons: it is a lack of response to the
requirements of the natural, social, and political environment that leads to the
ultimate decay. Olson (1982) specifies this idea by pointing to institutional rigid-
ities as the main reason for this lack of vitality. Sorokin (1957) believes in a
cyclical change between three types of culture (ideational, idealistic, and sensa-
tional) and thinks that we are now in a transition from the sensate (= positivis-
tic, science-oriented, agnostic) phase of culture to an idealistic or ideational (=
philosophical or religious) phase where the center of creativity shifts from
Europe "to the larger area of the Pacific-Atlantic" .
There are also theories which do not recognize a rise and decline of a cer-
tain culture but identify changing stages or cycles of performance of a society.
Aristotle may be first named here. In his book Politics he distinguishes three
"good" types of constitutions: kingship (the rule of the best to the advantage of
society), aristocracy (the rule of a few excellent citizens to the advantage of
society) and politie (the rule of all citizens to the advantage of society). Each
type may degenerate: kingship to tyranny, aristocracy to oligarchy and politie to
democracy. The degenerate forms are all defined as despotism to the advantage
of those in power without rule of law. The degenerate forms of constitutions
lead to decay of the community, to revolution, and finally to a change of the con-
stitution. There is no strict order of change. Pareto (1916) sees history as the
result of a circulation of the elites. Elite is a name for the ruling group. It
imposes its rule on the majority and identifies its own perception of utility with
the utility of the population. If the elite deteriorates and loses the willingness to
use force, there will be revolution, disorder and decay until a new elite takes over
and organizes society according to its perception.
Berdiajew (1927) denies any progress in history. Each generation lives in
its own right. Cultures come and go, but there is no trend, no goal in history.
This is close to Alfred Weber (1951), who distinguishes between culture and
civilization (this conforms to an old tradition in German philosophy). Civiliza-
tion comprises "practical knowledge" as provided by, for instance, the natural
sciences and engineering. Culture means the value side of human life and
comprises religion, philosophy, literature, art, and the like. There is no progress
in culture, though there may be cyclical movements, whereas progress is possible
in civilization.
On the economic side Kondratieff (1926) must be mentioned: he supported
the existence of long-term waves without presenting a theoretical background.
Schumpeter (1939) and others explained them on the basis of great tasks which
confronted society: the introduction of the steam engine in industry, the use of it
in transportation (railways and steam boats), the electrification, later the motori-
zation of society, etc. But this does not explain the regularity of these waves,
nor the low tides in between, since the basic knowledge for each new wave was
available long before the wave actually started. We shall suggest an explanation
later.
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Figure 1.9. Forecast of world economic development by Meadows et ai. (1972); see Fig-
ure 1.10.
In the present computer age world models have been constructed to forecast
the long-run development of the world economy. One of the first (and the most
spectacular one) was that of Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (1972). It
was built in order to show that the world is on the edge of an abyss and will col-
lapse in a relatively short time if basic changes are not initiated at once. These
changes are: a total stop to further industrialization, at least in the already
industrialized countries (zero growth), substantial savings in the use of energy
and minerals, conservation of nature, reduction of pollution, and basic redistri-
bution of income from North to South. The most striking results of Meadows et
al., can be seen in Figure 1.9 where a collapse of industrial production and of
population was forecast relatively soon after the year 2000. The forecasts of
Mesarovic and Pestel (1974) (see Figures 1.10 and 1.11) are more "normal". The
socialist world and the Middle East are the winners in these forecasts. The Bari-
loche Model [see Bruckmann (1976) and Herrera, A.D., Scolnik, H.D. et al.,
(1976)] has quite another character. It is a planning model constructed from the
point of view of the developing regions of the world. It allocates capital and
labor worldwide in such a way that life expectancy becomes maximal at birth in
all regions of the world. This, of course, amounts to a huge redistribution of
capital and wealth to the advantage of the developing regions. In this case
"basic needs" could be fulfilled in Latin America in the early 1990s, in Africa in
2008 and in Asia in 2040. In developed countries the growth rate of GDP will be
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drastically reduced. The authors do not see any physical limits to growth such
as Meadows does.
The UN Model constructed by Leontief et al., (1977) is an input-output
model for the whole world. Different target growth rates of GDP per capita are
assumed for developed and developing regions of the world and the implications
for structural change, international trade, the balance of payments, and the
income gap between developed and developing countries are estimated. The
results are that there are no physical barriers to growth (neither with respect to
natural resources nor with respect to abatement), but far-reaching changes in the
social and political order of developing countries are necessary.
The most recent and most comprehensive world model is the Globus Model
developed by Karl W. Deutsch and collaborators at the Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin and published recently by Stuart A. Bremer (1987). It is not constrained
to the economic sphere but covers also demographic and political processes
(domestic as well as international). Globus is a huge system of some 40,000
equations; it is dynamic, continuous and recursive, noneconometric, constructed
in the spirit of control theory and systems analysis. The results are optimistic:
the growth process will continue and the north-south GDP per capita
differential will decline. Our result is more pessimistic as far as the north-south
GDP per capita ratio is concerned.
Of course, these are only crude outlines of the methods and results reached,
and not all existing long-term world models are covered. For more details and
an overview of this whole area see Meadows et al. (1982), which is a report on
the Sixth IIASA Symposium on Global Modeling.
The pessimistic outlook of some of these results and especially the conse-
quences drawn by some of their authors (that the economic order of the world
must be changed as soon as possible to avoid disaster) are to be explained by the
time of their origin when, at the end of more than 20 years of unprecedentedly
rapid economic growth, the widening gap of GDP per capita between most
developing and developed countries and the necessity of structural changes
became apparent. If there is enough flexibility in the price system and in organi-
zational forms or (on the side of planned economies) in the planning system, and
if the developing nations can change their social and political order fast enough
and reduce their birth rates sufficiently, the necessary changes will be accom-
plished more or less smoothly and without much ado. But otherwise there will
be a crisis accompanied by a feeling of being caught in an inappropriate system
which has to be radically changed. But the process of development takes time
since it depends on education, transfer of knowledge, change of behavior and of
institutions. There is no way of jumping from one stage to the next. Impatience
and force will only prolong the state of transition that the world is in.
There is a series of studies of the Hudson Institute, especially by Herman
Kahn and others, which lie somewhere in between the "philosophical" and the
formal approaches, see, e.g., Kahn (1979). Kahn and his collaborators use partly
formal and partly informal methods of forecasting different features of the world
to come. One of his forecasts is reproduced in Figure 1.9. These projections are
mostly more optimistic than those mentioned earlier as far as averages are con-
cerned. As to the distribution of world inr.ome they are more pessimistic.
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There are several world models in operation now which are constructed and
used for short-term forecasting (say from 1 to 5 years) and for other purposes,
e.g., the Link Model of Lawrence Klein, the Wharton Econometrics Model, and
the EPA Model of the Economic Planning Agency of Japan [4]. They are much
more detailed than the long-term world models. But since they follow the
Keynesian line in so far as they are demand driven, and since the long-term sup-
ply conditions are usually taken as exogenous, they cannot be used for real long-
term purposes.
The Bonn-IIASA world model can be placed between the "futurologist"
and the short-term world models. Its results are consistent with those long-term
projections which do not forecast total disaster, at least not in the foreseeable
future. This implies that mankind is able to manage its own problems: first,
that devastating wars can be avoided; second, that the rising prices of exhausti-
ble resources will induce substitution by other resources and savings such that
these resources will always be available (though in decreasing amounts); third,
that pollution can be controlled and the natural environment preserved such that
this planet stays inhabitable; fourth, that all nations now lagging behind in
economic development will catch up eventually; some of them may even reach a
leading position. But this will take time.
1.4. The Bonn-IIASA Research Project
The Bonn-IIASA Research Project is concerned with economic growth and
structural change "in the medium term" of about 20 years. Economic growth
and structural change are phenomena which are barely perceptible in the short
run but which exert a decisive influence in the long run. On the other hand,
15-20 years are short enough to take the existing states and their basic political
and economic order as given and to forecast labor supply and technological
development. The existing economic theory is applicable and allows forecasts.
These forecasts are not prophecies. They show future lines of economic develop-
ment of nations conditional upon assumptions on the trends of the driving forces
of this development. Hopefully, those nations which find themselves on the dark
side of development will counteract and reverse the trend. This would, of
course, invalidate our forecasts. We would be happy were this to happen.
Mankind lives in societies that are organized as nations or countries. Thus
the project considers the most important developed countries separately. The
analysis and the projections comprise:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The growth of GDP or NMP in total and per capita of the most important
countries. This will show the change in the relative economic importance
of nations.
The sectoral composition of GDP or NMP, i.e., its subdivision into agricul-
tural production, manufacturing, services, etc.
The commodity flows between countries (exports and imports).
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(4) The commodity composition of these flows.
(5) The capital flows between countries and the cumulation of international
debts and assets.
Of course, in order to analyze and forecast these variables we shall need
other variables (such as prices, exchange rates, capital stocks) which have to be
explained in turn. A large amount of data had to be gathered, made consistent,
and then analyzed. This would not have been possible without the whole-
hearted support of collaborating research groups and scholars in many countries.
Details of the system and the forecasts will be given in the following chapters.
Here we shall present the basic approach.
1.5. The Main Driving Forces of Economic Growth
In order to understand economic growth and to forecast possible future develop-
ments it is necessary to identify the main driving forces of the economic develop-
ment which in turn are governed by the latent variable "degree of activity". Our
approach is best understood by assuming a production function for each country
where the production Y" (measured in a specific way) is a linear homogeneous
function of labor input L, of the "state of technology" 7, of the capital equipment
K and of the access to foreign resources IMR approximated by real imports of
raw materials and energy:
y" = f(L,7,K,IMR ) (1.1)
Domestic secondary inputs are netted out. This allows us to group the direct
real driving forces of economic growth in four categories, namely in those which
influence L,7, K or IMR , respectively.
(1) The first driving force is growth of labor input L, measured In working
hours. We have by definition
L = POp· >. . h . e (1.2)
where POP = number of population, >. = labor participation rate, h =
working hours per employed person per year, e = rate of employment
(including self-employment). For OECD countries we used forecasts for
POP from UN statistics and estimated the development of >., hand e. For
CMEA countries L is approximated by the number of persons employed in
the material sphere. Forecasts were taken partly from estimates of the UN,
partly from estimates of the countries themselves. For developing countries
L is approximated by the labor force as forecast by the UN. Thus we took
L as a predetermined known variable which is not influenced by the latent
variable "degree of activity" .
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(2) The next (and most important) driving force is technical progress, Le., the
growth rate of T. We use this term in a very broad sense to include all
influences which come from research, development, education, organization
of society, natural environment and from qualitative changes in capital
which are not reflected by the price system. We define
(1.3)
where Ta is an index of ability (or knowledge) of the members of the society,
Tw an index of their willingness to work, To an index of the organizational
state of the society, Te an index of the state of the environment (in the sense
of the easiness of access to natural resources within the country) and Tk is
an index of the quality of capital. Ta' Twand To relate to labor and may be
put together to form an index TI of the "quality" of labor [5]. All constit-
uents of T with the possible exception of Te depend on the latent variable
"degree of activity" u. Thus we get
T:::::!T(U), T'>O (1.3a)
(3)
We estimated and forecast T on the base of possible future values of u [6].
The third driving force is capital accumulation. The capital K of a country
is an index for the production power of domestic capital goods K dom and
imported capital goods Kimp:
where a possibly higher productive power of imported capital goods is, as a
rule, taken care of by their higher real prices in domestic currency. Capital
accumulation is defined by
K = K_ 1 (I-d) + I (1.4)
where d is the rate of depreciation and I = ti.Kdom + ti.Kimp is determined
by the investment ratio s:
1= s· Y (1.5)
Y = real GDP or NMP. Thus capital accumulation is determined by the
real shape of d and s. We kept d constant at the average historical rate [7].
The investment ratio s depends on GDP or NMP per capita (= Y / POP),
on the willingness Tw to work for the future, on organizational abilities To of
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(1.6)
TW and To depend positively on u. The influence of Y IPOP is small for the
ranges of Y IPOP to be expected in the forecasting period. The more un-
certain the future, Le., the higher the future discount rate, the smaller the
propensity to invest. Thus we have
(1.6a)
where the signs above the arguments indicate the signs of the partial
derivatives. But the future discount rate p also depends on the latent vari-
able u: a higher degree of activity is correlated with a more optimistic
outlook into the future, i.e., with a smaller discount rate. Thus we have
p~p(u), p'<O
and therefore
s~s(u), s'>O
(1.6b)
(1.6c)
The relations (1.3a), (1.6b) and (1.6c) are used to estimate the latent vari-
able Uj see Section 1.6.
From (1.6b) and (1.6c) we see that sand p are inversely related. This
may also be derived by optimizing consumption over an infinite time hor-
izon under the constraint of a production function for a given rate of time
discount; see Krelle (1987).
(4) The last (but not least) driving force in this category is determined by
greater international division o/labor which in our approach is measured by
an increasing amount of imports IMR of secondary factors of production,
mostly raw materials, intermediate goods and energy. This is where the
influence of the international economic order and of international capital
flows comes in (the other driving forces are of domestic origin). In the
current approach we took the secondary imports to be endogenous vari-
ables which depend directly only on other economic variables, not on the
latent variable u. But since the other economic variables depend on U via T
and s, the imports do likewise.
We now turn to the monetary side of the economy. Here the exogenous
"driving force" is the money supply M (for OECD countries and developing
market economies) and the monetary wage level I (for CMEA countries). We
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estimated functions for the velocity of money (for OECD and developing coun-
tries) from which the domestic price level is determined. For CMEA countries
the domestic price level follows from the ratio of the nominal wage rate to the
real wage rate which is related to labor productivity.
Summing up, we have for each country the main exogenous driving forces
L, T, s, d and M (or I) where T and s depend in turn on the "degree of activity"
u. The driving forces of all countries determine simultaneously the economic
performance of all countries. Details are given in the following chapters.
1.6. Some Empirical Results: Development of the Rate of
Technical Progress, of the Savings Ratio, and of the
Time Discount Rate
These three variables are used as indicators for the latent variable "degree of
activity" u; but they are also (along with the rate of growth of the labor force)
the most important driving forces of economic growth. Therefore it is interesting
to look at their time shape in the past.
We start with the rate of technical progress wr = (T - T_1)/T_1. This vari-
able is not directly observable. We use the following method for the
identification of wr [8]. As pointed out earlier, the major part of T is associated
with the quality of labor. Therefore we specify the technical progress as
Harrod-neutral. Instead of equation (1.1) we use
(1.1a)
This equation may be rewritten in terms of growth rates [9] and solved for the
latent variable: wr :
(1.7)
0:+,0+/=1
where 0:, ,0, / denote the production elasticities of labor, capital and imported
factors of production, respectively, and wM = wIM
R
" In equilibrium growth:
(1.8)
and equation (1.7) becomes simply
(1.9)
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In equilibrium growth, the rate of technical progress coincides with the growth
rate of labor productivity. For disequilibrium growth we define
(1.10)
and obtain from equation (1. 7):
(1.11)
In disequilibrium the growth rate of technical progress is determined only
partly by the rate of growth Wy - wL of labor productivity Y / L. The term
({3/ Ct.) dK measures the influence of a changing capital coefficient K / Y, the term
h/Ct.)dM the influence of a changing import coefficient IMR / Y, i.e., of a changing
international division of labor. Both influences have to be deducted from the
growth rate of labor productivity to get the rate wr of technical progress proper.
In order to make the influence of dK and dM visible, we also define an
adjusted growth rate of technical progress:
(1.12)
a = Ct./(1-"I), ~ = (3/(1-"I), a + ~ = 1
Now we get
(1.13)
We estimated Ct., {3, "I for the reference period 1955-1982 (see the following
chapter) and thus arrived at three different measures for the rate of technical
progress:
labor productivity WY/ L'
the adjusted growth rate wr of technical progress, and
the growth rate wr of technical progress proper.
Figures 1.12-1.15 show the graphs of these three functions for the USA, the
FRG, Japan and the USSR. The figure for the other countries look similar, with
the exception of the GDR. The vertical distance between the graphs of wY/L
and wr shows the influence of a rising capital coefficient, the vertical distance
between wr and wr the influence of a rising import coefficient, Le., the influence
of an increasing international division of labor. In equilibrium growth all three
graphs would coincide.
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The most striking feature of these figures is the fundamental decline of the
rate of technical progress, starting already in the 1960s. This is true for all coun-
tries in East and West with the notable exception of the GDR where this rate
stays almost constant.
The same unfortunate development can be seen in the investment ratio (see
Figure 1.16) and also in the future discount rate. We approximate this rate by
the government bond yield. Figure 1.17 shows the time shape of the negative of
the bond yield for the USA, the FRG and for Japan.
1.7. The Identification of the Latent Variable
"Degree of Activity"
Here we wish to forecast technical progress and the investment ratio. Both
depend on the latent variable "degree of activity" u [see equations (1.3a) and
(1.6cl]. We estimated u from the three indicators wr sand p by the method of
principal components and fitted a sinusoidal curve iI through these points. Fig-
ure 1.18 shows the results for the FRG. The curves for the other OECD coun-
tries look similar. For the USA, FRG, Japan, France, UK and Italy they are
reproduced in Figure 1.19 and extended to the year 2000.
Table 1.2 shows the cycle length in years. Details are given in Krelle
(1987). This looks rather like a Kondratieff cycle. In our perception it is the
reaction of society to unfortunate developments which induces the change. The
fight against stagnation and decline may be successful, and often
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will be, but not always. The extrapolations in Figure 1.19 must not be mistaken
for forecasts. Moreover, the interrelation between the growth paths of different
countries as caused by foreign trade and capital flows are disregarded. But the
curves show that we may expect a turn of the tide: the rate of technical progress
and the investment ratio will not continue to fall but will increase again, though
very likely not to the same level as in the 1960s. This assumption underlies our
forecasts.
Table 1.2.
Cycle length
in years
USA
33.6
FRG
42.7
Japan
30.8
France
33.2
UK
28.8
Italy
31.1
NL
28.8
Bel/Lux
29.5
1.8. A Simplified Theory for the Long-Term Cycle of
Degree of Activity
How can the Kondratieff-type long-term wave of economic activity be explained?
In Krelle (1973, 1982, 1984) it was shown that the process of transfer of informa-
tion and valuation from person to person may (and as a rule will) lead to cycles
of this type. If one treats a society as a person the idea may be formulated as
follows. A deviation of the degree of activity u from its normal zero value
intensifies this deviation in the next period, i.e., there is a law of "psychological
infection" in a society. But after a while the limitations of this new attitude and
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Figure 1.18. FRG: a sinus curve fitted to the estimated "degrees of activity".
its drawbacks become apparent. Thus there is a retracting, equilibrating force
from the previous period but one. Therefore we arrive at the equation
(1.14a)
where a1 > 0, a2 < O. If la21 > (ad2)2, the solution is
(1.14b)
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Figure 1.19. Trends of the degrees of activity In USA, FRG, Japan, France, UK and
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Of course, this is the most simplified version of a more elaborate theory; see
the Krelle references above. If this is basically an appropriate explanation for
the long-term sinusoidal movements of the driving forces of economic growth, we
may expect that they will continue in the future.
1.9. Growth and Structural Change
The growth process is always connected with structural change. If structural
change is inhibited, e.g., for social reasons (because people want to keep their old
working places), growth will stop. The demand structure changes if people
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become richer and if technology advances and the international division of labor
increases. There is a whole literature on this subject: Dennison (1974), Giersch
(1981), Nelson (1981), Kendrick (1981), Stoneman (1983), Conrad (1985), Jor-
genson, Gollop, Fraumeni (1986), to name only a few. We use the "upside
down" approach: growth determines structural change. Hindrances in struc-
tural change manifest themselves as a decline of the degree of economic activity
and therefore result in a decline of the rate of growth. Details will be given in
the next chapters.
1.10. Conclusion
This chapter provides the philosophical background of the Bonn-IIASA
Research Project. The industrial revolution which we are experiencing is a
unique period in human history and will lift mankind to a new, better life. Some
nations have led the way, the others will follow with some time lag. Thus
income distribution on a world scale will inevitably become more uneven for
quite a while. But in the historical perspective this will be a transitory phase.
Superimposed on this very long-term there are long-term Kondratieff-type
cycles of economic activity. We identified these cycles by using indicators and
looking for the principal components, and found that the main driving forces of
economic growth (the rate of technical progress and the investment ratio) show
sinusoidal fluctuations of a time length between 30 and 40 years. We are now a
short way behind the trough of a Kondratieff wave.
Since our project is concerned with the economic development over the
next 20 years, we may assume that the driving forces of economic growth will
not continue to decrease as in the last 15 years but increase again, though to
different degrees. This assumption underlies our forecasts.
Notes
[11
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
I wish to thank C.C. v. Weizsacker, director of the Institute for Energy Economics
at the University of Cologne, for providing these data.
Marchetti used this type of law of extension of knowledge and behavior exten-
sively and showed that it is applicable in very many fields; see, e.g., Marchetti
(1986), who used a graphical representation of a transformation of the logistic:
log Fj(I-F) = log bjc + dt, where F = xlx). Thus, the logistic curve
becomes linear in time space.
Since there does not seem to be a basic difference in natural gifts between nations,
a law of "regression to the mean" will work, which is called "Stein's law"; cr.
Efson and Morris (1977).
For a complete list of world models see Uebe et at. (various dates), and regular
printouts of the latest state of the bibliography by Uebe.
There are similar, but not identical, classifications of the constituent parts of
technical progress; see, e.g., Dennison (1967, 1974) and Kendrick (1981, p. 117).
Since they do not consider imported factors of production explicitly, they cannot
deal explicitly with the consequences of an increasing international division of
labor.
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[6] In fact we measured the rate of growth W T = (1" - 1"_1) /1"_1 of the state of tech-
nology, but did not break this index down into constituent parts as indicated in
equation (1.3). This remains a task for future research. It can be done in the fol-
lowing way. The index 1"a of "ability" of the population may be measured by the
average schooling and education of the population, by the amount of research and
development and by the transfer of knowledge from other nations. The index 1"w
of the "willingness to work" indicates the inclination of the population to work
hard, to show discipline, to make sacrifices for the wellbeing of others and for the
future, to take risks, to try something new and to adjust to new requirements of
the economy. It is an index of "entrepreneurship" in the sense of Schumpeter and
may be measured by several indicators. The index 1"0 measures the ability of the
leading groups to organize the society, to overcome old religious or philosophical
taboos and to change organizations and institutions if they become a hindrance to
economic progress. In a market economy it means keeping the price system flexi-
ble and total demand and income distribution at acceptable levels; in a planned
economy it means improving the efficiency of planning as much as possible. In
both systems it measures the capacity to realize the necessary structural changes.
Thus 1"0 is also an index of "economic activity" or "entrepreneurship" but related
to the leading groups of a country. The index 1"e measures the ease of access to
natural resources, e.g., by the relative amount of labor and capital used in the
extraction of natural resources.
[7] For DECD countries, d has also been varied; see Chapter 2.
[8] For details, see Krelle (1987). Section 1.6 follows this article.
[9] We always write W x = (i/x) ~ (x - x_1)/x_1 = growth rate of a variable x.
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CHAPTER 2
Main Results of the Bonn-
IIASA Research Project
Wilhelm Krelle
Summary
This chapter presents the main results of the Bonn-IIASA Research Project on
economic growth and structural change as far as the work of the central group is
concerned. First, the model is outlined. The basic assumptions about the main
driving forces of the economic development (technical progress and capital accu-
mulation) are stated, and finally the results (given in the Annexes) are discussed.
They may be summarized as follows. The growth process will continue, but at a
slower rate. The CMEA countries will come nearer to the OECD countries, but
not much. Within the group of the OECD countries, some smaller ones will pass
the USA as far as labor productivity and standard of life is concerned. Some
developing countries (especially Black Africa and India) will stay behind so that
the world income distribution will further deteriorate. The developing countries
(with the exception of the oil-exporting countries), the USA and some European
countries will keep their trade deficit, though (in the case of the USA) it will
decline.
2.1. Introduction: The Model
We are concerned with medium-term forecasts of the trend of economic growth
and structural change on the world level, Le., with trend forecasts until the year
2000. These are conditional forecasts, of course; we are not prophets. The con-
ditions are assumptions on the future time paths of the driving forces of
economic growth. They depend on the success of the different governments in
creating favorable economic conditions within their countries (or, in the case of
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CMEA countries, in organizing their economies efficiently) and in taking advan-
tage of world trade and international division of labor. Given the size and
development of these driving forces, we may estimate the future development of
GDP or NMP, its sectoral composition, exports and imports and their commod-
ity composition, the general price level, the price levels of groups of commodities,
and the exchange rates by means of a world model which consists of linked
national models (or, in the case of developing countries, models for groups of
countries). The countries and groups of countries considered in the project are
given in Annex 1 at the end of the book. The model is outlined in Annex 2 at
the end of the book. Here we only present the general construction principles of
the model and the underlying motivations.
One basic theoretical construct of the model is a production function for
each country of the Cobb-Douglas type:
(2.1)
where Y* is total production after netting out domestic secondary inputs, T is an
index for the state of technology, L = labor employed, K = capital, IMR =
imported secondary inputs (energy, raw materials, half-finished goods, etc.).
wT = (T - T_1)/T -1 is the rate of technical progress.[I]
It is necessary to defend the choice of this approach (which uses a very sim-
ple functional form) in the light of other much more sophisticated approaches.
We have to consider the aim of our research. We want to forecast the medium-
term trend of economic development, not the short-term economic results, say,
GDP or NMP in the next or next but one year. In this case we would have to
use much more complicated functions. But for medium- and long-run trends,
this type of function is most appropriate.[2]
Another basic assumption is the monetaristic approach: money supply (we
choose M2 as the money concept) and the velocity of money determine the
domestic price level, given real production. The velocity of money is explained
by a function, the most important arguments of which are the capital output
ratio, labor productivity and the foreign debt ratio with respect to production.
The nominal rate of interest is explained by the rate of inflation, the rate of
interest abroad (we took the US rate as a proxy), the savings ratio, the foreign
debt ratio and the rate of change of the exchange rate. The exchange rates of all
countries should be explained simultaneously. This approach is presented by Dr.
Welsch in Chapter 8. Unfortunately, we could not solve the total system numer-
ically with this complicated exchange rate subsystem. Thus we had to simplify
the approach. We explained the trend of the exchange rate by variants of the
purchasing power parity theory. This should be improved later.
For CMEA countries we estimated the price level by the ratio of the nomi-
nal wage rate (which is a decision variable of the government or of the planning
office and forecast exogenously) and the real wage rate which follows (among
others) from labor productivity. This is an endogenous variable.
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Foreign trade and capital flows form the links between all economies. We
explain real imports of each country by a dynamized version of the linear expen-
diture system.[3]
The import prices are determined by the export prices of other countries
and by the exchange rate. They are scaled in such a way that real imports equal
real exports for the whole world. Nominal exports are also explained by dynam-
ized versions of the linear expenditure system, where the total monetary demand
for exports equals the value of imports. The export prices are explained by the
domestic price level and by import prices, basically. This approach guarantees
consistency of the model (total imports = total exports in current as well as in
constant $) without using a trade matrix and thus without throwing away the
export functions. This approach works well in the reference period.
Of course, the current account balance of trade and therefore the develop-
ment of international indebtedness follow immediately. Finally the commodity
structure of production, exports and imports is estimated by structural equa-
tions.
2.2. The Driving Forces of Economic Development
The driving forces of economic development are those which increase production
Y* in equation (2.1). These are directly:
(1) The rate w r of technical progress.
(2) The growth rate wL of labor input.
(3) The growth rate wK of invested capital. This rate follows from the gross
investment ratio s and the depreciation rate d by the definitional equation
(2.2)
where I = gross investment, Y = GDP or NMP and 1= sY.
The exact definitions of L, K, I, and Y differ between DECD coun-
tries, CMEA countries and developing countries. Imports 1MR are related
to total imports 1M. Thus we consider as main driving forces wT' wL> sand
d. They are estimated for the reference period (mostly 1960-1982) and
forecast till the year 2000. For reasons which were pointed out in Chapter
1, we assume a "turn of the tide" with respect to the negative development
of wr and s in the DECD and CMEA countries in the past. Figure 2.1
shows the general principle. Details are given in the next section.
(4) Since commodity prices and interest rates influence imports and exports,
and therefore production, the money supply (or for CMEA countries: the
monetary wage rate) comes up as another more indirect driving force. It
affects GDP at least transitorily. Finally, we forecast the price index of
fuels exogenously because of the political character of this price. Thus it
may also be counted as a driving (or, better, a restraining) force of
economic development.
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Figure £.1. The general principle of forecasting the exogenous variables.
The driving forces of all countries simultaneously determine the rate of
economic growth of each country since the economies of all countries are linked
by foreign trade and capital flows. But the predominant cause of economic
growth of each country is still the development of its own driving forces.
2.3. Assumptions about the Future
Development of the Driving Forces
We start with the growth rate wL of employed labor. There is no great uncer-
tainty on the figures for the future population of working age - the number of
those who may join the labor force till the year 2000 or may drop out of it is
approximately known. But immigration or emigration may change this figure,
and the labor participation rate, the average working hours and the employment
rate are rather uncertain. For OECD countries all these figures are known for
the past, i.e., for the reference period 1961-1984. Averages are presented in
Appendix 2A. On the basis of these observations, of some outside information
and of subjective judgments of the author, the growth rate wL of employed labor
(in working hours) has been estimated, see Appendix 2A.l and Table lU. For
CMEA countries we estimated the growth rates of persons employed in the
material sphere from the available resources as indicated in Appendix 2A.2 and
Table lU!. For developing countries the number of the economically active popu-
lation has been forecast on the base of UN, UNCTAD and other data. We repro-
duce the growth rates, in Appendix 2A.3 and Table £.9. We keep these forecasts
constant for all three scenarios (see below).
The same applies for the money supply (for OECD and developing coun-
tries) and for the growth rate of monetary wages for CMEA countries. These
forecasts are based on actual behavior of the past; see Appendix 2B and Tables
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2.2-2.9. Of course, the behavior of the government and of the monetary authori-
ties may change. This is a political problem. Our forecasts are made on the
"behavior as usual" assumption. [4] For the oil-exporting countries the dollar
price of mineral oil and fuels is of special importance. We estimated it as the
dollar import price of mineral oil and fuels of OECD countries (see Appendix
2B), in accordance with forecasts of UNCTAD. For the CMEA countries the
rate of growth of the nominal wage rate plays a role similar to the money supply
in OECD countries. It was forecast on the base of past experience; see Appendix
2B and Table 2.2.
The rate of depreciation for OECD countries follows a "back to normality"
formula (see Annex 2, Appendix 2C and Table 2.1). For the other countries this
rate was estimated exogenously on the base of past observations; see Tables 2.2
and 2.9.
For the other most important driving forces of economic development,[5]
the rate of technical progress and the investment ratio, three different scenarios
have been defined which span the most likely range of possible future develop-
ments. Which scenario will be realized in each country depends on whether
there are able governments and other social forces which motivate the society
such that the economic activity increases or whether a spirit of laziness or fear
spreads or even social unrest, revolution or war. Of course, this will be different
in different countries.
We shall present estimations of the future development based upon an
"optimistic", a "medium" and a "pessimistic" scenario with respect to the future
development of these two driving forces. Following Murphy's law ("What can go
wrong will go wrong") we should perhaps concentrate on the pessimistic
scenario. Of course, this scenario is not really as "pessimistic" as it might be,
since revolutions, wars, and other political disturbances or catastrophes are not
considered.
The general assumption underlying all scenarios is demonstrated in Figure
2.1: there will be a turn of the tide. The negative trend experienced in the 1970s
will not continue. The three scenarios differ in the rate of technical progress and
in the investment ratio. As to the rate of technical progress we assume for the
optimistic scenario that its average in the future will be approximately the same
as the average from 1961-1984, for the medium scenario approximately the same
as the average from 1971-1984 and for the pessimistic scenarios approximately
as the average from 1976-1984.[6] Tables 2.1-2.9 show these rates in the Hicks-
neutral concept. In Appendix 2E we present the average of technical progress in
the past (in the Hicks-neutral as well as in the Harrod-neutral concept) for
OECD countries. For CMEA and developing countries the same procedure has
been used. As to the investment ratios, a "back to normal" formula was used for
the aECD countries; see Annex 2. The results are shown in Table 2.1 and
Appendix 2F. For CMEA countries the average performance in the past was
taken as the medium forecast. In the optimistic scenario this ratio was increased
by two percentage points, in the pessimistic scenario it was lowered by the same
percentage. For developing countries a variant of the method used for the
OECD countries was applied. (For details, see Chapter 6.)
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2.4. Assumptions to Make the Productive Performance
of DECD and CMEA Countries Comparable
47
All figures used in this project are based on the official statistics. They may not
be comparable from country to country. This is especially important in compar-
ing figures for CMEA countries with those of GECD countries. We made the
results approximately comparable, first, by using conversion factors (shown in
Table 2.4) to change the NMP figures of CMEA countries in domestic currency
to those in dollars.
Table 2.4. Conversion factors for CMEA currencies.
To 1975 GDP/NMP NMP/growth
Country Currency US$ 1975 rate GDP
USSR Ruble 0.518 1.29 1.3
(1973)
Bulgaria Leva 0.689 1.32 1.8
(1980)
CSSR Koruna 7.86 1.19 1.5
(1977)
GDR Mark 2.78 1.26 1.5
(1980)
Hungary Forint 14.0 1.24 1.5
(1976)
Poland Zloty 55.8 1.28 1.3
(1982)
Romania Leu 8.99 1.20 1.8
(1981)
But this was not sufficient. Since the national accounting system used in
CMEA countries (which is based on the NMP concept) is rather different from
that of GECD countries (which is based on the CDP concept), we had to use
CDP/NMP conversion factors as well as conversion factors for NMP /CDP
growth rates to make the growth paths of GECD and CMEA countries compar-
able. It is now generally acknowledged that the differences in level and in
growth rates between GECD and CMEA countries partially follow from the
different national accounting methods (CDP versus NMP) and from different
statistical procedures. Such differences must exist because otherwise (taking into
account the much higher growth rates of NMP in the CMEA countries compared
to the generally much lower growth rates of CDP of the GECD countries) the
CMEA countries should long have passed the GECD countries in standard of
living, which has not happened. There have been different suggestions from
CMEA and GECD economists for solving this problem. The World Bank estab-
lished a research group which carefully examined the problem on the basis of
available information. The results were published in Marer (1985). Basically,
we rely on these results, but combine them with other results published in
CMEA countries; for details, see the Appendix to Chapter 30.
48 '!he Future o/IM World Economy
To compare the economic development of OECD and CMEA countries, we
first converted the NMP figures to GDP figures for one base year (1975) by using
the conversion factors suggested by Marer (1985, pp. 18-19) for the year 1980
(see Table 2.~).
Thus, we calculated GDP for the year 1975 for all CMEA countries. By
using the conversion factors for the currencies (see Table 2.~) and applying the
official growth rates of NMP to these GDP figures we got GDP "type 1" (in $)
for all CMEA countries. Thus the growth rates of NMP and GDP "type 1" are
equal. This may constitute an upper limit to an estimate of economic perfor-
mance of the CMEA countries.
But, as pointed out above, the NMP growth rates are too high to be
applied to GDP. Therefore we reduced the official NMP growth rates to
equivalent GDP growth rates on the basis of Marer's estimate (see Marer, 1985,
pp. 184-185); Table 2.~ and the Appendix to Chapter 30.
Application of these conversion factors to the official NMP growth rates
and taking the GDP figure (in $) for 1975 as estimated above, we arrive at time
series for GDP "type 2". This may be considered as a lower bound to CMEA
economic performance.
2.5. Graphical Representation of the Main Assumptions
In order to show how our main assumptions are related to other observations in
the past we represent some of these figures graphically. Figures 2.2 and 2.9
represent employment figures (working hours for OECD countries, persons
employed for CMEA countries) and the trend forecasts. They remain unchanged
in all three scenarios. Figures 2.~-2.6 show the optimistic, medium and pes-
simistic trend forecasts for the rate of technical progress of some selected OECD,
CMEA and developing countries. For the other countries the graphs look simi-
lar. Figures 2.7-2.9 show the same for the investment ratio. In our opinion,
these developments of the main driving forces of economic growth cover the
range of what might be possible in the future under the general assumption that
there is some "turn of the tide" , as was indicated in Figure 2.1.
2.6. The Main Results of the Project
The main results are given in Tables 2-98 of Annex 3. In Table 1(a-c) of that
annex some basic figures from other sources are reproduced. We comment on all
of them. The following discussion refers consistently to tables appearing in
Annex 3 of this volume.
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2.6.1. Population and employment
57
Until the year 2000 the proportion of world population living in industrialized
market economies will shrink from 20.9% in 1960 to 14.7%. The proportion of
world population living in European CMEA countries (including the USSR) will
shrink from 10.7% to 7.1% in this time span; see Table l(a). This means that
almost 80% of the world population in the year 2000 will live in what is now
called developing countries, whereas in 1960 only about 70% were living there.
It also means that the pressure on redistribution of income of the world level will
Increase.
The displacements of employed labor forces are a bit smaller, but not fun-
damentally; see Table 1(b). Looking at the average growth rates of the employed
labor force is more informative; see Table 1(c). It is striking that the GECD
countries will experience a modest increase in employment of about 1.3%,
whereas the labor force in the European CMEA countries stays almost constant.
The largest increases (of 2 to 2.4%) are in the developing countries, of course.
2.6.2. Growth rates of real GDP
Annex Table 2 shows the real GDP growth rates for the past and the forecasts
until 1999 for OECD countries for the medium scenario. The trend is almost
constant between 2 and 3% with the exceptions of Japan, where the growth rate
lies above 4% but is declining, and Great Britain (UK), where this rate is only
just above 1%. The FRG, France, Italy and Belgium/Luxembourg are close
together (with growth rates between 2.8 and 2.9%). The US growth rate is
around 2.2%. In the optimistic scenario the growth rates of the continental
European GECD countries are almost 1% higher, for Japan even 1.3-1.5%, but
for the USA and UK only around 0.5%. In the pessimistic scenario the growth
rates for the continental European GECD countries and for Japan are 1-1.3%
lower, for the USA and UK only around 0.6%. Thus the variance of the growth
paths is lower for the slower-growing than for the faster-growing countries. All
scenarios show that the US economy advances at a lower rate than almost all
other GECD economies. The relative importance of the US economy declines.
We shall come back to that point later. This, of course, does not mean the most
advanced technologies might not be developed in the USA, though the chances
that the other GECD countries will equal or pass the USA in this respect are ris-
ing. Figure 2.10 shows the growth rates of some GECD countries graphically.
Annex Table 9 presents the equivalent figures for CMEA countries with
respect to the growth rates of real NMP (which is identical with the growth rates
of real GDP "type 1"). In the medium scenario these growth rates lie mostly
between 2.9 and 3.7%. They are slightly decreasing. For Bulgaria, the GDR
and (astonishingly) for Romania they lie between 4.5 and 5%. Hungary and the
CSSR stay behind. But these growth rates are based on the domestic NMP
figures, which are not directly comparable with GDP figures and might not be
fully comparable between the CMEA countries themselves. Table -4 shows the
growth rates of GDP "type 2" for CMEA countries where adjustments have been
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made in order to come nearer to comparability with the OECD countries. Now
the GDR comes out best. All CMEA countries lie rather near together (growth
rates of about 2.6-2.9%, which are similar to those of the OECD countries).
Also, after this adaptation, the CSSR and Hungary stay behind. Figure 2.11
shows these results for some CMEA countries.
The growth rates of developing countries are higher; see Annex Table 5.
They lie between 3.4 and 6.5% in the medium scenario. But this is mostly due to
the growth of the labor force and does not indicate an adjustment of the stan-
dard of living. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, the Middle East and North Africa are
doing well whereas India and Black Africa stay behind. The pessimistic scenario
does not reduce this growth too much since the main driving force, population
growth, is not influenced by it.
It is interesting to compare the growth rates of the GDP of the world
regions - OECD, CMEA and developing countries - and to estimate the growth
rate of world GDP; see Annex Table 6 and Figure 2.12. In the medium scenario,
the growth rates of the OECD and the CMEA group are approximately equal.
This means that the comparative standards of living would stay approximately
the same as they are now. The roughly 2% higher growth rates of developing
countries must be seen against the background of roughly 2% higher growth
rates of population and labor force in these countries; see Table l(c). Thus, the
standard of living of the developing countries as a whole will not improve more
than that of the developed countries, if all regions follow the medium scenario.
Of course, this need not be the case. But if the pessimistic scenario were to come
true for the developing countries and the medium scenario for the developed
ones, there will be a fundamental deterioration of the distribution of world
income.
2.6.3. GDP per capita
Annex Table 7 shows the forecasts of GDP per capita (representing standard of
living) for the DECD countries. The USA will be passed by several OECD coun-
tries, notably Japan, the FRG, France, Belgium/Luxembourg. The UK and
Italy will stay behind. Figure 2.19 illustrates this for some OECD countries. Of
course, for one country the pessimistic scenario may come true (e.g., for the
FRG), whereas for others (e.g., France) the optimistic one may prevail.
Annex Table 8 shows GDP "type 1" per capita for the CMEA countries.
Bulgaria as well as the GDR will enjoy a much higher standard of living than the
USSR. Poland stands at the end. Its standard of living will be only half of that
of the GDR and about two-thirds that of the USSR.
If one takes GDP "type 1" as a comparable measure of income in the
CMEA countries, Bulgaria and the GDR will pass the standard of living of the
USA before the year 2000, whereas the USSR will stay at about three-quarters of
it. Hungary passes the level of the UK. This seems unlikely.
If one takes GDP "type 2" as the appropriate measure (see Annex Table 9),
the GDR comes out best among the CMEA countries. In the medium scenario it
passes the level of the UK and reaches about 60% of the standard of living of the
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FRG. The standard of living in the USSR will also pass that of the UK, but
reaches only about 60% of that of the USA. Figure 2.1.1 shows the development
of GDP "type 2" per capita for some CMEA countries. For comparison's sake
the GDP per capita of the USA is also reproduced.
The developing countries are also making headway, but stay far behind the
OECD and the CMEA countries; see Annex Table 10 and Figure 2.19. In the
year 2000 Mexico, Brazil and Argentina will almost reach the standard of living
enjoyed by the UK at the beginning of the 1960s. India and Black Africa con-
tinue to be the poorhouses of the world. The oil-exporting countries are also on
the lower side. Their special position is gone. Thus income distribution on the
world scale becomes more unequal in the period considered. This is also visible
in Annex Table 11, where the GDP per capita of the world regions is reproduced.
In the medium scenario in 1999 the OECD countries reach a GDP per capita of
around $9,000, the CMEA countries (in GDP "type 2") around $5,800 and the
developing countries around $1,000.
2.6.4. GDP per employed person or labor productivity
Labor productivity should be measured by GDP per working hour. Unfor-
tunately, these figures are available only for OECD countries. For comparison's
sake, we approximate that measure by GDP per employed person. Since the
average working hours per employed person and per year are declining in OECD
countries, this measure understates the "true" labor productivity. Annex Table
12 shows the labor productivity in this sense. The USA will be passed by many
OECD countries, with the notable exceptions of the UK and Italy. Japan's labor
productivity increases fast, but is still lower than those of the FRG and France.
This, of course, refers to the average. In the most advanced industries it may
very well be the other way round. Figure 2.15 illustrates these results.
For CMEA countries we again have to differ between GDP "type I" and
GDP "type 2". Measured in terms of GDP "type I" (see Annex Table 19) labor
productivity of Bulgaria and the GDR will reach or pass that of the USA around
the year 2000, whereas the USSR will stay at about three-quarters of the labor
productivity in the USA in the medium scenario. If we take GDP "type 2" as
the appropriate measure (see Annex Table 1..), the GDR (with the highest labor
productivity in the CMEA countries) will stay at about half of the labor produc-
tivity of the FRG and about three-quarters of the labor productivity of the USA
around the year 2000. The USSR will then have about 65% of the labor produc-
tivity of the USA. Figure 2.16 illustrates this development.
For developing countries we take GDP per economically active person as a
measure of labor productivity (see Annex Table 15). This is not directly compar-
able to GDP per employed person. But if we make this comparison nevertheless,
we see that the most advanced countries in this group, namely, Mexico,
Brazil and Argentina, will in the year 2000 in the medium scenario reach the
labor productivity of Japan at the beginning of the 1970s. This is about 40% of
the labor productivity of the USA at the end of this century. India and Black
Africa are also far behind in this respect. The other countries are catching up
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more or less slowly. In Annex Table 16 the labor productivity of the three world
regions (GECD, CMEA and developing countries) is compared. If one sets the
average labor productivity of the GECD countries = 100%, the labor produc-
tivity of the CMEA countries (with respect to GDP "type 2") was 51% in 1981
and will be 58% at the end of this century. For developing countries these
figures are 11% and 13%, respectively. Thus, on the average the gaps are clos-
ing, but very slowly.
2.6.5. Foreign trade
Real imports and exports of GECD, CMEA and developing countries are shown
in Annex Tables 17-29. In Table 24 the development of total world trade may be
seen. The following list summarizes this result in form of growth rates (%) of
world trade i.e., total real exports, observed until 1981 and forecast thereafter,
under the medium scenario:
1964 9.1 1976 10.0 1988 4.3
1965 7.5 1977 6.1 1989 4.3
1966 8.0 1978 4.1 1990 4.6
1967 5.5 1979 6.3 1991 4.4
1968 11.5 1980 3.7 1992 4.5
1969 10.5 1981 3.1 1993 4.4
1970 8.8 1982 -1.8 1994 4.4
1971 6.2 1983 2.6 1995 4.3
1972 7.8 1984 7.5 1996 4.4
1973 10.7 1985 0.3 1997 4.4
1974 5.7 1986 4.0 1998 4.4
1975 -2.5 1987 4.3 1999 4.4
In the pessimistic scenario the growth rates decline from around 2% at the end of
the 1980s to 1% at the end of the century. In the optimistic scenario these rates
stay at about 6.6% from the end of the 1980s to the end of the century. Judging
from these figures, the most likely growth path would seem to lie between the
medium and the pessimistic scenarios.
Table 2.5 shows the shares of GECD, CMEA and developing countries in
total world trade (calculated from Table 24 in the Annex).
Table 2.5. Shares (%) of total world trade, medium scenario.
GECD countries
CMEA countries
Developing countries
1962
71
7
22
1970
71
8
21
1980
74
7
19
1990
75
7
18
1999
72
7
21
The share of CMEA trade stays constant at about 7%. The share of
GECD trade rises until the 1990s and falls thereafter, when the more advanced
68 The Future of the World Economy
developing countries turn the tide. As to the balance 0/ trade (including services,
i.e., the current account balance without transfer payments), Tables 25-27 in the
Annex show that the USA will reduce its trade deficit from $84 billion in 1984 to
$29 billion in 1999 in the medium scenario and to about $14 billion in the
optimistic scenario. But the deficit will remain. The surpluses of the FRG and
Japan will slowly increase in the medium scenario (to about $22 billion for the
FRG and to about $35 billion for Japan). But both countries will end up with
trade deficits of about $9 billion if the pessimistic scenario comes true. France
will have a large deficit, and Italy and Belgium/Luxemburg small ones, whereas
the UK and the Netherlands come up with relatively large trade surpluses. The
CMEA countries are able to earn small surpluses. The oil-exporting developing
countries enjoy large surpluses, whereas all other developing countries have rela-
tively large deficits. This refers to the medium scenario. In the optimistic
scenario these deficits are even larger.
These results depend on the exchange rates; see Table 29 in the Annex. As
was pointed out earlier, our exchange rate equations are based on purchasing
power parity theory and do not take into account speculative waves. The latest
devaluation of the dollar with respect to the DM and the yen is not considered.
Thus, the growth path of the European and the Japanese economies might be
too high compared to that of the USA. Therefore we should concentrate more
on the pessimistic scenario for these countries.
Of course, the exchange rates are related to the general price levels, which
in turn depend on money supply or on the development of the nominal wage
rates. In Annex Tables 92-94 the resulting rates 0/ inflation are reproduced.
The USA ends up with a rate of inflation of about 7%, the FRG 2-3%, Japan
4-5%, France 7-8%, the UK 10%, Italy 12%-13%. The majority of the CMEA
countries keep their inflation rate at 1-2%, with the exception of Hungary ( ~
5%) and Poland (6-7%). Of course, the monetary regime may change. If such
information becomes available, the system should be recalculated under these
new assumptions.
2.6.6. Relative size of economies
Labor productivity and standard of living are important indicators of economic
performance, but the sheer size of an economy, measured in GDP, is important
as well. It is one measure of political "power".
Table 95 in the Annex gives the ratios of GDP of different OECD countries
with respect to the "dominant" economy of the USA and the ratios of GDP
"type 1" and "type 2" of different CMEA countries with respect to the "dom-
inant" economy of the USSR. One sees that the relative importance of the USA
declines with respect to the other OECD countries and that these other coun-
tries, taken together, will have about 50% more productive power than the USA
at the end of this century. Within the CMEA countries the USSR keeps its
rank. The other CMEA countries taken together stay at about 35% of the
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productive power of the USSR. If the USSR as well as the USA perform accord-
ing to the same scenario (optimistic, medium, or pessimistic), the USSR would
improve its GDP ratio relative to the USA from 58.8% in 1984 to between 63
and 69%; see Table 95(d) in the Annex.
2.6.7. Sectoral composition of GDP or NMP
Annex Table 96 shows the sectoral composition of GDP for OECD countries. In
the USA the service sector will expand further, but slowly. There is no sign of
"deindustrialization". In Japan and Italy manufacturing expands; in the other
countries it stays more or less constant. In the CMEA countries the industrial
sector still expands substantially, mostly at the expense of the agricultural sec~
tor. Only part of the services is included in NMP, and this part stays more or
less constant. In developing countries the manufacturing sector is expanding, but
is still smaller than the agricultural sector in many groups of countries. Services
keep a surprisingly high level and continue to expand.
2.7. Which Growth Path Will Be Realized?
It should be emphasized once again that the results presented in Annex 3 and
commented upon in the foregoing section are not predictions, but indicate possi-
ble consistent growth paths. Which path will be realized in each country
depends heavily on the domestic performance of the economic agents, including
governments. This is reflected in the two main driving forces of economic
development: the investment ratio and the rate of technical progress. Of course,
it cannot be assumed that they follow the same scenario in each country - the
medium scenario, for instance. Especially countries with an unsatisfactory
economic performance in the past (SUCh as the USSR and Great Britain) will
have a high incentive to turn the tide, whereas those with a better record in the
past (such as the FRG and Japan) will not do as much to facilitate the necessary
structural changes. This conforms to the general theory of economic develop-
ment presented in Chapter 1 and illustrated in Figure 2.1 of this chapter. It is
especially evident in the FRG.
It seems to be likely that the USA, UK and the USSR will be able to realize
the optimistic scenario; the FRG and Japan will follow the pessimistic scenario;
and all other OECD, CMEA and developing countries will stay in the medium
scenario. The world model could be solved under these assumptions without
difficulties, but the limited time of the research project did not allow this. Thus,
Figure 2.17 presents only a rough approximation of the economic performance of
some countries under these assumptions, measured by GDP per capita (or GDP
"type 2" for CMEA countries). It is drawn by putting together the solutions for
different scenarios and therefore does not constitute a consistent solution of the
world model; but it may be used as an approximation.
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2.8. Final Remarks
7I
This is only a part of the results of the Bonn-IIASA research project. Other
results will be presented in the following chapters. All of them are estimates of
the consequences of basic behavioral assumptions, which we have tried to make
explicit at the outset. If these results are unsatisfactory for a country, that
nation should make efforts to change its basic economic behavior. As a rule, this
is not easy.
Notes
[1]
[2]
We use the notation Wz for the growth rate of a variable x, i.e., Wz = x/x if x is
continuous in time, Wz = (x - x_I)/x_I if x is discrete.
There are many reasons for this. We mention here only the the most important
ones.
(a) Given the technology T, constant returns to scale (EOj = 1) are almost
j
self-evident in the long run: doubling labor, capital and imported factors of
production must double the product. Limitations coming from exhaustible
or nonaugmentable factors (such as land) are taken care of by changes in T.
(b) The production elasticities OJ must stay within certain limits 0 <
Qj ~ OJ ~ (ij < 1. If we are only concerned with the trend, we take
the mean of OJ such that EOj = 1. If the unknown functions determining
I
OJ within these limits do not change in the medium term (as we assume), we
take this mean as expectation for the future.
Arguments (a) and (b) alone give us the Cobb-Douglas function. But there are
other arguments in favor of it as well.
(c) Jorgenson (1971, 1972) in defending his approach on investment functions
(which implies the Cobb-Douglas production function for a firm) showed
that many reliable estimations of production functions did not yield
significant deviations of the elasticity of substitution from one which implies
a Cobb-Douglas production function.
(d) Krelle and Pallaschke (1981a) derived the integrability conditions for a
linear and a quadratic approximation of a general demand system. One
term which always appears in this approximation to any production function
is a Cobb-Douglas term of the form above. Empirical research showed that
the deviations from this term are small, i.e., that the other terms do not
contribute much to the explanation of production; see Krelle (1981b).
(e) Houthakker (1955-1956) assumed fixed production coefficients OJ for all
firms and assumed a Pareto distribution
0' > 01-
for these coefficients. He showed that, by aggregation, this yields a
Cobb-Douglas function for the economy. Steindl (1965) proved that the
Pareto distribution follows from a very general stochastic process.
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Thus there are many a priori arguments in favor of our approach. The results
support our approach, too.
[3] The linear expenditure system is:
a·
x· = x· + -' (Y'N - "p.X.)
, 'p. 4 ,,', ,
i=l, ... ,n
where xi = total demand of commodity i, Pi = price of commodity i, xi =
predetermined demand of commodity i, and Y'N = total expenditure for all com-
modities. Assume xi = >'ixi-l and rewrite the system as
Y'N p.
x· = b·x· 1 + c· -- - d· " -' J.L ··x· 1
, ",- 'p , ~ P l' ',-i ;:Ii i
where bi = >'i(l-ai), ci = ai di = ai\' J.Lji = >';/>'i' This is the demand sys-
tem we use, basically. For det~ils, see Chapter 8.
[4] Since we use the asymptotic purchasing power parity theory to explain the
exchange rates, the influence of the monetary side is limited, as far as the trend is
concerned.
[5] We do not consider the ratio J.LR of imports of secondary factors to total imports
as a driving force. It is endogenous for GECD countries, but exogenous for CMEA
and developing countries. This treatment is only preliminary. The ratios used in
the forecasts are:
For OECD countries
USA
FRG
Japan
France
UK
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium/Luxembourg
Canada
Rest ofOECD
For CMEA countries:
USSR
Bulgaria
CSSR
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
For developing countrie~:
Oil-exporting countries
Asian countries without India
India
Africa
Latin America without Mexico,
Brazil and Argentina
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina
North Africa and Middle East
Average 0/ ~R (in %)*
14.25
16.32
42.72
13.43
11.36
22.13
17.21
15.26
7.30
13.23
52.0
78.0
77.0
74.0
74.0
72.0
80.0
5.74
11.04
59.59
10.28
14.63
18.87
19.27
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*Note that the rates for the OECD countries vary over time; see Appendix 2D.
Moreover, the rates for the OECD countries are not comparable with those for
CMEA, because the latter include machinery parts, tools, and so on.
[6] These averages have sometimes been modified according to other information and
judgments; see Appendix 2E for OECD countries.
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Appendix 2A. Forecast of Employed Labor Force
(in Working Hours)
By definition:
where wL = growth rate of employed labor (in working hours), wpoP = growth rate of
population, wLPR = growth rate of the labor participation rate, wER = growth rate of
employment rate, and WWH = growth rate of average working hours.
2A.1. Labor supply in GECD countries.
WpOP wLPR
Observed meall6 Forua6t Observed meall6 Forua6t
1985- 1985-
Country 61-84 71-84 76-84 rooo 61-84 71-84 76-84 2000
01 USA 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.8
02 FRG 0.4 0.06 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4
03 Japan 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1
04 France 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3
05 UK 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3
06 Italy 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.4 0.8 0.6
07 NL 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.3 0.6
08 BIL 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.4
09 Canada 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.3 0.9
10 Rest of
OECDa 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
WER bwWH wL
Observed meall6 Forua6t Observed meall6 Foreca6t Observed meall6 Forua6t
1985- 1985- 1985-
61-84 71-84 76-84 2000 61-84 71-84 76-84 2000 61-84 71-84 76-84 2000
01 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.4
02 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.9 -0.8 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 -1.2 -0.7 -0.4
03 -0.04 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.5 -0.2 0.6 0.6 1.6 0.4
04 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -0.25 -0.8 -0.9 -0.7
05 -0.4 -0.7 -1.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.03 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
06 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 -0.2 -10 -0.6 0.8 0.3
07 -0.6 -1.0 -1.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.04 -0.2 0.6 0.2
08 -0.5 -0.9 -1.2 -0.7 -0.9 -1.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -1.3 -0.8 -0.7
09 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.02 -0.2 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
10 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.1 -0.5 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3
a.rhe means for country 10 are calculated only up to 1982 (instead of 1984).
bWith precision up to the rounding errors.
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2A.2. Labor supply in CMEA countries: Growth rate wLM of employed persons LM in
the material sphere, 1986-2000 (in %).
USSR Bulgaria
(16) (71)
CSSR
(72)
GDR Hungary
(73) (74)
Pol
(75)
Romama
(76)
91: 0.36
1986-89:
1990-94:
1995-99:
o 0.05 1986:
1987:
1988-90:
1991:
1992-97:
1998:
1999:
0.6 0.33 1986-87: -0.17
0.34 1988-93: -0.16
0.33 1994-99: ~-.0165
0.40
0.33 91: -0.165
0.39
0.32
~0.50 1986-87:
~0.49 1988:
~0.47 1989:
------- 1990:
91: ~ 0.49 1991:
1992:
1993:
1994:
1995:
1996:
1997:
1998:
1999:
0.06
0.03
o
-0.03
-0.05
-0.07
-0.10
-0.12
0.14
-0.16
-0.17
-0.19
-0.21
91: -0.15
2A.3. Labor supply in developing countries: growth rate WL of economic active popula-
tion L, 1982-2000 (in %).
Latin Mezico,
A8ia America Brazil, N. Africa,
Oil- without without Argen- Middle
exporter8 India India Africa M,B,A tina Ewt
Year (11) (121) (94) (19) (14) (15) (18)
1982 2.14 2.09 1.67 2.67 3.35 2.78 3.27
1983 2.36 2.37 1.66 2.60 2.78 2.57 2.71
1984 2.30 2.16 1.63 2.28 2.70 2.77 2.64
1985 2.16 2.41 1.61 2.48 2.63 2.56 3.00
1986 2.63 1.91 1.69 2.42 2.56 2.75 2.92
1987 2.39 2.31 1.62 3.07 2.92 2.68 3.24
1988 2.42 1.98 1.63 2.52 2.83 2.73 2.75
1989 2.20 2.22 1.60 2.68 2.36 2.54 2.29
1990 2.31 1.76 1.58 2.40 2.31 2.59 3.36
1991 3.01 2.53 2.07 3.40 3.38 2.96 2.53
1992 2.56 2.34 2.03 3.09 2.91 3.09 3.52
1993 2.71 2.28 2.02 3.19 3.18 2.79 3.40
1994 2.71 2.23 1.95 2.90 3.08 3.02 2.30
1995 2.77 2.06 1.91 2.82 2.99 2.63 3.22
1996 2.37 2.14 1.88 2.74 2.26 2.76 2.49
1997 2.38 2.10 1.87 2.67 2.84 2.50 2.74
1998 2.57 2.05 1.81 2.43 2.15 2.62 2.37
1999 2.32 2.01 1.78 2.54 2.70 2.46 2.60
91 2.46 2.16 1.77 2.72 2.77 2.66 2.85
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Appendix 2B. Forecast of Money Supply
The Future of the World Economy
2B.l. OECD countries: rate of growth of money supply, M2, (%).
Ob!erved mean.! Forecad
Country 1961-84 1971-84 1976-84 1985-eooo
01 USA 8.1 9.0 9.5 9.0
02 FRG 9.5 8.2 6.6 6.5
03 Japan 14.8 12.6 9.4 9.0
04 France 13.1 13.5 11.4 11.0
05 UK 11.5 15.7 14.5 11.0
06 Italy 16.2 17.8 16.8 16.0
07 NL 11.2 11.3 9.4 9.0
08 B/L 9.3 10.0 7.8 7.5
09 Canada 12.0 13.5 12.2 12.0
10 Rest of
OECD 12.8 14.4 13.9 13.0
2B.2. Developing countries rate of growth of money supply, M2, (%): forecast
1982-2000. [For oil exporting countries (Group 11) we do not estimate M2 since we
determine the price level in another way; see Annex 2.]
Latin Mexico,
A,ia America Brazil, N. Africa,
without without Argen- Middle
India India Africa M,B,A tina Ewt
(12 I) (34) (13) (14) (15) (18)
18 15 20 45 45 22
2B.3. Rate of change of OECD import price (in $) of mineral oil and fuel (P$MFL WI,
see Annex 2) (%): forecast 1987-1999.
198e 89 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 9f! 99 94 95 96 97 98 99
-0.7 -10.9 -5.0 -15.0 -40.0 -5.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
2B.4. Rate of growth of the nominal wage rate, CMEA countries (%): forecast
1986-1999.
USSR Bulgaria CSSR GDR Hungary Poland Romania
(16) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76)
1986-89:12
5.5 5.0 4.0 4.0 8.5 1990-99:10 7.5
W~lmK,.~U~
Appendix 2C. Forecast of the Rate of Depreciation
of Capital (%), DECD Countries, 1985-2000
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We estimated the rate of depreciation by a "back to normal" formula; see Annex 2.
Therefore, there is a smooth change of this rate, and we only give the rates for some
years.
Reat 0/
USA FRG Japan Frana UK Italy NL BIL Canada OECD
Y~a,. (01) (02) (03) (04) (05) (06) (07) (08) (09) (10)
1982 5.89 3.91 5.66 4.68 4.77 3.39 2.62 2.68 4.80 2.47
1985 6.26 3.91 5.82 4.53 4.91 3.36 2.67 2.73 4.99 2.58
1988 6.08 3.91 5.84 4.52 4.85 3.37 2.68 2.75 5.00 2.67
1991 5.95 3.91 5.86 4.52 4.81 3.38 2.69 2.76 5.00 2.73
1994 5.86 3.90 5.87 4.51 4.78 3.39 2.69 2.77 5.00 2.78
1997 5.79 3.90 5.88 4.51 4.76 3.39 2.69 2.78 5.00 2.81
1999 5.75 3.90 5.88 4.51 4.75 3.39 2.69 2.78 5.00 2.83
~1985-1999 5.95 3.90 5.86 4.51 4.81 3.38 2.69 2.77 5.00 2.73
The rates of depreciation assumed for the CMEA and the developing countries are held
constant for the forecasting period; see Tables 2.2 and 2.9 in the text.
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Appendix 2D. Forecast of the Ratio (%) of Secondary Factor
Imports to Total Imports, 1985-2000
(= J1, R' see Annex 2)
2D.l. OECD countries.
R~3t 0/
USA FRG Japan Frana UK Italy NL BIL Canada DECD
Y~ara (01) (02) (03) (04) (05) (06) (07) (08) (09) (10)
1982 15.79 16.56 42.15 14.47 12.20 22.44 16.97 15.66 9.18 13.60
1985 14.47 16.44 43.37 13.82 11.71 22.59 17.39 15.50 7.73 13.44
1988 14.34 16.32 43.00 13.60 11.52 22.43 17.29 15.36 7.53 13.22
1991 14.25 16.23 42.73 13.44 11.38 22.32 17.21 15.26 7.39 13.23
1994 14.18 16.17 42.53 13.32 11.28 22.23 17.15 15.19 7.28 13.17
1997 14.13 16.12 42.39 13.23 11.20 22.17 17.11 15.14 7.21 13.12
1999 14.11 16.10 42.31 13.19 11.16 22.14 17.09 15.11 7.17 13.10
161985-1999 14.25 16.32 42.72 13.43 11.36 22.13 17.21 15.26 7.39 13.23
"The introductory explanation of Appendix 2C applies here analogously.
2D.2. CMEA countries. (This ratio is kept constant; see text note 5.)
2D.3. Developing countries. (These ratios result from a solution of a submodel; see
Chapter 6.)
Latin M~rico,
A8ia Amuica Brazil, N. Africa
00- without without Ar~n- Middl~
~xport~r8 India India Africa M,B,A tina Ewt
Y~ar (11) (leI) (94) (19) (14) (15) (18)
1982 3.56 18.01 41.54 11.39 11.72 17.76 16.68
1985 4.40 16.23 42.19 10.26 12.23 17.95 15.67
1988 6.02 14.28 56.28 10.26 16.21 17.64 18.06
1991 5.84 12.22 60.18 10.22 16.62 18.22 19.71
1994 5.83 10.23 62.58 10.32 16.18 19.59 20.34
1997 5.94 8.36 64.67 10.33 15.58 20.04 20.61
1999 6.04 7.14 65.85 10.32 15.20 20.41 20.74
161985-1999 5.74 11.04 59.59 10.28 14.63 18.87 19.27
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Appendix 2E. Observations and Forecasts of the
Rate of Technical Progress (%) for
Different Scenarios
2E.l. GECD countries.
Ob6erved meansb Scenario6b
Hi or
Country Ha& 1961-84 1971-84 1976-84 Optimi6tic Medium Pe66imi6tic
01 USA Hi 0.85 0.45 0.30 0.85 0.55 0.30
Ha 1.20 0.70 0.40 1.20 0.80 0.40
02 FRG Hi 2.90 2.30 2.05 2.80 2.25 1.75
Ha 4.10 3.30 2.90 4.00L 3.20 2.50
03 Japan Hi 4.00 2.50 1.75 3.20 2.45 1.75
Ha 5.60 3.50 2.40 4.50 3.40 2.40
04 France Hi 3.10 2.45 2.10 3.00 2.45 2.00
Ha 4.30 3.40 3.00 4.20 3.40 2.80
05 UK Hi 1.20 0.85 0.65 1.20 0.95 0.65
Ha 1.80 1.30 1.00 1.80 1.40 1.00
06 Italy Hi 3.85 2.05 1.20 3.15 2.00 1.20
Ha 4.80 2.60 1.50 4.00 2.50 1.50
07 NL Hi 2.30 0.95 0.25 1.75 0.95 0.25
Ha 4.20 1.70 0.50 3.20 1.70 0.50
08 B/L Hi 3.05 2.50 2.20 2.65 2.20 1.90
Ha 4.80 3.90 3.50 4.20 3.50 3.00
09 Canada Hi 1.10 0.00 ---{).60 1.00 0.45 0.00
Ha 1.70 0.00 ---{).90 1.50 0.70 0.00
10 Rest of Hi 2.75 1.70 1.15 2.25 1.60 1.00
Canada Ha 4.20 2.60 1.80 3.50 2.50 1.50
& Hi = Hicks neutral; Ha = Harrod neutral. If "'r = rate of technical progress in the Hicks-
neutral sense and ",'r the same in the Harrod-neutral sense and a = production elasticity of la-
bor, we have the relation: ",'r = fUr I a.
b All figures are rounded to 0 or 5 in the second decimal place.
2E.2. CMEA countries: rate of (Hicks-neutral) technical progress. See Table 2.2 in the
text.
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2E.3. Developing countries: rate of (Hicks-neutral) technical progress (medium
scenario, %).a
Lab'n Mexico,
A,ia America Brazil, N. Africa,
00- without without Argen- Middle
e:r:pomr, India India Africa M,B,A tina EQlt
Year (11) (121) (34) (13) (14) (15) (18)
1982 -1.643 0.50 0.50 -0.793 1.0 1.443 2.0
1985 -1.015 0.70 0.50 -0.484 1.0 1.504 2.0
1988 -0.072 1.00 0.50 -0.021 1.0 1.596 2.0
1991 0.871 1.30 0.50 0.441 1.0 1.689 2.0
1994 1.500 1.50 0.50 0.750 1.0 1.750 2.0
1997 1.500 1.50 0.50 0.750 1.0 1.750 2.0
1999 1.500 1.50 0.50 0.750 1.0 1.750 2.0
flJ1985-99 0.750 1.26 0.501 0.380 1.005 1.680 2.0
a For the groups of developing countries we estimated an average rate of technical progress for
the period 1960--1974 (or 1975, ... , 1979 for some groups) and an average rate from the end of
the first period until the end of the reference period (1983); see Figure 2.6. This latter rate was
substantially lower than the first. The reason for this procedure was that we could not get re-
liable estimates of a continuous time trend for this rate, whereas a break in the development of
this rate yields significant estimates. For the forecast we assumed that a rate in between will
be reached again after a while; see Figure 2.6 for the special linearity assumptions made in this
respect. For India, some Latin American countries and North Africa and the Middle East,
there was no significant difference between the two periods.
For the other scenarios similar tables exist. We reproduce only the average values
1985-99:
Scenario
Optimistic
Pessimistic
(11)
1.79
-0.23
(121)
1.91
0.74
(34)
0.97
0.50
(13)
0.90
-0.10
(14)
1.19
1.00
(15)
1.97
1.44
(18)
2.22
2.00
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Appendix 2F. Forecast of the Investment Ratio,
Medium Scenario (%)
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2F.1. OECD countries.
Rut of
USA FRG Japan France UK Italy NL BIL Canada OECD
YearB (01) (02) (03) (04) (05) (06) (07) (08) (09) (10)
1982 16.90 19.62 31.17 21.24 17.02 18.76 17.36 17.59 21.86 21.97
1985 19.48 19.71 30.36 20.19 18.27 18.74 17.84 17.07 20.00 22.25
1988 19.08 19.92 30.72 20.63 18.19 18.92 18.21 17.86 20.67 22.45
1991 18.79 20.08 30.99 20.95 18.14 19.05 18.48 18.44 21.17 22.60
1994 18.57 20.19 31.179 21.18 18.10 19.14 18.67 18.86 21.53 22.71
1997 18.42 20.28 31.32 21.35 18.08 19.21 18.82 19.17 21.79 22.79
1999 18.34 20.32 31.39 21.43 18.06 19.25 18.89 19.33 21.93 22.83
~1985-99 18.78 20.08 30.99 20.95 18.14 19.05 18.48 18.49 21.17 22.60
BThe forecasting equation is reproduced in Annex 2. We give the figures for only some years;
the others may be interpolated.
2F.2. CMEA countries: the investment ratios are kept constant in the forecasts; see
Table 2.2 in the text.
2F.3. Developing countries.B
Latin Merica,
A!ia America Brazil, N. Africa,
00- without without Argen- Middle
exporter! India India Africa M,B,A lina Ea5t
Year (11) (121) (34) (13) (14) (15) (18)
1982 33.00 25.00 20.00 22.00 16.00 20.00 25.00
1985 27.00 22.00 29.50 18.00 12.00 17.00 18.00
1988 23.06 24.35 21.65 20.93 15.05 19.29 20.53
1991 24.72 25.24 22.69 22.54 16.59 21.37 22.52
1994 24.93 25.40 22.88 22.81 16.84 21.78 22.84
1997 24.98 25.46 22.96 22.93 16.94 21.93 22.95
1999 25.00 25.49 22.99 22.98 16.98 21.98 22.99
~1985-99 24.77 24.78 22.20 212.84 15.89 20.61 21.75
BThe investment ratio of the developing countries declined substantially since the middle of the
1970s. We assumed that this decline will continue for a while (until the debt problem has
been settled), but that afterwards a certain fraction of the old investment ratio will again be
reached asymptotically. For details, see Chapter 5; for an illustration, see Figure f.9 in
Chapter 2.
NOTE: For the optimistic and the pessimistic scenarios, similar tables exist. The aver-
age values are shown in Table 2.9 in the text.
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CHAPTER 3
Economic Growth and Structural
Change of DECD Countries
Hermann Ross
Summary
In this chapter we present the estimates of production functions for OECD coun-
tries and define the different scenarios for the driving forces of economic growth.
They form the basis for the solution of the world model and determine our fore-
casts. In addition we estimate other functions (to explain the velocity of money,
the rate of interest and structure of production) and present forecasts for these
variables.
3.1. Introduction: The Group of Industrialized
Market Economies
The industrialized market economies considered in the model include 20 coun-
tries (with Belgium and Luxembourg treated as one country; see Annex 1 at the
end of this volume). With the exception of South Africa all of them are members
of the OECD. The countries were selected with respect to their share in world
trade at the end of the 1970s. The 20 countries covered 60.6% of world exports
and 72.3% of world imports (without intra-CMEA trade) reported for 1980 in
the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) of the International Monetary Fund.
Nine countries which covered 56.5% of all exports and 59.8% of all imports in
1980 are treated separately. The other 11 countries are aggregated and treated
as one economic unit [1].
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3.2. The Production Function and Technical Progress
As was explained in Chapter 2 we use a linear homogenous Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function which we write as
Y = (1"' L)U . K/3 . R1 . a, 0: + f3 + "I = 1 (3.1)
where Y = production, 1" = index of technical knowledge, L = labor input, K =
stock of fixed capital and R = imported raw materials. 1" is used here in the
notation of Harrod-neutral technical progress. This ensures that in equilibrium
growth (with the rate of growth of K and R being equal to the rate of growth of
Y) the rate of technical progress is equal to the rate of growth of labor produc-
tivity. If 0: = 2/3, the rate of technical progress, i, in Harrod-neutral notation is
50% higher than the rate of technical progress in Hicks-neutral notation
(i = ~ -+ wr = wJo:, where W:z: is the growth rate x/x of a variable x).
We measure imported raw materials as the imports of goods in the SITC-
Sections 2, 3 and 4 (i.e., inedible crude materials, except fuels; mineral fuels,
lubricants and related materials; animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes).
As was pointed out in Chapter 2 our conception of production is not gross
domestic product, but total production minus domestic secondary inputs. In
accordance with statistical practice we use a Paasche price index for total pro-
duction.
Labor input is the product of the number of people actually employed and
the number of average working hours per year ("actually worked" if such figures
are available, "paid for" otherwise). Capital stock series have been calculated as
the accumulated net fixed investment at constant prices starting with some
estimated initial value for 1950.
Technical progress is not directly observable. It must be identified from
other measurable variables. First we used a method suggested by Solow. We
shall present these results. For the Bonn-IIASA model we use another, related
approach.
Solow (1957) estimated technical progress as a discrete approximation to a
Divisia index. The derivative of the logarithm of the production function with
respect to time yields
(3.2)
If marginal productivity theory holds, the income shares (or cost shares) of the
factors should be equal to the elasticities of production with respect to the
corresponding factors of production.
We calculated the income shares for all countries and found that they are
in most cases nearly constant. As an example, see Figures 9B.l(a)-(h) in Appen-
dix 3B (where MRA W = R in the production function). They exhibit small
cyclic fluctuations which may be explained by the business cycle and an increase
of the cost share for raw materials in 1973/74 and 1979/80. Mean values for
1962-1983 are listed in Table 9A.l of Appendix 3A.
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We used income shares corrected for changes in the number of self-
employed persons (see also Eismont and Ross (1985)]. Our labor data include
employed and self-employed persons whereas the statistical figures on wages do
not include labor income of self-employed persons. This income is included in
profits and entrepreneurial income. To correct this we assumed the average
labor income per working hour to be the same for wage earners and self-
employed persons. The series for labor cost Leen and capital stock Keen
which we used are therefore defined by
Leen = Wen / WES
Keen = Qn _ wen. 1 - WES + Ken
WES
(3.3)
(3.4)
where Wen = nominal wage, WES = wage earners' share, Qn = nominal profit
and entrepreneurial income and Ken = nominal depreciation.
Technical progress (or the increase of total factor productivity, as it is also
called), if calculated by Solow's method, shows a similar trend for all countries in
the 1970s and early 1980s, especially if one looks at five-year moving averages of
the growth rates instead of yearly rates. In Figures 9B.2( a)-(h) of Appendix 3B
yearly rates of (Harrod-neutral) technical progress and five-year moving averages
are shown [2]. It is interesting to observe that the moving average of wr reaches
a local minimum around the year 1958. After that a period of high growth of
technical progress starts. There is a first interruption around the years 1965/67
in most countries followed by a new peak around 1970. In the United States this
peak is missing. The rate of technical progress in the USA was already in decline
since the late 1960s. All other countries followed this trend during the 1970s.
We fitted a linear trend through the values of technical progress obtained
in this way (but with imported raw materials included) for the years 1962-1983.
The results are given in Table 9A.1 of Appendix 3A. The trend is always nega-
tive, but there are differences between countries. The USA and the UK showed
a rather low level of technical progress (3.3 and 2.6% in 1960) but only a slight
decline on the average (-0.15 and -0.05% per year, respectively). Japan, Italy
and the Netherlands realized the highest level of growth rate in 1960 (11.2%,
9.2% and 7.7%, respectively) but also the highest decline on the average (-0.49,
-0.42 and -0.35% per year). The Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Belgium/Luxembourg, Canada and the group of other industrialized market
economies showed a medium growth of technical progress in the beginning
(about 6% in 1960) and a medium decline (about -0.2% per year).
Table 9.1 shows the average yearly growth rates of production, labor pro-
ductivity and technical progress between 1962 and 1977. The extent to which
the increase in labor productivity is explained by technical progress for the
period is smaller than the 88% value obtained by Solow (1957, p. 316) for the
United States for 1909-1949, but similar to his result for 1909-1929. Our results
for the USA are very close to those to be expected for equilibrium growth.
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For the Bonn-IIASA world model we estimated technical progress and the
elasticities of production in a slightly different way. In this project we are only
interested in the trend. Therefore we estimated the system:
(3.5a)
(3.5b)
(3.5c)
simultaneously under the restriction 0: + f3 + 'Y = 1. The reference period is
1963-1983. This specification of the index of technical knowledge yields a linear
time trend of the rate of technical progress: wr = wr + o· t, which conforms to
the observations for 1962-1983 (see Figure 9B.2 in Appendix 3B). The results of
the estimate are listed in Table 9A.9 of Appendix 3A and (for comparison) also
in Table 9.2. The differences from the first approach are small, cf. Table 9.1.
For the elasticity of production with respect to raw materials we get values
which are larger than the average factor shares. This is due to a slight increase
of this share in the reference period and the greater weight given to the last
observations when series with a trend are estimated with an additive error term.
3.3. The Development of the Driving Forces
of Economic Growth
The driving forces for the development of an economy are the rate of growth of
labor input wL , the investment ratio s, the rate of depreciation d and the rate of
technical progress wr For reasons which were explained in Chapter 1, we
assume the following development of these driving forces.
3.3.1. The investment rate
The ratio of real gross fixed investment to real gross domestic product declined
in most countries since the late 1960s. It differed from country to country. As a
rule, this ratio lay between 15% and 25%, with the exception of Japan where the
ratio is exceptionally high [up to 36% in 1973, see Table 9A.4 in Appendix 3A
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and Figures 9B.9(a)-(h) in Appendix 3B]. In almost all countries we observe a
similar pattern: the trend of the rate of investment increases during the 1950s
and the 1960s and decreases in the late 1960s or the early 1970s. The upward
trend was broken before the oil price increase of 1973/74 in several countries
(e.g., UK, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium/Luxembourg).
For the medium scenario the rate of gross fixed investment was assumed to
approach the mean value of the decade 1975-84, S:
St = >. • St-l + (1->') . S (3.6)
The adjustment speed parameter >. was set to 0.9. This implies that an initial
difference (St - s) in 1984 will be reduced to roughly 50% of that value in 1990
and 20% in 2000.
For the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios we fixed the final values s at
25% above and below the value for the medium scenario. The values are listed
in Table 9.2.
This method may be slightly favorable for Japan and somewhat pessimistic
for the USA and the UK. The results are given in Table 9A.4 of Appendix 3A
for some selected years and graphically demonstrated in Figure 9B.9 of Appendix
3B.
3.3.2. The rate of depreciation
The rate of depreciation d ~as rather constant for most countries [see Table
9A.S of Appendix 3A and Figures 9B(a)-(h) of Appendix 3B]. There are some
exceptions to the rule: in the Japanese economy d increased from 6.7% in 1950
to approximately 10% in 1964-1969 and decreased afterwards. The US rate of
depreciation increased from about 5% until the early 1970s to above 6% in
1983/84. For Canada we observe a decline from about 6% in the early 1960s to
about 5% in 1984. A higher rate of depreciation slows down the accumulation of
capital, but it increases technical progress by sorting out older and less efficient
capital goods. This is not made explicit in our model.
For all scenarios we assumed the depreciation rate of each country to
approach its mean value of 1975-1984, (1, asymptotically:
dt = >. . dt - 1 + (1->') . (1, >. = 0.9 (3.7)
Asymptotic results are shown in Table 9.9; figures for the rate of deprecia-
tion are given in Table 9A.S of Appendix A and graphically represented in Fig-
ures 9B.9(a)-(h) in Appendix 3B.
Since the USA and the UK have a relatively low rate of investment but a
relatively high rate of depreciation, their capital stock will grow relatively slowly.
The accumulation equation
Hennann R066
K t = K t- 1 . (I-d) + s . Yt- 1
89
(3.8)
implies a growth rate of the capital stock of WKt = s . Yt-d Kt- 1 - d. A growth
rate of capital stock of 3% (4%) in the UK in the next few years would require a
20.8% (23.5%) rate of investment with a depreciation rate unchanged at 4.7%, or
a depreciation rate of 3.7% (2.7%) with the investment rate unchanged at 18%.
3.3.3. Labor input
Only in four countries was total labor input (in billion working hours) higher in
1984 than in 1960 (see Table 9.4).
Table 9.4( a). Growth rate of labor input, 1960-1964, for selected industrialized market
economies.
Labor input
USA
Japan
Canada
Other industrialized
market economies
a 1982 value.
1960
132.0
108.0
12.5
87.5
1984
192.7
124.1
22.0
A verage growth rate (%)
1.6
0.6
2.4
0.3
Table 9.4(b). Yearly change in labor input, 1960-1984, for selected industrialized mar-
ket economies.
Labor input 1960 1984 Yearly change (%)
FRG 55.6 42.8 -1.1
France 45.2 42.6 --{l.25
UK 56.0 50.8 --{l.4
Italy 41.2 32.1 -1.0
Netherlands 10.6 10.5 --{l.0
Belgium/Luxembourg 7.8 6.6 --(l.7
All other countries experienced a decrease of labor input on the average
[see Table 9.4(b)]. But also in these countries labor input showed a transitory
increase in the middle of the 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s.
Labor input (LAB) can be factorized into
LAB = POP· LP'POp· ER . HWW . 52/1000 (3.9)
where POP is the population, LP' POP is the share of labor force in the popula-
tion (potential labor participation rate), ER is the employment rate, and HW W
is the average number of working hours per week. LABF = POP· LP'POP is
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the labor force and LABF· ER is the number of employed persons [see Table
9A.6 in Appendix 3A and Figures 9B.4(a-h) in Appendix 3B].
These factors contributed to the rate of change of labor input in the follow-
ing way:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The population increased in all countries in the period 1960-1984.
The potential labor participation rate increased in all countries, on average,
with the exception of the FRG and Italy.
The employment ratio decreased sharply after the beginning of the 1970s,
with the exception of Japan.
The average number of working hours per week decreased continuously in
all countries.
Table 9.5 shows the determinants of the average growth rates of labor
input (in percentages) for all countries in the period 1961-1984. We estimated
growth rates for the four determinants of labor input for the years 1985-2000, or
we took them from other sources. Growth rates of population were taken from
UN forecasts (DRPA statistics).
The potential labor participation rate LP'POP was assumed in the long
run to approach the high level of about 49%, similar to that of Japan and
Canada. We restricted the labor participation growth rate to no more than 1% a
year. The results are given in Table 9.6.
We assumed that the employment rate ER will increase slowly until the
year 2000. Table 9.7 shows the "required" growth rate of ER which would yield
an employment rate of 100% in the year 2000. We did not take this growth rate
of ER but some lower value, called the "assumed" growth rate. By this method
we restricted the employment growth rate to less than or equal to 0.5%.
We assumed that the general trend of declining working hours per week will
continue. In detail, we assumed that the average rates of decline during the
years 1961-1984 will stay unchanged in the future.
These assumptions on future labor input are summarized in Table 9.8. A
comparison of the second and the fourth row shows that the increase of the labor
participation rate is to a large extent cancelled by the decrease in hours worked
per week. But considering the increasing population and the reduction of unem-
ployment, we arrive at rather high growth rates of labor input. These assump-
tions on future trends of labor supply are represented in Figures 9B.4(a-h) in
Appendix 3B.
3.3.4. The rate of technical progress
For reasons explained in Chapter 1, we assume that the declining trend of tech-
nical progress will be reversed in the future. For the optimistic scenario, this is
modeled as a return to approximately the average level of 1961-1984; for the
medium scenario, as a return to approximately the average level of 1971-1984;
and for the pessimistic scenario, as a return to approximately the average of
1976-1984. If outside information was available or our own judgment pointed in
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another direction, we adapted these figures a little. This may be seen from
Appendix 2E in Chapter 2. We do not reproduce these figures here.
3.4. Solution of Isolated Country Models:
Future Growth Rates
The forecasts for OECD countries which follow from the solution of the total
world model were reviewed in Chapter 2. They are reproduced in Annex 3. We
also solved the country models separately by making some simplifying assump-
tions on total imports and imports of raw materials for each country [3]. The
average growth rates of GDP for the years 1983-1999 which result from these
solutions of isolated country models are reproduced in Table 9.9.
Table 9.9(a). Average growth rates derived from individual country models and from
the solution of the interdependent world model. Average growth rates of GDP,
1983-1999, were estimated by individual country models.a
Scenario USA FRG Jap Fra UK Ita NL BIL Can Other
Optimistic 3.1 4.4 6.9 4.8 2.4 5.1 4.2 4.6 3.5 5.5
Medium 2.7 3.9 5.0 4.1 2.0 3.7 3.0 3.8 3.0 4.5
Pessimistic 2.1 2.7 2.6 3.1 1.5 1.7 1.5 2.6 1.5 2.8
aEstimated by 100 . [(%99/%82)1/17- 11.
Table 9.9(b). Average growth rates of GDP, 1985-1999, estimated by the interdepen-
dent world model.a
Scenario USA FRG Jap Fra UK Ita NL BIL Can Other
Optimistic 2.8 3.9 5.5 3.7 1.6 4.4 3.5 3.8 3.5 4.0
Medium 2.2 2.8 4.1 2.8 1.1 2.9 2.1 2.8 2.5 2.9
Pessimistic 1.6 1.9 2.9 1.9 0.5 1.8 0.9 1.9 1.7 1.7
aEstimated as the arithmetic mean of the growth rates 1985-1999.
Of course, these growth rates differ from those of the solution of the inter-
dependent world model, cr. Table 2 in Annex 3. Averages are given in Table
9.9(b). It is surprising that the growth rates of all OECD countries are reduced
by considering the international interdependence of all countries (including the
developing ones). This seems to be due to the special way in which we isolated
the countries from each other; see Ross (1986). We put an upper limit on the
import ratio which does not depend on price ratios. But there might also be
other reasons for the upward bias of isolated country models of the type used in
the Bonn-IIASA research project.
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3.5. The Rate of Inflation
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The price level p of GDP is explained by a generalization of the classical quan-
tity theory:
M2
p = v· GDP (3.10)
where v = velocity of money M2 = money supply (in our analysis we use the
money concept usually referred to as M2, but include saving deposits, as is done
by the IMF in the IFS). If v is constant, the rate of inflation is equal to the
difference between the growth rate of money supply and the growth rate of GDP.
The velocity of money in the industrialized market economies was not con-
stant in the years 1960-1984, with the exception of Belgium/Luxembourg and
the group of other industrialized market economies; see Table 9A.7 of Appendix
3A and Figures 9B.5(a)-(h) of Appendix 3B. In the UK [Figure 9B.5(e)] the
velocity of money started to decrease in 1970 but turned back to an even higher
level in the high-inflation period of 1974-1981. For the USA there is an increas-
ing trend of v. In all other countries we observe a decrease of the velocity of
money which was stopped or even reversed in the early 1980s.
The velocity of money reflects short-term effects as well as the long-term
changes in the marginal propensity to hold money. This propensity depends on
business customs, techniques of payments, the level and distribution of wealth,
the rate of interest, the capital coefficient, the foreign debt ratio and other vari-
able. We specified the equation for the velocity of money as:
where i means the logarithm of x, k = capital coefficient K / Y, 11' = labor pro-
ductivity Y / L and An = accumulated foreign trade surplus. The estimated
results are reproduced elsewhere [4]. Some comments must suffice here.
In general the approach worked quite well. The coefficients a2 is always
negative, if it is significantly different from zero, and the same is true for a.. As
the capital coefficient was increasing in all countries during this period, the
coefficient a2 partly explains the declining velocity of money. If the capital
coefficient can be interpreted as a measure of relative wealth, then a higher
wealth in a country will imply a higher propensity to hold money. The negative
coefficient a4 indicates that trade surpluses (accumulated) slow inflation and
trade deficits speed up inflation. The dynamic behavior of the equation is satis-
factory. If we assume constancy of the capital coefficients, balanced trade and
3% growth of labor productivity, we get the asymptotic values for the velocity of
money shown in Table 9.10.
Hermann ROil
Table 9.10. Asymptotic velocity of money.
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USA
2.14
FRG
1.93
Jap
1.29
Fra
2.14
UK
2.72
Ita
1.30
NL
1.95
ElL
2.02
Can
2.23
Other
1.50
This holds a reasonable relationship with the observed values (see Table
9A.7 in Appendix 3A).
The forecasts of the growth rates of money supply (M2) are related to the
historical averages (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2).
The resulting "rates of inflation" are reproduced in Table 92 of Annex 3 for
the past as well as for the future. Table 9.11 shows forecasts of the rate of
inflation for the years 1990 and 1999 for the OECD countries for the different
scenarios.
Table 9.11. Forecasts of the rate of inflation.
Scenario USA FRG Jap Fra UK Ita NL ElL Can Other
Optimistic
1990 5.3 2.2 4.6 6.4 10.5 11.5 7.3 3.8 8.3 7.7
1999 5.8 1.0 3.7 6.7 9.8 10.5 6.1 3.4 8.0 8.3
Medium
1990 6.3 3.4 6.0 8.0 11.0 13.0 8.5 4.6 9.3 9.1
1999 7.7 2.5 4.9 7.9 10.4 12.6 7.7 4.4 9.2 9.7
Pessimistic
1990 7.3 4.5 7.3 9.4 11.6 14.2 9.5 5.4 10.2 10.5
1999 10.4 4.1 6.2 9.3 11.1 14.1 9.3 5.6 10.3 11.2
These results indicate that inflation is not a matter of the past if the rate of
growth of money supply stays within the order of magnitude of the past (see
Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). Money has to grow at a lower rate if inflation is to stay
at the low levels which are nowadays current.
3.6. The Nominal Rate of Interest
Interest rates influence the exchange rates and capital flows between countries.
This in turn influences foreign trade and the foreign debt situation and therefore
the domestic price level. Unfortunately, this part of the research program could
not be connected with the world model for reasons explained in Chapter 2. We
had to use a simpler approach for exchange rate determination. Nevertheless,
rates of interest are explained by our model.
We do not differ between different asset markets and their special rates of
interest. Only one average rate of interest, z, is considered. It is measured as an
average of the short-term money market rate, the government bond yield and the
discount rate.
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It is well known that the nominal interest rates of all countries are highly
correlated. The interest rate of the USA plays a leading role. Therefore we
estimated, for all other countries, the equation
(3.12)
The term st!St_4 is an indicator of the change of investment activity which
will influence interest rates. At!GDPf is the ratio of cumulated trade surplus to
nominal gross domestic product which should decrease domestic interest rates
(deficits should increase Zt). Indeed the coefficient as turns out to be always
negative and such that the rate of interest Zt increases about 0.2 to 0.5 percent-
age points if the ratio of foreign debts to GDP increases by one percentage point.
The coefficient a2 connected with the rate of inflation wp is rather low whereas
the coefficient a3 for the US interest rate zUSA is always very high.
The figures for RC2 and for D W indicate that this approach takes into
account the most important determinants [5]. One of them is the interest rate of
the USA. For the USA we used the same approach, but set a3 to zero. The
estimated results are quite good. The dynamic behavior of the equation is
acceptable, too. If, in the long run, the inflation rate is constant at wp , the
investment rate s is also constant and the foreign debts are zero, then the US
rate stabilizes at
zUSA =~. iJjP +~ = 0.73. iJjP + 4.48
I-a! I-a!
(3.13)
With an inflation rate of 5% the nominal rate of interest would stabilize at
8.13% and the real rate of interest at 8.13% - 5% = 3.13%, which is considerably
smaller than the rate of profit which follows from the marginal productivity
theory (for K/ Y = 3 and (J = 0.25, it follows that Z = 0.25/3 = 8.3%).
Under the same assumptions the nominal rates of interest for the other
countries would stabilize at the values shown in Table 9.12.
Interest rate forecasts are given in Table 9A.8 of Appendix 3A. The
optimistic scenario yields lower interest rates eventually than the medium
scenario, which in turn produces lower rates than the pessimistic scenario with
the notable exception of France, where the opposite is true. This needs further
research.
Table 9.12. ABymptotic nominal rates of interest.
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FRG
7.1
Jap
8.5
Fra UK
9.8
Ita NL
7.7
BIL
8.5
Can
9.6
Other
6.8
aAdditional assumptions: St = 20.0 for France; no change in the exchange rate for Italy.
3.1. The Structure of Production
There are a number of structural variables which are determined by the model:
the capital coefficient, the import and export share in GDP, the share of con-
sumption in GDP, labor productivity, the capital/labor ratio, and others. These
variables are related to the structure of production and may be used as explana-
tory variables to forecast structural change. By "sectoral structure of produc-
tion" we mean the share in GDP of real value added to different sectors of the
economy. Tables 9A.9(a) and (b) in Appendix 3A show the size and the stability
of the shares of real value added and nominal value added.
We specified a log-linear function to explain the shares of real value added:
(3.14)
where (3 = real value added share of the sector, 1l' = labor productivity, K / L =
capital/labor ratio, X / Y = export share, M / Y = import share, and s = gross
investment ratio. The estimated results are reported elsewhere [6]. They are
quite satisfactory for the great majority of cases, but certainly need some more
work in some cases. The results are reproduced in Table 96 of Annex 3 and com-
mented upon in Chapter 2.
3.8. Conclusion
We think that the models developed for OECD countries are able to simulate the
actual behavior of the most important aggregates of these economies in a satis-
factory way, if the driving forces are estimated correctly. This, of course, is the
crux.
Notes
[1] The method of aggregation is reported in Ross (1986). The data bank used is
described in detail in Ross (1985). National accounts data have been taken from
OECD publications, employment figures from ILO and OECD publications and
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[21[3
[4j[5
[6]
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monetary items from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.
For details, see Eismont and Ross (1985).
For details, see Ross (1986). Basically, we related real imports to real GDP.
Thus the international price competition has been neglected.
See Ross (1986), Appendix A, Table 9.
Details may be seen in Ross (1986, Appendix A, Table 10).
See Ross (1986, Appendix A, Table 12).
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Appendix 3A. Model Parameters (tabulated)
Country codes:
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01 = USA
02 = Federal Republic of Germany
03 = Japan
04 = France
05 = UK
06 = Italy
07 = Netherlands
08 = Belgium and Luxembourg
09 = Canada
10 = Other industrialized market economies
Table SA.l. Average cost structure and trend of the Divisia Index of (Harrod-neutral)
technical progress (%).
1a 2b 3c 4d 5"
Country 0:3 (33 13 W'T "60" 63
01 0.731 0.252 0.017 3.3 -0.15
02 0.687 0.262 0.051 5.9 -0.18
03 0.725 0.213 0.062 11.2 -0.49
04 0.705 0.246 0.049 5.7 -0.15
05 0.698 0.247 0.054 2.6 -0.05
06 0.774 0.158 0.068 9.2 -0.42
07 0.647 0.253 0.100 7.7 -0.35
08 0.657 0.234 0.109 6.2 -0.18
09 0.688 0.284 0.028 5.1 -0.28
10 0.699 0.248 0.053 6.8 -0.29
aLabor share using K,L,R 1962-1983 average. bCapital share using K,L,R 1962-1983 average.
cRaw imports share using K,L,R 1962-1983 average. dIntercept: growth rate of technical prog-
ress in 1960. 'Slope: yearly change of growth rate of technical progress.
Table SA.f. Parameters of the production function (%).
Country
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
0.706
0.644
0.717
0.717
0.684
0.791
0.553
0.634
0.648
0.647
0.259
0.240
0.143
0.209
0.255
0.109
0.317
0.187
0.320
0.251
0.035
0.115
0.140
0.073
0.061
0.100
0.131
0.179
0.032
0.102
4d
W'r tt60"
2.5
5.9
10.3
6.3
3.0
9.8
9.7
6.8
6.8
7.6
-0.11
-0.15
-0.40
-0.17
-0.10
-0.43
-0.47
-0.17
-0.35
-0.32
aElasticity of production with respect to labor. bElasticity of production with respect to capi-
tal. cElasticity of production with respect to imported goods. dRate of technical progress in
1960. 'Yearly change of the rate of technical progress.
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Table SA.S. Parameters of production functions (values in parentheses are t-values).
Country a {3 "f "',.. 0
01 0.706 0.259 0.035 2.465 -0.106
(33.88) (13.20) (3.58) (7.15) (4.40)
02 0.644 0.240 0.115 5.866 -0.154
(26.92) (8.93) (7.38) (17.81) (6.41)
03 0.717 0.143 0.140 10.284 -0.404
(18.47) (5.01) (4.90) (12.41) (7.30)
04 0.717 0.209 0.073 6.327 -0.174
(66.35) (18.61) (5.68) (27.95) (10.05)
05 0.684 0.255 0.061 3.001 -0.103
(27.88) (9.59) (4.65) (8.02) (3.55)
06 0.791 0.109 0.100 9.807 -0.427
(27.14) (4.62) (7.83) (16.57) (10.03)
07 0.553 0.317 0.131 9.701 -0.474
(16.74) (10.60) (7.36) (19.17) (12.08)
08 0.634 0.187 0.179 6.794 -0.173
(20.33) (7.45) (6.11) (10.93) (3.70)
09 0.648 0.320 0.032 5.834 -0.347
(20.58) (11.70) (2.57) (17.61) (12.97)
10 0.647 0.251 0.102 7.614 -0.316
(39.11) (16.62) (8.80) (19.48) (11.24)
Table SA.S. Continued.
Country Constant DW R2C SEE Est.
01 1.370 1.17 0.99 18.054 63-83
(21.57) FIML
02 1.702 0.80 1.00 10.106 63-83
(18.80) FIML
03 -0.217 0.65 1.00 2.747 63-83
(1.79) FIML
04 2.019 1.32 1.00 12.415 63-83
(50.85) FIML
05 0.248 1.37 0.97 1.590 63-83
(5.81) FIML
06 0.548 0.90 0.98 2.400 63-83
(11.50) FIML
07 1.213 0.71 0.99 3.122 63-82
(12.04) FIML
08 3.413 0.78 0.98 53.761 63-83
(22.81 ) FIML
09 1.015 1.29 1.00 1.855 63-83
(14.40) FIML
10 0.620 1.39 0.99 5.055 65-82
(12.72) FIML
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Table SA ..{ Ratio of gross fixed investment to GDP (%).
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Forecast
Country
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
1960
18.528
24.422
22.411
19.222
16.793
25.192
21.760
21.428
22.727
22.117
1968
19.700
22.603
30.656
23.500
20.989
24.235
26.865
23.041
22.282
24.558
1976
17.229
20.260
31.717
23.025
19.020
19.765
19.320
22.150
23.573
24.085
198-4
19.642
19.620
30.206
20.014
18.295
18.663
17.693
16.740
19.717
21.968
199!!
18.707
20.121
31.057
21.031
18.127
19.083
18.551
18.597
21.302
22.640
1999
18.338
20.319
31.392
21.432
18.061
19.248
18.890
19.329
21.927
22.828
Note: 1960-1984 observed, 1992-1999 assumptions for the medium scenario.
Table SA.5. Rate of depreciation (%).
Forecast
Country
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
1960
5.023
3.899
8.807
4.444
4.537
3.757
2.581
3.420
5.968
2.232
1968
5.039
4.041
10.083
4.367
4.561
3.656
2.661
3.336
5.775
2.659
1976
5.291
3.956
6.195
4.724
4.446
3.442
2.684
2.909
5.254
2.547
198-4
6.331
3.912
5.814
4.531
4.933
3.358
2.669
2.719
4.994
2.466
199!!
5.915
3.905
5.863
4.513
4.800
3.382
2.687
2.765
4.998
2.749
1999
5.751
3.902
5.882
4.506
4.748
3.391
2.694
2.783
4.999
2.828
Note: 1960-1984 observed, 1992-1999 assumptions for the medium scenario.
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Table 9A.9(a). GDP: Structural composition of real value added in 196D-1982.a,b
Country AGR MIN MAN EGW CON IND SRV
01 3.5 2.7 24.8 2.4 5.6 35.5 61.0
USA 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.9 1.6 1.8
14.3% 7.4% 4.0% 4.2% 16.1% 4.5% 3.0%
02 3.2 1.8 37.1 2.3 7.5 48.7 48.1
FRG 0.5 0.7 1.8 0.4 1.0 2.6 2.9
15.6% 38.9% 4.9% 17.4% 13.3% 5.3% 6.0%
03 7.3 0.8 28.7 2.0 8.9 40.4 52.4
Japan 3.0 0.2 4.0 0.1 0.7 4.3 1.5
4.1% 25.0% 13.9% 5.0% 7.9% 10.6% 2.9%
04 6.6 1.4 29.0 1.7 7.9 40.0 53.4
France 1.5 0.5 1.3 0.3 1.0 4.3 1.8
22.7% 35.7% 4.5% 17.6% 12.7% 3.8% 3.4%
05 2.7 2.8 27.4 2.7 7.7 40.5 56.8
UK 0.1 1.0 1.9 0.4 1.0 1.7 1.6
3.7% 35.7% 6.9% 14.8% 13.0% 4.2% 2.8%
06 8.9 2.4 28.2 4.8 9.5 44.9 46.2
Italy 1.3 0.2 2.3 0.4 1.7 1.2 0.7
14.6% 8.3% 8.2% 8.3% 17.9% 2.7% 1.5%
07 5.2 0.1 28.2 2.1 7.8 38.2 56.6
Neth 0.4 0.0 1.7 0.5 1.4 1.7 1.5
7.7% 0.0% 6.0% 32.8% 17.9% 4.5% 2.7%
08 3.9 1.3 26.5 2.5 7.6 37.9 58.3
B/L 1.0 0.7 1.8 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.0
25.6% 53.8% 6.8% 28.0% 10.5% 4.0% 1.7%
09 5.9 4.1 21.8 2.4 8.0 36.3 57.8
Canada 1.0 0.4 1.2 0.5 0.5 1.4 2.0
16.9% 9.8% 5.5% 20.8% 6.3% 3.9% 3.5%
10 8.1 2.7 26.2 2.3 9.3 40.6 51.3
Other 1.3 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.9 1.2 1.5
indo 16.0% 3.7% 3.1% 13.0% 9.7% 3.0% 2.9%
a Explanation: In 1960-1982, 3.5% = the average share, 0.5 = the standard deviation of the
share, and 14.3% = the variation coefficient.
b AGR = agriculture, MIN = mining and quarrying, MAN = manufacturing, EGW =electrici-
ty, gas, water, CON =construction, IND =total industry = MIN+MAN+EGW+CON, SRV
=services.
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Table 9A.9(b). GDP: Structural composition of nominal value added in 1960-1982.a ,b
Country AGR MIN MAN EGW CON IND SRV
01 3.1 2.4 26.0 2.5 4.8 35.6 61.3
USA 0.4 0.6 2.3 0.2 0.2 1.9 2.1
12.9% 25.0% 8.0% 8.0% 4.2% 5.3% 3.4%
02 3.7 1.5 39.6 2.5 7.8 51.4 44.9
FRG 1.1 0.5 1.8 0.2 0.8 2.7 3.7
29.7% 33.3% 4.5% 8.0% 10.3% 5.3% 8.2%
03 7.1 0.9 33.0 2.5 8.0 44.4 48.5
Japan 2.7 0.4 2.3 0.4 1.0 1.8 4.1
38.0% 44.4% 7.0% 16.0% 12.5% 4.1% 8.5%
04 7.1 1.1 30.4 1.9 7.5 41.0 52.0
France 2.1 0.4 2.1 0.1 0.8 2.7 4.5
29.6% 36.4% 6.9% • 5.3% 10.7% 6.6% 8.7%
05 2.8 2.7 29.7 3.0 6.5 41.9 55.3
UK 0.5 1.5 3.5 0.2 0.6 2.9 3.3
17.9% 55.6% 18.5% 6.7% 9.2% 6.9% 6.0%
06 9.0 2.4 27.7 5.4 8.0 43.5 47.5
Italy 2.2 0.2 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.9 1.9
24.4% 8.3% 5.1% 11.1% 3.8% 2.1% 4.0%
07 6.1 0.8 30.9 2.4 7.6 41.6 52.3
Neth 1.5 0.6 2.9 0.1 0.6 3.4 4.8
24.6% 75.0% 9.4% 4.2% 7.9% 8.2% 9.2%
08 4.2 1.2 30.6 2.7 7.2 41.7 54.1
B/L 1.5 0.7 2.7 0.4 0.6 2.6 3.8
35.7% 58.3% 8.8% 14.8% 8.8% 6.2% 7.0%
09 5.0 4.4 23.5 2.9 6.4 37.2 57.8
Canada 0.9 0.8 2.4 0.4 0.6 1.5 2.3
18.0% 18.2% 10.2% 13.8% 9.4% 4.0% 4.0%
10 8.9 2.6 26.8 2.6 8.9 41.0 50.0
Other 2.3 0.8 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.9 2.9
indo 22.8% 30.8% 4.1% 3.8% 6.7% 2.2% 5.8%
a Explanation: In 1960--1982, 3.1% = the average share, 0.4 = the standard deviation of the
share, and 12.9% = the variation coefficient.
b AGR = agriculture, MIN = mining and quarrying, MAN = manufacturing, EGW = electrici-
ty, gas, water, CON = construction, IND = total industry = MIN+MAN+EGW+CON, SRV
= services.
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CHAPTER 4
Economic Growth and Structural
Change of CMEA Countries
Rumen Dobrinsky
Summary
This chapter deals with two main topics: first, an historical perspective on
economic growth and structural change in the European CMEA countries in the
period 1960 to 1985 is given; second, different scenarios for the future are
presented and analyzed. The driving forces of economic growth are analyzed in
greater detail. Three scenarios of the driving forces are designed on the basis of
the observed past trends and the actual long-term policies of the countries.
Some ex ante simulation results are also reported and discussed.
4.1. Introduction
One part of the Bonn-IIASA Research Project is devoted to the analysis and
forecast of economic growth and structural change in the seven European CMEA
countries: Bulgaria, CSSR, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR.
(Throughout this chapter, the countries are ordered alphabetically.) Some of the
main results of this study are reported in this chapter, concentrating on the fac-
tual aspects of the analysis and forecast.
The specific methodological aspects of the approach applied with respect to
the CMEA countries are described in more detail in Chapter 6. It should be
mentioned that the CMEA country models were constructed in accordance with
the System of Material Product Balance accounting system (MPS), and there are
some differences in the macroeconomic indicators used for the analysis and fore-
cast of CMEA countries as compared to the market economies. The actual data
base for the CMEA countries which was used in the project was compiled on the
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basis of contributions from many collaborating groups. This data base is
described in more detail in Dobrinsky (1986a).
Several comments should be made in order to clarify our attitide with
respect to the results reported in this chapter and, especially, with respect to the
forecasts. Although this chapter concentrates on the numerical results of our
studies, we do not think that the figures, taken at face value, should be con-
sidered as the main outcome of this research. The models produce forecasts only
in combination with the expert knowledge of the analyst working with them, and
the result is a conditional forecast of the future which depends on the vision of
the driving forces of long-term development, as introduced by the analyst. This
is how we suggest that the three forecast scenarios (which are discussed later in
the chapter) be interpreted. We shall try to illustrate the potential of the models
as analytical tools rather than pretend to a strong predictive power in the abso-
lute sense.
4.2. Economic Growth and Structural Change in the
CMEA Countries, 1960 to 1985
4.2.1. An overview of the main developments
Economic growth has always been a problem of major importance in the
economic policy of the socialist countries. Historically, most of them started
from a rather low level of economic development, and their main goal for quite a
long period was to achieve fast growth through rapid industrialization, high
investment rates and full utilization of domestic resources,. In the period under
consideration, the European CMEA countries in general successfully managed to
follow these policies and achieved rates of economic growth which were among
the highest in the world (Table -/..1). This was especially manifested in the 1960s
and in the first half of the 1970s, when several countries hit the 10% level of
annual NMP growth rates in some years.
Table .1.1. Growth rates of NMP (%).
Period
Country
Bulgaria
CSSR
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
1961-1985
6.6
4.0
4.5
4.5
4.3
7.9
5.5
1961-1970
7.7
4.4
4.4
5.5
6.1
8.4
7.3
1971-1980
7.0
4.6
4.8
5.0
5.2
9.2
4.7
1981-1985
3.7
1.8
4.4
1.6
-0.8
4.3
3.5
However, in the second half of the 1970s the rates of economic growth
started to decline. This tendency continued and was even more accentuated in
the first half of the 1980s. A more detailed analysis of the driving forces of
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Figure ".9. Sectoral structure of NMP in the CMEA countries, 1960-1982.
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(e) Poland.
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Figure ,/.9. Continued.
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economic growth will follow in the next section. Here we would only like to men-
tion some of the factors which brought about this decline in the rates of
economic growth.
First of all, the sources of extensive growth which had played an important
role in the previous subperiod were nearly exhausted: there was almost no
growth in the labor supply (a consequence of the demographic development) and,
as a result, subsequent expansion of production became more difficult. Growth
in the utilization of domestic natural resources could not be sustained, either
because of depletion or by rising extraction costs due to unfavorable natural con-
ditions. Other unfavorable factors in the most recent years were the deteriorat-
ing terms of trade and large foreign debts in some countries.
The overall effect of these developments can be traced in the long-term
behavior of such synthetic indicators as "labor productivity" and "output/
capital ratio". The trends in these indicators in the seven countries in the period
1960-1985 are given in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. In these plots labor productivity is
measured by NMP produced by one person employed in the material sphere, and
the output/capital ratio is measured by NMP produced per unit of fixed assets.
Both indicators are presented in index form, with the value of 1960 taken as 1.0.
The labor productivity index, as may be expected, follows the NMP growth
almost identically. More interesting is the development of the output/capital
ratio. In most countries, until about the middle of the 1970s, this ratio showed
an increasing trend which, on a macro level, suggests increasing efficiency of the
fixed assets. Only in the case of Bulgaria and the USSR was the trend decreas-
ing, but at a rather moderate rate. However, starting from the middle of the
1970s this trend changed and the output/capital ratio started to decline in all
countries with the exception of the GDR, where it remained more or less at a
constant level.
The development of the production structure in the CMEA countries mea-
sured in constant prices by sectors of economic activity in the period 1960-1982
is shown in Figure 4.9 [1]. In accordance with the MPS, six (macro-) sectors of
economic activity in the material sphere are treated separately: Agriculture and
Forestry, Industry, Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Transport and
Communication, and Other activities of the material sphere. The residential
sixth sector, which is usually insignificant in value terms, is not shown in the
plots (according to statistical practice in the USSR, this sector is not separated
at all). In the plots the names of the sectors appear in abbreviated form.
Although there were differences in the patterns of economic development fol-
lowed by the countries, there was one common feature in the dynamics of struc-
tural change of all countries: the increasing share of industry at the expense
mainly of a declining share of agriculture. This feature is revealed to a different
extent in the various countries, depending on the starting development level, the
natural conditions and the economic tradition, as well as on the economic poli-
cies pursued.
Thus, by the beginning of the 1960s, the GDR and the CSSR had already
reached a relatively high level of industrialization reflected in the high level of
the industrial sector's share and continued this line quite smoothly. In both
countries the share of industry in NMP during 1960-1982 increased by about
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10% [2] while the share of agriculture decreased by about half. In the USSR,
Hungary and Poland the shares of agriculture for this period also decreased by
about one half, but the starting level at the beginning of the 1960s was higher.
This change in the shares of agriculture in the three countries was accompanied
by a more considerable increase in the shares of industry. In the USSR the
shares of industry increased by about 20%, in Hungary by about 15%, and in
Poland by about 18%.
Most substantial structural change took place in Bulgaria and Romania.
Historically, these countries were industrially underdeveloped, their economies
relying strongly on agriculture. In the postwar years they followed a policy of
rapid industrialization which, in the period under consideration, brought about
major shifts in their production structure. The shares of industry in the NMP of
the two countries doubled while the shares of agriculture decreased to about one
third of the initial level.
In all countries the other three sectors did not undergo such substantial
changes and in most cases manifested a slowly increasing trend. Some excep-
tions were the trade sectors in Bulgaria, the CSSR and Hungary, which experi-
enced considerable fluctuation, and the construction sectors in Poland and
Romania, which started to decline in the second half of the 1970s.
The dynamics of the sectoral shares highlights only one side of the process
of structural change with respect to production. This picture can be completed
by the dynamics of the real NMP produced in the different sectors of the econ-
omy. Average growth rates in the production sectors of the European CMEA
countries for the period 1961-1982 are presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Average growth rates of NMP (%), by sectors of economic activity,
1961-1982.
Sector
Agriculture Wholesale Transport
and Industry and retail and
Country forestry (total) Construction trade communication
Bulgaria 1.4 10.9 9.3 12.3 11.0
CSSR 0.7 4.7 4.2 4.8 4.1
GDR 1.6 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.8
Hungary 1.4 6.4 5.0 6.7 5.5
Polanda 1.2 6.2 3.7 5.0 6.5
Romania 3.0 12.8 8.1 7.5 10.9
USSR 1.2 8.0 5.5 6.0 6.9
aThe growth rates for Poland refer to the period 1961-1985.
As can be seen from the figures, during the period under consideration the
countries that experienced the highest overall NMP growth rates underwent the
most substantial economic structural change as well, and vice versa.
Throughout this period all countries completed the process of industrialization of
their economies, and those which had gone through that stage earlier stabilized
this development. By the beginning of the 1980s all European CMEA countries
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were approaching a similar economic structure, which is in line with the CMEA
policy for equalizing the levels of economic development in the member coun-
tries.
4.2.2. The driving forces of economic growth and structural change
In this section we present a brief analysis of the main driving forces of economic
growth and structural change in the CMEA countries during the reference
period, following the general approach of the Bonn-IIASA Project. Here we con-
centrate only on the numerical results of this analysis. The underlying general
methodology is given in Chapters 1 and 2, and the specific methodological
aspects concerning the CMEA countries in Chapter 5.
We start with a general analysis of the factors of growth.
We describe the production technology by a Cobb-Douglas production
function, which in the case of the CMEA countries relates total domestic
material output y* [3] to the production factor: L (number of employed persons
in the material sphere), K (fixed assets in the material sphere) [4], IMR (imports
of raw materials and intermediate products). The level of technical progress (or,
of total factor productivity) T is taken in its explicit Hicks-neutral form (wT is the
growth rate of T).
3
y* = 0:0 T_ 1 (1 + WT) L al K a2 IM~2, ~ O:i = 1
i=1
(4.1)
This assumption about the production technology implies that the growth
rates of the variables are related as:
(4.2)
where wY'" wL' and wIMR are the growth rates of Y*, L, K and IMR , respec-
tively.
Each of our four terms on the right-hand side of (4.2) can be interpreted as
the contribution of each of the four main "factors of growth" to the growth rate
of the total domestic material output Wy... Such an analysis for the seven Euro-
pean CMEA countries for the period 1961-1985 is provided in Table ./.9. Besides
the values for the whole period, figures for three subperiods are given (1961-70,
1971-80,1981-85).
For each period the values of wY'" WT" 0:1WL, 0:2wK and 0:3wIMR are given
in the average annual percentage growth rates for the period and also the
"share" of each of the four components of Wy.. is shown (as a percentage of Wy..).
These "shares", or "weights" indicate the actual contribution of each the four
"factors of growth" to Wy.. [5].
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Several main tendencies can be traced from the figures in Table 4.9. In
most countries the growth of employment has played an almost negligible role in
the growth of total output both in absolute (0:1 wL) and in relative (percentage of
Wy.) terms. The general trend of the absolute term is declining, due to the de-
clining (sometimes zero, or negative, in the most recent years) growth rates of
employment in the material sphere.
Table .pl. Analysis of the factors of growth.
Contribution to Wy
Country
Bulgaria
CSSR
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
Bulgaria
CSSR
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
CSSR
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
Bulgaria
CSSR
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
Period
1961-85
1961-70
1981-85
7.2
4.3
4.4
5.1
4.5
7.9
5.7
9.0
5.0
4.8
6.6
6.5
9.1
7.3
4.9
4.5
5.5
5.0
8.9
5.0
4.7
1.8
3.7
1.5
-0.6
3.6
4.1
1.7
1.3
2.0
1.4
1.0
2.4
1.1
2.3
1.9
2.2
2.3
2.5
3.2
2.3
1.5
2.0
1.6
0.7
2.6
0.5
0.4
-0.4
1.8
-0.7
-1.5
0.2
0.1
%of
Wy.
24
30
45
28
22
30
20
26
38
46
35
39
35
32
30
44
29
14
29
10
L
0.3 4
0.2 5
0.0 0
0.0 0
0.4 9
0.0 0
0.4 7
0.3 3
0.3 6
0.0 0
0.1 2
0.8 12
0.0 0
0.4 5
0.1 2
0.1 2
0.0 0
0.2 4
0.1 1
0.4 8
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.3
K
3.1 43
1.9 44
1.7 39
2.0 39
1.9 42
4.2 53
3.7 65
3.3 37
1.5 30
1.5 31
1.6 24
1.5 23
3.8 42
4.1 56
2.4 50
1.8 41
2.4 44
2.6 52
4.8 54
3.8 76
2.8
1.8
1.7
1.8
1.2
4.0
3.0
2.1
0.9
0.7
1.7
1.2
1.3
0.5
3.1
1.3
1.1
2.6
1.7
2.1
0.5
0.9
0.6
1.5
1.5
1.4
0.3
1.3
0.2
0.2
0.3
-0.3
-0.6
0.7
%of
Wy.
29
21
16
33
27
17
8
34
26
23
39
26
23
7
18
13
27
30
16
6
The contribution of "fixed assets accumulation" (0:2wK) to the growth of
Y* in all countries is quite high both in absolute and in relative terms. The de-
clining tendency in the absolute value of 0:2wL is not so pronounced as the de-
clining tendency in the growth rates of output (starting from the middle of the
1970s) which even results in an increasing relative contribution of 0:2wK in Wy...
However, this development is accompanied by a decline in the absolute efficiency
of fixed assets in most of the countries, as indicated in Figure 4.f!.
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In many countries the periods of high economic growth were accompanied
by even higher growth of foreign trade. During such periods (especially in the
1960s) the "imports component" (Q3 wIM) had quite a high value in both absolute
and relative terms. However, when the slowdown of the economic growth
started, just the reverse tendency occurred. This was especially manifested in
countries with higher level of foreign indebtness.
It can be seen from Table 4.9 that the factor which contributes most
significantly to changes in rates of economic growth is the rate of technical prog-
ress, or total factor productivity wr [6]. The slowdown of economic growth at
the end of the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s in most countries is linked
to a significant decline in the value of wr . The only exception is the GDR, where
there was almost no drop in the level of W r in both absolute and relative terms
and, accordingly, no slowdown of the general rates of economic growth (some
drop in the value of wp in the first half of the 1980s can be related to decline in
wIMR '
The actual figures for wr> one of the main driving forces of economic
growth, during the period 1961-1985, are presented in graphical form in Figure
4.4. Note that the values until 1980 are the five-year moving averages, whereas
from 1981 they are annual values (for this reason there are more fluctuations in
this subperiod). As can be seen, in all countries during the 1970s, the rate of the
total factor productivity started to decline. Some of the causes for this develop-
ment have already been mentioned. We shall add another possible interpreta-
tion. The exhaustion of the factors of extensive growth requires adaptation of
the planning and management systems of the countries and re-orientation of the
main emphasis toward the intensive factors of growth. This process is quite
complex, and its actual results can be assessed only with some time lag. How-
ever, the values of wr in the first half of the 1980s indicate that the declining
trend is probably over, and it is likely that W r might increase in the future.
Another main driving force of growth is the investment (savings) ratio.
This determines, to a great extent, the dynamics of the fixed assets. As has been
shown, their contribution to the overall rates of economic growth is quite
significant.
In our models we use as a "savings ratio" the share of gross investment in
the final material product (shown as IG' YD on the plots). Another "savings
ratio" often used in the CMEA countries is the "accumulation rate" - the share
of net accumulation in the NMP used (shown as A' YU). Both these indicators
are shown graphically in Figure 4.5.
During the slowdown period the investment ratio in most cases decreased
too. In some countries this was partly due to the decline of imports; partly this
was related to the general policy of increasing (or, at least, preventing a decrease
in) the level of real consumption.
There is, however, one interesting development in the most recent years in
many of the countries that may be traced on the plots. As can be seen, the
decline in the IG' YD was not so pronounced as that in A' YU. This can be
explained by a change in the investment policy of these countries, namely, to
finance a larger share of the investment outlays from the so-called "amortization
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fund" which is formed on the basis of the norm of depreciation of the fixed
assets.
Some more data about the driving forces of economic growth will be given
when the forecast scenarios are discussed.
4.3. Ex Ante Scenarios and Simulations
4.3.1. Medium- and long-term economic strategies and objectives
of the CMEA countries
A central objective in the long-term economic strategies of the CMEA countries
at the present time is the intensification of production by a massive injection of
scientific and technical acumen in order to achieve higher rates of economic
growth. These are also the key issues of the "Program for science and technical
progress of the CMEA countries till the year 2000" , which was approved by the
41st session of the CMEA in December 1985 (PROGRAM, 1985). This Program
outlines the main directions of cooperation and joint work in the fields of science
and technology: electronics, complex automation, nuclear energy, new materials
and biotechnology. At the same time the Program sets the goal of doubling the
labor productivity in the CMEA as a whole up to the year 2000.
In the period 1985-1986 almost all countries set their five-year economic
goals and outlined some long-term economic policies. Here is a brief summary of
the general strategies, quoted in abridged form from the Economic Survey of
Europe (ESE, 1986, pp. 133-137):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Transition to an intensive, resource-efficient path of economic development,
with relatively high average output growth rates.
Far-reaching structural change, as well as re-equipment of the productive
apparatus.
Reconstruction and re-equipment of many sectors of the nonmaterial
sphere, especially science and research.
Higher investment growth.
Faster growth of accumulation, rather than of total domestic consumption.
Further increases in real income and in overall living standards
Changes in management and planning systems with corresponding adjust-
ment in economic policies.
Increasing participation in the international division of labor.
"Altogether, the underlying strategies contained in the five-year plans,
draft guidelines and related documents open the way for accelerated, more bal-
anced and also more efficient economic growth" (ESE, 1986, p. 137).
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4.3.2. Scenarios for the driving forces of economic growth
and structural change
The analysis of the possible paths of future development on the basis of our
macroeconomic models is performed by constructing scenarios for the "driving
forces" of economic growth and structural change. So the first task is to
"translate" the strategy we want to study into the language of the "driving
force" variables and solve the models for these scenarios.
Three main scenarios have been constructed and analyzed:
(1)
(2)
(3)
A "high" scenario, scenario "A", which is in line with the strategies for
accelerated growth outlined in 3.1.
A "low" scenario, scenario "C", which assumes a continuation of the
unfavorable "slowdown" trends of the last ten years.
A "medium" scenario, scenario "B", which is a "middle-of-the-road"
development between "A" and "C".
The main driving forces of economic growth which we consider (within the
research scope of the project) are:
(1) The labor input.
(2) The rate of technical progress.
(3) Fixed assets accumulation.
(4) The international division of labor.
We shall briefly analyze the underlying assumptions for the driving forces
in our three scenarios.
Labor input (L)
The labor input in the CMEA country models is given by the number of
employed persons in the material sphere L. As has already been mentioned, this
value did not change significantly over the last 25 years, even with a declining,
and sometimes negative, growth rate.
For our scenarios we used forecasts of two variables: the total population
in the countries (whenever available national forecasts were used) and forecast of
the share of L in the total population (usually as a time trend). The resulting
values of L were checked with national forecasts, when such were available.
Table ..... shows the average historical growth rates of L in 1961-1985 and
the resulting average growth rate from the forecast for 1986-2000 (note that in
the actual forecasts for L the growth rate is not constant!). Only one version of
the labor input L was used in the three scenarios.
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Table 4.4. Average growth rates of L (%).
Period Bulgaria CSSR CDR Hungary Poland Romania USSR
1961-1985 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9
1986-2000 0.05 0.36 0.33 -0.17 0.48 -0.08 0.0
Table 4.5. Average growth rates of wr (%).
Mean value for: Scenarios
1961- 1961- 1971- 1976- (Mean value for 1986-2000)
Country 1985 1980 1985 1985 "A" "B" "C"
Bulgaria 1.7 2.1 1.3 0.9 2.1 1.5 0.9
CSSR 1.3 1.7 0.8 0.2 1.7 0.9 0.2
GDR 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.6 2.1 1.6 1.2
Hungary 1.4 2.0 0.9 0.1 1.8 0.9 0.2
Poland 1.0 1.6 0.0 -1.9 2.0 1.3 0.6
Romania 2.4 2.6 1.7 0.6 2.3 1.5 0.6
USSR 1.1 1.4 0.5 0.3 1.8 1.1 0.4
Rate of technical progress (wr)
The historical trends of wr were already analyzed in Section 4.2.2. In Table 4.5
we give the average values of wr for some subperiods.
As can be seen, during the last decade (1976-1985) the values of wr have
fallen to a rather low level. The strategies for "accelerated growth" described in
Section 4.3.1. assume that there would be a (significant) rise of wr in all coun-
tries. It is more reasonable to expect that wr might rise to some level, which has
already been experienced by the country. So, for our scenario "A" we assume for
1986-2000 an average level of wr which is approximately equal to the mean value
in the period 1961-1980. The "low" scenario "c" is based on the mean values
for 1976-1985 [7]. Scenario "B" is approximately the mean of "A" and "C".
However, as it can be seen, in most cases "B" is very close to the mean historical
figures for the period 1971-1985.
Fixed Assets Accumulation
Two main variables determine the dynamics of fixed assets accumulation: the
gross savings ratio s (IG' YD on the plots in Figure 4.5) and the rate of "sorting
out" of fixed assets d [8]. The higher rates of technical progress discussed above
require modernization and re-equipment of the productive assets and, accord-
ingly, larger amounts of investment outlays. So three scenarios for the "savings
ratio" have been developed, in line with the three scenarios for wr (Table 4.6).
The "medium" scenario "B" is taken as the average historical value for
1961-1985 (excluding the investment "boom" years in some countries in the
1970s). The "high" and "low" scenarios differ from the "medium" one by two
percentage points ("+" and "-", respectively).
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Table {6. Gross savings ratio s (IG' YD).
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Country
Mean value for
1960-1985
Scenarios: mean value for 1986-£000
"A" "B" "C"
Bulgaria
CSSR
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
0.30
0.27
0.26
0.29
0.32
0.31
0.27
0.32
0.29
0.27
0.28
0.30
0.31
0.29
0.30
0.27
0.25
0.26
0.28
0.29
0.27
0.28
0.25
0.23
0.24
0.26
0.27
0.25
The rates of "sorting out" d which are used in the model are calculated on
the basis of a "zero-lag" assumption of the implementation of the investment
outlays (all investments of a given year are put into operation within the same
year). The mean values of d for 1961-1982 and the forecast values (one version
for all scenarios) are given in Table 4.7.
In general, the scenario values are based on the mean values in the sample
period; in some cases recent trends have been reflected as well.
The international division of labor
The impact of this factor is modeled by the variable IMR (imports of raw materi-
als and intermediate goods), which directly enters the production function. In
the case of the CMEA countries IMR is considered as a share br of the total
imports. The historical and forecast values of br are shown in Table 4.8 (one
version for all scenarios).
The scenarios for br are based on the more recent development of the
import structure of the countries.
Other factors
Besides the main "driving forces" in the case of the CMEA countries there are
two other "driving" variables which determine some of the future developments.
The "norm of depreciation of fixed assets" ad defines the share of the gross
investment which is aimed at replacement of the old fixed assets, the so-called
"amortization fund" AD.
[f.fOSS = AD + JTIet (4.3)
(4.4)
where flross and Inet are gross and net investment, respectively; K is total fixed
assets. Thus ad defines the proportion by which AD is formed in relation to K.
In the models it is used to determine NMP (by subtracting AD from the value of
final material product Y*).
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Table {7. Rate of "sorting out" of fixed assets d (%).
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Mean value of d
during period:
1961-1982
1986-2000
Bulgaria CSSR
2.2 1.3
2.3 1.4
CDR
0.9
0.9
Hungary Poland Romania
1.2 1.7 1.9
1.2 0.9 1.7
USSR
1.5
1.4
Table ,{B. Share ofraw materials and intermediate goods in total imports br.
Mean value of br
during period: Bulgaria CSSR CDR Hungary Poland Romania USSR
1961-1975 0.75 0.71 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.54
1976-1985 0.78 0.72 0.76 0.74 0.72 0.81 0.52
1986-2000 0.78 0.72 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.80 0.52
Table i.9. Norm of depreciation of fixed assets ad (%).
Mean value of ad
during period: Bulgaria
1961-1982 5.3
1986-2000 5.3
CSSR
2.7
2.7
CDR
1.3
1.7
Hungary Poland Romania
3.0 2.4 4.8
2.9 1.6 5.0
USSR
4.1
3.8
The historical and forecast values of ad are given in Table i.9 (one version
for all scenarios). As in the case of d, the scenario values are based on the mean
values in the sample period; in some cases recent trends have been reflected as
well.
Finally, the index of nominal wages of the employed in the material sphere
is the "driving factor" in the dynamics of the general price level in the countries
(together with the index of real wages, which is endogenous). The historical
development and the forecast values of the growth rate of nominal wages w, are
given in Table i.10 (one version for all scenarios).
Table {10. Growth rate of nominal wages, w, (%).
Scenario
Mean value for: mean value for:
1961- 1961- 1971- 19B1- 19B6- 1991-
Country 19B5 1970 19BO 19B5 1990 2000
Bulgaria 6.2 7.1 5.4 4.5 5.0 5.0
CSSR 3.8 4.5 3.3 3.0 4.0 4.0
GDR 4.1 3.8 4.4 4.3 4.0 4.0
Hungary 7.4 6.5 8.0 8.5 8.5 8.5
Poland 12.3 4.9 13.3 33.8 12.0 10.0
Romania 8.0 7.7 8.2 8.2 7.0 7.0
USSR 4.2 5.8 2.6 3.7 4.0 4.0
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Table ,1.11. Ex ante simulation results: average growth rates of important variables,
1986-1999 (%).
Bulgaria CSSR CDR
Indicator "A" "B" "C" "A" "B" "C" "A" "B" "C"
NMP produced 6.1 4.8 3.5 4.4 2.9 1.7 5.4 4.4 3.6
NMP used 6.4 5.0 3.6 4.0 2.7 1.6 4.3 3.4 2.7
Labor productivitya 6.1 4.8 3.5 4.0 2.6 1.3 5.1 4.1 3.3
Fixed assets, total 6.4 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.0 4.8 4.3 3.8
NMP produced per
fixed assets, total -0.3 -0.8 -1.4 -0.2 -0.6 -1.3 0.6 0.2 -0.2
Consumption, total 5.9 4.9 4.0 3.2 2.4 1.7 3.1 2.6 2.2
Real imports, total 7.1 5.4 3.7 5.7 4.2 2.9 4.4 3.0 1.6
Real exports, total 6.6 5.1 3.6 5.9 4.3 2.8 7.1 5.7 4.3
Real primary incomesb 4.2 3.7 3.1 3.3 2.8 2.3 3.6 2.7 1.9
Price deflator of NMP
produced 0.7 1.3 1.8 0.7 1.2 1.6 0.3 1.3 2.1
Price deflator of total
consumption 1.1 1.6 2.1 0.8 1.1 1.5 0.4 1.3 2.0
aDefined as NMP produced per employed person in material sphere.
bDefined as income of one employed person in material sphere.
4.3.3. An overview of the main results from the ex ante simulations
A number of ex ante simulations were run on the models of the CMEA countries
both in a "detached" mode (each model running separately) and in a "linked"
mode (linked with the models of the other countries and groups of countries).
Due to space limitations we present here only a selection of the most general and
important results of these simulations. More results concerning the CMEA
countries are available in Chapter 7 and in Annex 3 as well as in Dobrinsky
(1986b). Here we focus our attention on the three basic scenarios described in
the previous section. The simulations reported here were performed on the
linked world model described in Chapter 7.
The most important findings from the three basic simulation runs are sum-
marized in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. Table 4.11 reports the major macroeconomic
indicators presented in the form of the average rates of growth for the simulation
period (1986-1999). Table 4.12 reflects the changes in the structure of produc-
tion in the three scenarios. Since these results are basically self-explanatory we
comment only briefly on them.
The variables selected in Table 4.11 are those indicators whose performance
was analyzed in this chapter and those which were a subject of the special treat-
ment detailed in Chapter 5. In addition, we have included total imports and
exports in order to have a more complete picture of the overall economic perfor-
mance. However, it should be pointed out that, since the scenarios were run on
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Table -4.11. Continued.
Hungary Poland Romania USSR
"A" "B" "c" "A" "B" "C" "A" "B" "C" "A" "B" "C"
4.4 2.7 1.4 4.3 3.1 1.9 7.0 5.2 3.2 5.2 4.0 2.7
4.7 2.1 0.5 4.3 2.9 1.4 7.0 5.0 2.9 5.2 4.0 2.7
4.5 2.9 1.6 3.8 2.6 1.4 7.1 5.3 3.2 5.2 4.0 2.7
3.9 3.3 2.8 3.6 3.2 2.7 6.9 6.0 5.1 6.0 5.4 4.7
0.5 -0.5 -1.3 0.7 -0.1 -0.8 0.0 -0.8 -1.9 -0.8 -1.3 -1.9
4.0 1.6 0.4 3.9 2.7 1.5 6.4 4.9 3.2 5.1 4.2 3.3
7.4 5.0 2.5 6.7 4.3 1.7 5.0 2.6 0.2 5.5 3.7 1.9
6.6 5.3 4.1 6.8 5.4 3.9 5.0 3.1 1.0 5.5 3.3 1.0
4.5 3.2 2.1 3.8 3.1 2.0 7.1 6.0 4.5 4.9 4.0 3.2
3.8 5.2 6.3 6.4 7.5 8.7 0.0 1.4 2.9 0.6 1.4 2.2
4.2 6.0 7.3 6.4 7.5 8.7 0.1 1.7 3.3 0.8 1.7 2.7
the linked world model, the foreign trade indicators reported here depend not
only on the domestic development in the countries under consideration, but also
on the general world economic performance. In our case all results in scenario
"A" correspond to the "high" or "optimistic" scenario for the world economy;
"B" to the "medium scenario" and "C" to the "low" or "pessimistic" scenario.
In general, scenarios "A" and "B" outline a stable long-term development
in the countries with relatively high rates of economic growth. The principal
long-term economic goals of the CMEA countries discussed in Section 3.1. are
met in scenario "A". As can be seen, some important economic ratios which are
subject to special attention in the economic policy are preserved in this scenario.
Thus, the real wages of those employed in the material sphere do not grow faster
than labor productivity; and real consumption grows more slowly than NMP
used (this means an increasing share of accumulation in NMP used, which is in
line with the long-term objectives mentioned in Section 4.3.1). The latter also
means a higher investment growth than in the previous several years (also in line
with the targets of Section 4.3.1.). Foreign trade (imports and exports) also in
general grows at higher rates than NMP (increasing imports to NMP ratio),
which corresponds to increasing participation in the international division of
labor (another goal mentioned in Section 4.3.1).
In this scenario there are also positive tendencies with respect to the
output/capital ratio, measured by NMP per total fixed assets. In three countries
(GDR, Hungary and Poland) it increases; in one (Romania) it does not change;
and in the rest of the countries it continues to decline, but at much lower rates
than have been experienced in the last few years.
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Table .4.H. Ex ante simulation results: sectoral structure of net material product.
Scenarios
aA" aB" ac"
Country Sectora 1982 1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999
Bulgaria (1) 17.3 18.6 12.4 19.9 14.3 21.3 16.2
(2) 51.9 49.9 54.1 48.8 52.6 47.7 51.1
(3) 10.0 10.0 10.4 9.5 9.8 9.0 9.3
(4) 8.8 9.5 11.0 9.8 11.2 10.1 11.4
(5) 8.6 8.7 9.2 8.6 9.0 8.4 8.9
CSSR (1) 8.2 8.7 8.2 9.2 8.6 9.7 9.0
(2) 58.0 55.0 54.3 55.4 55.5 55.8 56.7
(3) 11.2 12.7 12.9 12.7 13.0 12.7 13.0
(4) 17.4 18.4 19.7 17.3 17.6 16.3 15.6
(5) 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7
GDR (1) 8.3 7.0 5.2 6.9 5.2 6.7 5.3
(2) 67.9 68.7 70.7 69.5 71.0 69.8 71.3
(3) 6.1 6.4 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.8 5.7
(4) 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.0
(5) 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.3
Hungary (1) 16.4 14.3 14.1 15.8 15.4 17.4 17.4
(2) 49.1 50.6 51.6 51.5 52.8 52.3 54.2
(3) 10.5 11.3 11.6 11.0 11.3 10.8 11.0
(4) 17.5 16.1 14.6 14.0 12.3 11.9 9.2
(5) 5.4 6.1 6.3 6.2 6.6 6.3 6.7
Poland (1) 18.1 16.1 14.0 15.4 11.9 14.7 9.6
(2) 49.2 50.0 52.1 50.5 53.1 51.2 54.4
(3) 11.0 13.0 12.3 12.8 12.7 12.7 13.1
(4) 15.7 15.2 15.4 15.8 16.0 15.5 16.5
(5) 4.5 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.8
Romania (1) 17.9 16.9 16.6 18.2 16.0 19.2 14.0
(2) 57.1 58.7 59.9 57.7 60.1 56.8 61.4
(3) 8.6 8.6 8.2 8.0 7.5 7.3 6.5
(4) 7.1 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.4
(5) 6.8 7.3 7.2 7.6 7.8 7.9 8.6
USSR (1) 14.8 9.4 6.3 11.4 6.9 13.6 7.9
(2) 59.6 63.7 66.9 63.1 67.7 62.3 68.3
(3) 10.9 11.5 11.3 10.6 10.3 9.6 9.3
(4) 8.3 8.6 8.6 8.3 8.3 8.1 7.9
(5) 6.4 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.8 6.4 6.6
aSectors are as follows: (1) Agriculture and forestry, (2) Industry, (3) Construction, (4)
Wholesale and retail trade, and (5) Transport and communications.
Scenario "C" should be regarded as a kind of "warning" scenario. It indi-
cates the likely long-term consequences of a development in which the unfavor-
able trends observed in recent years are prolonged into the future. In many of
the countries in this scenario the unfavorable tendencies deepen and some of the
proportions mentioned above do not match. So scenario "C" is intended rather
to indicate the necessity for a change in the economic policies of the countries
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(and, as was pointed out in Section 3.1, such a change has already been ini-
tiated!) than to project a realistic and sustainable development path.
As for the structure of production in the countries (Table 4.12) the general
trend of increasing the industrial share is present in almost all scenarios. How-
ever, the development in the three scenarios differs from country to country.
Thus, in Bulgaria the higher rates of economic growth imply a relatively higher
share of industry and lower share of agriculture; in Poland it is the other way
round; in the CSSR and Hungary both these sectors "shrink" at higher growth
rates (at the expense of the other sectors); in the GDR, Romania and the USSR
these results differ in the different subperiods.
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
It should be noted that in accordance with the national data available in the
CMEA data base (Dobrinsky, 1986a), the base years for constant prices differ
from country to country, namely: Bulgaria - 1980, CSSR - 1977, GDR - 1980,
Hungary - 1976, Poland - 1982, Romania - 1981, USSR - 1973. The production
structure shown in Figures .{11-17 refers to sectoral shares measured in the prices
of these years.
The figures reported here refer to real production shares measured in constant
prices of the indicated years.
For the definitional identities, see Annex 2 of this volume.
Total fixed assets were used as a proxy, owing to the lack of more detailed data.
However, in the presence of negative growth rates, as was the case from 1981 to
1985, these "shares" do not have such a clear interpretation, so we do not calcu-
late them for that subperiod.
In terms of the assumed production technology, changes in the level of l' mean
shifts of the isoquants of the production function in the direction of the original
(positive wr ) or in the opposite direction (negative wr ). These shifts are due to
the combined effect of different factors, technical progress being only one of them.
Technical progress per se can be accepted as the main driving force for positive
changes in the level of l' ("improvement" in the production technology), but nega-
tive changes can be due to general deterioration of the production environment or
lower degree of capacity utilization. For this reason we prefer to interpret l' as
"level of total factor productivity". Whenever "technical progress" is used, it is
also in the sense of "total factor productivity" .
There are some exceptions. The "high" and "low" values for Poland are calcu-
lated as the averages for the other CMEA countries (besides the USSR). The
"high" value of wr for the USSR is based on the mean for 1961-1975.
Note that "fixed assets" and "sorting out of fixed assets" which are used in the
CMEA country models are not directly comparable with "real capital" and
"depreciation of real capital" which are used in the models of market economies.
"Fixed assets" denote assets which are physically available for operation. "Sorting
out" denotes the process of physical liquidation of old assets, and the rate of sort-
ing out refers only to the portion of fixed assets which have been liquidated during
a specific year.
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CHAPTER 5
The Macroeconomic Models of
the European CMEA Countries
Rumen Dobrinsky
Summary
Some specific features of the models of the European CMEA countries are
described in this chapter. Three main aspects of the models are discussed: the
production technology, the structure of production, and the distribution of the
final product. The empirical findings concerning these aspects of the models are
presented, as well as an analysis of the dynamic properties of the model as a
whole.
5.1. Introduction
This chapter reports on the models of the seven European CMEA countries [1]
and outlines some specific methodological aspects of the approach to the model-
ing of the economies of these countries. The factual aspects of the analysis and
forecast are presented in a separate chapter.
The models have been developed following general lines of the Bonn-IIASA
Project. However, the approach to the CMEA country models differs in some
important details which are due to the different behavior of economic agents in a
socialist economy as compared to a market-type economy. Another cause of
difference is the different accounting system in the CMEA countries whose statis-
tics are based on the System of Material Product Balances.
The actual data base for the CMEA countries which was used in the proj-
ect was compiled on the basis of contributions from many collaborating groups.
This data base is described in Dobrinsky (1986).
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5.2. The Production Technology
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The central part of our study is the production technology which, in our case,
following the general approach of the Bonn-IIASA Project, is described by a
linear homogeneous production function of Cobb-Douglas type.
The application of the neoclassical productions, and in particular, the
Cobb-Douglas form, to modeling of a socialist economy has been a subject of
long debate in the economic literature. Also subject to discussion and criticism
have been different aspects of this approach, such as the linear homogenity
assumption (Anchishkin, 1973), the restrictive assumption with respect to the
elasticities of substitution between factor inputs (Klacek and Neflporova, 1983),
and the necessity to distinguish between a production function for potential
product and a production function for actual product (Klacek and Neflporova,
1983). These aspects of the debate are of more general character and refer to the
general properties of the neoclassical approach. However, the most controversial
issue has been the "marginal productivity assumption" relating the marginal
productivities of the input factors to their "prices" (or factor costs). This
assumption, which is the foundation of most theoretical and empirical studies in
the western countries has been widely criticized by Marxist economists both in
terms of its theoretical basis (Anchishkin, 1973) and of the possibilities for its
empirical implementation (e.g., Pappe and Ryvkin, 1977).
The general outcome of the debate seems to be positive with respect to
practical implementation; however, in most cases some modification of the tradi-
tionally used neoclassical forms have been suggested. Thus, Anchishkin (1973)
suggests modeling the Soviet economy with a Cobb-Douglas production function
which is not homegeneous to degree one. Simon and Samoval (1981) propose a
"function of economic growth", in which the production elasticities are functions
of some secondary factors. Klacek and Neflporovci (1983) advocate the translog
and other flexible functional forms and test them on CSSR data. Ershov and
Sadykov (1986) suggest a model of the "limits of the production potential",
which assumes "switching" of the production technology to different modes of
substitutability of the inputs.
At the same time more traditional functional forms have also been analyzed
[2]. Probably the first attempt to estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function
for the Soviet economy was the works of Mikhalevski and Solov'ev (1966).
Weitzman (1970) estimated a CES production function for the Soviet industry.
Toda (1976) analyzed a CES (and a translog) form with respect to Soviet
manufacturing. Desai (1976, 1985) used Cobb-Douglas and CES forms to
analyze the factor productivity and the elasticity of factor substitution in Soviet
industry. Similar approaches were applied by Toms and Hajek (1970) for
Czechoslovakia; by Brown et al. (1974, 1976) for Hungary; and by Kemme (1984)
for Poland. A Cobb-Douglas production function was used in a macromodel of
the Bulgarian economy (Econometric Macromodels, 1984).
The central issue and, at the same time, the main problem of concern in all
empirical studies remains the estimation of the production elasticities of the
input factors, and all scholars acknowledge the serious difficulties in the estima-
tion of these parameters [3]. Many of these problems have an objective
Rumen Dobriruky 145
character; but a simple and straightforward solution does not exist. Thus, the
common approach of unrestricted (with respect to the estimated parameters)
direct estimation of a production function with an explicitly defined shape of the
technical progress variable, using time series data, is actually an attempt to "fix"
the production isoquant curves only on the basis of one point (since it is assumed
that the production isoquants are "shifted" in every observation, only one obser-
vation is available per isoquant). Combined with the usually strong multicol-
linearity of the variables in the regression, this provides an almost insoluble task,
both theoretically and practically [4]. Another problem (and source of estima-
tion difficulties) may be that the actual economy - as depicted by the empirical
data - can diverge significantly from the assumptions of the theoretical model,
which may be very restrictive (e.g., constancy of the production elasticities, con-
stant, even unit, elasticities of substitution, etc.). A further difficulty is caused
by the quality of the data available which is usually not very high.
In our judgment, the selection of the theoretical model and the methods for
its estimation should be based first of all on the goal of the research and on the
assessment of the ability of the theoretical model to serve the goal. This was the
main criterion for selecting the functional form for our technology. Our goal is
to study the long-term growth trends, and for this goal the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function seems to be the most appropriate tool, in spite of its implicit
restricitive assumptions with respect to the production technology. Other func-
tional forms (e.g., the translog, or the other flexible forms) may better fit the
goals of analyzing past performance, but can scarcely be used for long-term fore-
casts. (Unfortunately, almost all flexible functional forms are very unstable in ex
ante simulations.)
The production function which we use in the models is specified as
(5.1)
3E aj = 1, 0 < aj < 1, i = 1,2,3
j=1
where Y* = total material output; T = the level of technical progress (total fac-
tor productivity); L = the number of employed persons in the material sphere; K
= fixed assets in the material sphere (in our case, approximated by total fixed
assets); and IMR = imports of raw materials and intermediate products.
We assume that the total material output Y* is separable in Y (final
material product) and IMR :
Y* = flo yP IM"A-P (5.2)
and that Y is also defined by a Cobb-Douglas production function over Land
K:
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(5.3)
The parameters of (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3) are related as follows:
(5.4)
Further, we assume that the planning board of the economy pursues
different policies on the different levels of the production technology. First, we
assume that on the level defined by equation (5.2) the planning agency follows a
cost-minimization policy with respect to the utilization of domestic resources Y
and imported resources IMR. Taking into account that in nominal terms we
have
y*. P'Y* = y. P'Y + IMR · P'IMR (5.5)
where P' Y*, P' Y and P'IMR are price deflators of the corresponding variables.
This assumption means that we can identify 1-{J = Q3 by the share of
IMR . P'IMR in Y* . P' Y*. This leaves us only with the estimation of ,.
Next we assume that the policy with respect to the final material product
Y [equation (5.3)] is maximization of Y and at the same time provision of a cer-
tain level of real primary income (real wages) of those employed in the material
sphere lr :
(5.6)
where ~ is the desired level of income.
In Appendix 5A, we present the solution to this problem in the case when
the distribution function for the real wages is defined as
(5.7)
where qr denotes real primary incomes of enterprises per unit of fixed assets (see
Appendix 5A for the complete definitions).
The solution to this problem provides the following relation between the
parameters of the production and distribution functions:
lr - a 1 . Ir,-1 =~. K
a3 . qr,-1 1-, L
(5.8)
Rumen Dobrirulcy 147
The economic interpretation of equation (5.8) is that there is a specific rela-
tion between the process of production and primary distribution of Y. From a
practical point of view equation (5.8) can be used to derive additional constraints
on the parameters of the estimated equations which would allow us to obtain
more reliable estimates.
Another problem is the estimation of the technical progress variable 1". It is
a latent variable which, by its nature, changes smoothly over time (see Chapter
1). In estimation the shape of the trend is usually set exogenously and only its
parameters are estimated. However, in the presence of second (and higher) order
variations in the trend of T, the results of such an estimate can be highly
unstable; and this was our experience in estimating the production functions for
the CMEA countries. For this reason we used another approach to the estima-
tion of 1".
In the observations for the output Y* and for the production factors
T, L, K, IMR (which are yearly figures) one can usually distinguish two com-
ponents: a "trend" component F(X), X = {Y*, T, L, K, IMR } which defines the
long-term growth path of the variables and a "fluctuation" component which in
log form can be defined as Ux=logXjF(X),X={Y*,T,L,K,IMR } and
which can be due to the presence of short-term cycles (such as the investment
cycles), variation on the capacity utilization, etc. Taking into account the nature
of the technical progress variable T, we can consider that the fluctuations in Y
are only determined by the fluctuations of L, K and IMR , which is equivalent to
the assumption that T = F(T) and Ur = O.
This enables us to eliminate T from the estimation equation which, after the
substitutions, reads:
(5.9)
The level of T can be calculated residually from (5.1) where Y*, L, K, IMR are
substituted by F(Y*), F(L), F(K), F(IMR ). In the actual estimations the trend
functions F(X), X = {Y*, L, K, IMR } were specified as five-year moving aver-
ages.
The estimation of the production function was performed in the form (5.9)
jointly with the distribution equation for real wages (5.7), imposing (5.8) as
parameter restrictions. The full information maximum likelihood method was
used for the estimation. The estimation period was 1960-1982 [actually
1962-1980, because five-year moving averages were used for equation (5.9)]. The
estimated production function and demand function for unit income are given in
Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
We would like to make some points concerning the estimation results.
First of all, due to the specified restrictions the degrees of freedom in the system
are reduced considerably (actually we estimate only three of the six coefficients).
Due to this, the calculated standard errors of the estimated parameters are very
low (and, accordingly, the t-values are high). But since we consider this as an
indication of low degrees of freedom and not as a high precision of the estimate,
we do not reproduce these values in the tables.
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Table 5.1. Parameters of the estimated production functions. 3
Estimated results Calculated parameters
Country a 1 a 2 a 3 DW R 2 R 2 MAPE a O1 2
Bulgaria 0.361 0.405 0.234 1.53 0.42 0.998 0.78 1.476
CSSR 0.408 0.411 0.181 1.17 0.21 0.997 0.80 3.926
GDR 0.383 0.423 0.194 1.54 0.89 0.998 0.39 2.072
Hungary 0.341 0.416 0.243 1.58 0.55 0.994 0.85 3.486
Poland 0.424 0.401 0.175 0.84 0.22 0.997 1.24 7.972
Romania 0.321 0.501 0.178 1.03 0.67 0.998 0.67 2.168
USSR 0.421 0.514 0.065 1.81 0.10 0.996 0.81 1.048
3Estimated equation: Uy' = 0<1uL + 0<2UK + 0<3uIMR + E: (see text).
Table 5.£. Equations for real wages in the material sphere. 3
Country a 1 a2 a3 DW R 2 MAPE
Bulgaria 0.866 0.161 0.147 1.49 0.996 1.67
CSSR 0.811 0.128 0.072 2.28 0.970 2.84
GDR 0.538 0.448 0.423 2.21 0.995 1.12
Hungary 0.392 0.361 0.177 2.02 0.994 1.83
Poland 0.484 0.358 0.208 2.14 0.992 1.50
Romania 0.315 0.574 0.470 2.41 0.999 1.09
USSR 0.507 0.519 0.519 1.69 0.999 0.56
3Estimated equation: 'r = 0<1/r-1 + 0<2 (Y/L) - 0<3 (qr_1 K / L ) + E: (see text).
The next point is that two values of the goodness of fit are shown in Table
5.1. The first one (Rr) refers to the actual R2 of the estimated equation (5.9).
At first glance Rr seems to be low in general, but we have to take into con-
sideration that (5.9) is estimated on the residual series Ux and in this sense in
most cases it can even be regarded as rather high. Ri is the equivalent (recalcu-
lated) goodness of fit of equation (5.1) on the basis of the estimated parameters.
The mean absolute percentage error (MAP E) is also calculated with respect to
(5.1). Both these indicators are quite satisfactory.
The values of T which result from this estimation are given in Chapter 4 on
"Economic Growth and Structural Change in the CMEA Countries" in the form
of growth rates (w r).
All parameters of the estimated equation for lr have the correct sign and
order of magnitude. From the estimated equation (5.7) we can calculate the
structural parameters and other characteristics of the distribution system (see
Appendix SA). In Table 5.3 we present the most important of them: the pro-
duction elasticities and the own short-run quantity elasticities of the factor
remunerations lr and qr calculated as sample averages [5J.
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Production elasticity
Own short-run quantity
elasticity (uncompensated)
Country
Bulgaria
CSSR
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
0.37 1.54
0.31 1.50
0.91 1.10
0.87 1.09
0.76 1.23
1.27 0.78
1.12 0.90
-0.17 -0.85
-0.21 -0.93
-0.48 -0.58
-0.63 -0.82
-0.53 -0.79
-0.71 -0.53
-0.51 -0.49
5.3. The Structure of Production
The structure of production in the CMEA countries is defined by the shares of
output produced in the sectors of the material sphere. Below we propose a possi-
ble approach to the derivation of a specification for explaining the production
sector shares. As our output concept is based on the final material product Y,
we derive the equations explaining the composition of Y:
n
Y="y'~ i'
i=1
n
Yi = (Ji . Y; ~ (Ji=1
i=1
(5.10)
where (Ji denotes the share of sector i in the final material product.
However, the available database (Dobrinsky, 1986) contains only data
about the structure of the Net Material Product (NMP). But, as we show later,
the equation derived can be applied to the NMP sector shares under some not
very restrictive assumptions.
We start our derivation of the functions (Ji from the input-output system in
real terms. Let Xj be real total production (gross output) of sector j, Yj = real
final product of sector j; Iaij I = the input-output matrix; Cj = total consump-
tion of the product of sector j; A j = gross accumulation of product j; E j =
exports of j; M j = imports of j; X = total gross output in the economy; Y =
total final product; C = total consumption; A = total gross accumulation; E =
total exports; M = total imports; j = 1, ... ,n.
From this system we can express the final product of sector i as:
Y· = " a ... x· - " a·· . x + C· + A. + E- + M·1 ~ I] ] ~]I 1 1 1 1 1 •
] ]
(5.11)
ISO
Denote:
OJ = ~ ajj' Xj - ~ ajj • Xj
j j
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(S.12)
C·
f3p = -t; M·f3f = ~;
where OJ sum up to zero; f3P, f3f, f3f, and f3f sum up to 1.
From (S.lO) and (S.12) we can write:
13 · = 0· . ...!... + 13 9 . Q + f3A. ~ + 13M . M + f3~' KI I Y I Y I Y I Y I y' (S.13)
We shall now analyze the coefficients introduced in (S.12). Consider for exam-
ple, f3P. We can assume that approximately Cj ~ a . Yj, C ~ b . Y and, as a
consequence,
(S.14)
where a, b, and d = const, which is quite natural for an equilibrium growth
path. A similar assumption can also be made for f3f, f3jM and f3f. As for OJ, it
accounts for the difference between the amount of sector j's gross output used as
intermediate product in the economy, and all intermediate products used in sec-
tor i. It depends of the structure of final demand. Therefore
(S.IS)
Now substitute (S.14) and (S.IS) into (S.13). If we solve this nonlinear equation
for f3 j we can present the linearized (by a Taylor expansion) solution as:
1 CAM E13· = a 1 . - + a 2 . - + a3 . - + a4 . - + as' - + a6I y Y Y Y Y (S.16)
This is the form which served as basis for our estimations.
Two more points remain to be made. We use this equation to explain the
structure of NMP, whereas it is derived for the final product. However, this is
only equivalent to the assumption that the amortization fund is distributed
among the sectors proportionally to their final product. Obviously, this is not a
very restrictive assumption. The next point concerns the estimation. If we
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estimate (5.16) directly, we may run into problems because of the linear depen-
dence of (Y, C, A, M, E). In order to avoid this we substitute IG (gross invest-
ment) for A (gross accumulations). From the point of view of the economic
interpretation we even gain from this substitution because the difference between
A and IG is the so-called "change in material assets and stocks" which is subject
to large fluctuations and is not a significant factor of structural change.
The actual estimated results for the production sector functions for the
seven CMEA countries are given in Table 5.4. Some of the estimated parameters
may seem unsatisfactory from the point of view of the precision of the estimation
(the t-values are very low). However, we have not excluded any variable for this
reason, because in the full specification the set of sector functions for a given
country preserve the valuable property of summing up to 1 [6], and this is one of
the main requirements with respect to these functions. The relatively low value
of R 2 occurs mainly in the cases of low variation of the observed values of Pi'
As for the signs of the estimated parameters which indicate the direction of
influence of the explanatory variables, no theoretical considerations indicating a
positive or negative sign stem from our derivation. So it is difficult to make a
comprehensive intercountry comparison, because the signs reflect the different
processes of structural change in the countries.
5.4. Consumption and the Price Index for Consumer Goods
The problems of specification and estimation of a macroeconomic function
explaining aggregated consumption in a socialist economy have not been studied
so intensively as, for instance, the production side, especially as far as the empir-
ical implementation is concerned. Among the well-known works we should men-
tion the attempts of Portes and Winter to estimate an aggregated "consumption
supply" function (1977) and a "consumption demand" function (1978), as well as
their theoretical work on disequilibrium estimation (1980); see also Charemza
and Quandt (1982). As for the price index for consumer goods, probably the
most common is the cost-push approach (W. Welfe, 1985), sometimes incor-
porating disequilibrium techniques (A. Welfe, 1985).
The general approach to the modeling of consumption within the
Bonn-IIASA Project is basically supply-driven, total consumption being deter-
mined residually from the national accounts identity (see Annex 2). However,
we also considered it to be of interest to estimate "consumption demand" func-
tions for the CMEA countries and to test their performance against the perfor-
mance of consumption supply as an indicator of possible disequilibrium tenden-
cies on the consumer goods markets.
We based our approach with respect to consumption demand on the
dynamic version of the linear expenditure system, discussed in Appendix 5A. In
this case we consider the distribution of final material product used [7] - Yu -
among the final demand categories: personal consumption, other consumption,
gross investment, change in material assets and stocks. Or, in a more aggregated
form: total consumption C and gross accumulation A. When we consider only
two items, the theoretical setting and derivations are identical to those given in
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the Appendix. There is a difference only in the interpretation of the system. In
this case the demand system which we consider reflects the behavior of the
economic agents who are responsible for the distribution of the final product in a
socialist economy. We assume that their goal is the maximization of a social
utility function. It is also assumed that the agents represent or act in the
interest of the actual final users in the economy. By aggregation over these
agents we derive the aggregated demand system for the whole economy in which
the total expenditure term is represented by Yu'
The derived estimable equation for the aggregate demand for consumption
goods [8] is specified in the form
(5.17)
where P' Yu' P' C and P' A are the price deflators of Yu' C and A, respectively.
The parameters of the estimation aI' a2' a3 can be interpreted in terms of the
structural parameters of the demand system (see Appendix SA). In this case
again we have a system of two equations with a budget constraint so the estima-
tion of one equation is sufficient to determine the whole system.
The results of the estimations of the aggregated consumption demand equa-
tions (5.17) for the seven CMEA countries are shown in Table 5.5. From a sta-
tistical point of view they can be accepted as satisfactory (except for some low t-
values). The check of the order of magnitude indicates that all signs are correct
and all parameters are in the plausible range of magnitude.
The expenditure and own price elasticities corresponding to the estimated
demand systems are shown in Table 5.6 (calculated as sample averages). One
comment is necessary here. Equation (5.17) corresponds to a direct demand
function with respect to price-quantity relations. However, as follows from our
theoretical model, it reflects the actual demand of the final users indirectly,
through the performance of the agents who are assumed to act in their interest.
This fact must be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the results in
Table 5.6.
One striking feature of the calculated elasticities is the similarity of these
results across the countries, which might be interpreted as a similarity of the
underlying economic policies. In all cases the expenditure elasticity of gross
accumulation is much higher than that of total consumption, which indicates
that the level of accumulation is affected to a much larger degree by fluctuations
in the level of the final product used. Accumulation is also more price-elastic.
Another interesting feature is that the expenditure elasticities of the final
use products in most of the cases (with the exception of Romania and the USSR)
compare quite favorably with the production elasticities of the real factor remun-
eration (Table 5.9). Although indirectly, this might indicate a link between the
primary and final distribution of output in the economy.
In order to derive an equation for the price index of consumer goods, we
use a theoretical model which is similar to the one discussed in the beginning of
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Table 5.5. Equations for the total consumption demand (1" values given III
parentheses).a All estimates cover the period 1961-1985 (OLS).
Country
Bulgaria
CSSR
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
0.504
(6.80)
0.669
(8.83)
0.616
(10.66)
0.783
(20.44)
0.589
(11.42)
0.574
(8.80)
0.397
(3.47)
0.358
(6.27)
0.340
(4.75)
0.377
(7.42)
0.209
(5.60)
0.368
(6.71)
0.326
(4.41 )
0.493
(5.57)
0.092
(1.02)
0.324
(3.37)
0.305
(4.59)
0.148
(3.05)
0.242
(2.98)
0.090
(0.75)
0.282
(2.21)
DW
1.98
2.36
1.97
1.68
2.08
2.42
1.50
R2C
0.998
0.997
0.999
0.999
0.995
0.999
0.999
MAPE
1.52
1.19
0.62
1.07
1.31
1.47
0.87
a Estimated equation:
For further details, see text.
Table 5.6. Implied expenditure and price elasticities for final use products (C = con-
sumption; A = accumulation).
Short-run price
Expenditure elasticity elasticity (uncompensated)
Country C A C A
Bulgaria 0.58 1.70 -0.47 -0.90
CSSR 0.50 2.11 -0.31 -0.66
GDR 0.51 2.44 -0.36 -0.68
Hungary 0.32 2.40 -0.18 -0.85
Poland 0.56 1.96 -0.38 -0.75
Romania 0.51 1.90 -0.38 -0.90
USSR 0.77 1.40 -0.58 -0.70
this section [9]. Consider again our production function in the form (5.2), but
formulated with respect to the total final product X [10]. More generally,
assume that X is a linear homogenous function of "domestic inputs" Y and
imported inputs M [11]:
X = f( Y, M) (5.18)
Assume also that there exists a cost function K = K(X) which is derived from
cost-minimization conditions.
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The product X is used for consumption (total), accumulation (gross) and
exports:
X=C+A+E (5.19)
The planning agency distributes the output X so as to maximize a social
utility function, which is defined over C and A.
max U = U(C, A)
subject to the constraints:
(1) Revenue-cost constraint:
P'C· C + P' A . A + P'E· E - K(X) 2 R
where P' E is the price deflator of exports; R is a certain desired level.
(2) Balance of trade constraint:
P'E· E - P'M·M 2 iJ
(5.20)
(5.21)
(5.22)
where P'M is the price deflator of imports; iJ is also a certain target level.
The desired price levels P' C, P' A and P'E will be those which equilibrate
the three markets to a certain degree be, bA , bE' respectively.
C = be' C(P'C)
A = bA · A(P'A)
E = bE' E(P'E)
(5.23)
where the right-hand parts are the corresponding demand functions (for simplic-
ity of notation, the interdependences over the prices are omitted). For
simplification of the further derivation, we also assume be = bA = bE = 1.
Imports M are also considered to be defined by an import demand function
M = M(X) = M[C(P'C) + A(P'A) + E(P'E)] (5.24)
If we perform the necessary substitutions we can formulate the following
optimization problem:
Rumen Dobrimky
max Ure rA rE [C(P'C), A(P'A)], ,
subject to:
P'C· C(P'C) + P'A . A(P'A) + P'E· E(P'E)
- K[C(P'C) + A(P'A) + E(P'E)] ~ R
P'E· E(P'E) - P'M· M[C(P'C) + A(P'A) + E(P'E)] ~ 13
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(5.25)
(5.25a)
(5.25b)
If we solve this problem of constrained optimization using the usual Lagrangean
technique, after several transformations (and making some assumptions) we can
arrive at an estimation equation for P' C, which in our derivation had the follow-
ing form (in a linearized version):
(5.26)
C A P'M 1+ a4 . - + as . - + a6 . + a7 . - + as + E:Y Y t
where t is a time-variable.
The expected signs of the coefficients are (+) for aI' a3 and a6; (-) for
a2' a4 and as; a7 is not determined.
The estimation results for equation (5.26) for the seven CMEA countries
for the period 1961-1982 are shown in Table 5.7. Some variables have been
removed from the regression because of wrong signs or negligible value. We did
not remove variables only because of high standard error of estimation, if they
had the right sign.
Finally, we would like to make some comments on the use of the consump-
tion function in the simulation model. As was pointed out, our general approach
is "supply driven" and the investment ratio is one of the main driving factors.
So, with respect to the ex ante forecasts, the consumption demand function plays
a secondary role. The value of the expected "consumption demand" is compared
to the generated value of "consumption supply". Since our production techno-
logy actually reflects the production boundary, the value of "consumption sup-
ply" can be treated as the maximum level available at this level of production.
On the other hand the value of "consumption demand" reflects the normally
expected level of consumption. So a resulting discrepancy between these two lev-
els might be regarded as an indicator of possible disequilibrium in the consumer
goods market.
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5.5. The Complete Models and Their Dynamic
Characteristics
161
A simplified picture of the structure of the complete macroeconomic models of
the CMEA countries is shown in Figure 5.1. The boxes on the figure correspond
to endogenous variables whereas the circles stand for exogenous ones. Although
the foreign trade sector is also partly reflected on Figure 5.1, we shall mainly
focus our attention on the domestic part. The foreign trade equations for the
CMEA countries which were used in the linked world model are presented in
Chapter 7 on "Growth is an Interdependent World Economy: Linking of
National Models with an Integrated System of International Trade".
Within the domestic part of each country model, there are 10 main
behavior equations:
(1) Production technology which determines total material output Y* [equa-
tion (5.1)].
(2) Real wages of the employed in the material sphere lr [equation (5.7)].
(3) Demand for consumption goods, denoted as Cd on Figure 5.1 [equation
(5.17)].
(4) Price index for consumption goods P'C [equation (5.26)].
(5) Structure of domestic production (Jj [six equations, specified as (5.16)].
The other endogenous variables including fixed assets K, final material
product Y, net material product NMP, gross accumulation A, gross investment
[G, "consumption supply" C, price deflator of NMP-P' NMP and some others
which are not shown on Figure 5.1 are determined from identities. All important
equations are given in Annex 2.
The main exogenous driving forces are: the rate of technical progress (or,
total factor productivity) w~ the number of employed persons in the material
sphere L, the rate of sorting out of fixed assets d, the investment (savings) ratio
s, the level of nominal wages in the material sphere L. They were analyzed in
more detail in Chapter 4.
The performance of the models was tested in dynamic ex post simulation
for 1965-1982. The mean absolute percentage errors (MAP E) for the four main
behavioral variables resulting from these simulations are shown in Table 5.8
(consumption C in this table is evaluated by "consumption demand"). For a
dynamic simulation these results can be regarded as satisfactory.
The dynamic performance of the models was also checked on the basis of
the dynamic elasticity multipliers. They were calculated as the dynamic
response of the models to a single positive shock of 10% in the level of some
important exogenous driving forces (for the exact formulas, see Chapter 7).
A selection of some of the main results is given in Table 5.9. The table
reports some elasticity multipliers calculated for a single shock in the level of
technical progress r and for the level of nominal wages in the material sphere l,
taking place in 1986. The medium scenario (described in other chapters) was
used as the control solution.
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Table 5.8. Ex post simulation test: mean absolute percentage errors of selected vari-
ables.
Country
Variable Bulgaria CSSR GDR Hungary Poland Romania USSR
y* 1.02 0.87 0.41 1.54 2.55 1.26 1.20
C 1.86 1.05 0.70 1.78 3.01 1.17 1.07
lr 2.19 2.32 1.63 1.45 3.58 1.93 1.21
P'C 3.03 1.27 2.13 3.81 4.13 1.79 1.42
Table 5.9. Elasticity multipliers: percentage level response of selected variables to a
single, positive 10% shock of T and I in 1986.
T I
--
Country Y NMP M Cd C p'y P'C P'C
Bulgaria 1.28 1.56 2.72 1.97 3.35 -0.85 -1.55 0.91
CSSR 1.23 1.43 1.02 0.86 1.94 -0.27 -0.38 0.44
GDR 1.25 1.36 1.01 0.94 1.74 -1.59 -1.97 0.90
Hungary 1.27 1.51 3.69 1.22 4.15 -0.99 -2.90 1.20
Poland 1.26 1.37 2.13 0.85 1.86 -0.90 -0.91 0.95
Romania 1.25 1.50 1.88 0.67 1.81 -1.31 -1.07 1.02
USSR 1.06 1.23 3.45 0.87 1.03 -0.91 -0.98 1.09
The calculated multipliers for T show a similar response of Y and NMP in
the countries. However, the responses of the other variables are more diversified.
Thus, the response of the import demand to the shock in T (actually, the latter
can be interpreted as a single shift to a higher rate of economic growth) is quite
high in Bulgaria, Hungary and USSR; it is moderate in Poland and Romania and
low in CSSR and CDR.
It is interesting to trace the induced response of the "consumption
demand" Cd and "consumption supply" C. Although the margins are different,
the effect is similar in all the countries: in all cases the induced response of C is
higher than that of Cd' This can be interpreted as a positive effect with respect
to the situation on the consumer goods markets.
5.6. Concluding Remarks
The macroeconomic models of the CMEA countries discussed in this chapter
were used for a number of simulations. First, the models were tested as separate
units; later they were linked to the other models of the Bonn-IIASA Project.
The actual results of these simulations are discussed in the other chapters of this
volume.
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[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
Bulgaria, CSSR, G DR, Hungary, Poland, Romania and USSR (the ordering is
alphabetical).
Our brief review concentrates only on some studies with empirical implementa-
tion.
See, for example, the recent survey and report on measuring total factor produc-
tivity in CMEA countries in the Econom~'c Survey of Europe (ESE, 1986).
Because of these difficulties some of the authors of the empirical studies quoted
above, although rejecting the marginal productivity assumptions theoretically, use
them in empirical estimates.
Formulas can be found in Welsch (1987).
It is easy to show that the OLS estimation of the production sector functions in
the form of (5.16) will guarantee that
E a i. = 0 j = 1,2,... ,5;i] , Ea~ = 1]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
which, in turn, provides that E Pi = 1.
1
It equals final material product produced less the balance of exports and imports
of goods and material services.
Note that, in accordance with MPS, we deal here only with consumption of
material goods and services.
The "theoretical" setup for the derivation which follows is based on ideas sug-
gested by Dr. H. Welsch.
X exceeds Y* by the value of imported investment and consumption goods which
are not included in the production technology (5.2).
Note that in this case total imports M enter the production function.
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Appendix 5A. A Theoretical Macromodel of Production and
Primary Distribution in a Socialist Economy
Consider a centrally planned economy where output Y is the "final material
product" (NMP plus the amortization fund), and where it is defined by a linear
homogeneous function of the two factor inputs L (number of employed persons
in the material sphere) and K (fixed assets in the material sphere):
Y = ,(L,K).
In a more general formulation which we use later:
(5A.la)
(SA.lb)
From the primary distribution of income (the third quadrant of the
input-output table) we have the following definitional identity (in nominal
terms)
(SA.2)
where Wn = total primary income of the employed in the material sphere, Qn =
gross primary income of the enterprises (including the net profit of the enter-
prises, the sum of indirect taxes collected for the state budget and, the amortiza-
tion fund, since we regard Yas final material product); P' Y is the price deflator
of Y.
Further, we denote
(SA.3)
(SAA)
where I is the nominal wage (primary income) of one person employed in the
material sphere; q is the primary income per unit of fixed assets. Whereas
(SA.3) is a straightforward relation, (SAA) may seem a bit dubious, especially
because of the presence of indirect taxes in Qn which are a matter of state regu-
lation and can hardly be associated with K. In a theoretical setting it would be
more correct to exclude taxes from Y. However, the relevant data for the empir-
ical implementation of this division were missing. However, the other two terms,
and most of all the amortization fund, are directly linked to the value of K.
Furthermore, we can write (SA.2) as
Y·P'Y=I·L+q·K (SA.S)
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(SA.6a)
In a more general formulation which we use later, and In accordance with
(SA.Ib) we can rewrite (SA.6a) as
(SA.6b)
where ql and q2 denote the unit primary incomes (factor remuneration). In
(SA.6a)
(S.A7)
is the real wage (primary income) of one employed person in the material sphere
(throughout the chapter we use the term "real wage" only in this sense). More-
over,
q -~
r - P'Y (S.A8)
is the real primary income per unit of fixed assets.
We now make a slight digression. From the setting of equations
(SA.I)-(SA.8) there is only one step to the standard marginal productivity
assumption. Actually, if we interpret lR and qr as "factor prices" of Land K,
and assuming profit-maximizing (or cost-minimizing) behavior of the producer,
from the constrained optimization of (SA.I) we would get al/aL = lr i
a1/aK = qr which is the usual neoclassical approach.
However, we consider that a step in this direction should not be made when
modeling a socialist economy. The main argument against it is the fact that lr
and qr are not and cannot be regarded as "factor prices", because (especially in a
centrally planned economy) the primary division of income in (SA.2)-(SA.6) only
indicates a distribution relation which is not an element of the process of crea-
tion of the income (SA.I). This fact, which is one of the main arguments against
the marginal productivity theory, has been pointed out by many of its critics.
However little, if anything at all, has been suggested toward a constructive con-
tinuation of this critique in the direction of workable estimation procedures for
the production function (SA.I), based on alternative assumptions.
In what follows we try to suggest a possible approach which could provide
an alternative to the standard marginal productivity assumptions.
We start from the fact that the primary division of income reflects an
income distribution relation. In allocating the available income the planning
agency follows certain criteria: it considers social justice and incentives to work
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by determining the relation between wage income and residual income of the
enterprises (which is mostly used for accumulation). We represent these criteria
in the form of a social utility function defined over the factor remunerations, i.e.,
U( ql ,q2)' The decision-making process connected with the income distribution
can be modeled as a process of maximizing social utility U( Ql,Q2) in the presence
of the budget constraint (5A.6). Formally, this is equivalent to the derivation of
demand equations from a utility maximization problem.
As follows from demand theory (see, e.g., Phlips, 1983) the constrained
utility maximization in such a system would yield the distribution functions in
the form
(5A.9)
[In these distribution functions the places of "quantities" and "prices" are
inverted as compared to demand functions. However, they are not to be mixed
with "inverse" demand functions in the sense of Anderson (1980). Besides, we
shall speak about "production elasticities" and "quantity elasticities" instead of
the usual "expenditure elasticities" and "price elasticities" .j
Next we consider that the planning agency plans the production (5A.la)
(the allocation of xl and x2) taking into account that the primary distribution
will be carried out in accordance with (5A.9) and (5A.6a) and on the basis of
other criteria as well. Taking into consideration the existing planning practice,
one possible way to model this decision-making process is the following optimiza-
tion problem. The planning agency maximizes output Y and at the same time
sets the goal to guarantee a certain level of the real wages of the employed per-
son: ql'
Y = f( xl x2) such that
I
(5A.1O)
Note that in the case of distribution functions derived from constrained maximi-
zation of a duly specified utility function (as we assume) the budget constraint
will be guaranteed automatically. Since we already have a restriction on one of
the two distribution functions of the system we do not have to include a budget
constraint in the optimization problem and this simplifies the solution
significantly. The Lagrangean function in this case can be defined as:
(5A.Il)
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If we take the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and make all the necessary transforma-
tions, we get the solution of this optimization problem in the form:
(5A.12)
This general relation can be regarded in a way as an analogue to the standard
marginal productivity assumption, applied to a socialist economy. Obviously
(5A.12) is less restrictive because it does not establish the relation between the
marginal productivities as a static proportion, but as a proportion of incremental
changes in the distribution function.
In order to make practical use of this derivation we have to specify the pro-
duction function and the distribution system and analyze the implied relation-
ships between the parameters. For the production function, as we have already
discussed, we assume a linear homogeneous Cobb-Douglas form:
(5.AI3)
If we also assume a Cobb-Douglas specification for the social utility function, we
arrive at a distribution system which is formally equivalent to the Linear Expen-
diture System. We used the dynamic version of this system as formulated by
Pollak (1970) and Phlips (1972) and further elaborated by Klevmarken (1981)
and Welsch (1986, 1987). Without going into detail we shall just mention that
the main assumption of this model (interpreted in terms of our system) is that
the actual level of factor remuneration qj has two components: a "base" level q/
which is proportional to the lagged actual level:
(5A.14)
where Aj denotes a habit formation coefficient; and an "excess" component
(qj - q/) which depends on the actual income-quantity situation ( Y, xl x2).
The resulting distribution equation is: '
(5A.15)
where {Jj is the marginal share in Y of unit income i.
After transformation (5A.15) can be rearranged in the following estimable
form with respect to our variables lr and qr:
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(5A.I6)
where the estimable parameters aj' bj , j = 1,2,3 are related to the parameters of
the structural equation (5A.I5) and among themselves as follows:
al = ~1 . (1 (31) = ~1 . f3q = b3
a 2 = f3 1 = 1 - f3q = 1 - b2
a3 = ~q • f31 = ~q . (1 - f3q) = b1
(5A.I7)
Obviously, since the distribution system is derived with a budget constraint it is
sufficient to estimate only one equation of (5A.I6) - the first one, for instance -
in order to determine the whole system.
Taking the marginal productivities from (5A.I3) and the quantity deriva-
tives of lr from (5A.I6) and substituting them into (5A.I2) yields:
(5A.I8)
Equation (5A.I8) defines the relation between the parameters of the production
and the distribution functions which can be used during the estimation.
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CHAPTER 6
Economic Growth and Structural
Change in Developing Countries
Istvan Szekely
Summary
Macroeconometric submodels of different groups of developing countries have
been constructed and integrated into the Bonn-IIASA World Model. The sub-
models are designed to reflect the specific characteristics of these economies.
The results of the medium-term scenario analysis indicate the contours of
economic development in the different regions through the end of this century.
A detailed analysis arrives at the conclusion that, if no far-reaching measures are
undertaken, the limit of feasible growth rate differences between the developed
market economies and the developing countries considered in the study lies
between 1.5-2%. This pace implies scarcely any reduction of the existing income
gap.
6.1. Introduction
Previous chapters discussed the different aspects of economic growth and struc-
tural change in developed market and centrally planned economies. In the
present chapter, we continue this analysis by focusing on the specific characteris-
tics of developing economies. The framework we apply to these economies is
similar to the one generally used in the Bonn-IIASA Research Project. However,
there are some special features of this analysis which reflect the different nature
of economic growth and structural change in these economies.
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Due to the limitations of our project, the developing countries are modeled
as a group. The only exception is India, which is modeled separately because of
its dominant size and different growth pattern. The composition of the groups
differs from those of well-known world models. To achieve a reasonable degree
of homogeneity and a manageable size, representative countries were selected in
the different regions and considered as groups. Countries were selected based on
their common cultural and historical backgrounds and on similarities in their
growth patterns. The description of the groups is given in Annex 1 to this
volume.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, the macroeconometric
model used in our analysis is described in detail. In Section 6.3, attention is
directed to the future development of developing countries. Using the results of
a medium-term scenario analysis, the growth prospects of different regions of
developing countries are investigated. Finally, in the Appendix, the estimation
results are presented together with the results of an ex post simulation.
6.2. Models for Groups of Developing Countries
in the Bonn-IIASA World Model
6.2.1. General description of the models
The structure of the models of the different groups of developing countries is
essentially no different from that of the models specified for the developed
market economies and described in the previous chapters. However, there are
some differences reflecting the specific characteristics of the developing
economies under study. In the discussion that follows, these differences will be
indicated.
A full-scale model of a group consists of 83 equations, of which 29 are sto-
chastic behavioral equations and 54 are identities. It contains 98 variables, of
which 15 are exogenous. The model as a whole is highly nonlinear. In the
Linked World Model, described in Chapter 7, a somewhat tailored form of these
models is used. The simplifications mainly concern the commodity structure of
foreign trade and were necessary to obtain a manageable size for the world
model.
Since there is no natural unit of domestic currency for groups of countries
and since an important economic indicator would have been lost by using dollar
terms, artificial currencies were defined for these groups of developing countries.
The exchange rate of an artificial currency against the US dollar is a weighted
geometric average of the individual exchange rate indices of the national
currencies of the group, where the 1975 values of these indices were normalized
to 1, and the nominal GDPs were used for weighting. The variables in the
model are expressed in terms of these artificial currencies unless otherwise
stated.
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Stemming from the basically supply-oriented nature of our models, the out-
put is determined by a production function. To reflect the interdependencies in
the production process, besides the usual factors of production, imports of raw
and intermediate materials are also incorporated into the specification. In con-
trast to the developed market economies, marginal productivity theory is not
applied in the estimation of the input elasticities. Technical progress is one of
the main driving forces in the model.
Total output is, then, disaggregated into six sectors by sector share func-
tions. This way of determining the sectoral outputs reflects the generally
adopted top-down approach of our model.
The investment ratio determining the level of investment in real terms is
another important exogenous driving force of the model.
The volume of imports is determined by an import demand function, which
is based on a dynamic version of the Linear Expenditure System. The total
import demand, then, is disaggregated into four commodity groups by a demand
system based on the same approach. In the Linked World Model, only the
aggregate import demand is determined.
In explaining export flows, the general idea of the model is that exports of
the different countries or groups are determined by the pooled import demand of
the others. This, together with the world market prices in the different commod-
ity groups, determines the nominal demand in each commodity group. Interpret-
ing these nominal demands as incomes allocated to imports of the different com-
modity groups and using again the framework of the Linear Expenditure System,
export demand functions are specified for the different commodity groups.
Exports of services are assumed to be proportional to exports of goods, and total
exports are then determined as the sum of the different export items. In the
Linked World Model, again, only aggregate exports are modeled. Specification of
the export demand functions designed for this purpose is given in Chapter 7.
Effective demand meets the level of production by adjusting the level of
consumption.
Turning to prices, the general price level is determined from the Fisher
equation. Money supply is assumed to be exogenous, and the income velocity of
money is endogenized.
The investment deflator is explained by the general price level and by the
import deflator.
As to foreign trade prices, in contrast to the approach for the developed
market economies, price-taking behavior is assumed. This means that both
export and the import prices in the different commodity groups are linked to
corresponding world market prices.
The consumption deflator is left to be determined from the GDP expendi-
ture identity.
Finally, determination of the exchange rate is based on purchasing power
parity theory. In spite of the widely emphasized problems of this approach, we
felt that it best suited the behavior of financial markets in developing countries
and the medium-term orientation of our model.
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6.2.2. Specification of selected equations and the estimation results
The production function
The production function is of Cobb-Douglas type with constant returns to scale.
Technical progress is assumed to be Hicks-neutral with constant exponential rate
of growth, but with a specification that allows different rates of technical prog-
ress for different time periods. The estimated form of this function can be writ-
ten
where Y*, K, Land IMR are output, capital and labor input and input of
imported raw materials and energy, respectively. Y* is the sum of real GDP and
real imports of raw materials and energy (approximated by the sum of SITC
categories 2, 3 and 4). Since no reliable indicator of capacity utilization is
available, K is taken as gross capital stock. L represents the number of the
economically active population. As to the specification of technical progress, t is
the time trend, te indicates the year when the change in the rate of technical
progress takes place, and de is a dummy variable (0 until te , and 1 thereafter).
Following from this specification, the rate of technical progress equals a2 in the
first subperiod and a2 + a3 in the second.
Table 6A.l in the Appendix reports the estimation results of the production
function. The equations were estimated in their original form by the MIDIS
(MInimum DIStance) method. In the case of group 11 (oil-exporting countries)'
the real value added of the sector mining and quarrying was deducted from Y*.
This reflects the fact that the production of this sector could not be explained by
a supply-driven approach.
In order to identify the switching point in the rate of technical progress, the
production function was estimated for different time periods but with a constant
and uniform rate of technical progress. The switching point (te) shown in the
second line of Table 6A.l was set where the estimated rate of technical progress
changed substantially. In the estimation for the whole period, the value of a2
was set at the estimated rate of technical progress in the first subperiod. In the
case of India, groups 14 and 18, there was no indication of change in the rate of
technical progress.
Regarding the estimated values of the output elasticity of capital (a4), it
can be observed that, with the exception of groups 11 and 12, they are quite near
to each other, faIling in the range of 0.42 and 0.46. The estimated value for
group 12 is in line with the results of other studies on countries of this group
(see, e.g., Chen, 1979, pp. 62-63). With respect to the output elasticity of
imported raw materials and energy (a6)' the results clearly show the importance
of this factor. Except for India, the estimated parameters are larger than 0.1
and, with the exception of groups 11 and 18, they are strongly significant. It is
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important to note that the real imports of raw materials and energy are deter-
mined endogenously in the model.
The structure of production
In the model, six producing sectors are distinguished. Agriculture comprises
ISIC major division 1, mining and quarrying, manufacturing, utilities and con-
struction refer to ISIC major divisions 2 through 5 and services cover major divi-
sions 6 through 9.
The structure of production is explained by a Cobb-Douglas type function,
having the following form:
(6.2)
where Yi is the share of real value added produced by sector i in real GDP;
Y, K, IM, EX and I refer to real GDP, real capital stock, real imports, real
exports, and gross capital formation in real terms, respectively; and L represents
the number of the economically active population.
Since this specification does not guarantee the fulfillment of the adding-up
constraint, the estimated sector shares are scaled to add up to 1.
The general price level
The general price level is determined from the Fisher equation by assuming that
the money supply is exogenous:
p = Mv
Y
(6.3)
where M refers to money measured as end-of-period M2 money stock, and it is
expressed in terms of the artificial currency defined for the group. The income
velocity of money is determined by the following equation:
(6.4)
where v is the income velocity of money (M2), Y and L are real GDP and
economically active population and wp refers to the rate of inflation.
The original specification of equation (6.4) also included the interest rate,
but finally it was left out for different reasons. First, reliable figures on interest
rates were available only for some of the countries in our model. Second, in most
of the countries where these figures were available, the interest rates were insti-
tutionally pegged and did not in general reflect financial market conditions. This
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character of the interest rates in developing countries was pointed out by several
empirical studies investigating the money markets in these countries [see, e.g.,
Wong (1977) and Driscoll and Lahiri (1982)]. It was also pointed out in these
studies that the speculative demand for money was negligible in these economies.
The estimation results are shown in Table 6A.2 in the Appendix.
For group 11, the general price level is determined by the following func-
tion:
(6.4)
where p, PIM and PEX are GDP, import, and export deflators, respectively. The
estimation re~ults of this equation are also shown in Table 6A.2. The parameters
are plausible, and the specification permits correlating the short- and long-run
adjustment of the domestic price level with the export and import prices.
Real imports
The equations describing the import demand of the different groups of develop-
ing countries are based on a dynamic version of the Linear Expenditure System.
The theoretical derivation of the specification can be found in Welsch (1987).
The estimated form of the import demand function can be written
where 1M, I, C, EX, and Yare real imports of goods and services, gross capital
formation in real terms, real consumption, real exports of goods and services,
and real GDP, respectively, and the price terms refer to the corresponding
deflators. One of the advantages of this specification is that it can reflect the
changes in the expenditure structure of GDP. The estimation results show that,
in the case of developing countries this effect is of great importance since the
increase of the share of gross capital formation has a rather strong influence on
their import demand.
For this specification, the short-run import price elasticity is given by
1ME8r - a ~-1IM,PIM - 1 1M
and the long-run elasticity by
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Table 6A.9 in the Appendix shows the regression results of equation (6.6).
In the last two columns, the estimated values of the price elasticites can be
found. The equations were estimated by the MIDIS method. In all cases, the
import propensity of consumption (parameter aa) was found to be insignificant.
This may be due to the strong multicollinearity among the explanatory variables
and to the rigidity of the import demand for consumption. The other parame-
ters bear the signs required by the theoretical approach and are in general
significant. The widely varying estimated values of the propensities of the
different expenditure items seem to justify our approach of disaggregating the
income term in the import demand function.
Commodity structure 0/ real imports
In the foreign trade part of the model, the structure of exports and imports of
goods is described by four commodity groups: agricultural goods (commodity
group 1) comprise SITC major groups 0 and 1; crude materials (commodity
group 2) make up SITC major groups 2 and 4; mineral fuels (commodity group
3) refer to SITC major group 3; and manufactured goods (commodity group 4)
cover SITC major groups 5 through 9. In the presentation of the model, we shall
always refer to these commodity groups. The commodity structure of the
imports of goods is explained by a demand system also based on a dynamic ver-
sion of the Linear Expenditure System:
IM~1 pJM
k + u
PIM
(6.7)
4 aUE a2k = 1 and -----'---
k=1 l- a2k
k, 1= 1, ... ,4
where superscripts k and I refer to the commodity groups and superscript G
indicates that 1M refers only to the imports of goods. Each demand system con-
sists of four equations, but only three of them are estimated. The parameters of
the fourth equation can be calculated from those of the first three.
In the case of group 11 (oil-exporting countries), imports of mineral fuels
could not be explained by this demand system. Since the share of this commo-
dity group in total imports of goods is negligible and of no importance in the
explanation of the production, it is taken as exogenous in the model. In the case
of India, imports of agricultural goods could not be explained by this
specification, either. This is probably due to the fact that the import demand of
India in this commodity group is strongly influenced by the harvest conditions,
and this factor is not reflected in the specification. In the case of group 15, the
lagged effect of the agricultural imports could not be identified and, therefore,
this parameter was set to zero.
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When looking at the results of the estimations in Table 6A.4 in the Appen-
dix, it can be found that the parameters in all cases bear the correct sign from
the point of view of theory and they are in general significant. It is interesting to
compare the different groups of developing countries with respect to the margi-
nal expenditure shares (a 2). In doing so, it can be observed that these parame-
ters are quite similar for all groups. The only notable exception is India, which
has a rather different structure of these parameters. Comparing the structures
of marginal expenditure shares of the developed countries in question to those of
the developed market economy (see Welsch, 1986, p. 13), the developing coun-
tries are characterized by very high shares of manufactured goods. When mak-
ing the same comparison with respect to the persistence coefficient [ad (1 - a2)1,
it can be found that the values of these parameters are considerably lower in
developing countries. The only exception is group 12, for which the coefficients
are rather similar to those of the developed market economies.
Real exports
The export demand functions are specified for the different commodity groups
by:
(6.8)
where k (k = 1,... ,4) refers to the commodity groups, EX is the real exports of
the country under consideration, WT is the volume of world trade in the com-
modity group, and p WT is the corresponding price deflator. Superscript F refers
to the countries different from the one under consideration. Superscript $ indi-
cates that the variables are expressed in US$ terms.
The results are given in Table 6A.5 in the Appendix. In the case of India
and group 15, the exports of mineral fuels (SITC 3) could not be explained in
this way. This is probably due to the fact that their exports were determined
not only by the demand side but by the supply side as well. For group 12, it was
necessary to distinquish between the import demand of the developed market
economies and that of the rest of the world because of the considerable
differences in the marginal expenditure shares. (The corresponding parameters
in Table 6A.5 are a2 and a3; a 4 stands for the lagged effect originated in the
countries different from the ones in group 12.) The specification of the export
demand function used in the Linked World Model is given in Chapter 7.
Export and import prices
The export and import prices of the developing countries in the different
commodity groups are linked to the world market prices by the following equa-
tions:
btvan Szi~l!I 181
(6.9)
(6.10)
where PfM and P[;X are the export and import prices of the group under con-
sideration and PWT stands for the world market prices. Superscript k refers to
the commodity groups. Superscript $ indicates that the variables are expressed
in US$ terms.
In the Linked World Model, a similar approach was applied to the aggre-
gate export and import prices. The design of these equations is given in Chapter
7.
6.2.3. Ex post simulations
As the models discussed above were developed for ex ante simulations, it is of
basic importance to evaluate their ability to forecast. In the case of dynamic
simultaneous econometric models, as it is widely pointed out, it is not sufficent to
perform statistical tests only on the individual equations. Therefore, we made ex
post simulations to investigate the models in this respect. Since in the next sec-
tion the analysis will be based on ex ante simulations with the Linked World
Model, the results of the ex post simulation presented in Table 6A.6 in the
Appendix refer to the same model [1]. The simulation period was 1966-1981.
Taking into consideration the fact that the simulation period covers the two oil
shocks, the values of the mean absolute percentage error reported in this table
can be rated as satisfactory.
6.3. Growth Prospects of the Developing Countries:
Results of a Medium-term Scenario Analysis
The ultimate goal of the Bonn-IIASA Research Project was to indicate the possi-
ble growth paths of the different regions of the world economy. To trace these
paths, the world model developed in the project was used for a medium-term
scenario analysis. Chapter 2 provided a general description of the design of this
analysis and discussed the main results of the medium scenario. Here, we con-
centrate on the developing countries.
6.3.1. Assumptions of the scenarios
Similar to the procedure applied to other regions, three different sets of assump-
tions were used to define the scenarios. Table 6.1 summarizes these assumptions.
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Table 6.1. The definition of scenarios for developing countries.
Country group"
Variable
Rate of growth of
labor input
(economically
active population)
Rate of (Hicks-
neutral) technical
progress
Gross investment
ratio
Rate of depreciation
Rate of change of
money supply (M2)
Scenario
and
period
all:
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
high:
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
medium:
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
low:
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
high:
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
medium:
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
low:
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
all:
1986-2000
all:
1986-2000
11
2.39
2.75
2.37
1.69
2.00
2.00
0.00
1.31
1.50
-1.03
-0.02
0.88
29.05
29.87
30.00
24.05
24.87
25.00
19.00
20.32
21.00
2.50
12
2.04
2.29
2.08
1.87
2.00
2.00
1.00
1.44
1.50
0.62
0.81
0.98
28.29
28.89
29.00
25.25
25.35
25.50
20.73
21.85
22.00
3.3
18.0
India
1.63
2.00
1.82
0.96
1.00
1.00
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
25.84
25.89
26.00
21.50
22.82
23.00
18.62
19.91
20.00
1.7
15.0
19
2.62
3.08
2.60
0.85
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.66
0.75
-0.49
0.03
0.44
22.65
24.69
25.00
20.86
22.72
23.00
14.89
17.58
18.00
2.3
20.0
1-4
2.60
3.11
2.46
1.18
1.20
1.20
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
17.45
19.70
20.00
14.95
16.76
17.00
10.79
11.89
12.00
3.2
45.0
15
2.66
2.90
2.55
1.95
2.00
2.00
1.60
1.73
1.75
1.44
1.44
1.44
23.04
24.82
25.00
19.22
21.65
22.00
16.13
18.53
19.00
1.4
45.0
18
2.91
2.99
2.54
2.22
2.22
2.22
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
24.73
26.76
27.00
20.54
22.74
23.00
16.43
19.21
19.50
1.5
22.0
"Group code numbers refer to the following: group 11 = oil-exporting countries; group 12 =
Asian countries excluding India; group 13 = developing African countries; group 14 = Latin
American countries excluding group 15; group 15 = Argentina, Brazil, Mexico; and group 18 =
Middle Eastern and North African countries excluding groups 11 and 13.
The scenarios (called high, medium, and low) differ in their rates of technical
progress and in the gross investment ratios.
As to the gross investment ratio, the assumptions were designed in the fol-
lowing way. In the case of (oil-exporting countries), in the low scenario, the level
reached right after the first oil shock; in the medium scenario, the average level
between the two oil shocks; and finally, in the high scenario, the level reached
after the second oil shock were assumed. For groups 12 and 15, in the low
scenario, the average of the historically observed lowest values; in the high
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scenario, that of the historically observed highest ones; and finally, in the
medium scenario, the average of the remaining observations was assumed. In
the case of groups 13, 14 and 18, the same principle was used for the domestic
savings ratio, but not for the external sources of investment. A substantial
decrease in the latter was assumed. The resulting gross investment ratios (which
are consequently rather moderate as compared with the historically observed
values, but still quite high as compared with those of the developed market
economies) reflect the outcome of these two assumptions. For India (where
domestic saving was the dominant factor in the determination of investment), in
the medium scenario, it was assumed that the level of the investment ratio
reached during the second half of 1970s will be kept up in the long run. In the
high scenario, the observed tendency for the investment ratio to increase was
assumed to continue leveling off at 26%. In the low scenario, the average of the
historically observed values was assumed.
As to the rate of technical progress, in the case of India, groups 14 and 18
(regions where there was no indication of change in this parameter), the
estimated rates indicated in Table 6A.l in the Appendix were used in the
medium and in the low scenarios; while in the high scenario, a moderate increase
in these rates was assumed. For the other groups (where the estimation results
indicated a substantial decrease in the rate of technical progress after the first or
second oil shock), a gradual increase was assumed, leveling off differently in the
three scenarios. But it was never assumed that any of these countries could
reach those very high levels maintained until the switching points. (These levels
are given by the estimated values of a2 in Table 6A.l in the Appendix.)
The main results of the solutions of the Linked World Model for the
developing countries under the scenarios described above are presented in Tables
6.2 to 6.4 [2].
6.3.2. Growth prospects
One of the most important questions of social and economic development in the
developing countries is the feasibility of accelerated growth. Such accelerated
growth would be necessary in order to narrow the income gap [3] between
developed and developing countries. Narrowing the income gap, it is hoped,
would bring more social justice and equality of opportunity.
The feasibility of such a goal can be investigated from several points of
view. Certainly, there are physical limits to faster growth in the long run, espe-
cially if it is not accompanied by the necessary structural changes. The rapidly
increasing pollution of the environment could also lead to constraints on any
accelerated growth, especially in the developing countries, where the new techno-
logies necessary to reduce pollution substantially are not available. Moreover,
recent structural changes in the world economy have tended to relocate the most
polluting industries and technologies from the industrialized countries to the
developing countries. The availability of mineral resources could also become a
factor limiting economic growth. Changes in the social environment are also
essential conditions for faster economic development in the developing countries.
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Table 6.£. Results of the analysis: high scenario.
Country groupa
Variable Period 11 1£ India 19 1'; 15 18
Growth rate of 1986-1990 10.3 5.9 4.5 3.8 5.9 7.4 7.1
real GDP 1991-1995 8.8 5.9 4.5 4.7 6.2 7.6 7.8
1996-2000 7.7 5.5 4.4 4.5 5.8 7.5 7.6
Growth rate of 1986-1990 3.7 6.6 10.5 4.5 10.1 12.0 3.9
real imports 1991-1995 8.4 6.8 6.0 4.9 8.2 7.2 8.1
1996-2000 6.9 6.9 5.4 4.9 7.0 6.8 7.9
Rate of change 1986-1990 1.3 0.6 0.8 2.6 0.2 1.7 2.5
of import prices 1991-1995 4.2 3.8 4.0 4.2 3.6 4.0 3.8
(in US$) 1996-2000 4.7 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.3
Growth rate of 1986-1990 11.2 5.4 5.8 2.9 3.4 5.0 3.7
real exports 1991-1995 10.6 6.9 10.0 6.0 6.4 6.7 7.1
1996-2000 7.9 7.3 8.9 7.2 6.7 7.3 7.0
Rate of change of 1986-1990 -8.7 1.2 0.1 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.9
export prices 1991-1995 2.8 3.8 2.6 3.2 4.7 3.5 4.5
(in US$) 1996-2000 4.1 4.2 3.0 3.5 5.1 3.8 4.9
Trade balance 1986-1990 -0.2 -3.6 -4.8 -2.9 -3.7 -0.4 -7.8
to GDP 1991-1995 2.6 -4.0 -5.5 -4.8 -6.3 -1.5 -8.3
1996-2000 3.1 -3.8 -5.1 -3.7 -6.4 -1.6 -8.4
Trade balance 1986-1990 -1.0 -6.7 -78.5 -10.6 -27.1 -5.4 -55.1
to exports 1991-1995 9.0 -7.3 -74.7 -17.2 -45.3 -21.6 --62.6
1996-2000 10.9 -6.4 -57.7 -12.5 -44.0 -23.5 -63.8
Imports to 1986-1990 28.6 60.9 8.1 36.3 20.3 9.6 16.3
GDP 1991-1995 26.6 62.7 9.2 37.0 23.9 10.1 16.1
(in real terms) 1996-2000 25.9 66.0 9.6 37.5 25.3 9.8 16.4
Exports to 1986-1990 34.3 55.0 6.2 29.2 14.1 9.1 14.8
GDP 1991-1995 40.1 56.0 7.9 29.8 13.6 8.5 13.9
(in real terms) 1996-2000 41.3 59.7 9.7 32.8 14.0 8.3 13.6
a For definitions of group code numbers, see note to Table 6.1.
All of these aspects are very important, especially in the longer run, but the
recent development of the world economy suggests that the most serious factors
limiting accelerated growth in the developing countries probably originate from
the international economic environment, which these countries must face. The
scarcity of external financial resources necessary to increase investment and,
through this, achieve a faster rate of technical progress seems to be the most
acute problem in this respect.
Viewing the results of the scenario analysis from this angle, we can associ-
ate the different growth paths of the world economy described by the different
scenarios with the corresponding trade balance indicators. Since we concentrate
on the feasibility of accelerated growth that may ultimately narrow the income
gap, Table 6.5 gives the differences, in terms of annual growth rates, between the
developed market economies as a whole and the different groups of developing
countries with respect to real CDP and real CDP per capita.
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Table 6.9. Results of the analysis: medium scenario.
Country groupa
Variable Period 11 12 India 19 1-/ 15 18
3.7 2.5 5.1
3.6 3.8 5.3
3.5 3.8 5.0
11.3 3.2 8.8
6.2 3.4 6.9
5.0 3.5 5.8
1.2 3.0 0.5
4.8 5.2 4.4
5.4 5.6 5.4
2.3 1.1 0.8
7.6 3.5 3.4
6.9 4.7 4.0
Growth rate of
real GDP
Growth rate of
real imports
Rate of change
of import prices
(in U8$)
Growth rate of
real exports
Rate of change of
export prices
(in U8$)
Trade balance
to GDP
Trade balance
to exports
Imports to
GDP
(in real terms)
Exports to
GDP
(in real terms)
1986-1990 6.6 4.2
1991-1995 6.8 4.6
1996-2000 6.2 4.2
1986-1990 -0.9 5.1
1991-1995 5.8 4.8
1996-2000 4.7 4.8
1986-1990 1.7 0.9
1991-1995 5.1 4.7
1996-2000 5.9 5.4
1986-1990 8.5 3.6
1991-1995 8.7 4.6
1996-2000 6.7 4.9
1986-1990 -8.7 1.5
1991-1995 2.8 4.7
1996-2000 4.1 5.3
1986-1990 1.8 -2.2
1991-1995 4.8 -3.4
1996-2000 5.0 -3.6
1986-1990 6.5 -4.0
1991-1995 17.5 -6.2
1996-2000 18.3 -6.5
1986-1990 25.9 60.0
1991-1995 23.2 60.9
1996-2000 21.9 62.0
1986-1990 34.0 55.6
1991-1995 40.3 55.0
1996-2000 41.8 56.0
0.3
3.1
3.8
-3.5
-5.4
-5.9
-68.2
-94.0
-91.7
6.5
7.9
8.5
5.3
6.2
7.2
1.2
3.9
4.4
-1.9
-4.8
-5.4
-6.8
-18.6
-21.0
34.7
34.6
34.1
29.1
28.0
28.5
1.8
5.7
6.4
-2.0
-4.9
-5.6
-15.8
-41.1
-48.0
17.5
20.0
20.9
13.3
11.7
11.0
6.2
6.7
6.6
10.2
6.5
5.5
2.1
4.9
5.5
3.3
4.5
5.0
1.4
4.3
4.8
1.3
-0.3
-0.8
16.8
-5.2
-12.6
7.7
8.4
8.1
9.3
8.2
7.6
6.0
6.8
6.6
1.0
6.1
6.1
2.8
4.5
5.2
0.7
4.1
4.4
1.3
5.4
6.2
-5.7
-6.2
-6.3
-43.4
-55.0
-59.9
14.0
13.1
12.8
13.8
11.7
10.6
a For definitions of group code numbers, see note to Table 6.1.
In interpreting the results for group 11 (oil-exporting countries), it should
be borne in mind that, in the model of this group, the production of the oil sector
(the contribution of which to total GDP is extremly high, and the production of
which is almost entirely exported) is demand-driven. As a consequence, the
manageable extent of growth difference is mainly determined by the overall pace
of economic growth in the other regions. Under the most favorable scenario
analyzed in the project, even a very high growth difference of 5-6% seems to be
feasible. In terms of GDP per capita, this would mean a growth difference of
3.4-4.1%. Under the medium scenario, it decreases to 4-5% with respect to
GDP and to 2.4-3.1% with respect to GDP per capita, which should also be con-
sidered high by all standards. Under the low scenario, the corresponding ranges
are 2.5-3.5% and 0.9-1.6% [4]. According to the results, growth differences
larger than these values tend to lead to a deterioration of the foreign trade bal-
ance.
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Table 6.4. Results of the analysis: low scenario.
The Future 0/ the World Economy
Country groupa
Variable
Growth rate of
real GDP
Growth rate of
real imports
Rate of change
of import prices
(in US$)
Growth rate of
real exports
Rate of change of
export prices
(in US$)
Trade balance
toGDP
Trade balance
to exports
Imports to
GDP
(in real terms)
Exports to
GDP
(in real terms)
Period 11 12
1986-1990 3.4 3.2
1991-1995 4.0 3.3
1996-2000 3.7 2.9
1986-1990 -5.6 3.7
1991-1995 2.9 2.7
1996-2000 1.3 2.3
1986-1990 2.0 1.4
1991-1995 6.2 5.7
1996-2000 7.7 7.0
1986-1990 4.6 2.1
1991-1995 5.9 2.2
1996-2000 3.9 2.0
1986-1990 -8.7 1.9
1991-1995 2.8 5.7
1996-2000 4.1 6.9
1986-1990 3.3 -1.2
1991-1995 5.8 -3.0
1996-2000 4.7 -3.9
1986-1990 13.3 -2.3
1991-1995 22.8 -5.9
1996-2000 20.0 -7.9
1986-1990 22.5 57.8
1991-1995 19.5 57.0
1996-2000 18.0 55.5
1986-1990 32.1 54.4
1991-1995 37.9 51.6
1996-2000 39.0 49.5
India
3.5
3.4
3.2
10.8
6.5
5.3
1.7
5.9
7.0
-1.6
4.1
3.1
0.5
3.7
4.9
-2.6
-5.1
--6.4
--60.7
-129.8
-173.5
6.1
6.5
7.2
4.5
4.4
4.4
19
1.2
2.4
2.7
0.7
2.0
1.6
3.5
6.4
7.5
-0.6
0.8
1.3
1.6
4.7
5.7
2.0
-2.3
-4.4
7.2
-9.5
-20.0
29.8
29.8
28.6
28.9
26.5
24.9
3.8
4.2
3.9
2.3
4.9
4.0
0.8
5.4
7.0
-1.6
0.0
0.0
2.3
6.9
8.4
1.0
-1.3
-2.5
7.7
-13.1
-27.5
13.3
14.2
14.3
12.7
10.1
8.5
15
5.4
5.8
5.5
8.7
6.2
3.5
2.6
6.0
7.3
1.7
2.1
2.1
1.7
5.2
6.3
2.6
0.7
-0.0
33.7
11.5
-0.8
6.2
6.6
6.3
9.3
7.8
6.7
18
5.1
6.1
5.9
-2.8
4.3
3.3
3.1
5.3
6.6
-2.3
0.4
0.3
1.7
6.6
8.1
-3.8
-4.3
-4.3
-30.4
-46.8
-58.1
11.8
10.1
9.1
12.7
9.4
7.3
a For definitions of group code numbers, see note to Table 6.1.
In the case of the other groups, although the limits of feasible growth
differences correlate positively with the overall rate of growth in the world econ-
omy, this relation does not seem to be so strong.
As to group 12 (Asian countries) the results tend to suggest that under the
medium scenario, this region would be able to keep up a growth difference of
1.5-2% with respect to GDP. Although this growth path would be associated
with a negative balance of trade, it does not seem unmanageable. This pace, in
turn, would mean a growth difference with respect to real GDP per capita level-
ing off at 0.6-1.1% by the end of this century. Under the high scenario, these
values would be increased by about 0.5%.
In the case of India, the alarmingly high foreign trade deficits are clear
signs of the fact that even a gradually declining growth difference of 1.0-0.7%
with respect to GDP (which would actually mean a slowly widening income gap
between India and the developed market economies as a whole) would be hard to
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Table 6.5. Differences in annual growth rates (%) between developed market economies
and groups of developing countries.
Scenario Country groupa
and
Variable period 11 1£ India 19 1-4 15 18
Real GDP high:
1986-1990 6.8 2.4 1.0 0.3 2.4 3.9 3.6
1991-1995 5.1 2.2 0.8 1.0 2.5 3.9 4.1
1996-2000 4.0 1.8 0.7 0.8 2.1 3.8 3.9
medium:
1986-1990 3.9 1.5 1.0 -0.2 2.4 3.5 3.3
1991-1995 4.0 1.8 0.8 1.0 2.5 3.9 4.0
1996-2000 3.4 1.4 0.7 1.0 2.2 3.8 3.8
low:
1986-1990 1.5 1.1 1.4 -0.9 1.7 3.3 3.0
1991-1995 2.1 1.4 1.5 0.5 2.3 3.9 4.1
1996-2000 1.8 1.0 1.3 0.8 2.0 3.6 4.0
Real GDP high:
per capita 1986-1990 4.9 1.1 -0.1 -2.2 0.7 2.2 1.6
1991-1995 3.3 1.0 -0.2 -1.6 0.9 2.4 2.2
1996-2000 2.4 0.9 -0.1 -1.8 0.7 2.4 2.1
medium:
1986-1990 2.0 0.2 -0.1 -2.7 0.7 1.8 1.3
1991-1995 2.2 0.6 -0.2 -1.6 0.9 2.4 2.1
1996-2000 1.8 0.5 -0.1 -1.6 0.8 2.4 2.0
low:
1986-1990 -0.4 -0.2 0.3 -3.4 0.0 1.6 1.0
1991-1995 0.3 0.2 0.5 -2.1 0.7 2.4 2.1
1996-2000 0.2 0.1 0.5 -1.8 0.6 2.2 2.2
aFor definitions of group code numbers, see note to Table 6.1.
maintain in the longer run. In interpreting the results of this scenario analysis,
especially in the case of India, a note of caution is necessary. The aggregate level
of the analysis and the demand-oriented modeling export flows prevented our
considering favorable changes in the commodity structure of export supply
different from the historically observed pattern. In reality, development proj-
ects in India are mostly aimed at bringing about such favorable structural
changes. Successful implementations of these projects could, consequently, make
at least a modest beginning toward narrowing the existing income gap. But
according to the results, without these favorable structural changes in export
supply (and, of course, without changes in the pattern of import demand), the
income gap rather tends to widen.
The results for group 13 (African countries) are shocking. Under the most
optimistic scenario analyzed in the study (high scenario), the feasible growth
difference seems to be not higher than 0.5-0.8%. Under the medium scenario
(which is still rather optimistic with respect to the overall rate of economic
growth in the developed market economies), even this growth rate difference
tends to produce a rapidly deteriorating foreign trade balance. The shocking fact
is that this growth path is associated with a very fast increase in the already
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alarmingly wide income gap. The difference in the yearly growth rate of real
GDP per capita between this group and the developed market economies as a
whole would be about -2.1% to -1.8%.
In the case of group 14 (Latin American countries), the results indicate
that even a very moderate breakaway from the growth path keeping up the exist-
ing level of the income gap between this group and the developed market
economies as a whole might produce a rapidly deteriorating foreign trade bal-
ance.
In the longer run, group 15 (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) seems to be in a
more favorable position. Of course, in view of the present debt situation of these
countries, these favorable growth paths in the longer run are feasible only if the
countries in question can manage to bring down their accumulated debts to a
tolerable level during the next few years - a task easy to assign to a country but
very hard to achieve.
According to the model, it seems unlikely that group 18 (North African and
Middle Eastern countries) can maintain their very high growth rates of the years
after the oil crisis.
To sum up, taking into consideration the results of the three main scenarios
and those of the alternative scenarios described in Chapter 7 and aimed at inves-
tigating similar aspects, a difference of 1.5-2.0% in the growth rates of real GDP
between developed market economies and developing countries [5] seems to be
the limit of feasibility [6]. In terms of our scenarios, this means that if the
developed market economies were to grow along the path described by the
medium scenario, the developing countries as a whole could rather be expected
to follow along the growth path envisaged by the pessimistic scenario, which
would hardly narrow the existing income gap at all. The results also suggest
that some groups of developing countries might be expected to sustain a faster
pace of economic development. Among the regions considered here, group 12
(Asian countries) seems to be in the most favorable position in this respect.
6.3.3. Structural change
Another important aspect of economic development in developing countries is
the pattern of structural change. In Chapter 2, several aspects of this issue were
investigated, among them the structure of production. We extend this examina-
tion by comparing the different groups of developing countries and the results of
the different scenarios. Table 6.6 summarizes the projections of the model under
the different scenarios [7].
According to the model, there seems to be a general tendency for the share
of agricultural production to continue its decline. The only exception is group 13
(African countries), where, under the low scenario, this share is expected to
increase. Another general feature, suggested by these results, is that accelerated
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Table 6.6. The structure of production in different groups of developing countries: share
of real value added to GDP by different sectors (%).
High scenario Medium scenario Low scenario
Sector/
Country groupa 1990 1995 fWOO 1990 1995 fWOO 1990 1995 £000
Agriculture:
11 20.8 20.0 18.9 21.9 21.4 20.5 24.1 23.0 22.2
12 14.8 12.9 11.4 15.8 14.1 12.8 16.4 15.1 13.9
India 33.9 32.8 31.6 37.0 35.9 34.8 40.3 39.3 38.3
13 25.9 25.0 23.9 27.9 27.7 27.1 30.1 31.0 31.1
14 12.8 11.7 10.6 13.4 12.6 11.7 14.2 13.8 13.1
15 8.2 6.9 5.7 9.0 7.7 6.6 9.7 8.5 7.5
18 18.9 17.0 14.9 20.5 19.0 17.2 22.3 21.0 19.4
Manufacturing:
11 11.5 11.3 11.1 12.2 11.9 11.7 12.5 12.3 12.1
12 31.9 34.6 37.0 30.0 32.0 33.8 28.9 30.2 31.3
India 18.2 18.3 18.5 17.5 17.8 18.1 16.6 16.9 17.2
13 11.9 12.2 12.7 11.0 10.9 11.0 10.2 9.5 9.2
14 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.9 23.0 23.2 24.7 24.8 25.0
15 29.1 29.6 29.7 27.8 28.4 28.5 26.5 27.2 27.2
18 16.0 16.0 15.8 16.2 16.1 16.0 16.3 16.2 16.1
Services:
11 51.8 51.8 51.7 51.3 51.3 51.2 50.0 50.5 50.6
12 45.1 44.7 44.1 45.7 45.6 45.3 46.3 46.3 46.3
India 40.5 41.5 42.4 38.3 39.3 40.2 36.2 37.0 37.7
13 45.0 45.0 45.0 44.6 44.2 44.0 44.8 43.5 42.7
14 52.5 53.5 54.4 51.5 52.4 53.2 49.5 50.2 50.9
15 52.4 52.6 52.6 53.1 53.2 53.4 53.8 53.9 54.2
18 50.6 51.8 53.1 49.6 50.5 51.5 48.5 49.1 50.0
aFor definitions of group code numbers, see note to Table 6.1.
overall economic development would accentuate the changes. In the case of agri-
culture, this means that the high scenario would bring about a faster decrease in
the share of the agricultural sector.
In spite of these and other common tendencies, the directions in which the
different regions of developing countries are expected to develop seem to be
somewhat diverse. In the case of group 12 (Asian countries) and group 15
(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), manufacturing seems to be the leading sector of the
economy; while in the other regions, services tend to play this role.
In the case of group 13 (African countries), these results also seem to sup-
port the finding that the growth prospects for this group are rather limited. The
very high share of agriculture tends to decrease rather slowly (or actually, under
the low scenario, it even increases). On the other hand, the share of manufactur-
ing seems to remain very low. All this means that this group is likely to continue
to be an exporter of primary commodities and, consequently, to face depressingly
low prices and virtually no growth in demand for its exports.
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6.4. Concluding Remarks
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The results of the scenario analysis presented here tend to suggest that the
growth prospects of the developing countries as a whole are rather limited. The
availability of external financial sources seems to be the most serious limiting
factor in the medium run. The growth paths of the world economy envisaged by
the projections would hardly narrow the income gap between developed and
developing countries at all.
The situations of the different regions of developing countries seem to be
rather different. The African countries (as represented by group 13 in our
model) are felt to be in the most critical situation, while some of the Asian coun-
tries (those in group 12) are likely to continue to catch up with the developed
market economies. The projections on the structure of production in the
different regions also seem to support these findings.
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Notes
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[3]
[4]
[5]
[61
[7]
A general description of the Linked World Model can be found in Chapter 7 and in
Annex 2 to the volume. During the ex post simulation, the exchange rates were
taken as exogenous.
Assumptions and results for the other regions can be found in Chapter 2.
In the discussion that follows, the term income gap refers to the difference between
the levels ofreal GDP per capita in the countries in question.
One reservation should, however, be made with reference to this group. Owing to
the aggregate nature of the foreign trade subsystem and to the features of the
Linear Expenditure System, the framework of which is extensively used in the
design of this subsystem, the projected market share of this group might very well
be overstated. If this is the case, the corresponding figures on the feasible growth
differences are probably considerably lower than those expressed in Table 6.5.
Developed market economies and developing countries as represented by the coun-
tries considered in our model. A study covering the poorest African and Asian
countries not considered here would probably find this difference to be smaller.
A scenario analysis based on the SIGMA system developed at UNCTAD (for a
description of this system, see Chapter 26 in this volume), and described in the
Appendix of Chapter 7, seems to support this finding, too.
It should be mentioned that the shares for group 11 (oil-exporting countries) refer
only to that part of the GDP which is not produced in the oil sector (mining and
quarrying) .
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Appendix 6A. Sources, Abbreviations and Model Parameters
Main data sources:
Handbook 01 World Development Statistics, UN, 1983.
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, IMF, various years.
List of abbreviations used in the tables:
DW
FIML
MAPE
MIDIS
R2C
SEE
= Durbin-Watson d statistics
= Full Information Maximum Likelihood method
= mean absolute percentage error
= MInimum DIStance method
= corrected R-squares
= standard error of estimate
Country group codes:
11 = Oil-exporting countries
12 = Asian countries excluding India
13 = Developing African countries
14 = Latin American countries excluding group 15
15 = Argentina, Brazil, Mexico
18 = Middle Eastern and North African countries excluding groups 11
and 13
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Table 6A.1. Production functions for groups of developing countries (t-values in
parentheses) .a
Country group
Variable 11 1t> India 1:/> 14 1S' 18
tc 1978 1979 1974 1974
a 1 0.215 0.147 0.312 0.108 0.749 0.241 0.226(1.43) (14.97) (10.79) (17.05) (19.75) (2.58) (4.38)
a2 0.031 0.030 0.005 0.025 0.010 0.029 0.022
(3.97) (1.99) (2.05) (2.44)
a 3 -0.048 -0.025 -0.033 -0.015
(3.75) (5.23) (14.34) (2.86)
a 4 0.245 0.344 0.445 0.458 0.457 0.426 0.423
(1.54) (18.11) (16.67) (9.13) (10.62) (3.84) (7.73)
a 5 0.535 0.491 0.489 0.436 0.439 0.409 0.457(3.42) (22.81) (21.52) (7.22) (7.86) (5.70) (9.66)
a6 0.220 0.165 0.066 0.106 0.105 0.165 0.120
(2.37) (5.56) (3.51) (5.62) (7.34) (3.23) (1.90)
DW 1.45 1.95 1.53 2.23 1.46 2.34 1.21
R2C 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
SEE 4.154 0.914 1.125 0.215 0.472 3.178 0.911
aFor the specification see equation (6.1) in the text. All calculations performed using
the MIDIS method for the period 1961-1981.
bFor groups 12, 13, and 15 a2 was set to the estimated rate of technical progress until
the switching point (te). For a more detailed description of the estimation procedure
see the text.
Table 6A.£. Estimation results of the equation for velocity of money (t-values in
parentheses) .a
Country groul a 1 a2 a3 a 4 DW R2C SEE Est.
12 0.177 0.185 0.459 1.60 0.93 0.165 62-81
(4.61) (2.08) (5.69) MIDIS
India 0.223 0.004 0.190 -0.141 2.21 0.94 0.181 63-81
(6.02) (2.10) (2.73) (1.11) MIDIS
13 0.129 0.325 0.296 1.86 0.89 0.175 65-81
(2.68) (2.69) (3.35) MIDIS
14 0.203 0.002 1.020 0.111 2.00 0.79 0.260 62-81
(7.45) (4.24) (3.21 ) (0.58) MIDIS
15 0.110 0.174 1.011 1.84 0.76 0.349 62-81
(2.62) (2.56) (4.02) MIDIS
18 0.322 0.283 -0.093 2.02 0.96 0.091 62-81
(6.69) (2.03) (1.39) MIDIS
aFor the specification see equation (6.4) in the text.
bEstimation results for group 11 (R2C = 1.00, SE = 0.0198, DW = 199):
0.554 0.1966 0.297
P = 1.081 . PIM (5.79) P-l (4.14) PEX(8.32)
(83.30)
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Table 6A.9. Import demand functions for groups of developing countries (t-values in
parentheses). a
Country group
Variableb 11 1£ India 19 15 15 18
al 0.567 0.485 0.531 0.240 0.577 0.665 0.519
(5.67) (8.58) (4.63) (2.99) (7.26) (5.15) (6.94)
a2 0.326 0.268 0.279 0.587 0.425 0.198 0.329
(1.89) (3.27) (3.59) (6.43) (5.80) (2.97) (5.48)
a4 0.165 0.459 0.374 0.233 0.400 0.579
(3.69) (6.50) (7.38) (3.44) (2.70) (6.76)
as 0.014 0.011 0.026 0.041 0.052 0.048
(0.50) (0.96) (1.81) (4.39) (4.40) (4.84)
DW 1.66 1.88 1.39 2.26 2.35 1.71 1.50
Durbin's m 0.29 0.01 1.56 0.76 0.98 0.57
R2C 0.99 1.00 0.82 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00
MAPE 4.53 1.61 10.45 3.25 2.41 4.66 2.13
APE:c
short run -G.485 -G.556 -G.481 -0.771 -0.456 -0.374 -G.511
long-run -1.119 -1.079 -1.026 -1.014 -1.078 -1.115 -1.056
a For the definition of the variables see the text. Specification:
IPi EXpEX PY- 1IM= a1IM_ 1 + a2- + a4-- - aSY_1--+ U
PIM PIM PIM
bDue to insignificance a3 in equation (6.6) in the text was set to zero.
cAPE = average price elasticity.
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Table 6A.-I. Estimation results for the structure of imports (t-values in parentheses). a
Country
Commoditybgroup a 1 a 2 a3 a 4 as
11c 1 0.569 0.120 0.093 0.068
(5.77) (9.98) (8.91 ) (5.99)
2 0.760 0.020 0.013 0.011
(7.82) (3.47) (3.21 ) (2.90)
12 1 0.941 0.095 0.097 0.097 0.103
(29.14) (6.39) (6.24) (6.34) (6.19)
2 0.975 0.050 0.052 0.051 0.054
(25.87) (2.09) (2.10) (2.10) (2.10)
3 0.844 0.170 0.177 0.175 0.185
(21..66) (4.90) (4.77) (4.82) (4.70)
Indiac 2 0.340 0.214 0.107 0.199
(2.62) (4.06) (1.93) (3.67)
3 0.232 0.536 0.232 0.498
(2.00) (5.55) (2.40) (4.68)
13 1 0.673 0.080 0.053 0.065 0.039
(5.81) (2.72) (2.19) (2.59) (1.38)
2 0.658 0.021 0.016 0.017 0.011
(4.82) (3.73) (3.38) (3.71) (1.66)
3 0.772 0.058 0.042 0.039 0.029
(11.81) (2.05) (1.76) (1.67) (1.17)
14 1 0.767 0.079 0.074 0.048 0.060
(7.80) (3.32) (3.44) (2.79) (2.91 )
2 0.922 0.018 0.015 0.011 0.014
(19.05) (3.48) (3.61) (2.81 ) (3.07)
3 0.494 0.190 0.158 0.178 0.144
(4.32) (5.64) (5.69) (5.83) (5.16)
15 1 0.120 0.050 0.105 0.019
(10.88) (3.17) (7.97) (1.56)
2 0.413 0.047 0.041 0.007
(3.65) (5.63) (5.49) (1.65)
3 0.845 0.031 0.013 0.005
(13.98) (1.85) (1.80) (1.35)
18 1 0.287 0.284 0.165 0.167 0.192
(2.46) (10.93) (4.39) (4.59) (7.16)
2 0.532 0.085 0.034 0.050 0.057
(4.40) (5.03) (2.25) (3.65) (4.12)
3 0.516 0.121 0.0499 0.070 0.082
(4.47) (3.38) (1.86) (2.60) (2.76)
aFor specification see equation (6.7) in the text. All calculations performed using the
FIML method for the period 1964-1983.
bCommodity groups are as follows: 1 = agriculture, 2 = manufacturing, and 3 = ser-
vices.
C In the case of group 11 and India, the missing commodity group was left out of the
demand system.
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Table 6A.{ Continued.
Country Durbin's
group Commodityb DW m R2C SEE
l1e 1 1.63 0.30 0.99 0.394
2 (1.93) 0.05 0.98 0.189
12 1 2.33 0.78 0.99 0.175
2 1.38 1.56 0.99 0.271
3 2.10 0042 1.00 00409
Indiae 2 1.22 1.62 0.80 0.211
3 2.18 0.56 0.95 0.366
13 1 2.09 0043 0.95 0.069
2 1.91 0.04 0.98 0.011
3 2.30 0.75 0.97 0.102
14 1 2.90 1.89 0.95 0.130
2 2.20 0.38 0.98 0.028
3 2.11 0043 0.97 0.155
15 1 1.34 1.50 0.96 0.272
2 1.67 0.28 0.98 0.130
3 2.65 1.52 0.99 00431
18 1 2047 1.32 0.98 0.161
2 2.24 0040 0.94 0.116
3 1.52 1.10 0.89 0.344
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Table 6A.S. Estimation results for the export demand functions in the different
commodity groups (t-values in parentheses).a
Country Durbin's
group Commodity a 1 a2 a 3 DW m R2C SEE
11 1 0.915 0.018 0.018 2.53 1.22 0.98 0.094
(10.60) (1.88) (1.87)
2 0.645 0.061 0.053 1.98 0.04 0.97 0.212
(3.60) (4.75) (4.23)
3 0.160 0.769 0.707 2.59 1.33 0.99 6.665
(0.87) (6.19) (4.33)
4 0.005 1.22 1.57 0.95 0.622
12b
(18.95)
1 0.010 0.176 1.71 0.58 0.99 0.321
(2.22) (9.26)
2 0.701 0.084 0.137 3.32 1.98 1.00 0.150
(6.29) (6.28) (2.68)
3 0.534 0.011 0.153 2.13 0.25 1.00 0.204
(2.35) (3.09) (6.01)
4 0.846 0.074 0.197 1.98 0.04 1.00 0.996
(8.92) (5.03) (5.87)
India 1 0.757 0.012 0.009 1.89 0.09 0.97 0.120
(4.84) (1.05) (0.79)
2 0.450 0.005 0.002 1.67 0.31 0.92 0.074
(3.81) (4.77) (1.89)
4 0.586 0.008 0.007 1.13 1.74 0.98 0.246
(3.96) (2.55) (2.06)
13 1 0.651 0.064 0.060 2.37 0.80 0.99 0.136
(9.63) (5.05) (4.54)
2 0.018 0.004 1.58 0.56 0.94 0.126
(2.44) (0.53)
3 0.426 0.007 0.003 2.03 0.02 0.99 0.109
(2.94) (3.60) (1.13)
4 0.821 0.011 0.011 2.67 1.34 0.85 0.325
(7.47) (2.70) (2.63)
14 1 0.458 0.038 0.024 1.64 0.38 0.97 0.274
(2.28) (1.48) (0.91)
2 0.854 0.016 0.013 1.57 0.94 0.95 0.143
(3.51 ) (1.68) (1.09)
3 0.558 0.014 0.008 2.81 1.67 0.99 0.203
(3.84) (3.62) (2.52)
4 0.579 0.012 0.010 2.18 0.43 0.95 0.367
(2.55) (2.04) (1.85)
15 1 0.084 2.26 0.71 0.98 0.546
(65.78)
2 0.620 0.019 0.014 1.98 0.04 0.98 0.271
(5.23) (3.37) (2.12)
4 0.834 0.006 0.003 1.43 1.22 0.99 0.307
(5.79) (1.04) (0.54)
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Table 6A.5. Continued.
Country
group Commodity a 1 a 2 a 3
18 1 0.817 0.010 0.009
(7.71) (1.19) (1.07)
2 0.819 0.027 0.025
(16.35) (4.71) (4.10)
3 0.936 0.012 0.011
(8.21) (3.94) (2.89)
4 0.002
(60.07)
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Durbin's
DW m R2C SEE
1.55 1.07 0.90 0.088
2.37 0.80 0.97 0.096
2.30 0.73 0.99 0.137
1.20 1.65 0.99 0.079
a For the specification see equation (6.8) in the text. All calculations performed using the
MIDIS method for the period 1965-1982, except for Group 11 commodities 1 and 2
(1967-1982) and 3 (1967-1981).
bYariable a 4 results for Group 12 were obtained as follows: commodity 2 = 0.071 (6.14), com-
modity 3 = 0.018 (3.23), commodity 4 = 0.098 (5.67).
Table 6A.6. Ex post simulations, 1966-1981: mean absolute percentage errors.
Country group
Variables 11 1£ India 19 1-1 15 18
GDP (real) 4.9 1.3 1.2 2.9 1.0 3.9 2.8
GDP deflator 3.1 3.9 6.6 6.9 4.1 3.8 5.2
Investment (real) 4.9 1.3 1.2 2.9 1.0 3.9 2.8
Consumption (real) 5.9 3.0 1.8 3.1 1.6 6.4 3.8
Imports (real) 7.9 2.5 8.6 5.7 6.6 6.9 7.7
Imports price index 1.7 2.2 7.2 4.5 2.0 3.2 3.0
Exports (real) 9.3 3.5 10.8 7.4 5.2 9.7 11.6
Exports price index 3.2 2.1 5.7 4.7 5.8 6.7 5.6
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CHAPTER 7
Growth in an Interdependent
World Economy: Linking the
National Models
through International Trade
Rumen Dobrinsky and Istvan Szekely
Summary
This chapter analyzes the effects of different national growth patterns on world
trade in real and monetary terms. The world model that underlies our estima-
tions connects the national models via export and import functions in such a way
that total world exports equal total world imports in monetary and real terms.
The results of different simulation exercises are presented.
7.1. Introduction
One specific aspect of the Bonn-IIASA Project is the analysis of the interdepen-
dence of the world economy. It is a well recognized fact that national economies
are more mutually dependent now than ever before and the world economy can
no longer be regarded as a set of autarchic national entities. The interdepen-
dence of the world economy is manifested in a variety of forms from the more
traditional, such as international trade and financial flows, to the more modern,
such as technological transfer. A specific form of economic integration and the
exercising of joint economic policies is the international economic alliance, such
as the EC, CMEA, etc. Interdependence is a reality that cannot be neglected in
the analysis of growth and structural change of the world economy and its com-
ponents. On the other hand, as already mentioned, this very complex
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phenomenon can hardly be modeled completely in a study with the limited scope
of ours.
In this chapter we analyze some aspects of the interdependence of the
world economy in the context of growth and structural change, as reflected by
our general approach. We put our attention here on the linking of the national
models and the foreign trade models since the description of these models per se
and the analysis of domestic factors of growth and structural change are
presented in the special chapters devoted to those topics. Due to the limitations
of our project, we concentrate only on the interdependence of national economic
growth, on the one side, and international trade, on the other. Moreover, since
the country models are basically supply-driven growth models, we can focus
mainly on the effects of different domestic growth patterns on the world trade.
An important aspect of our analysis is the interdependence of growth and struc-
tural change in real and monetary terms, and especially the effect of real growth
on relative foreign trade prices and vice versa.
The tool we are using for these investigations is a world model that
integrates the previously described country (or group) models. For manageabil-
ity, these country models are to a certain extent simplified. The simplifications
mainly relate to foreign trade, and they are discussed in Section 7.2. Since the
model covers the whole world's trade (with assumptions made about the foreign
trade of the countries not involved in the model), it is designed to ensure that
world exports equal world imports in both real and nominal terms. The general
idea behind and the specification of the subsystem describing the foreign trade
flows, and ensuring that these consistency conditions are satisfied, are also given
in Section 7.2. Finally, in Section 7.3 the results of the different simulation exer-
cises are presented. Since our model is designed for medium- and long-term fore-
casts, the results presented in this section can also highlight the different nature
of short-, medium- and long-term effects. Better understanding of these aspects
is essential for an economic policy aimed at balanced growth.
Knowing the limitations of such models, it is our responsibility to
emphasize not only those aspects where our model can be a useful device, but
also the reasons for a cautious interpretation of the results presented here. First
of all, it should be mentioned that because the world model describes only the
aggregate export-import flows, changes in the (commodity) structure of foreign
trade are not explicitly reflected. The rather simple form of exchange rate deter-
mination used in the model should also be mentioned. All this is to suggest that
the simulation results presented here and the consequences drawn from them
indicate certain tendencies rather than describe exactly the future development
of the world economy.
1.2. The Integrated System of International Trade
7.2.1. Basic propositions
The basic idea of our approach is to reflect the existing interdependence of the
world economy in a simultaneously interdependent world model. Since in our
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approach the country models are linked by their corresponding trade flows, the
appropriate tool for this analysis is an integrated system of international trade
which provides a simultaneous link between generated real world trade flows and
foreign trade prices and domestic developments (growth and monetary changes)
in the countries (or groups of countries). Two basic approaches have emerged
from the past experience: the bilateral (on the basis of trade or trade share
matrices) approach and the pooling approach. [1]
However, our Integrated System of International Trade (ISIT) was
specifically designed to meet some particular requirements of the Bonn-IIASA
Project. The first and, perhaps, the most important point is that our system is
used for long-term projections. Stemming from that fact, though maybe not
apparent at first sight, is the essential requirement for complete internal con-
sistency of the foreign trade subsystem, i.e., total world exports must sum up to
total world imports in both nominal and real terms at any time point. Whereas
in short-term projections one can afford to neglect some aspects of internal con-
sistency, arguing that the generated discrepancies are comparable in size with
the statistical discrepancies arising from the imperfect measurement of the world
trade,[2] in long-term projections in the presence of dynamic relations the gener-
ated discrepancies may become intolerably high if no special measures are taken
to avoid them. (In our work we experienced the validity of this statement.)
Besides, the consistency conditions have to be incorporated as a property of the
linking system in the design stage, and this is by no means a trivial task.
Stemming from the long-term character of our approach, we focused our
attention on the stable or permanent interdependency links, taking the liberty of
sometimes neglecting links that we thought would cause mainly short-term
fluctuations.
Another basic requirement that had to be fulfilled is the simultaneous inter-
dependence of domestic growth and foreign trade: domestic output (GDP or
NMP) of the countries is generated at the same time, exercising its influence on,
and being influenced by, international trade (monetary effects being present as
well). Whereas the domestic part of the country models is basically supply-
driven, we thought it indispensable to incorporate some principles of a supply-
and-demand equilibrium in the system of international trade as a market clear-
ing mechanism to determine the world foreign trade prices.
Last, but not least, is the requirement to produce an easily solvable and
manageable model. The result, described here, is a compromise between these
technical limitations (and available resources!) and the desire for more analytical
power. Due to the limitations imposed, some important aspects of international
trade are not reflected in the linking system. Some elements of the domestic
country models were also excluded from the linked world model. So the system
described in this chapter should be regarded as a prototype model.
Following the general lines of the Bonn-IIASA project, we assume that the
main driving forces for international trade are the primary domestic factors of
growth in the countries or groups of countries. However, we differentiate the
directions of influence of these factors in order to realize the principle of supply-
and-demand equilibrium of international trade, as indicated earlier. Thus,
imports are (mainly) demand-driven, the volume and value of any country's
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imports being determined on the basis of the projected domestic growth and the
relative price of imported goods. The generated total world (nominal) imports
are then distributed as exports among the countries, the relative export prices
being an essential factor for this distribution. Export prices, in their turn, are
basically supply-driven, the export price functions being in fact inverted export
supply functions (see Chapter 8 in this volume). Import prices are then deter-
mined on the basis of the average export prices of the main trading partners.
[From now on we shall only speak of aggregated imports (exports), meaning the
totals of all countries' imports (exports) of goods and services. The same refers
to the corresponding price deflators.] So there is a full symmetry in the two sides
of the foreign trade system: the generated import demand is later converted into
exports, whereas the generated export prices are subsequently converted into
import prices.[3] This approach is applied in its pure form to the models of the
developed market economies. Some specific features of the export price determi-
nation of the CMEA and developing countries (or groups of countries) are dis-
cussed later.
The system of international trade is balanced when the total world imports
are equal to the total world exports both in nominal and in real terms, with a
tolerance level of the order of the observed statistical discrepancy. (One of these
conditions may be replaced by the requirement that the general world export
price deflator be equal to the general world import price deflator.) Since our sys-
tem is designed so that the value condition is fulfilled by definition, it remains to
guarantee the volume condition. The role of the equilibrating market clearing
power in our system is played by import prices, which are scaled in such a way
as to provide the required consistency condition.
Another closely related problem is that of currency conversion in the
model. Consistency conditions on the world level can be implemented only in
the presence of a numeraire unit of valuation of world trade. In our model (as it
is usually assumed) this is the US dollar - in current and 1975 prices. The
conversion problem connected to the modeling of US dollar exchange rates is
treated in the following way in our model. Exchange rates (actually, indexes of
the exchange rates) of the developed market economies (and some of the develop-
ing countries) are modeled in accordance with a weak purchasing power parity
(PPP) assumption. In spite of the controversy surrounding this approach, it
does not seem unreasonable for long-term projections. Our analysis of the yearly
exchange rates figures from 1971 (the period of free fluctuation) shows that the
deviation of the exchange rates indices from the true PPP indices is within the
limits of a trend. A similar finding is reported in Klein (1983). However, it must
be kept in mind, that the PPP assumption also means that we shall not deal
with the short- and medium-term regulating role of the exchange rates. (A more
sophisticated approach to the modeling of exchange rates is presented in Chapter
8 in this volume.) As for the exchange rates of the CMEA and some developing
countries, they were estimated as some geometric averages of a PPP index and a
lagged value (see Section 7.2.2).
Given this type of exchange rate and the character of the pricing subsys-
tem, it follows that the main driving forces of structural changes in the foreign
trade prices in our model are: the inflation rate in the USA (following our
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general approach, in the final run it is dominated by the growth rate of money
supply in the USA) and export prices of the developed market economies (espe-
cially the characteristics of their long-term performence).
7.2.2. Specification of the system
The two pillars of the foreign trade system, embodying the principles of supply
and demand, are the import demand and the export price functions.
The import demand function is based on a dynamic version of the Linear
Expenditure System. The general form of the equation is:
(7.1)
GDp· 1· P'GDp·
1,- 1 + u
P'IMj
where 1M denotes real imports; I, C, and EX are real investment (gross capital
formation), real consumption, and real exports, respectively; GDP stands for real
GDP; and P'IM, P'1, P' C, P'EX and P' GDP are the corresponding price
deflators, all expressed in domestic currency terms. Subscript i refers to the
country under consideration. The theoretical derivation of this general form can
be found in Welsch (1987). The specific forms used and the estimation results
for the the different groups of countries are presented in the previous chapters
describing the country models.
The export price function for the developed market economies is conceptu-
ally an inverted export supply function:
P' EX- = a 1 P'GDP?2 P'1M:3 P'1M:4 1 P' EX?5 1 + u
• • I 1,- .,-
(7.2)
The theoretical derivation of this specification is based on the profit-
maximizing behavior of a representative firm, described in detail in Chapter 8.
The estimation results for the developed market economies can also be found
there.
For the CMEA and developing countries, price-taking behavior was
assumed:
(7.3)
where subscript WI refers to the developed market economies and superscript $
indicates that the price deflators are expressed in US$ terms. For the oil-
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exporting developing countries, instead of the export prices of the developed
market economies, world market oil prices were taken:
P'EX~ = a P'EX~ a2p$. a3p$. a4 + u
• 1 ,,-1 oil ou,-1 (7.4)
The estimation results for the developing countries are reported in Chapter 6.
According to our general approach described above, the subsystem generat-
ing the nominal exports of the countries and groups is meant to distribute the
pooled import demand. The framework applied is the Linear Expenditure Sys-
tem. Assuming habit persistence and using the same reasoning as in the deter-
mination of the import demand functions, the following form can be derived:
- ~ (a1c+2 i P'Exf Exf -Il + u
k=1 I ,
k~i
(7.5)
n
~ a2i = 1 and
i=1
i,k = 1, ... ,n i 1= k
where 1M'Nfv is the sum of the imports of the countries involved in the model
plus the net imports of the rest of the world; EX'N$, EX$, and P' EX$ are nomi-
nal and real exports and export price index in US$ terms, respectively; subscript
i refers to the country under consideration; and subscript k to those different
from the one under consideration. The restrictions on the parameters are to
guarantee that the sum of exports equals the sum of imports.
The equations were estimated by the nonlinear FIML method. Due to the
limitations of our software package (lAS Bonn System) the system was reformu-
lated in the following way: in the first step world imports were distributed
among the USA, the FRG, Japan, the rest of the developed market economies,
the CMEA countries as a whole, and the developing countries as a whole; in the
second step the latter three were further distributed among the countries and
groups involved. The results presented in Table 7A.l in the Appendix refer to
the first step, and those presented in Tables 7A.2 to 7A.4 to the second one.
This export determination guarantees the first consistency condition -
namely, that total world exports in nominal terms EX'Nfv are equal to total
world imports in nominal terms 1M'Nfv.
The second consistency condition requires that the total world imports
should equal total world exports in real terms as well:
(7.6)
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It is obvious that this condition depends crucially on the relation between
the export and import price vectors. If no special measures are undertaken,
equation (7.6) will not necessarily hold. One possible way out would be to
replace the estimated import price equations by direct calculation of a consistent
import price vector. [4] However, this normally requires the endogenous deter-
mination of the complete trade share matrix and implies pure price-taking
behavior on the import side - two problems that we wanted to avoid. In princi-
ple one could try to estimate the system of import price equations jointly impos-
ing cross-equation restrictions which would guarantee that equation (7.6) holds.
However, given the present state of the art, this hardly seems possible, taking
into account that the system should perform in the structually changing environ-
ment of world trade.
We have chosen another approach to deal with the problem. We introduce
into the system two vectors of import prices:
(1) A vector of prices P'Mi$ which are explained by the average export price of
the countries of origin [see equations (8.28)-(8.29) in Chapter 8]:[5]
For the CMEA and developing countries, equation (7.7) is expressed and
estimated in US$ terms which reflects price-taker behavior; for OECD
countries, equation (7.7) is expressed and estimated in domestic currency
which reflects a mixture of price-maker and price-taker behaviors (i.e.,
PM'EXi$ are adjusted by the exchange rates).
The prices P'Mi$ reflect the mechanism of formation of the import
prices, but they do not necessarily satisfy equation (7.6).
(2) A vector of prices P'IMi$ which are scaled in such a way that the condition
(7.6) holds. P'IMi$ are calculated from P'Mi$ by using a scaling factor dp
which is the same for all countries:
P'IM~ = d . P'M~ (7.8)I p I
P'IMi$ are taken as the actual import prices in the model. The scaling fac-
tor dp is defined as:
It is easy to check that, if the import prices are determined from (7.8) and
(7.9), then equation (7.6) holds:
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(7.10)
The reasoning behind this approach is as follows: from a technical point of
view, we would like to determine the vector of consistent prices (7.8) simultane-
ously in one solution step. However, due to interdependence in the system, a
change in the import prices, such as the scaling, causes repercussions throughout
the whole system, and the solution can be obtained only iteratively. During this
iterative process, the prices P'M;$ remain little changed, while P'IM;$ and the
scaling factor dp (its initial value is 1) iterate until consistency is reached. It can
be shown (and this is also borne out by our experience) that, due to the high
degree of simultaneity, the attempt to iterate only one vector of import prices
will not necessarily guarantee complete consistency.
One attractive feature of this approach is that the iterative process can be
simulated within the Gauss-Seidel algorithm, which is used to solve the whole
world model.
It remains to be said that although, at first glance, the price scaling may
seem to be a purely technical operation, it has a fine theoretical interpretation.
Actually, remembering that our import equations reflect import demand and our
export prices reflect export supply, the iterative codetermination of the foreign
trade prices and quantities is analogous to the familar cobweb market clearing
trajectory, only proceeding in a multi-dimensional space. Its performance can be
illustrated graphically with respect to total world imports and exports (real)
IM'~ and EX~ and the corresponding prices P'IM~ and P'EX~ (see Figures
7.1 and 7.2; for simplicity, we omitted the $ sign from the notation of the
figures).
The numbers (1,2, ... ,n) refer to the iterations. Within each iteration we
have one value of the total world nominal imports 1M'N~ which by definition is
equal to the nominal world exports EX'N~. These values for each iteration are
presented by their isoquants. However, when the real parts are not balanced,
the import demand and the export supply are represented by different points on
the isoquants. For example, for iteration 1 these are the points
II (IMw, P'IMW) and E 1 (EXW, P' EXW)' This determines the scaling factor
dp [see equation (7.9)] and the price vector for the next iteration [see equation
(7.10)]. When the prices change, we get a new value for 1M' N w = EX' N w and
two new points on its isoquant - P and E 2 and so on. During these iterations
the points II, P, ... , define a hypothetical "world import demand" curve (as a
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price-quantity relation) while E I , E2, • •• , define in a similar way a "world
export supply" curve. These two curves are indicated with the broken lines.
Finally in our movement we reach the equilibrating point of intersection
r' = En, which provides our consistency condition (7.6). The convergence of
this procedure can be proved for our system under some natural assumptions.
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 reflect two possible types of iterative movement with
respect to quantities and prices. However, they both refer to one and the same
initial condition of [1 and E I . The reverse initial location of [1 and E I is also
possible: it is symmetrical to the one shown. As one can see, Figure 7.2 is iden-
tical to the cobweb model.
Finally, we can also interpret the direction of movement within the itera-
tive process (whether we get the equilibrium point to the left or to the right of
the initial isoquant). This depends on the changing structure of the world trade
and reflects the changing relative importance of the countries in the formation of
world trading prices. As follows from the determination of our scaling factor dp ,
a movement to the right of the initial curve corresponds to a situation when
countries with relatively high export (and/or import) prices (i.e., those whose
prices grow faster than the world average) expand at the same time their share in
the world trade. A movement to the left corresponds to the reverse situation.
The cobweb type of movement will take place when a combination of the above
occurs within subsequent iterations. So the feedback mechanism built into our
iterative procedure and illustrated on the figures actually reflects the spillover
effect of the structural changes of world trade on average trading prices.
The conversion of national currency units to US$ and vice versa is per-
formed on the basis of the US$ exchange rates which, in our system, are modeled
in their index form r FXi . For OECD (and some developing) countries, a weak
PPP form for the indices of the exchange rates is used:
, , [ 1 + W'Pi ][ FXi = [ FXi -1 . W' P
, 1 + USA
(7.11)
where W' Pi and W' P USA are the rates of change of the general price level in
country i and in the USA, respectively.
For the CMEA (and some developing) countries, the indices of the
exchange rates [6] are estimated as some geometric averages of a lagged value
and the expected weak PPP value (but formulated with respect to the average
foreign trade price):
(7.12)
where W'P~T is the rate of change of the average prices of foreign trade
(imports plus exports, in US$ terms). This specification reflects a habit per-
sistence in the formation of the actual level of the exchange rates.
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To illustrate the empirical work connected with the implementation of our
approach, we present in Appendix 7A the complete estimation results of the
foreign trade subsystem for the CMEA countries which is used in the ISIT.
Table 7A.S reports on the estimated demand functions, Table 7A.6 the export
price equations, Table 7A.7 the import price equations and Table 7A.8 the
estimated equations for the indices of the exchange rates (the indices of the
conversion factors). The export equations for the CMEA countries are contained
in Table 7A.9.
The general structure of the linked world model is illustrated on Figure 7.9.
The upper part (above the axis) corresponds to the domestic part: the models of
the countries and groups of countries. The lower part (below the axis) is actu-
ally the ISIT. Circles denote variables that are not simultaneously determined
within the ISIT.
There are several important loops in the model. Import demand (in domes-
tic currency) 1M'N.. is converted into US$ terms 1M'N..$ on the basis of the
exchange rate FXDA... Then all 1M' Nf are summed up to form 1M'N~
( = EX'N~). Total world exports are distributed among the countries EX'N..
on the basis of the export prices P'EX'f, Then the countries' exports are con-
verted into domestic currency EX'N.. and the latter is one of the explanatory
variables in the import demand equation. The desired export prices P'EX.. (in
domestic terms) are generated on the basis of the general price level in the coun-
try P' GDP.. and the import prices P'IM.. (in domestic terms). P'EX.. are then
converted into US$ terms - P'EX..$. The latter, as mentioned, drive the distribu-
tion of the total exports and, simultaneously, explain the formation of import
prices P'M..$ (unscaled). This link in Figure 7.9 is indicated only schematically
through the general world export price level P'EX~. Actually, a more sophisti-
cated link exists in this part of the model in which the introduced "average
export prices abroad" PM'EX..$ are determined individually for each country.
The P'M..$ vector is then "scaled" by the scaling factor dp to form the actual
import prices P'IM..$ (in US$ terms), and the latter are converted into domestic
currency P'IM... The iterative scaling of the import prices (the scaling factor dp
is also endogenously determined) guarantees that in real terms the total world
imports IM~ are equal to the total world exports EX~.
1.3. Simulation Experiments with a Linked Model
of the W orId Economy
7.3.1. The model and its ex post performance
The linked model of the world economy is constructed in accordance with the
general principles discussed in the previous section. It comprises the models of
the 24 countries and groups of countries of the Bonn-IIASA Project (with some
simplifications) which are connected among themselves by the ISIT. The model
also computes aggregates of some important variables (e.g., GDP, imports,
exports, etc.) for the world total (actually, the part covered by our model) and
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three subtotals: "OECD total" (the 9 OECD countries treated separately within
the project plus Group 10 which aggregates the rest of the rest of the developed
market economies); "CMEA total" (the 7 European CMEA countries); "Develop-
ing total" or "LDC total" (the 7 groups of developing countries).[7]
All in all, the model contains 1069 endogenous variables (equations) and
332 exogenous variables. Most of the latter are auxiliary variables. Actually, we
use three main sets as scenario variables: rate of technical progress, savings
ratio and growth rate of money supply (for the CMEA countries we use growth
rate of nominal wages).
The performance of the model was tested in a number of ex post simulation
runs. It should be mentioned that due to the rather simplified modeling of the
exchange rates of the OECD countries (which are appropriate for the long-term
but not for the short-term simulations), we decided to exclude the exchange rate
determination from these tests. So the ex post simulation results reported here
are based on a version of the model where all exchange rates are taken exog-
enously as the actual observations.
Tables 7.1. and 7.2 give a very brief summary of the ex post results from a
simulation run for the period 1971-1981. As the performance of some com-
ponents of the model is analyzed in other chapters, we focus our attention here
Table 7.1. Ex post simulation, 1971-1981: mean absolute percentage errors of world to-
tals and subtotals.
Variable GECD CMEA LDC World
GDP (real) 0.5 0.8 2.7 0.3
Imports (real) 1.9 2.4 6.5 1.4
Exports (real) 2.1 6.1 11.6 1.4
GDP price index 1.6 1.1 2.0 1.0
Import price index 2.7 1.8 2.0 1.9
Export price index 1.3 2.8 4.6 1.9
Table 7.2. Ex post simulation, 1971-1981: mean absolute percentage errors of export
part, GECD countries.
Variable
Country Real exports Nominal exports Export price index
USA 4.0 6.9 3.0
FRG 1.8 2.9 1.8
Japan 6.8 6.3 1.7
France 7.4 6.5 2.1
UK 9.2 5.8 4.1
Italy 3.7 3.4 2.6
Netherlands 7.3 8.1 1.9
Belgium/
Luxembourg 7.9 8.6 2.2
Canada 4.7 6.4 3.0
Rest of DMEs 1.9 2.3 1.4
212 The Future of the World Economy
(a) Imports (b) Exports
1000 1000 11900 ...--/' 900 // ,., y V' ;Qj {I l.~
..
c.
'"
800 800
'I....0> /...
~ y
en
:l fj
... 700 700 /' -I:: / I:5 /CO /600 600 'I(/
r
500J
r
i
500 i
1975 1980 1975 1980
Figure 7../. OECD: real imports and exports (solid lines = observed data; broken lines
= simulated).
(a) Imports (b) Exports
2.0 2.0J
1.5 - 1.5 /l
'" t....0> 1.0 1.0....~ '?'
., fj
fQj ?.~
.. f
I
t:l..
,y
0.5 0.5
0.0 o.oj
1975 1980 1975 1980
Figure 7.5. OECD: indexed import and export prices (solid lines = observed data; bro-
ken lines = simulated).
RUrMn Dobrimky and 18tvan SzikdV
(a) OECD (b) CMEA
213
III
4i
"'""
U
.;::
""p.
...,
I:: 0 04i
..
- /.. .......::l
-
-
---_/~
Ul j::>
~
-so-
l::
~
a:i
-50
1975 1980 1975 1980
(e) LDC (d) LDC less oil-exporting countries
III
4i
U
.;::
P.
...,
~ 50
..
..
::l
~
Ul
::>
~
=
.2
=
a:i
o
1975 1980
o
-50
1975 1980
Figure 7.6. Foreign trade balances by country group (solid lines = observed data; bro-
ken lines = simulated).
214 The Future 01 the World Econom!l
mainly on the world totals and subtotals which are calculated in the linked
model (Table 7.1) and on the performance of the exports subsystem which was
designed and estimated especially for this model (this is illustrated in Table 7.2
by the simulation results for the DECD countries). The level of the MAPEs
reported in these tables can be rated as rather satisfactory, taking into con-
sideration the complexity and the large scale of the model as well as the fact that
the simulation period covers the two oil shocks.
A closer insight into the ex post performance is given by Figures 7.4-7.6.
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 illustrate the ex post performance with respect to the DECD
foreign trade aggregates: total imports and exports (real) and the corresponding
price indices. Figure 7.6 presents the simulation results of a very sensitive indi-
cator - the foreign trade balance, in current prices for (a) DECD, (b) CMEA (c)
LDC and (d) LDC excluding group 11 (the oil-exporting countries). Dne can see
that the model was capable of capturing the main developements in this impor-
tant (and difficult to trace!) indicator.
A special simulation run was designed to test the efficiency of the price-
scaling mechanism, which contributes to the consistency of the foreign trade sys-
tem. It was identical to the one discussed above except for the fact that the
price-scaling module was "switched off" during its execution. This test run indi-
cated that the balancing procedure alone substantially improves the ex post per-
formance of the model. Thus, the MAPE for real world exports in the "unbal-
anced" run was 2.8% as compared with 1.4% in the "balanced" run; for real
world imports these figures are 1.7% and 1.4%, correspondingly; for the world
import price index, they are 2.9% and 1.9%, etc. This confirms the importance
of the consistency conditions for the adequate long-term simulation of world
foreign trade.
7.3.2. Interdependence and cross-country effects
As was stated in the very beginning one of our goals is to analyze the interna-
tional propagation of effects to indicate the interdependence of the world econ-
omy. The purest indicators of the cross-country transmission mechanism in a
system like ours are the cross-country multipliers. They are analyzed in this sec-
tion.
Several introductory comments have to be made. In general, the cross-
country multiplier measures the induced response of an endogenous variable of a
country to a change in the level of an exogeneous variable of another country.
The variables where the change is introduced are usually scenario- or policy-
related. Following the general approach of the Bonn-IIASA Project, we have
selected two exogeneous variables for this purpose: the level of technical prog-
ress (one of the most important driving forces of economic growth) and the level
of money supply (the exogenous monetary driving force). Further, we analyze
the effects of two types of changes in these variables: (1) a single "shock" in the
level of the variables taking place in one selected year; (2) a sustained shift in the
growth rate of the variables for the whole simulation period. The latter form of
Rurnt!n Dobrinsky and Idvan Szikely 215
change (which reflects a shift to another growth path for the variable concerned)
was specifically chosen taking into consideration the long-term character of our
study.
For most of the variables analyzed, we calculated the dynamic multipliers
in level form (which we denote as m~):
(7.13)
where y~ is the value of y in some control solution; y: is the value in the shocked
or shifted solution. In all cases we used as the control solution the medium
scenario of the linked model (see Annex 3); the shock year (or the initial year of
the shift) was always 1985. As the system is highly nonlinear and dynamic, the
multipliers are calculated from numerical simulations within the system.[8]
From the solution the multipliers m~ are calculated in a form of a time
series for the whole simulation period. Although the shape of the multiplier
curve is also of interest, we concentrate mainly on the short-term effect (the
value of the multipliers in the initial year of the shock or shift, i.e., 1985) and on
the long-term effect (the value of m~ in the last simulation year - in our case,
1999). All the shock multipliers have been calculated for a 10% shock level in
1985. Accordingly, the values of these multipliers in 1985 divided by 10 will also
be exactly the value of the dynamic elasticity multiplier for this year.[9]
To study the transmission effects in the linked model, we simulate a shock
or shift in one country and calculate the multipliers for all countries. So, actu-
ally, we have two types of multipliers: the "own" multiplier (the induced
response of the country's own variables) and the "cross-country" multipliers (the
induced response of the other countries' variables). However, the own multiplier
accounts for both the strictly own response and also for the feedback effect from
the induced response of other countries to the shocked country.
In Tables 7.9 to 7.7 we present some of the calculated dynamic multipliers.
For lack of space, we can show only a selection from these results. We have
chosen to show the measured response of the world system to shocks or shifts in
countries with a relatively high weight in the world economy, such as the USA,
the USSR, Japan, and the FRG. As for the responses, also due to space con-
siderations, we present only the multipliers of our aggregates - DECD, CMEA,
LDC and World - and not the actual country multipliers (except for the own
multipliers, which are also listed). However, one can consider that these aggre-
gated multipliers represent the typical response of a country belonging to the
corresponding area. It should be pointed out that the calculated area multipliers
do not account for the own response of the shocked country when it belongs to
this area. For example, when we introduce a shock in USA, the corresponding
DECD multipliers refer only to the rest of the area: DECD less USA. However,
the World multipliers do account for the own response of the shocked country as
well.
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Table 7.9. Dynamic multipliers for GDP (NMP for CMEA): percentage response to
changes in the level of technical progress.
(a) 10% shock of T taking place in 1985.
Short-term response (1985) Long-term response (1999)
Shock
occurs an: Own DEGD GMEA LDG World Own DEGD GMEA LDG World
USA 7.27 0.04 0.01 0.47 1.86 0.06 -0.01 0 0.05 0.02
FRG 7.36 0.01 0 0.25 0.53 0.03 0 0 -0.03 -0.01
Japan 8.51 0.01 0 0.18 0.82 0.02 0 0 0.01 0
USSR 12.40 0.01 0 0.04 1.96 0.22 0 0 0 0.03
(b) Sustained shift of wr to a higher level from 1985 on.
Short-term response (1985) Long-term response (1999)
Shock
occurs in: Own DEGD GMEA LDG World Own DEGD GMEA LDG World
USA 0.89 0.01 0 0.06 0.23 20.8 0.3 0.1 1.1 4.7
FRG 2.42 0 0 0.08 0.17 53.8 0.4 0.1 3.7 4.2
Japan 2.96 0 0 0.06 0.29 63.8 0.3 0.1 4.0 7.4
USSR 1.02 0 0 0 0.16 43.6 0 0 0.1 7.3
Table 7.,r Dynamic multipliers for real imports: percentage response to changes in the
level of technical progress.
(a) 10% shock of T taking place in 1985.
Short-term response (1985) Long-term response (1999)
Shock
occurs in: Own DEGD GMEA LDG World Own DEGD GMEA LDG World
USA 10.20 1.08 0.47 1.38 2.64 -0.58 -0.38 0.03 -0.25 -0.35
FRG 9.51 0.45 0.19 0.50 1.25 1-0.28 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10
Japan 10.70 0.32 0.14 0.36 0.91 -0.18 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03
USSR 3.61 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.19 -0.24 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
(b) Sustained shift of wr to a higher level from 1985 on.
Short-term response (1985) Long-term response (1999)
Shock
occurs an: Own DEGD GMEA LDG World Own DEGD GMEA LDG World
USA 1.28 0.13 0.06 0.18 0.33 20.8 10.3 4.7 7.7 10.9
FRG 3.15 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.41 38.6 12.1 9.2 8.8 13.9
Japan 3.75 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.32 50.6 8.5 7.3 7.4 12.7
USSR 0.30 0.01 0 0.01 0.02 3.6 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.6
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Table 7.5. Dynamic multipliers for real exports: percentage response to changes in the
level of technical progress.
(a) 10% shock of r taking place in 1985.
Short-term response (1985) Long-term response (1999)
Shock
occurs In: Own OEGD GMEA LDG World Own OEGD GMEA LDG World
USA 1.80 3.24 1.01 2.59 2.65 0.08 -0.62 -0.09 0.15 -0.35
FRG 1.47 1.33 0.56 1.49 1.25 -0.07 -0.10 -0.04 -0.14 -0.10
Japan 0.65 1.04 0.41 1.08 0.91 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.03
USSR 0.12 0.19 0.06 0.22 0.19 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05
(b) Sustained shift of wr to a higher level from 1985 on.
Short-term response (1985) Long-term response (1999)
Shock
occurs In: Own OEGD GMEA LDG World Own OEGD GMEA LDG World
USA 0.22 0.40 0.13 0.33 0.33 10.3 13.5 6.1 5.9 10.9
FRG 0.42 0.41 0.19 0.50 0.41 8.4 14.5 9.4 16.5 13.9
Japan 0.23 0.34 0.14 0.38 0.32 -3.0 14.1 8.7 16.5 12.7
USSR 0.01 0.02 0 0.02 0.02 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.6
We would like to mention that our system makes it possible to analyze the
international and cross-country transmissions of real-term shocks or shifts into
monetary responses. A synthetic long-term indicator of these transmissions is
the behavior of the cumulated foreign trade balance (CFTB) of the countries.
Due to the possible change of sign in the value of CFTB, the standard multiplier
form (7.13) is not suitable for this indicator. Therefore, we calculate a
discrepancy level for it:
(7.14)
where CFTB: and CFTB: are the values of CFTB in the shocked and in the con-
trol solution, correspondingly.
Tables 7.9 to 7.6 reflect the induced response of the model to changes in the
level of technical progress (r) in the four selected countries: USA, FRG, Japan
and USSR (the ordering is by the computer codes used in the model). The first
part of each table shows the short- and long-term value of the multipliers
corresponding to a single positive shock of 10% in the level of technical progress
in these countries taking place in 1985. The second part of the tables contains
the multipliers resulting from a sustained positive shift in the growth rate of
technical progress (w r) in the countries. The actual values of wr used for this
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purpose were: USA and USSR - twice the medium scenario value of W r ; FRG
and Japan - 2.5 times the medium scenario value of wr . (The medium scenario
values of w r are available in the relevant country group chapters.) These levels
of wr are close to those prevailing in the corresponding countries during the
1960s.
The calculated cross-country multipliers for GDP (Table 7.9), as might be
expected, are very low. This is a direct consequence of our basically supply-
driven growth models. The measured responses result only from the reaction of
the production functions to the induced changes in the level of imports of raw
materials and intermediate goods in the countries. The only area with a rela-
tively high response is LDC, but this is mainly due to the partially demand-
driven determination of GDP in Group 11 (see Chapter 6).
However, the foreign trade part of the model is much more sensitive to
changes in the level of technical progress in the countries. The dynamic multi-
pliers for imports (Table 7.4) and exports (Table 7.5) indicate a variety of cross-
country effects caused by shocks or shifts in T. Besides, owing to the dynamic
specification of the foreign trade equations, even the single shocks in T induce a
long-term response. It is interesting to note that the sustained positive shift of
wr in FRG and Japan in the long run induces the largest (among the four coun-
tries analysed) increase in the total world trade. If we compare the world export
response in the case of FRG and Japan to that for USA, we can see that in the
latter case the response is mainly concentrated in DECD whereas in the former
it is highest in LDC.
Table 7.6 shows the generated responses in terms of the discrepancy level of
CFTB [10] which, as we mentioned, synthesizes both the real and the nominal
effects. The figures in this table show the pure gain (positive value) or loss
(negative value) of the countries or areas in terms of CFTB in the shocked or
shifted runs with respect to the medium scenario. In this table, in addition to the
previous ones, we show separately the results for USA and LDC without group
11 since these figures can be considered of special importance with respect to the
overall world economic performance.
A general feature is the different sign of the own long-term effect in the
shocked and shifted scenarios (and this applies to all analyzed countries!). In all
cases the sustained shift to a higher growth rate induces a large negative value of
dCFTB' The corresponding values for DECD, CMEA, LDC indicate the distribu-
tion of this effect (remembering that the own effect is excluded from the area to
which the country belongs). Note, too, that the short-term responses of CFTB
coincide with the response of FTB itself.
In Table 7.7 we present the multipliers calculated after a shock or shift in
the level of money supply of USA. As we pointed out, the US money supply
plays a special role in our model due to the exchange rate determination. The
shocked level was again 10% above the medium scenario level, taking place in
1985. The sustained shift of the growth rate of money supply was 3% above the
medium scenario value (12% versus 9%). The most important outcome from
these simulations is that both the real and the nominal parts of the model
responded to changes in the level of US money supply. As for the effect on the
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CFTB, it is always negative for USA and positive for OECD (without USA).
For the other areas the results are mixed, but we should note the large negative
long-term effect of the sustained shift on the CFTB for the area LDC without
group 11.
7.3.3. Alternative scenarios
The three scenarios presented in the previous chapters (called low, medium, and
high) were designed to characterize the different possible growth patterns of the
world economy in the future. Assumptions about the driving forces of economic
growth (that is, on investment ratios and on rates of technical progress) in the
different countries and groups of countries were varied together; to put it in
another way, the growth paths of the different regions moved together, leaving
the differences among the growth rates at nearly the same level in the different
scenarios. The results of these scenarios and the consequences drawn from them
might throw some light on the contours of economic growth and structural
change in the world economy to the end of this century. With the scenario
analysis presented in this section, we attempt to broaden and deepen our under-
standing of the nature of interdependency in the world economy.
Effects of changing growth patterns in the developed market economies
It is widely emphasized that the export performance (and, consequently, the debt
situation) of the CMEA and developing countries is very strongly influenced by
the domestic development of the developed market economies. Scenarios A and
B are designed to indicate the size of these effects and the differences among the
relative situations of the different regions. In Scenario A for the developed
market economies, the assumptions of the high scenario were taken, whereas for
the CMEA and developing countries those of the medium scenario. (For
definitions of the different scenarios see Chapter 2). In Scenario B for the
developed market economies, the assumptions of the low scenario were taken.
The results of these alternative scenarios are reported in Table 7.8. For com-
parison, the same results for the (original) medium scenario are also given.
When comparing the results of Scenario A and the medium scenario in
Table 7.8, it can be observed that an increase of 0.8--0.9% in the growth rate of
real GDP of the developed market economies caused an increase of 1.1-1.2% in
the growth rate of world trade in real terms. (Since, due to the specification of
the model, world real exports equal world real imports, by definition the term
"world trade" refers to both of them.) The changes in the rate of growth of
world trade in nominal terms are rather different: while the difference in the
first period is 0.8%, at the end of the simulation period it diminishes almost to
zero. The explanation for this is to be found largely in the fact that the rate of
monetary expansion (rate of change of money supply M2) in the developed
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Table 7.8. Results of alternative scenarios A and B (average values in percentages).
Scenarios
A Afi B A Afi B A Afi B
Region 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
World growth rates
real GDP 4.0 3.6 3.0 4.1 3.5 3.0 4.1 3.5 3.0
trade in real terms 5.4 4.3 3.3 5.7 4.4 3.1 5.6 4.4 2.9
trade in nominal terms 6.7 5.9 5.2 10.0 9.6 9.3 10.3 10.2 10.4
Developed market economies'
growth rates
real GDP 3.5 2.7 2.1 3.7 2.8 1.9 3.7 2.8 1.9
real exports 4.9 3.7 2.7 5.2 3.9 2.6 5.3 3.9 2.3
real imports 5.8 4.5 3.3 5.7 4.2 2.8 5.6 4.2 2.6
USSR
growth rate of real GDP 4.3 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.7
growth rate of real exports 3.8 2.9 2.1 4.7 3.6 2.4 4.9 3.6 2.1
growth rate of real imports 3.5 3.0 2.6 4.7 3.9 3.1 5.5 4.5 3.4
trade balance/GPD ---0.1 ---0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.1 ---0.1
trade balance/exports -1.3 -2.9 -4.4 2.8 0.2 -2.5 4.8 1.9 -1.4
growth rate of real exports 5.0 4.5 4.1 5.8 5.1 4.4 6.2 5.4 4.6
growth rate of real imports 4.2 3.8 3.4 4.7 3.9 3.2 5.6 4.6 3.6
trade balance/GPD 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.7
trade balance/exports 4.2 4.2 3.7 5.9 5.1 4.2 7.1 6.2 5.3
Oil-exporting LDCs
growth rate of real GDP 7.6 6.6 5.7 7.6 6.8 6.1 6.6 6.2 5.6
growth rate of real exports 9.6 8.5 7.4 9.6 8.7 7.6 7.0 6.7 6.1
growth rate of real imports 0.2 -1.0 -2.2 7.3 5.8 4.2 6.0 4.7 3.0
trade balance/GPD 3.0 1.8 0.7 6.8 4.9 3.0 7.3 5.0 2.6
trade balance/exports 10.5 6.6 2.6 22.2 17.5 11.9 23.9 18.3 10.8
Other LDCs
growth rate of real GDP 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.5
growth rate of real exports 3.8 3.0 2.2 5.8 4.6 3.3 6.3 4.9 3.4
growth rate of real imports 6.8 6.4 6.0 6.1 5.4 4.8 5.8 5.1 4.3
trade balance/GPD -0.4 -0.7 ---0.9 -1.7 -2.2 -2.8 -1.7 -2.6 -3.4
trade balance/exports -2.6 -4.3 -5.9 -10.6 -15.5 -20.7 -10.6 -18.7 -28.0
aM refers to the (original) medium scenario (see Chapter 2).
market economies was kept at the same level. (Although this is generally true
because of the determination of the exchange rates and that of the export prices,
it is of special interest in the case of the USA.)
If we look at the growth rates of real GDP in the CMEA and developing
countries, it can be seen that the patterns are in general not influenced by the
faster growth in the developed market economies. This is a reflection of the
supply-driven nature of the country models. The only exception is the group of
oil-exporting countries because the production of the oil sector is demand-driven.
(For definition of the country groups, see Annex 1.) As to real exports, the pic-
ture is rather different. Both the CMEA and the developing countries benefit
from the faster growth of the world trade. On the other hand, the faster growth
of real exports contributes to the faster growth of real imports. The changes in
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Table 7.9. Results of alternative scenarios C and D (average values in percentages).
Scenarios
C M1 D C M1 D C M1 D
Region 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
World growth rates
real GDP 4.0 3.6 3.0 4.1 3.5 3.0 4.2 3.5 3.0
trade in real terms 5.6 4.3 3.1 5.7 4.4 3.3 5.7 4.4 3.1
trade in nominal terms 7.2 5.9 4.8 10.9 9.6 8.4 11.6 10.2 8.9
Developed market economies'
growth rates
real GDP 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7
real exports 5.0 3.7 2.6 5.1 3.9 2.8 5.2 3.9 2.7
real imports 5.7 4.5 3.5 5.5 4.2 3.1 5.6 4.2 3.0
USSR
growth rate of real GDP 5.4 4.3 3.1 5.1 3.9 2.6 5.0 3.7 2.4
growth rate of real exports 4.0 2.9 2.0 4.8 3.6 2.5 4.9 3.6 2.4
growth rate of real imports 4.0 3.0 2.1 5.0 3.9 2.9 5.7 4.5 3.4
trade balance/GPD -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0
trade balance/exports -1.1 -2.9 -4.2 2.1 0.2 -1.3 4.0 1.9 -0.2
Other CMEA countries
growth rate of real G DP 5.0 3.8 2.6 5.4 4.0 2.7 5.4 4.0 2.7
growth rate of real exports 5.2 4.5 3.9 6.0 5.1 4.3 6.6 5.4 4.5
growth rate of real imports 5.5 3.8 2.2 5.0 3.9 2.9 5.7 4.6 3.7
trade balance/GPD 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.6 1.1 0.3 0.8 1.4
trade balance/exports 1.8 4.2 6.6 1.0 5.1 9.1 2.2 6.2 10.3
Oil-exporting LDCs
growth rate of real GDP 9.5 6.6 4.4 8.3 6.8 5.1 7.5 6.2 4.8
growth rate of real exports 10.0 8.5 6.5 9.1 8.7 7.5 8.0 6.7 5.3
growth rate of real imports 2.6 -1.0 -4.4 7.2 5.8 4.9 6.0 4.7 3.6
trade balance/GPD -1.2 1.8 4.5 1.0 4.9 8.0 1.3 5.0 7.9
trade balance/exports -5.0 6.6 17.2 3.9 17.5 28.3 4.9 18.3 28.0
Other LDCs
growth rate of real G DP 6.4 5.3 4.5 6.7 5.8 5.0 6.5 5.6 4.8
growth rate of real exports 4.1 3.0 2.0 5.8 4.6 3.4 6.3 4.9 3.7
growth rate of real imports 7.7 6.4 4.6 6.4 5.4 4.6 6.2 5.1 3.9
trade balance/GPD -2.5 -0.7 1.0 -3.8 -2.2 -0.5 -4.0 -2.6 -1.0
trade balance/exports -16.3 -4.3 6.4 -26.4 -15.5 -3.7 -28.7 -18.7 -7.2
aM refers to the (original) medium scenario (see Chapter 2).
the foreign trade balance to exports (or to GDP) ratios are considerable. The
strongest influence is on the non-oil-exporting developing countries, where the
difference is some 8% at the end of the simulation period. The USSR manifests a
similar improvement of its foreign trade balance/export ratio, while the other
CMEA countries seem to gain less. A comparison of the real and nominal indi-
cators reveals the importance of the effects of changes in relative export (import)
prices.
The effects of slower growth in the developed market economies (Scenario
B) can also be assesed from Table 7.8. A comparison of the results of Scenarios
A and B suggests that slower growth in the developed market economies affects
the developing countries more strongly than accelerated growth.
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Internal development and external position in the CMEA and developing countries
While we have stressed the importance of the external conditions of growth in
the CMEA and developing countries, we should not lose sight of the importance
of the internal development of these economies. Accelerated growth, in general,
leads to an increase in import demand and, if the external conditions do not
change, to a worsening of the foreign trade balance. With Scenarios C and D we
attempt to assess the extent of this effect. Starting again from the medium
scenario, in Scenario C for the CMEA and developing countries the assumptions
of the high scenario are taken, whereas in Scenario D those of the low one. The
results are summarized in Table 7.9.
The results of Scenario C in Table 7.9 show that the extent of changes in
the growth rates of world real GDP and world trade in real terms are very simi-
lar to those in Scenario A (and the same is true for Scenarios B and D). How-
ever, this does not hold for world trade in nominal terms. Again, this is due to
the internal price determination in the models of the developed market
economies and to the determination of the export prices and exchange rates.
Similarly to Scenarios A and B, the growth of the developed market economies
was not much influenced by the faster growth of the CMEA and developing
countries.
Regarding the effects on the different regions, it can be observed that, with
the exception of the USSR, faster growth in these economies considerably wor-
sened the foreign trade balance to export (or to GDP) ratios. In the case of the
non-oil-exporting developing countries, an increase of 0.9-1.1% in the growth
rate of real GDP leads to a 10-12% decrease in this ratio. The behavior of the
oil-exporting developing countries is similar, indicating that these countries share
this common feature of the developing economies. In the case of the USSR, the
increase in its own import demand is compensated by an even larger increase in
its exports generated in this scenario. This, together with the improvement of
the terms of trade, leads to an increase of 1.8-2.1% in the foreign trade
balance/export ratio. A comparison of the real and nominal indicators reveals
again the importance of effects originating in changes in relative export (import)
prices.
The consequences of slower growth in the CMEA and developing countries
can also be seen from Table 7.9 (Scenario D). Not surprisingly, with the excep-
tion of the USSR, foreign trade balance/export ratios improved substantially.
Taken as a whole, our scenario analysis tends to suggest that the larger the
difference between the growth rates of the developed market economies and the
developing countries, the more dramatically the foreign trade balances of the
latter deteriorate and their debt burdens increase. Considering this general
finding, together with the facts that the external indebtedness in most of the
developing ountries has already reached the limits of manageability and that
most studies known to us project rather moderate growth in the developed
market economies in the next decade, the growth prospects for the developing
countries as a whole do not seem to be too promising, if no substantial changes
take place in the world economy.
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[t]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Though tentatively, as with any attempt at classification, we could point out that
a representative of the first approach is the well known Project LINK (Wael-
broeck, 1976; Sawyer, 1979). The same approach is also used in some of the UN
studies [e.g., UNCTAD's System for Interlinked Global Modeling and Analysis
(SIGMA) - see this volume, Chapter 26]. The pooling approach has been applied
in the UN-sponsored study of Leontief et at. (1977) and other similar models.
The separate measurement of world exports and imports by aggregating country
data leaves a statistical discrepancy of about 1% of the value of world trade.
A similar approach is applied in the foreign trade models of Project LINK, though
on the commodity level; see Klein (1983).
This is how this problem is tackled in Project LINK, where the import prices are
weighted sums of partners' export prices, the weights being the columns of the
trade share matrix. See Sawyer (1979).
A simplified version of this equation is used with three aggreg\ted areas: OECD
countries, CMEA countries, developing countries. PM' EXj is the weighted
average of the export prices of these areas, the weights being the columns of an
aggregated trade share matrix (in ex ante simulations they are kept constant at
the average level of the last five available observations).
For the CMEA countries, these are actually the conversion factors which
"transform" the value of total imports and exports from domestic currency into
US$. These conversion factors are calculated artificially by dividing the two time
series (in domestic currency and in US$).
For short, further on we shall refer to these totals (subtotals) as: "World",
"OECD", "CMEA", "LDC". On some plots and tables they may be indicated by
their computer codes which are "WO", "WI", "W2", "W3", correspondingly. The
abbreviation "OECD total" (or "OECD") is not very precise because these subto-
tals include the whole Group 10, which incorporates some non-OECD countries as
well.
It should be recalled that in nonlinear systems the values of the multipliers also
depend on the initial conditions, so we do not ascribe generality to the calculated
values of our multipliers.
Remember that the dynamic elasticity multipliers are defined as:
where x: and x~ are the values of the shock variable in the shocked and in the con-
trol solution, respectively.
[10] The foreign trade balance (FTB) is defined as exports of goods and services less
imports of goods and services, in current US$. The medium scenario solution for
FTB is given in Annex 3.
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Appendix 7A. Export and Import Functions
Table 7A.l. Export functions (first step). a
Variable USA FRG Japan Rest of DME CMEA
a 1 0.802 0.684 0.800 0.510 0.924(13.91) (21.91) (13.69) (11.15) (12.71)
a 2 0.108 0.145 0.086 0.410 0.035
(3.76) (12.70) (4.46) (12.20) (1.70)
aa 0.086 0.130 0.077 0.368 0.031
(3.58) (11.45) (4.22) (10.10) (1.64)
a 4 0.094 0.127 0.069 0.328 0.028
(3.50) (11.69) (4.29) (12.61) (1.72)
as 0.093 0.125 0.074 0.359 0.030
(3.51) (10.04) (4.04) (8.59) (1.70)
a6 0.103 0.139 0.082 0.392 0.030
(3.27) (8.81) (4.08) (14.37) (1.75)
a7 0.089 0.120 0.071 0.339 0.029
(3.53) (9.68) (4.27) (10.87) (1.69)
DW 1.96 1.79 1.22 1.49 1.99
R2C 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
SEE 4.517 1.657 4.454 5.449 2.216
aYalues in parentheses are t-values. The specification of the estimated system is given by
equation (7.S) in the text, but note that the equation for the developing countries as a whole is
not estimated directly. All estimates use the FIML method for the period 1962-1981.
Table 7A.£. Export functions for developed market economies (second step).a
Nether- Belgium/
Variable France UK Italy lands Luxembourg Canada
a 1 0.553 0.743 0.591 0.600 0.457 0.697(18.43) (30.23) (10.34) (20.87) (15.73) (15.49)
a 2 0.203 0.105 0.137 0.119 0.144 0.095
(15.21) (10.25) (8.42) (14.80) (17.12) (7.90)
aa 0.168 0.070 0.091 0.080 0.096 0.063
(12.31) (7.89) (9.04) (12.02) (14.77) (7.08)
a 4 0.139 0.072 0.113 0.099 0.119 0.079
(9.48) (7.00) (8.23) (13.70) (15.20) (8.05)
as 0.138 0.072 0.093 0.082 0.099 0.065
(12.13) (8.96) (8.37) (8.80) (8.81 ) (5.98)
a6 0.108 0.056 0.073 0.064 0.098 0.065
(12.85) (8.26) (8.01 ) (13.13) (14.82) (7.32)
a7 0.156 0.081 0.105 0.092 0.111 0.051
(9.96) (8.99) (7.12) (10.32) (10.38) (6.65)
a8 0.175 0.091 0.118 0.103 0.124 0.082
(11.59) (9.10) (7.96) (11.64) (12.25) (7.97)
DW 0.65 2.22 2.19 1.08 0.73 0.82
R2C 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98
SEE 1.990 1.211 1.532 1.070 1.844 2.820
aYalues in parentheses are t-values. The specification of the estimated system is given by
equation (7.S) in the text, but note that the equation for group 10 is not estimated directly.
All estimates use the MIDIS method for the period 1962-1984.
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Table 7A.9. Export functions for CMEA countries (second step).a
Variable USSR Bulgaria CSSR CDR Hungary Poland
a1 0.292 0.899 0.874 0.884 0.941 0.894
(10.50) (139.24) (37.50) (18.75) (23.97) (106.89)
a2 0.643 0.054 0.069 0.080 0.031 0.059(26.53) (7.98) (7.85) (4.01) (3.07) (6.67)
a3 0.611 0.044 0.056 0.066 0.Q25 0.048(26.53) (6.27) (7.08) (4.18) (3.00) (5.57)
a4 0.603 0.051 0.065 0.076 0.030 0.056
(23.07) (7.25) (7.85) (4.01) (3.07) (6.67)
as 0.618 0.052 0.066 0.075 0.029 0.055
(21.74) (6.70) (7.20) (4.03) (3.06) (6.23)
a6 0.624 0.053 0.067 0.078 0.030 0.056
(18.32) (7.28) (7.52) (4.01) (3.03) (5.86)
a7 0.611 0.051 0.065 0.076 0.030 0.057
(26.53) (7.98) (7.85) (4.01) (3.07) (6.25)
as 0.553 0.047 0.059 0.069 0.027 0.051
(15.54) (7.02) (8.30) (3.68) (3.03) (6.08)
DW 1.43 1.99 1.20 1.08 1.90 1.35
R2C 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
SEE 0.606 0.173 1.158 0.520 0.199 0.393
aYalues in parentheses are t-values. The specification of the estimated system is given by
equation (7.5) in the text, but note that the equation for Romania is not estimated directly.
All estimates use the F1ML method for the period 1962-19SS.
Table 7A,,4- Export functions for developing countries (second step).a
Variable 11 12 India 19 1.1 15
a1 0.150 0.851 0.529 0.910 0.833 0.900
(4.50) (68.31) (8.71) (480.27) (19.27) (121.06)
a2 0.731 0.105 0.045 0.011 0.028 0.052
(22.99) (7.98) (6.29) (5.31 ) (3.94) (6.67)
a3 0.695 0.058 0.025 0.006 0.016 0.029
(22.99) (4.36) (4.03) (3.72) (3.13) (4.11)
a4 0.405 0.058 0.043 0.010 0.027 0.050
(8.00) (5.74) (6.29) (5.31 ) (3.94) (6.67)
as 0.673 0.096 0.042 0.006 0.016 0.029
(22.99) (7.98) (6.29) (4.47) (4.10) (5.19)
a6 0.627 0.090 0.039 0.009 0.026 0.048
(14.22) (7.33) (6.44) (5.10) (3.94) (6.67)
a7 0.695 0.099 0.043 0.010 0.027 0.045
(22.99) (7.98) (6.29) (4.47) (4.10) (5.19)
as 0.589 0.084 0.037 0.009 0.023 0.042
(13.62) (6.28) (5.56) (4.70) (3.93) (5.58)
DW 1.39 1.46 0.67 2.20 1.15 1.54
R2C 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99
SEE 2.653 1.442 0.482 0.444 0.483 1.372
aYalues in parentheses are t-values. The specification of the estimated system is given by
equation (7.5) in the text, but note that the equation for group IS is not estimated directly.
All estimates use the F1ML method for the period 1962-19S1.
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Table 7A.5. Import demand equations, CMEA countries."
Count,y al a2 a3 a 4 DW SEE Est.
Bulgaria 0.188 0.514 0.857 0.556 1.51 280.318 61-85
(1.47) (5.61) (6.40) (5.13) OLS
CSSR 0.515 0.285 0.474 0.290 2.01 3.719 61-85
(5.72) (3.73) (4.96) (3.43) OLS
CDR 0.424 0.283 0.582 0.279 1.90 1.548 61-82
(3.80) (5.90) (4.17) (5.17) FIML
Hungary 0.403 0.528 0.611 0.545 2.27 7.039 61-85
(3.80) (7.50) (4.39) (6.40) OLS
Poland 0.641 0.217 0.559 0.255 1.61 26.745 61-85
(10.58) (9.30) (4.61 ) (11.92) OLS
Romania 0.591 0.221 0.428 0.236 1.83 4.716 61-85
(7.88) (6.32) (4.87) (6.13) FIML
USSR 0.749 0.067 0.453 0.071 2.26 2.183 61-85
(4.08) (0.70) (1.54) (0.68) OLS
aValues in parentheses are t-values. Throughout, R2C = 0.99. Estimated equation:
A'N + C'N EX'N L 1 · ry
IM= a1 IM_ 1+"'2 rIM + as rIM - 0, rIM + u
where
1M
rIM
CoN
A'N
EX'N
Y
ry
= total imports, in domestic currency, constant prices
= price index of total imports, in domestic currency
= total consumption, in current prices
= total gross accumulation, in current prices
= total exports, in domestic currency, current prices
= domestic material output, in constant prices
=price index of domestic material output
Note that the equations for GDR and Romania were estimated with additional restrictions on
the value of the habit persistence parameters.
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Table 7A.6. Export price equations, CMEA countries. a
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Country a 1 a2 aa a4 DW R£C SEE
Bulgaria 0.330 0.473 1.033 1.85 0.99 0.024
(4.47) (8.90) (190.18)
CSSR 0.314 0.495 1.042 2.48 0.98 0.037
(3.48) (7.44) (125.50)
GDR 0.420 0.347 0.093 1.099 1.66 0.99 0.033
(5.41) (3.29) (3.88) (102.53)
Hungary 0.591 0.147 1.033 1.16 0.93 0.036
(5.93) (4.60) (113.71)
Poland 0.642 0.212 0.986 0.71 0.91 0.081
(3.06) (1.33) (39.29)
Romania 0.062 0.681 0.138 1.077 1.52 0.97 0.068
(0.54) (4.39) (2.98) (48.44)
USSR 0.200 0.770 0.076 1.112 1.44 0.98 0.072
(1.99) (6.15) (1.64) (40.31)
aValues in pa.rentheses are t-values. Estima.ted equation:
P' EX. = P' EX! 1 "1 P' Exfvl "2 P'Exfl "3 . a. + u
where
P'ExS = price index of total exports, in $ terms
P'Exfvl = price index for total exports, OECD total, in $ terms
P'EXfl = price index for total exports, Group 11, in $ terms (used as an explanatory vari-
able for some CMEA countries with relatively high exports of oil products)
Note that the equations for GDR and Romania were estimated with additional restrictions on
the value of the habit persistence parameters. All estimates use the FIML method for the
period 1962-1984, except Hungary, for which the period is 1962-1982.
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Table 7A.7. Import price equations, CMEA countries.a
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Country a 1 a2 a3 a4 DW R2C SEE
Bulgaria 0.926 0.683 -0.550 -0.020 2.78 0.99 0.048
(6.52) (6.14) (2.68) (0.81)
CSSR 0.897 0.476 -0.304 -0.024 2.63 1.00 0.027
(9.94) (6.86) (2.29) (1.56)
GDR 0.992 0.639 -0.577 -0.013 2.26 1.00 0.034
(8.49) (7.80) (3.54) (0.53)
Hungary 0.463 0.526 -0.237 0.228 2.05 0.98 0.035
(2.13) (5.95) (1.42) (2.38)
Poland 0.576 1.044 -0.817 0.128 2.87 0.95 0.063
(3.03) (5.79) (5.19) (2.43)
Romania 0.211 1.316 -0.454 -0.068 2.39 0.99 0.059
(0.87) (10.08) (1.56) (1.80)
USSR 0.772 0.894 -0.642 -0.006 2.71 1.00 0.022
(4.20) (14.97) (2.92) (0.52)
aValues in parentheses are t-values. Estimated equation:
P'1M* = alP'IMa~l + a2PM"EK* + a3PM"EX~1 + a. + u
where
P" M* = price index for total imports, in $ terms
PM"EXS = average of export prices abroad, in $ terms
All estimates use the OLS method for the period 1962-1984.
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Table 7A.8. Equations for the indexes of exchange rates.a
Country al a2 ag DW
Bulgaria 0.535 0.426 1.000 2.29
(4.63) (4.09) (104.36)
CSSR 0.325 0.456 1.029 1.80
(2.16) (4.28) (93.53)
GDR 0.450 0.468 1.018 2.17
(6.21) (7.31) (155.37)
Hungary 0.522 0.488 1.004 1.41
(3.01) (3.58) (93.82)
Poland 0.300 0.705 0.994 2.27
(7.03) (22.57) (72.67)
Romania 0.640 0.321 1.003 1.75
(5.08) (2.71) (76.54)
USSR 0.710 0.244 1.006 1.76
(7.79) (3.73) (122.56)
aValues in parentheses are t-values. Estimated equation:
r FX = r FX a1 . [r FX . [ 1 + W' P Jt· a
-1 -1 1 + W' pJr g
where
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R£C SEE
0.98 0.033
0.85 0.039
0.99 0.021
0.77 0.045
0.98 0.061
0.88 0.059
0.90 0.033
rFX
W'P
W'P~r
= index of the exchange rate
= rate of change of the general price level in the country
= rate of change of the average foreign trade (imports + exports) price, in $ terms.
All estimates use the MIDIS method for the period 1962-1985, except Poland, for which the
period is 1962-1984.
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CHAPTER 8
Modeling Exchange Rates and Foreign
Trade of Developed Market Economies
Heinz Welsch
Summary
This chapter is concerned with that part of the Bonn-IIASA world econometric
model that deals with exchange rates and foreign trade of developed market
economies. The variables explained are aggregate imports and exports, imports
and exports disaggregated according to commodity groups, corresponding prices,
and exchange rates. The exogenous explaining variables are GDP, nominal con-
sumption, nominal investment, the GDP deflator, the interest rate and the rate
of change of money supply of the countries considered and of the rest-of-the-
world category applicable in each case. The model structure as well as the esti-
mation results and the ex post tracking performance are presented.
8.1. Introduction
Foreign trade and financial flows provide the basic economic linkages between
national economies. Therefore their analysis has to play a major part in the
analysis of economic growth and structural change in the world economy. How-
ever, financial flows (including changes in foreign reserves) are only a mirror
image of trade flows, due to the balance of payments identity. For this reason,
the scope of this chapter will be restricted to the modeling of foreign trade and
one of its major determinants, the exchange rate. In this context, the develop-
ment of aggregate foreign trade refers to the concept of economic growth whereas
variations in the commodity composition of trade flows will be identified with
structural change.
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According to the general principle of the Bonn-IIASA Research Project the
ultimate driving forces behind economic growth and structural change are the
rate of growth of the labor force, the (net) savings ratio, and the rate of technical
change in the individual countries. They determine the internal development of
the economies as characterized by variables such as GDP, consumption, invest-
ment, domestic price level, and interest rates. These variables, in turn, influence
the trade flows between the countries, where their impact is transmitted by
export and import prices and exchange rates. Therefore, the latter variables
have to be modeled, too.
The effect of the ultimate driving forces of economic growth and structural
change on the internal development of the industrialized countries was the sub-
ject of Chapter 3. The present chapter is concerned with aggregate imports and
exports and their commodity composition, the corresponding prices, and the
exchange rates of these countries. In the following section the general structure
of this (partial) model is presented. Section 8.3 deals with the specification and
the estimation results of the behavioral equations, and in Section 8.4 the ex post
tracking performance of the model is demonstrated. The chapter does not con-
tain ex ante simulations because, due to the partial character of the model, too
many assumptions about the variables exogenous to this part would be required.
For ex ante simulations of foreign trade and exchange rates of Developed Market
Economies (DMEs), the reader is referred to Chapter 7, which deals with solu-
tions of (a simplified version of) the complete, interdependent world model.
8.2. General Structure of the Model
One of the basic features of the model of exchange rates and foreign trade of the
DMEs is that it consists of a set of interdependent two-country models. This
means that each country is considered vis-a-vis the rest of the world (or some
important part thereof). With respect to foreign trade this implies that no bilat-
eral trade relations are considered. For exchange rate determination it means
that for each currency only an exchange rate index relative to a basket of foreign
currencies is explained. The indexes then serve as a basis for the determination
of the dollar rates of the individual currencies.
Another important feature is the top-down approach adopted in modeling
foreign trade. This means that in a first step aggregate foreign trade is modeled.
This is then disaggregated into imports and exports of various commodity
categories.
The theoretical basis of the exchange rate equations used in the model is the
balance of payments approach to exchange rate determination. This approach is
designed to explain the exchange rate in a two-country model in which each
country produces a specific good and has its specific money and an interest-
bearing asset. For each of these items demand functions are specified on the
basis of utility or portfolio optimization, where one of the arguments of these
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functions is the exchange rate. Substituting the appropriate demand functions
into the balance of payments equation yields an equation which can be inter-
preted as an equilibrium condition for the foreign exchange market. The
exchange rate equation is then obtained by solving this condition for the
exchange rate. This approach is used to determine the exchange rate indices
mentioned above.
Regarding aggregate foreign trade in goods and services, the general princi-
ple used is that volumes are modeled by import and export demand functions
whereas the corresponding prices are determined from the supply side. The
import demand functions are based on a dynamic version of the Linear Expendi-
ture System which allocates the income of the country under consideration to
domestic and imported goods. The same approach is applied to the rest of the
world to derive export demand functions. Export prices are modeled by inverted
export supply functions, and import prices are explained by weighted averages of
the export prices of the countries from which the imports originate, and by
exchange rates.
The structure of foreign trade is determined by first separating total import
and export expenditures into expenditures on commodities and services (as a
residual) and then allocating the expenditures on commodities to the various
commodity groups, using again the dynamic Linear Expenditure System. The
corresponding prices are explained by the prices of aggregate foreign trade and
their own lagged values.
In total, the model consists of 24 behavioral equations for each country [1]
and for the summary category of other DMEs. The exogenous explaining vari-
ables are GDP, nominal consumption, nominal investment, the GDP deflator,
the interest rate and the rate of change of money supply of the countries con-
sidered and of the rest-of-the-world category applicable in each case.
The directions of influence among the endogenous variables of the foreign
trade and exchange rate model for DMEs are graphically represented in Figure
8.1. (For the notations used, the reader is referred to Appendix 8A of this
chapter. The behavioral and definitional equations underlying the figure are
given in the subsequent sections.)
8.3 Specification and Estimation of the Behavioral Equations
8.3.1. Exchange rates [21
For each of the countries considered we define an exchange rate index as
weighted average of its exchange rates relative to all other countries:
n
FXi = E llij FXij ,
j=ljp
i = 1, ... ,n,
n
E llij = 1
j=l
j::j:i
(8.1)
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Figure 8.1. Graphical representation of the model structure.
where FXij is the price of the currency unit of country J in terms of the currency
of country i and Ci.ij is an indicator of the importance of J as a trading partner of
i. We assume that the following arbitrage condition is fulfilled (which is in fact
approximately true):
FXil;
FXij = FXjk
' i, J, k = 1, ... ,n, FXii = 1 (8.2)
Thus, all exchange rates FXij and hence all exchange rate indices FXi can be
expressed in terms of the exchange rate vis-a.-vis one arbitrary currency, say, the
currency of country 1. It follows that only the n -1 exchange rates of all curren-
cies with respect to currency 1, FXil , i =/: 1, have to be determined. All the
other exchange rates are then fixed. The exchange rates FXil , i =/: 1, in turn,
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can be recovered from the n -1 exchange rate indices FXi , i =J 1. This can be
seen by rewriting the last n -1 equations of the equation system (8.1) as follows:
(8.3)
FXn1 FXn1
FXn = O:nl FXn1 + O:n2 FX + ... + O:n n-l X
21 'F n-l 1,
Dividing the first equation by FX2V "" the last equation by FXn1 , and rearrang-
ing, the system (8.3) may be written as
A . _1_ = 0: where A =
FX
(8.4)
1
FX21
1
= 0:=FX
1
FXn1
If IA I =J 0 we may solve (8.4) for the reciprocal values of all FXi1 :
(8.5)
In the empirical application, all exchange rates are normalized with respect to
the US dollar.
It remains to specify the estimation equations for the exchange rate indices
as defined by (8.1). As outlined in Section 8.2 they are obtained by substituting
demand functions for the various items of the balance of payments equations.
Using the index i for the country under consideration and the index F for
all foreign countries, the balance of payments equation of country i (expressed in
the foreign currency) can be written as
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(8.6)
where FXi = price of one unit of currency F in terms of currency i; XjA: = com-
modities of origin j purchased by country k, MjA: = money of origin j held by
country k; Pj = price level of country j (in currency of country j), and
j, k c {i,F}.
The arguments of the demand functions to be substituted for XjA:' KjA: and
Mjle are available income, the terms of trade PF/(pd FXi ), the inflation rate
disparity 11" = w'PF - w'Pi [3], the interest rate disparity p = rF - ri' the growth
rate disparity of real GDP ~w' Y = w' YF - w' Yi, the disparity in the rate growth
of money supply ~w' m, and the relative creditor or debtor position of country i
is A, which is measured by the cumulated balance of trade in goods and services,
divided by nominal GDP.
After these functions have been substituted into (8.6) the resulting equation
is solved for FXi , where use is made of some additional assumptions and some
approximations and linearizations (see Krelle and Welsch, 1985).
The result is
(8.7)
This equation states that long-run equilibrium growth (with constant
11", p, ~w'Y, ~w'm, A) determines the exchange rate by relative purchasing
power parity. Deviations from it are due to monetary disequilibria, differences in
growth rates and foreign indebtedness.
The equation was estimated for the period 1970-1982, using the method of
OLS. The results are depicted in Table 8.1.
In recovering the dollar exchange rates from the exchange rate indices
according to (8.5), it turned out that the matrix A was sometimes badly condi-
tioned, leading to considerably larger errors in the dollar rates compared with
the exchange rate indices. Therefore, we chose to replace the system of
definitional equations (8.5) by a system of behavioral equations which explain
the dollar rate FXil by the ratio of the exchange rate indices of country i and
country 1 (= USA) and the ratio of the weighting factors a.ld a.il:
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These equations provide an approximation to the system of equations (8.5), but
they definitely work better. Their key meaning is that the dollar rate of country
i should reflect the relative strength of currency i and the dollar as expressed by
the ratio of their exchange rate indices, moderated by the strength of the bilat-
eral trade relations (aliiail)'
The estimation results can be found in Table 8.2 (1970-1982, OLS).
8.3.2. Aggregate foreign trade
Aggregate exports and imports of the DMEs are determined by demand func-
tions.
In choosing among the various specifications of import demand functions [4]
to be found in the literature, one usually refers to the criteria of compatibility
with general demand theory and goodness of fit. In addition to these, the recent
literature focuses on the application of statistical specification tests to check the
reliability of these functions.
Following Thursby and Thursby (1984), the import demand specification
that is (in general) most appropriate, according to these criteria, is a log-linear
one where the regressors are the ratio of domestic prices to import prices, a
domestic activity variable and, possibly, the lagged dependent variable.
The problem with this specification in the context of long-term forecasting
models is that it tends to produce a power coefficient of the activity variable
which is larger than one. This is due to the fact that the observed import ratio
generally increased substantially over the last decades. Of course, using this
specification with a power coefficient larger than unity implies that asymptot-
ically the import ratio grows beyond all limits, a very unreasonable property.
Therefore, our task was to find a specification which, besides fulfilling the
requirements of compatibility with general demand theory and statistical reliabil-
ity, gives a good description of the past and shows reasonable long-term
behavior.
This is being achieved by taking into account the budget constraint which
import demand has to fulfill. Moreover, the effect of predetermined demand
components on this budget constraint is explicitly considered.
The basic assumption is that a country allocates its available income to the
purchase of imports (1M) and domestic goods (GDP). Available income of an
open economy consists of the value of domestic and foreign sales (GDP' Nand
EX'N, respectively), net transfer and capital income (B'TRF, B'I) and the net
increase in debts (B'C = balance of capital flows). Thus, denoting the import
deflator by P'IM and the GDP deflator by P'GDP, the budget constraint
(which is, of course, equivalent to the balance of payments equation) reads
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rIM· 1M + rGDp· GDP = GDrN + EX'N
+ B'TRF + B' + B'C
On the other hand, from the national accounts identity we have
rIM· 1M + rGDp· GDP = C'N + rN + EX'N
241
(8.9)
(8.10)
where C'Nand r N denote the value of consumption and investment, respec-
tively, Therefore, instead of the RHS of (8.9) we can use the RHS of (8.1O) as
income variable.
We now assume that actual demand for imports is the sum of "free
demand" IM* and base demand, which is proportional to lagged demand [5]:
1M = IM* + HM_ 1, ). ~ a (8.11)
An analogous assumption holds for the demand for domestic goods.
Free demand for imports and domestic goods is determined by maximizing
a Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to the constraint that its value equals
available income minus the expenditures on base demand. The resulting import
demand equation is
1M = aIM + b C'N + rN + EX'N - c P;;f{ GDP_ 1
-1 rIM (8.12)
where 1M'N denotes the value of imports and a, b, c are non-negative
coefficients (for details see Welsch, 1987).
In empirical applications of this equation we admit the possibility that
there is not just one decision making unit allocating its income
C'n + r N + EX'N to imports and domestic goods but that we have consump-
tion goods, investment goods and export goods sectors with different propensities
to import. In this case equation (8.12) becomes
(8.13)
- c rGDP GDP
rIM -1
This is the basic import demand equation in our model. The equations
actually used are special cases which are obtained by imposing zero or equality
242 ~ Future 01 the World Economy
restrictions on certain parameters. The estimation results are listed in Table 8.9
(1962-1982, OL8).
The approach to import demand modeling just outlined is also used to
derive export demand functions. In order to do this one has to take the view that
all countries different from the one under consideration are lumped together.
Exports of anyone country are then determined by a function describing the
demand of all these foreign countries for imports from the country considered.
Equation (8.12) can immediately be interpreted as describing this demand if one
takes the variables included in this equation as referring to the total of foreign
countries.
In order to write down the export demand function explicitly, we introduce
the notation that variables referring to the group of countries different from the
country considered are indicated by the suffix "F". As the common currency of
this group we choose the U8 dollar. We assume that the import price faced by
the group is the export price of the country considered (P' EX) divided by the
dollar exchange rate of this country (FX). Then the export function can be writ-
ten as
EX = aEX + b C'NF + rNF + EX'NF
-1 P'EX/FX
(8.14)
- c
P'GDPF
P'EX/FX GDPF_ l
It should be noted that the variable EX' NF appearing on the RH8 is, of course,
given by the term 1M'N / FX.
In the empirical application of this function it turned out to be useful to
split up the income components C' NF and/or r NF according to subgroups of
the group of countries different from the country considered. Moreover, in the
equations actually used, zero restrictions for some of the coefficients were
imposed. The estimated equation has the form
C'NF I + rNF l + IM'N/FX C'NF3
EX = aEX_ l + bl P'EX/ FX + b2 P' EX/ FX
(8.15)
rNFb 3 _ c P'GDPF GDPF
+ 3 P'EX/FX P'EX/FX -1
where C'NF I and rNF l refer to DMEs (different from the country considered)
and C' NF3 and r NF3 to developing countries. Consumption and investment of
CMEA countries were not found to be significant. Estimation results are de-
picted in Table 8.4 (1962-1981, OL8).
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Since export and import quantities are determined by demand functions,
we model the corresponding prices in a way which reflects the supply side of
international trade. This means that conceptually export price functions are
inverted export supply functions. They can be derived as follows (for a similar
approach see Stevens et al., 1984). Suppose that each country produces a homo-
geneous good (X), which can either be used domestically or be exported:
X = A + EX (8.16)
where A = absorption (= consumption + investment).
A representative firm is assumed to maximize its profit
P'A . A + P'EX· EX - G(A + EX) with respect to A and EX, where
G(A + EX) is the cost function and P'A, P'EX denote the absorption and
export deflator, respectively. The well-known result in the case of perfect com-
petition is that prices are given by
P'A = P'EX = MG
and in the case of discriminating monopolistic behavior by
P'A = [1 + 1 ]-1. MG,
cA,P'A
P'EX = [1 + 1 ]-1 .MG
cEX,P'EX
(8.17)
(8.18)
where MG denotes the marginal costs and CAP'A' CEX P'EX are the price elastic-
ities of domestic absorption and exports.' ,
In order to get an estimatable equation for the export price, we have to
specify the marginal cost function and, in the monopolistic case, the markup
term (1 + l/cEX P'EX) in terms of observable variables.
Regarding ~arginal costs it can be assumed that the output X is produced
according to a Cobb-Douglas production function in GDP and imported goods:
(8.19)
This specification could be tracked back to a production function for X,
where the inputs are capital, labor and imports, and a production function for
GDP in labor and capital alone, where both of these functions are linear homo-
geneous and of Cobb-Douglas type and an additional consistency assumption is
required.
Heinz WeLsch
Minimizing the expenditures
C = P'GDp· GDP + P'IM· 1M
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(8.20)
with respect to GDP and 1M subject to (8.19), substituting the resulting demand
functions for GDP and 1M into (8.20) and taking the derivative of this with
respect to X gives the marginal cost function dual to (8.19):
MC = 1.- [P'GDPlfJ [p' IMll- fJ
a (3 1-(3
(8.20)
= a P' GDPfJ . P'IM1-fJ
where a is a function of a and (3.
Inserting this into the second equation of (8.18) yields
P'EX = a [1 + 1 1-1 P' GDpfJ . P'IM1-fJ
cEX,P'EX
(8.22)
Next, the markup term (1 + l/cEX P'EX)-1 may be simplified in a specific
way. To do this, it should be noted th'at the export price elasticity CEX P'EX
according to the export demand equation (8.15) has the form '
EX_1
cEX,P'EX = a ----ex - 1, a ~ 0 (8.23)
From this it can be seen that cEX P'EX decreases for increasing EX/EX -1' Con-
sequently, according to (8.22), the markup of export prices over marginal costs
also decreases as EX/EX_ 1 increases.
Therefore, we choose to substitute for the markup term in equation (8.22)
the expression (EX/ EX_1)6, where b is expected to be negative [6]:
P'EX = a (~]6 P'GDpfJ. P'IM1-fJ
EX_ 1
(8.24)
Furthermore, it may be assumed that export prices cannot be adjusted
instantaneously to the current marginal costs. This means that lagged marginal
costs, which are a function of lagged P' GDP and lagged P'IM, affect the export
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price. Thus, equation (8.24) describes the desired price, whereas the actual
export price is given by
(8.25)
where B is a function of the lagged values of P' GDP and P'IM. We specify B
as follows:
00 .
log B = b "E >,1 log P'GDP-i
i=1
(8.26)
00 .
+ c"E >.1 log P'IM_ 1 , >. E (0,1)
i=1
which means that the lagged values of log P' GDP and log P'IM influence log B
with geometrically decreasing weights. Substituting (8.26) into the logarithmic
version of (8.25) and applying the Koyck transformation (i.e., deducting
>. log P'EX-1 and solving for log P'EX) gives
log P'EX = ao + al log[~] + a2log P' GDP + a 3 log P'IMEX_ 1
(8.27)
+ a4 log P' GDP-1 + as log P'IM_ 1 + a6 log P'EX_ 1
where all coefficients are functions of the basic structural parameters. It should
be noted that the signs of a4 and as are undetermined.
This is our basic estimation equation. In the empirical application zero re-
strictions were used for some of the coefficients. In particular, al was set to zero
for most countries, which means that in these cases there is no significant
monopolistic power. The estimation results are given in Table 8.5 (1962-1982,
OLS).
Import prices are also supply-determined. They are explained by the aver-
age export price of the countries of origin, adjusted by the exchange rates.
Denoting these adjusted average export prices by PM'EX our basic assumption
on import price determination can be written as
00 .
P'IM = ao + al PM'EX + a2 "E JlI PM' EX_ i
i=1
(8.28)
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This means that import prices are a linear function of actual and lagged average
export prices of the suppliers, where the weights of the lags decrease geometric-
ally. (In the special case a 1 = a2 the geometrical decrease starts in the present
period).
The reasoning behind this equation is that due to time lags (transportation
and storage time, etc.) it may happen that prices for traded goods enter the
statistics of the exporting country before the corresponding prices appear in the
statistics of the importing country. Depending on which fraction of trade is
delivered within one period and which fraction only later, P'IM is composed of
current and lagged PM' EX. The nature of this composition is clearly a linear
one since no qualitative transformation of goods (production) is involved. (We
abstract from transportation as a process which changes the quality of a good.)
Due to the fact that the assumed lag distribution is a geometrical one,
equation (8.28) can easily be made estimable via the Koyck transformation. This
gives
P'IM = aD (1 - JL) + al PM' EX + JL(a2 - ( 1)PM'EX_ 1 + JLP'IM_ 1
(8.29)
where a2 will be negative for a 1 > a2' Equation (8.29) is our basic estimation
equation for import prices. The estimation results can be seen in Table 8.6
(1962-1981, OLS).
8.3.3. Structure of foreign trade
A large part of the foreign trade model of DMEs is concerned with the disaggre-
gation of imports and exports according to their commodity composition. Since
aggregate foreign trade, as considered in the previous subsection, includes goods
as well as services we have to separate, in a first step, these two broad categories.
This could be done by using, again, the demand system approach described
above. However, to do this, deflators for trade in services would be required,
which are not available. Therefore, we modify the dynamic Linear Expenditure
System by assuming that for services there are no base quantities, only base
expenditures, proportional to lagged expenditures. Then we get the following
demand equation for total commodity exports (in expenditure form):
XC'N = a P'XC . XC_ 1 + b EX'N - c (EX'N_ 1 - XC'N_ 1) (8.30)
where XC' N denotes total expenditures on commodity exports, P' XC and XC
are the corresponding deflator and volume, and EX'N is expenditures on exports
of commodities and services. A completely analogous equation applies to total
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commodity imports. The estimation results for these equations are very good.
We do not reproduce them here due to space considerations.
Our next task is to allocate total commodity export and import expendi-
tures to the various commodity categories. The categories considered are 1 =
AGR = SITC 0 + 1,2 = CRU = SITC 2 + 4, 3 = MFL = SITC 3, and 4 =
IND = SITC 5+ ,... , + 9. Again, the dynamic Linear Expenditure System is
applied.
The estimation equations (in expenditure form) for export demand for com-
modity category j E {AGR, CRU, MFL, IND} are [7]:
X1·'N = a P'X1·• X1'- I + b XG'N - ~ ck P'Xk • Xk - I
I kh '
(8.31)
The equations for imports are analogous. The coefficients a, band ck are func-
tions of the structural parameters that characterize each commodity group
within the demand system: the habit persistence parameters Aj and the margin-
al expenditure shares Pj' These functional relationships imply cross-equation
restrictions for the estimation coefficients a, band ck which were imposed as side
conditions in the estimation procedure. The systems were estimated using the
method of Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), for the period
1963-1983. The fl2 and DW statistics are given in Table 8.7, while Table 8.8
gives an overview of the implied structural parameters. (Ml, ... , M4 and
Xl, ... , X4 refer to imports and exports, respectively, of the four categories men-
tioned above).
It remains to specify equations for the prices of the commodity categories.
We chose the following specification:
(8.32)
and the analogue for imports. The estimation results are very good, but we do
not reproduce them, due to space limitations.
8.4. Performance of the Model
To assess the performance of the complete model of exchange rates and foreign
trade of the DMEs, a dynamic ex post simulation was run for the period
1970-1981 (which is the overlapping interval of all reference periods underlying
the estimation).
The system solved comprises the behavioral equations discussed in section
3 and the following definitional equations:
A = A_I + EX'N - IM'N (8.33)
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Table 8.9. Mean absolute percentage errors of the foreign trade and exchange rate
model of DMEs. (For definitions of terms, refer to Appendix 8A.)
Term USA FRG Japan France UK Italy Neth. Belg. Can. Other
FX 1.97 4.71 6.14 3.04 11.73 0.79 2.60 3.87 3.59 2.87
FX'doliar 3.78 5.34 3.63 11.71 2.09 3.26 3.77 2.52 1.46
1M 3.70 2.39 5.11 2.55 3.67 3.70 3.92 1.88 1.48 3.62
IM'N 3.87 5.79 6.90 3.96 7.15 2.72 4.18 5.02 2.85 2.46
P'IM 3.66 6.34 6.72 4.66 10.57 4.02 3.72 4.54 2.61 1.80
EX 3.33 2.38 6.18 1.53 2.72 2.62 2.66 2.71 2.38 4.91
EX'N 3.26 4.61 8.18 2.96 6.65 2.68 5.20 5.64 2.73 4.07
P'EX 1.82 2.55 2.96 2.46 4.60 2.07 4.24 3.40 3.06 1.62
MG 3.43 2.30 3.71 3.88 2.99 4.06 2.21 2.23 4.19 2.61
MG'N 1.96 0.91 1.19 0.80 2.02 0.59 0.72 0.98 1.69 1.30
P'MG 3.11 1.60 3.54 4.05 2.65 4.13 1.94 1.83 4.44 2.68
MAGR 4.09 3.54 4.60 9.84 1.82 7.75 2.98 3.17 4.03 2.94
MAGR'N 5.38 3.66 5.66 10.21 4.79 11.24 3.64 4.38 5.72 3.97
P'MAGR 4.15 2.75 4.28 4.79 5.19 3.95 3.50 3.44 3.29 4.09
MCRU 1.47 4.06 6.13 7.49 6.43 12.80 2.69 5.59 7.43 4.96
MCRU'N 4.65 4.40 6.83 9.71 6.99 14.40 4.19 4.24 8.32 4.35
P'MCRU 4.47 3.29 4.28 3.93 6.21 3.18 3.34 4.86 8.46 1.74
MMFL 12.77 8.94 4.88 10.48 6.71 14.79 9.03 5.96 9.63 10.87
MMFL'N 12.60 6.87 8.25 11.26 10.16 14.74 8.88 7.48 18.29 12.63
P'MMFL 8.57 5.78 7.95 6.39 11.95 7.96 5.43 4.79 19.08 15.01
MIND 4.92 2.04 7.59 2.53 4.76 2.97 2.84 3.04 4.76 2.91
MIND'N 4.47 1.21 5.47 2.06 4.65 2.24 2.63 1.75 2.23 2.28
P'MIND 4.79 1.74 3.16 2.70 3.54 2.50 2.09 2.47 5.01 1.63
XG 1.95 1.49 1.50 3.71 4.21 2.26 2.42 2.79 2.44 2.53
XG'N 1.31 0.81 0.97 1.33 1.97 0.63 0.89 1.21 1.03 1.96
P'XG 1.24 1.28 0.83 3.59 3.74 2.51 1.85 2.53 2.79 1.51
XAGR'N 5.77 3.96 46.91 4.23 6.22 10.51 1.64 3.47 7.98 4.55
XAGR'N 8.88 4.56 43.16 5.59 6.21 7.64 3.90 4.18 6.07 5.07
P'XAGR 3.61 4.02 4.22 3.09 3.38 7.24 3.47 3.73 4.92 2.58
XCRU 5.04 5.73 14.54 7.82 7.27 14.26 7.53 3.65 7.63 12.50
XCRU'N 4.84 4.54 12.99 7.39 7.02 14.62 5.73 5.32 9.48 11.81
P'XCRU 4.20 5.21 6.22 5.04 6.53 7.39 6.79 3.52 4.77 4.76
XMFL 14.83 7.37 14.29 16.54 21.75 10.06 10.42 21.09 12.47 13.64
XMFL'N 12.03 7.62 14.93 17.01 24.06 10.35 9.83 23.84 11.45 14.61
P'XMFL 4.57 6.13 4.48 8.65 12.69 8.94 4.63 9.58 8.51 12.00
XIND 1.37 1.37 1.77 4.15 4.52 1.92 2.55 3.35 4.52 4.53
XIND'N 1.00 0.76 1.09 2.19 2.28 1.04 1.86 1.71 1.42 4.21
P'XIND 1.24 1.20 0.85 3.84 3.95 2.54 1.19 2.93 4.22 1.80
where A is the cumulated balance of trade in goods and services that enters the
exchange rate equation (8.7), and
IM'N = P'IM· 1M (8.34)
EX'N = P'EX· EX (8.35)
M· = M.'N/P'M. (8.36)J J J
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Figure 8.£. Ex post forecast for the USA: solid lines = observed data; broken lines =
computed data.
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X· = X·'N/P'X·1 1 1
XG = EX.
. 1
1
P'MG = MG'N/MG
P'XG = XG'N/XG
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(8.37)
(8.38)
(8.39)
(8.40)
(8.41)
The mean absolute percentage errors of the ex post forecast are given in
Table 8.9. In Figures 8.2-8.4 the performance of the model is graphically
demonstrated by plotting the actual and computed values of real exports and
imports as well as the exchange rate indices and dollar rates of the USA, FRG
and Japan.
Our conclusion is that the model is able to trace the past behavior of
foreign trade and exchange rates of the DMEs in a satisfactory way.
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[41
[5]
[6]
[7]
For the USA only 23 equations are used.
This subsection is based on Krelle and Welsch (1985).
For each variable z, we denote its rate of change by w' z.
The following paragraphs on import demand functions are based on Welsch
(1987).
This approach is based on the attempt of Pollak (1970) to dynamize the Linear
Expenditure System proposed by Klein and Rubin (1947) and extensively used by
Stone (see, e.g., Stone, 1954a).
This substitution is also motivated by the fact that (8.18) is only valid for abso-
lute price elasticities larger than unity, an assumption which need not hold empiri-
cally. Qualitatively, however, it is evident that the markup over marginal costs
depends inversely on the absolute price elasticity. This relationship is captured by
(8.24). Moreover, the pressure of competition is important for price setting. This
influence is reflected by P'IM. Hence, the impact of this variable on P'EX might
be higher than is suggested by the above derivation.
The derivation is as described in Subsection 8.3.2 for aggregate foreign trade. For
details regarding the application to the structure of commodity trade, see Welsch
(1986).
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EX
EX'N
FX
FX'$
1M
IM'N
MG
M·1
MG'N
M·'N
plEX
P'IM
P'MG
P'M·1
P'XG
P'X·1
XG
X·1
XG'N
X·'N1
= real exports of goods and services
= nominal exports of goods and services
= exchange rate index relative to currency basket (~FXi)
= exchange rate relative to US dollar (~FXil)
= real imports of goods and services
= nominal imports of goods and services
= real imports of commodities
= real imports of commodity group j
= nominal imports of commodities
= nominal imports of commodity group j
= price index of exports of goods and services
= price index of imports of goods and services
= price index of commodity imports
= price index of imports of commodity group j
= price index of commodity exports
= price index of exports of commodity group j
= real exports of commodities
= real exports of commodity group j
= nominal exports of commodities
= nominal exports of commodity group j
The index j refers to commodity groups:
J = AGR = SITC 0 + 1
J = CRU = SITC 2 + 4
J = MFL = SITC 3
J = IND = SITC 5 + ,..., + 9
For instance, P'MAGR denotes the price index of imports of SITC 0 + 1.
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CHAPTER 9
Structural Change in Foreign
Trade of the CMEA Countries
Jan B. Gaida
Summary
This chapter presents the model of foreign trade for the seven East European
members of the CMEA. Some specific problems of the CMEA foreign exchange
are discussed: the dual currency (transferable rouble and dollar) system and
their exchange rates into "valuta" currencies, insulation of domestic from the
world market prices, and foreign debt and its approximation. The valuta
exchange rates were found to follow predominantly the behavior of the strength
of US $ measured against SDR. Exports are explained mainly from the supply
point of view, an important element in a model oriented toward simulation and
scenario analysis; imports are considered from the demand side.
9.1. Introduction
We start with a short discussion of differences between the centrally planned
economy and the free market one as far as the foreign trade subsystem is con-
cerned.
The first important difference is associated with the exchange rates and
currencies used to express the foreign trade of the CMEA countries. The rates
refer to so-called "valuta" currency, not directly related to the domestic
currency. Imported or exported goods having the same dollar price, say, may
have different domestic prices and vice versa. This is roughly equivalent to
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variable subsidy and taxation rates applied to different items in foreign trade.
No published data exist which allow us to consistently transfer the value given in
the "valuta" prices into the domestic market prices.
The system of "valuta" currency introduces some kind of insulation of
domestic prices from the world market prices. Basically the value of exports and
imports is published in "valuta" currencies only, being in this way comparable
with foreign trade of the rest of the world, but without being directly compatible
with other indicators of domestic activity, such as GDP or its counterpart NMP
(net material product, which is widely used in centrally planned economies), con-
sumption, etc., expressed in domestic prices of the country.
Smaller economies bothered with foreign debt payments find total insula-
tion from the world prices unacceptable, especially when the world prices change
rapidly. The Hungarians (in 1976) and the Poles (in 1982) found it useful as well
as necessary to introduce a direct connection between world and domestic prices.
They abolished the "valuta" currency system and introduced direct exchange
rates for their domestic currency. The exchange rates are determined by the
central banks on the basis of several factors, therefore some form of insulation
still exists. Nevertheless one may assume that current exchange rates in these
countries reflect the differences between domestic and foreign costs and demands
more precisely than in the case of countries with the "valuta" exchange rates.
An additional problem arises due to the fact that the intra-CMEA trade
used to be expressed in terms of the transferable rouble. There exists a transfer-
able rouble/dollar exchange rate (recently about 0.7 rouble per dollar). Poland
and Hungary have set direct exchange rates of their domestic currency for the
rouble and the dollar. The rates do not obey the arbitrage condition. As an
example one may quote the Polish rates; at the end of 1985 the dollar rate was
147.88 zloty and the rouble rate 88 zloty. In Hungary too the dollar rate hap-
pens to be higher than the rouble rate. As a result the dollar value of foreign
trade calculated from roubles using the direct rouble/dollar exchange rate differs
considerably from the same dollar value obtained through initial conversion from
roubles to the domestic currency and then from the domestic currency to dollars.
Actually, the intra-CMEA prices change according to a pattern different
from that of the world prices (mUCh slower and with considerable delay). If it
were not for the compactness of the world model (and lack of properly disaggre-
gated data) the model of foreign trade for the CMEA countries would be disag-
gregated into two parts: the first describing intra-CMEA trade and the second
describing trade with the Rest of the World.
One might expect that for the Soviet economy the rouble/dollar exchange
rate would be free from such biases. However, massive reductions of price in the
Soviet domestic market made in the 1960s, supposedly owing to a decrease in the
domestic costs, were not reflected in the rouble/dollar exchange rates of this
period. The differences in valuations apparently accumulated in the state
budget, which interferes with the economic activity through subsidies and taxes,
insulating the domestic from the world market prices.
While analyzing the patterns of behavior of the "valuta" exchange rates
with respect to the dollar, one can observe some similarities between the CMEA
countries. Before 1972 the rates were kept at constant levels. Since 1972 they
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started to move in quite a similar fashion - increasing until 1979-80 and decreas-
ing afterwards (see Table 9.1).
Table 9.1- Exchange rates of seven European CMEA countries (US/SDR rate and US
GDP deflators given for comparison).
USA
$ per CDP
Year USSR Bulgaria CSSR CDR Hungary Poland Romania SDR Deflator
1960 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.54
1961 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.55
1962 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.56
1963 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.57
1964 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.58
1965 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.59
1966 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.61
1967 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.63
1968 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.66
1969 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.69
1970 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.73
1971 0.90 1.17 7.20 4.20 56.96 95.21 6.00 1.00 0.77
1972 0.83 1.08 6.63 3.87 52.46 87.55 5.53 1.09 0.80
1973 0.74 0.97 5.83 3.34 46.19 79.52 5.02 1.19 0.84
1974 0.75 0.97 5.84 3.48 44.39 79.01 4.97 1.20 0.92
1975 0.72 0.97 5.59 3.48 41.61 79.01 4.97 1.21 1.00
1976 0.75 0.97 5.77 3.48 41.62 79.01 4.97 1.16 1.06
1977 0.74 0.95 5.65 3.48 40.98 79.01 4.97 1.17 1.12
1978 0.68 0.89 5.42 3.48 38.08 75.36 4.56 1.25 1.20
1979 0.66 0.87 5.31 3.48 35.61 73.53 4.47 1.29 1.31
1980 0.65 0.88 5.38 3.30 32.48 72.69 4.47 1.30 1.43
1981 0.72 0.92 5.89 5.32 34.43 80.00 4.47 1.18 1.56
1982 0.73 0.95 6.12 3.46 36.85 85.11 4.47 1.10 1.67
Notes: "Valuta" exchange rates except for those of Hungary and Poland, which were
calculated from data published in UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; for
Hungary and Romania, in IMF International Financial Statistics; for Poland, in W9
Data Bank and national yearbook, various issues. Minor discrepancies with other
sources, due to rounding errors and existence of difference valuta courses for exports and
imports, are possible.
The behavior of the rates exhibits some differences for different countries.
One group of countries makes annual updates of their exchange rates. These
are: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Soviet Union. Other countries
tried to keep the exchange rates stable for longer periods; only at the end of the
1970s did their exchange rates start to show annual adjustments. Romania is
somewhat exceptional in this group since its exchange rate has undergone two
three-year periods of annual updates interwoven with even longer periods of a
stable rate; it is the only country for which the exchange rate did not decrease in
1981 and 1982.
For Romania we have also a commercial exchange rate reported to the
IMF. In Table 9.2 both Romanian rates are shown - the one reported by the
IMF and the one reported by the UN. The two series exhibit a tendency to be
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related in a certain proportion. Since the commercial exchange rate "is in fact a
coefficient so as to transform foreign currency values into domestic units of
accounts . . . and a noncommercial exchange rate is used for invisibles, mainly
tourism, and therefore closer to purchasing power parity criteria" (Colombatto,
1983), we shall use the noncommercial one in our further research.
Table 9.2. Comparison of the commercial exchange rate reported by Romania to IMF
with the rate shown in Table 9.1 (in lei per $).
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
UN data
6.000
6.000
5.530
5.023
4.970
4.970
4.970
4.970
4.559
4.470
4.470
4.470
4.470
IMF data
20.253
20.253
20.253
20.253
20.000
20.000
20.000
20.000
18.355
18.000
18.000
15.000
15.000
Ratio of UN/IMF rates
3.376
3.376
3.662
4.032
4.024
4.024
4.024
4.024
4.026
4.027
4.027
3.356
3.356
Due to the different role played by the "valuta" currencies in the centrally
planned economies, and (at first glance) arbitrary decisions setting the "valuta"
exchange rates, it was not at all obvious that one can describe the behavior of
these rates in a pattern similar to that of the exchange rates of market
economies. Below we show that some consistent pattern, although different from
that of market economies, has been found for the exchange rates of the CMEA
countries.
The second problem is associated with exports. Except for the Soviet
Union and Bulgaria, all the other members of the CMEA have to cope with con-
siderable foreign debt. This suggests that the governments of these countries
should exhibit a kind of pro-export activity, resulting in an increase in the
country's marginal propensity to export. The change may be assumed to be
roughly proportional to the burden associated with the debt, as measured, say,
by the debt per unit of exports.
Many models of the CMEA countries assume that exports are demand
determined [see, e.g., Welfe (1982)]. Our explanation of the behavior of exports
takes into account the fact that in the CMEA countries goods supplied for
exports are in many cases of better quality than the same goods produced for the
domestic market. One can assume that the fraction of goods of the "first" qual-
ity (usually supplied for exports) is quite stable, at least in the short and medium
range, the total supply of them increasing as the relevant economy expands. As
the world demand increases, goods of the "second" (lower) quality can be sold as
well, thus shifting the export supply curve. The above statement leads us to
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supply-driven equations describing exports, with the world demand variable
responsible for the shifts in the supply curve.
The third problem is related to imports, especially in the case of a country
bothered by a heavy foreign debt. The earning capacities of exports, diminished
by the debt interest and capital payments, impose strong restrictions on the
value of imports. The behavior of imports in our model is demand driven with a
budget constraint (see Welsch, 1986).
The fourth problem is connected with the foreign debt (net foreign assets)
and the balance of payments. The information on the balance of payments is
available from IMF sources for Romania and Hungary only. For Romania the
data cover the years 1971-81, and for Hungary the years 1970-82. In both cases
the series are expressed in US dollars. There exists some information on the bal-
ance of payments for Poland (for 1970 and 1978-81 in "valuta" zloty and for
1981-83 in both domestic zloty and dollars). For the other countries no data are
available and some approximations have to be used. Following the research plan
(Krelle, 1985) let us recall the basic equation for the balance of payments:
EX* - IM* + B.TR* + B.K* - B.FK* = 0
It seems that the most important item here is the balance of capital flows B.K*.
One can determine it from the above equation as follows:
B.K* -EX* + IM* -B.TR* + B.FX*
~ -EX* + IM*
where the balance of transfers B.TR* and the change of the stock of gold and
foreign exchange B.FX* are assumed to be equal to zero. In a more elaborate
version of the approximation one may assume that the two items are propor-
tional to, say, GDP, EX or 1M.
Analyzing the published data, one can see that these items are absent from
the Romanian balance of payments. In the case of Hungary they vary from $36
million to $99 million Le., from at best 1.5% of exports EX*, usually less than
1%. For Poland the balance of transfers in some exceptional years reaches 10%
of exports, being dominated by the transfers of money from Polish emigrants to
their relatives in the country. Other CMEA countries either do not have so
many emigrants in western countries, or contacts between relatives are looser
than in the case of Polish and Hungarian emigration. In some countries (Hun-
gary and Poland, for example) the citizens are allowed to possess foreign
currency; they can even get some interest on their foreign currency deposits in
banks. In other countries regulations require that the citizens exchange any
foreign currency for the domestic one. Sometimes they obtain special coupons to
be cashed in "valuta" shops. The above-mentioned differences may have quite
strong impacts on the size of inflow of the currency from abroad.
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The inhabitants of the CMEA countries basically do not have income-
producing property abroad, and other items entering the balance of the transfer
payments are of negligible importance. Hence, the assumption of zero balance of
transfers seems quite reasonable; in the case of Hungary or Poland one may
replace it with the assumption of some proportionality between this inflow and
exports (at, say, the 1%-5% level).
Not much is known about operations on gold and foreign currency reserves
in the CMEA. These countries do not produce significant amount of gold. The
only exception is the Soviet Union; however, we lack any information on this
topic. The assumption of zero balance of gold and foreign currency reserves has
thus a rather pragmatic character.
The suggested reformulation of the equation for the net foreign assets
A E,net, understood as a proxy for the foreign debt, has the following form:
where z denotes the interest rate charged on international credits. As a first
approximation one may set z ~ 0.1 (not much is known about the actual interest
rates charged). A more sophisticated approach would introduce z = zE where
zE is an "external" interest rate, calculated on the basis of the interest rates
charged by the main creditors, and/or, say, the LIBOR interest rate. Such
approximations are, nevertheless, of limited precision since the interest rate
charged depends on the time horizon.
In some other models for the CMEA countries (see Gajda, 1983) a similar
approach was tested in the late 1970s, when the data on foreign debt of the
CMEA countries were neither published nor collected in one source. The accu-
mulated foreign trade balance was used as a proxy for the foreign debt, even
without the corrective term zAtlnet . In the early 1980s, when the estimated size
of foreign debt was published, it turned out to be quite close to the series of
proxies. Moreover, the proxies correlated with other variables of the IES models
better than the debt series evaluated by some western sources. It may be of
importance that the debt is defined in many foreign currencies like dollar, pound
sterling, French and Swiss francs, German mark, etc. In most cases it is to be
repayed in the same currency. When expressed in dollars, its value is sensitive
to variation in exchange rates between these currencies.
9.2. The Initial Specification
The initial assumptions specified in the research plan (see Krelle, 1985) are
briefly reviewed below for convenience of further exposition.
It was assumed that the imports satisfying the needs of domestic produc-
tion, consumption and investment are proportional to the real national income Y
(in the case of the CMEA countries NMP - net material product - rather than
GDP was taken as the income):
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(9.1)
Exports are function of world demand, represented by real income abroad
(9.2)
where N = a set of indices of countries trading with the given country; at = a
measure of importance of country i in the trade with the country under con-
sideration; and Y j = the real income of country i.
The "variable parameter" aj is to be explained as follows:
(9.3)
where wI denotes the rate of growth of Ij K/ L = the capital/labor ratioj P =
price deflator (in this case, the domestic one); e = exchange rate; the super-
script E denotes the variables "abroad", i.e., calculated from the data of the
other countries, similar to the real-income-abroad variable y E shown above.
The "variable parameter" f3j of (9.2) is to be explained in a similar way.
The export price deflator PEX depends on the price level P of the country
under consideration:
PEX = 1 P (9.4)
the "variable parameter" 1 is to be explained similarly to (9.3).
Prices of imports depend on the export prices abroad (i.e., charged by other
countries) pfx:
(9.5)
Thus, the exports of the country under consideration depend on the
demand of other countries, while the imports depend on domestic demand,
characterized by the level of domestic activity, both modified accordingly to
measures of the relative dynamics and prices in the given country and in the
world. Prices of exports are in turn determined by the level of domestic prices;
prices of imports, by prices abroad.
266 The Future 0/ iN World Economy
The exchange rates stern from the hypothesis of purchasing power parity of
the domestic currency and US dollar:
e·I
* Pj
-y -
POI
(9.6)
where the "varying parameter" -y* depends on the measures of purchasing power
disparity, interest rate disparity, interest rate abroad, etc., and POI is the US
economy price deflator.
The balance of payments equation
EX* - IM* + B.TR* + B.K* - B.FX* o (9.7)
contains (accordingly to SNA approach) the following variables: EX* = exports,
IM* = imports, defining the current account balance EX* - IM*, and B.TR*
= balance of transfers, B.K* = balance of capital flows, B.FX* = change in
stock of gold and foreign reserves, amounting to the foreign trade balance. The
endogenous variable B.K* is to be calculated as a residual.
9.3. Model Equations
9.3.1. Exports
Estimations of equations explaining the behavior of exports began with the ini-
tial specification, according to the research plan (see Krelle, 1985). The results
were of nonuniform quality; the values predicted by the model equations had
higher variability than that of the empirical values of modeled variables. The
final specification of the export equations was thus chosen as follows:
[
NFA$Nt_l] *
EX = aj + a 2 NMP + a3 EX$N + a4 NMP dum + asdum + uEX
t-l
(9.8)
where EX = real exports, domestic (or valuta) currency; NMP = real net
material product, domestic currency; NFA$N = accumulated foreign trade bal-
ance, US $; EX$N = nominal exports in US $; dum = dummy variable
(described in the text).
We argued that, in the behavior of the CMEA exports, supply plays an
important role that should not be overlooked. The well-known problem of these
countries is the lack of goods of quality high enough for foreign customers,
accompanied by the lack of a network of services assuring repair. Products sup-
plied for domestic markets frequently happen to have lower quality than the
same products exported (see Mejstrik, 1983). If one assumes that the
shares of goods of the "first", "second" and "third" quality levels in the total
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production stay relatively constant, then obviously the supply of these goods
increases as the domestic output increases. On the other hand, the share of
these countries in the world's trade is relatively small. Thus, one can expect
that in most cases the increased supply of goods of the highest quality can be
sold on the world market without throwing the market out of balance (such spe-
cial goods as copper, oil or sugar seem to be exceptions). Hence, in general we
will be inclined to explain exports as being driven by the domestic output, meas-
ured by NMP.
It is assumed that the higher the burden associated with the foreign debt,
the harder the administration tries to increase the marginal propensity to export.
The debt pressure is characterized by the ratio of the last year's debt (for the
reasons explained earlier, this is measured as the accumulated foreign trade bal-
ance NFA$N) to the last year's exports. One can interpret the absolute value of
this ratio as the number of years the country would need to repay its debt using
all its earnings from exports (assumed to be equal to the last year's earnings).
Observe that an increase of debt is associated with negative balance of payments
(or its approximation - foreign trade balance); hence, the positive debt is
reflected in negative values of the accumulated foreign trade balance NFA$N
(and thus NFASN/ EX$N). The Soviet Union, having a systematic positive
foreign trade balance and simultaneously being in debt to western banks, is an
exception. The probable reason is that the Soviet Union's trade with the
developing countries more than offsets the negative balance with the developed
West. This supports the opinion that disaggregation of the CMEA foreign trade
into two or perhaps three subgroups (intra-CMEA, Developed Countries, Rest of
the World) would be of importance if one wants to analyze the causal relation-
ships in foreign trade more precisely.
The third variable is the increase (first difference) of the world trade. This
variable represents the influence of changes in world demand, which "shifts" the
export supply curve, as we argued above.
An inspection of the data indicates that some countries (the Soviet Union,
Bulgaria and Romania in particular) have changed their propensity to export in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. The changes were caused by some special policy
measures which the explanatory variables do not convey any information about.
We captured this phenomenon by using interactive variables of the following
form: NMP* (dummy), where the dummy variable had value 1 for the relevant
years, and zero otherwise. The estimation results presented in Table 9.9 show
that the propensity to export changed from 0.046 to (0.046 + 0.118) = 0.164 for
the Soviet Union, in the years 1980-83, from 0.397 to (0.397 + 0.450) = 0.847 for
Bulgaria in the years 1977-83, from 0.123 to 0.105 (decreased) for Romania in
the years 1977-83. The changes were significant, with the t-ratios varying from
19.67 for Bulgaria, through 6.39 for the Soviet Union, to 3.96 for Romania.
The interpretation of the absolute values of these changes is not straight-
forward since the explained and explanatory variables were measured in different
units. The case of Bulgaria is supported by the data in yearbooks, showing that
its exports (measured in US$ per capita) increased by more than 60% since 1977.
Even if one takes into account that the dominant fraction of the Bulgarian
export trade is directed to other CMEA countries, with all the measurement
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Table 9.9. Estimates of equations for exports (t-ratio shown in parentheses below
parameter estimate).
EX = a1 + 02 NMP +03 [NFASNt_d EXSNt_1] + 04 NMP*dum + Os dum + uEX
Country al a2 a3 a4 as D-W R 2
USSR 0.249 0.046 0.118 -55.413 1.55 0.99
(0.76) (43.31) (6.39) (6.47)
dum80-83 'NMP t dum80-83t
Bulgaria -1086.30 0.397 0.450 -7308.8 1.7 1.00
(13.74) (53.29) (19.67) (16.64)
dum77-83'NMpt dum77-83t
CSSR -0.552 0.142 -9.598 0.77 0.98
(0.13) (11.73) (1.89)
GDR -13.615 0.431 8.612 -5.730 -7.876 0.87 0.99
(7.86) (34.37) (5.71) (3.90) (5.28)
lagged t dum80t dum81 t
Hungary -79.447 0.663 -23.291 29.389 1.40 0.99
(10.33) (25.22) (1.60) (3.38)
dum82t
Poland -163.268 0.190 -121.441 -70.10 0.99 0.98
(5.61) (18.99) (3.28) (1.39)
Romania -1.266 0.123 -1.864 -o.Q18 1.56 0.98
(0.53) (17.31) (1.40) (3.96)
dum77-83'NMpt
problems associated with recalculation of the transferable rouble into dollars, the
dynamics are impressive.
For two countries, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, the estimates of parame-
ters associated with the variable NFA$N/ EX$N were nonsignificant; hence, the
variables were dropped from the final version of the equations. On the other
hand, the estimates of coefficients associated with NMP show a consistently high
t-ratio, confirming high precision of estimation.
9.3.2. Imports
Three basic specifications of import equations explaining the total imports of the
CMEA countries have been tested.
The first one follows propositions of the research plan (see Krelle, 1985).
Following the discussion contained in a report of Bonn-IIASA Group (Gajda,
1985) the estimated equation was specified with additive disturbances:
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rather than:
1M = (3* yE
where:
(9.10)
(9.11)
The estimation results were not of uniform quality. The equation fit was reason-
able, even when some parameters were "zeroed" due to incorrect signs of their
estimates. There exist strong indications of autocorrelation of residuals, as
judged by the Durbin-Watson statistics. The inspection of plots of empirical
versus fitted values of endogenous variables shows that the empirical values
behave rather smoothly, while the fitted values show high period-to-period vari-
ability.
The second approach, based on the Stone-Geary demand function [see
Welsch (1986) for an exposition], will be reviewed here briefly to indicate some
changes due to the specifics of the economies of Eastern Europe. We assume the
two-commodity model, with the first commodity being imports (xl) while the
second commodity consists of goods of domestic origin (x2). The demand for
these commodities is described by the Stone linear expenditure system:
(9.12)
where xi denotes some autonomous part of the demand for the ith commodity
and P are the price deflators of the commodities and income Y. The demand for
the good i is assumed to be a sum of an autonomous demand xi and a com-
ponent xt which depends on prices of both goods PI' P2 and the income
(Ypy - xl PI - x2P2) available after the autonomous demands have been
satisfied. It can be derived from the maximization of the Cobb-Douglas-type
utility function with constant demand parts subject to the budget constraint
(9.13)
(see Welsch, 1986). Assuming the autonomous demand to be a fraction of the
past demand, one may write
>.. >01- (9.14)
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where>.; denotes a habit-forming coefficient. A fraction, ai say, of the predeter-
mined demand is paid according to the current prices, while for the rest the
lagged prices are valid (due to preexisting contracts, etc.). The resulting equa-
tions have the following form:
PYt () Pi t-lX-t = ).-X-t-l + {3-- Y -{3-).-x- t-l - (3- l-a- ).--'-X-t-l
I I I, I Pit I I I, I I I Pit I,
(9.15)
Pjt () Pj,t-l
- (3i a -). --x- t-l - (3i 1 - a - ). ---x- t-l] ] Pit ], ] ] Pjt ],
where j = 2 when i = 1 and vice versa.
The last two elements of the equation (9.15) are strongly correlated. First
estimations made it clear that, unless one of the variables were omitted, there
exists no chance of obtaining correct signs of the estimates. Since the dominant
part of foreign exchange of the CMEA consists of intra-CMEA trade, with prices
negotiated well in advance on the basis of past world and current CMEA prices,
we chose the elimination of the influence of the term with current prices in favor
of the lagged ones as a plausible simplification. Further modification stems from
the observation that the income variable Y consists of items as different as con-
sumption and investment goods. Henceforeward, in the final version this vari-
able was split into three elements: consumption, investment and exports (within
the above-mentioned framework, the income consists of the values of domestic
sales and exports, while demand refers to the domestic production and imports).
This allows different propensities to import to be associated with these different
groups of goods. The splitting has an additional positive effect in the case of
countries having imports and exports measured in "valuta" currency, since the
sum of NMP (in domestic currency) and 1M (in "valuta" currency) has no mean-
ing. The version suitable for estimation is as follows:
PINV PEX PY-l1M = a 1 /M_ 1 + a2 --INV + aa --EX + a4 -'- Y-1 + "1M
PIM PIM PIM
(9.16)
This approach produces a good fit, with signs consistent with the theory
and significant estimates (see Table 9.-1). On the other hand, the adding up
property of the original system is now fulfilled only approximately.
In some cases a restricted estimation, assuming some coefficients a priori
equal to zero, was performed. In this way consumption was removed from all
these equations; in the case of the Soviet Union the estimates of effects of invest-
ment and lagged NMP had an unsatisfactory quality and were thus set equal to
zero. In all other equations the effects of exports and investment have been cap-
tured separately.
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Table 9.4. Estimates of equations for imports (t-ratio shown III parentheses below
parameter estimate).
IM= PINY PEX PNMP,t-la1IMt_1 + a2-- INV + a3-- EX + a4 NMPt- 1 + uIM
PIM PIM Pm
Country a 1 a2 aa a4 D-W R
2
USSR 0.526 0.373 2.09 0.98
(2.17) (2.23)
Bulgaria 0.601 0.277 0.594 -0.082 1.79 0.99
(2.89) (1.68) (1.91) (1.14)
CSSR 0.344 0.149 0.765 -0.034 1.63 0.99
(1.91) (3.54) (3.28) (2.78)
GDR 0.638 0.494 0.627 -0.122 1.59 0.99
(5.95) (2.91) (3.12) (2.56)
Hungary 0.463 0.619 0.463 -0.129 1.59 0.99
(3.13) (5.19) (2.82) (3.34)
Poland 0.737 0.178 0.478 -0.050 1.80 0.99
(9.25) (8.34) (2.27) (5.12)
Romania 0.499 0.190 0.616 -0.041 1.64 0.97
(2.85) (4.14) (1.80) (2.77)
The import equations rank among the best in the model of foreign trade of
the CMEA countries. Given the usually high correlation between NMP and 1M,
the simultaneous presence of both explanatory variables increases the risk of
harmful multicollinearity effects. The estimates obtained do not seem to show
many signs of them - we can interpret this fact as an argument in favor of plaus-
ibility of the underlying theory.
9.3.3. Export price deflator
Equations for export prices have been estimated in the form proposed in the
research plan, with the substitution of the hyperbolic (1/7j trend variable in the
place of the capital/labor ratio:
(9.17)
The results are shown in Table 9.5. Except for Bulgaria and Hungary, the equa-
tions fit the observations quite well. What troubles us is the indication of the
presence of autocorrelation for all countries but the Soviet Union and Romania.
One should stress, however, that the domestic deflators Py in these countries are
very stable, slightly lower than unity before 1975 and slightly higher afterward;
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thus the variability of the deflator is to be explained predominantly by the "vari-
able" parameter. The problem of the internal consistency of these series, men-
tioned earlier (mostly due to the valuation of almost half of the foreign trade in
intra-CMEA prices in transferable roubles while foreign trade with the other
countries is valued in dollars, basically, at world market prices), diminishes the
precision of the estimations. This applies to the import price deflator as well.
Table 9.5. Estimates of equations for export price deflator (t-ratio shown in parentheses
below parameter estimate).
Country at a2 aa
USSR -3.282 3.419 129.709
(5.07) (14.63) (3.66)
Bulgaria -1.155 1.616 43.906
(1.28) (3.63) (1.19)
CSSR 1.013 0.176 -78.230
(4.91) (13.58) (7.11)
GDR 0.552 0.419 -71.555
(0.52) (3.61) (1.41)
Hungary -0.195 O.OlD 54.649
(0.69) (2.84) (2.05)
Poland 1.260 0.007 -69.642
(5.98) (2.47) (4.69)
Romania -0.706 0.335 2.930
(1.84) (15.35) (0.14)
-0.089
(2.00)
d..m76-821
D-W R 2
1.88 0.98
0.77 0.77
0.91 0.97
0.74 0.90
0.91 0.70
0.72 0.94
1.67 0.98
The structure of our model requires us to link the export prices to the
behavior of the domestic prices (and therefore to the costs of production).
Hence, the problems just mentioned remain. On the other hand, the economic
reforms pursued currently in the CMEA countries make this specification much
more realistic in simulations of the future.
9.3.4. Import price deflator
The equations for the import price deflator were estimated in accordance with
the initial specification (9.5) with a minor modification: instead of lagged world
prices, lagged own import prices were introduced.
(9.18)
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The reason was the fact, mentioned earlier, that a considerable proportion of the
CMEA foreign trade is intra-CMEA trade where the prices of the previous
period persist, due to the pricing system of the intra-CMEA exchange. Table 9.6
shows our results. In some cases further improvements are necessary, especially
when the Durbin-Watson statistics, already biased toward two by the presence
of the lagged explained variable, suggests closeness to the inconclusive region. In
the equation for Poland, the estimate associated with the lagged explained vari-
able has low precision and the current export prices abroad seem to explain the
variable sufficiently. This is in strong opposition to the other equations, where
these coefficients are estimated with high t-statistics.
Table 9.6. Estimates of equations for import price deflator (t-ratio shown in parentheses
below parameter estimate).
Country at a2 a3
USSR -0.084 0.269 0.880
(4.20) (5.48) (19.74)
Bulgaria -0.047 0.112 0.996
(1.49) (3.75) (19.40)
CSSR -0.078 0.127 1.018
(4.62) (4.84) (29.51)
GDR 0.002 0.224 0.837
(0.11) (6.03) (18.14)
Hungary -0.207 0.250 0.939
(1.41) (3.23) (5.43)
Poland 0.251 0.489 0.203
(3.46) (5.37) (1.13)
Romania -0.045 0.360 0.768
(1.36) (4.25) (9.64)
-09.096
(3.47)
dum81!
0.102
(2.11)
dum76-81!
1.029
(11.11)
dum82!
D2 W R2
1.82 0.99
1.35 0.99
1.23 0.99
1.93 0.99
2.04 0.95
1.32 0.99
2.50 0.98
9.3.5. Exchange rates
The statistical analysis suggested that the item dominating the behavior of the
variable coefficient "( in equation (9.6) of the initial specification is the value of
dollar in the international market, as measured by US$ per unit of SDR (denoted
US$/SDR). The estimated version has the following form:
(9.19)
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Further analysis has shown that there are some incompatibilities between the
mean values of the left- and the right-hand side variables; the introduction of an
additive term a3 improved the fit of equations enormously. As one can see from
Table 9.7, the t-statistic for a3 exceeds 8, except for Hungary.
Table 9.7. Estimates of equations for exchange rates (t-ratio shown in parentheses below
parameter estimate).
e= (al + a2 USS/SDRj ---'!.- + as + u.
POI
Countr" a l a2 a3 D-W R
2
USSR 0.701 -0.482 0.615 2.70 0.90
(7.41) (4.89) (16.79)
Bulgaria 0.840 -0.557 0.791 2.50 0.91
(7.44) (4.62) (17.28)
CSSR 6.477 -5.068 5.430 2.09 0.87
(7.56) (5.78) (17 .44)
GDR 2.328 -1.439 2.947 1.35 0.79
(4.67) (2.73) (13.30)
Hungary 60.591 -15.851 -0.669 2.06 0.96
(11.02) (2.54) (1.17)
Poland 43.438 -47.868 56.627 1.30 0.97
(10.11) (5.97) (8.29)
Romania 3.679 -1.753 3.387 1.86 0.93
(6.82) (3.08) (14.89)
The other test statistics of our equations are astonishingly good. We write
"astonishingly" since the rates used must be understood as figures fixed in a
somewhat arbitrary way, as conversion coefficients of dollars and/or transferable
roubles and the "valuta" currency. The equations in Table 9.7 prove that,
although the decision to change the exchange rates as well as the decision to fix
their initial values on its absolute value might have been a political one, the
changes, once introduced, were economically justified and not as ad hoc as popu-
lar opinion claimed.
9.4. Final Remarks
The successful estimation of equations explaining the functioning of foreign
exchange of the CMEA countries in a uniform manner for all regions of the
world model suggests that the differences in the mechanisms of the foreign trade
between countries with different economic systems are dominated by the general
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rules of economic thinking, at least at this highly aggregated level. The success-
ful estimation of the "valuta" exchange rates suggest that it may be possible to
estimate approximate exchange rates for the domestic currency of the CMEA
countries. The solution seems to be associated with the solution of the problem
of the demand pressure index (see also Dobrinsky, 1986).
A set of auxiliary identities was used to incorporate the model of the
CMEA foreign exchange into the larger world model. More detailed data for
these identities have been prepared (see Gajda and Welsch, 1985a, b, c). As they
obey the general rules set in the research plan and are reported elsewhere in this
volume we do not reproduce them in this place.
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CHAPTER 10
US Economic Growth in Retrospect
and Prospect
Bert G. Hickman
Summary
This chapter presents another view of the major factors affecting US economic
growth both historically and prospectively. The Hickman-Coen (HC) annual
growth model is used to investigate the determinants of economic growth and
productivity change during 1956-1982 and to forecast the principal macro-
economic variables for 1985-2000. Our approach stresses the interaction of
aggregate supply and demand in the growth process instead of concentrating
exclusively on reduced-form analysis of the production function. It leads to a
different view of the driving forces of economic growth, as summarized in the
concluding section.
10.1. An Empirical Growth Model
The HC annual growth model for the US economy (Hickman and Coen, 1976) is
a dynamic nonlinear simultaneous equation system combining Keynesian and
neoclassical elements and allowing for departures from the full-employment
growth path owing to gradual price adjustments. The key assumptions underly-
ing this property are as follows.
(1) Firms are imperfectly competitive and set prices as a markup over normal
unit labor costs, with allowance for the prices of imported inputs and the
degree of capacity utilization.
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(2) Given prices, output is determined by effective demand, which is disaggre-
gated into three categories of investment, six of consumption, federal and
state and local purchases, exports, and imports.
(3) Firms choose capital and labor inputs to minimize cost, conditional on
expected output and factor prices. The desired long-run or equilibrium
inputs are derived by minimizing the cost of producing the expected out-
put. Only part of the gap between actual and desired inputs is closed each
year, however, owing to adjustment costs, so that the short-term factor
demand functions contain lags which may prevent the attainment of full
long-term equilibrium inputs for the given level of production.
(4) Labor force participation is a function of the real after-tax consumption
wage and the ratio of employment to population (Coen and Hickman,
19S0a). The latter variable is included to capture the "discouraged worker
effect" , a nonprice signal which induces potential workers to withdraw from
the labor market when unemployment rises. The labor force participation
model is disaggregated into 16 age-sex groups, so that the aggregate labor
force depends on the composition of population as well as its level.
(5) The model includes an "expectations-augmented" Phillips curve for nomi-
nal wage inflation as a function of the gap between the actual and natural
unemployment rates and the lagged rate of consumer price inflation.
(6) The model can be solved for potential as well as actual output. Potential
GNP is defined as that output which would be realized each year if the
markets for labor and capital were continuously cleared at the natural rate
of unemployment (Coen and Hickman, 19S0b). A key characteristic of this
concept is that potential output is unaffected by deviations of actual out-
put, factor inputs, and real factor prices from their full-employment values.
It is truly a measure of productive potential in which output is constrained
only by available technology and factor supplies, and labor and capital are
assumed to be fully employed each period along the growth path. Depar-
tures from the natural path imply disequilibrium in the factor markets, as
the quantities of capital and labor deviate from their full-employment lev-
els, but these temporary deviations do not affect potential output in subse-
quent periods, since they can be offset by future changes in investment and
employment.
10.2. Factor Demands
The demands for labor and capital are interrelated in the model, since they are
jointly derived on the assumption that firms minimize production costs subject
to a long-run or planning Cobb-Douglas production function with constant
returns to scale:
(10.1)
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where XNR* is expected output (gross private nonresidential product), K* is
desired business fixed capital stock, MR* is desired manhours, and f3 is the rate
of Hicks-neutral technical progress.
Minimizing production cost subject to (10.1) gives the long-run factor
demand functions:
(10.2)
(10.3)
where Q * is the expected implicit rental price of capital and W* is the expected
nominal before-tax wage rate. The implicit rental price is defined by
Q == PI(r+d) T, where PI is the investment price deflator, r is the after-tax rate
of return, d is the depreciation rate, and T symbolizes the tax treatment of
investment expenditure.
Adjustment costs prevent firms from accommodating immediately to varia-
tions in the desired inputs. These adjustment costs include external purchase
costs and internal installation costs for capital goods and hiring, training, and
layoff costs for labor. They are represented implicitly by exponential partial
adjustment processes:
(lOA)
(10.5)
where f and 9 are the adjustment speeds for labor and capital.
Combining the desired input and adjustment hypotheses yields the short-
term or disequilibrium demand functions:
(10.6)
(10.7)
Joint estimation of the short-run demand functions (10.6) and (10.7) yields
estimated values of the adjustment speeds f and 9 and of the structural parame-
ters of the production function (10.1) and long-run factor demand functions
(10.2) and (10.3).
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10.3. Determination of Potential Output
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The first step is to specify the natural unemployment rate in order to estimate
the full-employment labor supply. We follow Wachter (1976) in determining the
natural rate as a weighted average of the full-employment unemployment rates
in our 16 age-sex groups. The latter are determined by a set of regressions on
the prime-age male group (to remove cyclical variations) and the population pro-
portion of the age-sex group (to capture structural shifts from demographic fac-
tors). It is important to emphasize that the natural unemployment rate (UF) in
the He model is not a nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU),
since it is not calculated from a Phillips curve by imposing the nonacceleration
constraint. It does take account of changes over time in factors affecting struc-
tural and frictional unemployment, and the related changes in labor market
tightness, but it does not impose the assumption of a vertical long-run Phillips
curve.
The complete labor supply model includes the 16 labor force participation
equations and an equation for average hours of work. With the addition of the
natural rate equation, the system can be solved simultaneously for the natural
unemployment rate UF and the corresponding full-employment supply of
manhours MHF, conditional on given values of the real wage, the population and
its age-sex distribution, and the size of the armed forces and government
employment.
10.3.1. The natural growth path
Along the natural growth path of potential output both labor and capital are
fully employed. Making use first of the labor market condition, potential output
is defined as the level of output that would equate labor supply and demand at
the natural rate of unemployment and full-employment wage rate. Since the
labor demand function (10.6) relates manhours to output and relative factor
prices, an expression may be derived for potential output, conditional on the
wage/rental ratio, by substituting MHF for MH and solving the equation for
output:
(10.8)
where XNRP is potential output. Since full employment would prevail each
period along the natural growth path, note that XNRP depends on MHF in the
current and preceding year irrespective of whether the economy actually
operated at full employment in the preceding year.
It remains to determine W· / Q •. We assume that real wage expectations
would be realized along the natural growth path, so that the full-employment
wage/rental ratio is
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where WF / PF is the real wage on the equilibrium path. Note that the last term
is an autonomous component, since d, rand T are all exogenous. Finally, the
potential real wage is assumed to grow at the same rate as potential labor pro-
ductivity:
(WF/PF)t!(WF/PF)t_l = (XNRP/MHF)t!(XNRP/MHF)t_l (10.10)
This last assumption is both observationally realistic and consistent with the
theoretical structure of the model.
Rewriting (10.8) in productivity form as
(10.11)
where B = A[(l-a:)/a:j-a, and using (10.9) and (10.10) to determine WF /QF
and the labor supply system to determine MHF, one can solve simultaneously for
the full-employment values of labor productivity, output, labor force, employ-
ment, unemployment, hours of work, and the real wage and rental/wage ratio
along the natural growth path, for exogenous values of the demographic and pol-
icy variables (population, armed forces, government employment, and tax
parameters) .
Capital as well as labor must be fully employed along the natural growth
path. In the standard neoclassical model, a constant fraction of output is saved
and automatically invested. In contrast, the HC model includes an explicit
investment demand function, equation (10.7), which determines actual business
fixed investment, and hence saving need not equal investment ex ante in the
model solution for current output. The natural growth path of potential busi-
ness fixed capital stock is calculated by setting current and lagged capital stock,
the wage/rental ratio, and aggregate output equal to their full-employment
values on the right-hand side of the investment function. Gross investment is
then obtained from the capital stock identity
(10.12)
where IF is potential gross business fixed investment or gross nonresidential
fixed investment, and KF is the potential net stock of business fixed capital.
Thus the quantities of net and gross business fixed investment required to sus-
tain the natural growth path are fully determined. A greater flow of saving
could not be profitably absorbed in business fixed capital formation under the
given investment conditions, and a smaller flow would be inadequate to attain
the required rate of capital deepening to equilibrate the capital/labor and
rental/wage ratios. Inventory investment and residential construction are
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determined elsewhere in the model and do not affect the path of potential (non-
residential) output, although they are added to the latter to determine potential
GNP.
10.3.2. The production function and potential output
In the derivation of the desired input functions (10.2) and (10.3), the production
function (10.1) is viewed as a planning relation between equilibrium input and
output levels. The corresponding disequilibrium production function for actual
current output is
(10.13)
where kt and mt are indexes of the intensity of utilization, respectively, of the
measured inputs Kt - 1 and MHt . The intensity of use of capital stock, for exam-
ple, can be increased by operating equipment at a faster rate, increasing the
number of machine-hours per day or week, or diminishing downtime by postpon-
ing maintenance. Similarly, a manhour may represent a greater amount of
effective labor input as workers are induced to work at a faster pace and with
fewer or shorter breaks, although the scope for variations in intensity of use of
labor input is smaller than for capital.
Variations in the intensity of factor utilization occur in the process of
adjusting manhours and capital stock to changes in the desired or equilibrium
quantities. Because adjustment costs render uneconomic the instantaneous
adaptation to changes in desired quantities, the observed inputs of K and MH
must be used at intensities that differ from the equilibrium rates of factor utiliza-
tion. Since the principal source of variation in factor utilization is a discrepancy
between the actual and desired inputs, our premise is that the intensities of fac-
tor use are revealed by firms' investment and employment decisions.
Specifically, we assume that the intensity of use of each factor is proportional to
the extent of its disequilibrium:
mt = MHt/MHt
kt = Kt/Kt _ 1
(10.14)
(10.15)
Moreover, since the observed changes in measured inputs are proportional to the
desired changes by hypotheses (lOA) and (10.5), the intensity indexes may be
measured in terms of observable variables:
m t = (Mti Mt_d(l-fJ//
kt = (Kti Kt_1)1/g
(10.16)
(10.17)
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Potential output can now be determined from the production function
(10.13) by substituting full-employment manhours and capital stock and measur-
ing the effective capital and labor inputs at their natural intensities mn and kn:
XNRP - Ae pt (knKF )a (mnMHF )1-at - t t-l t t (10.18)
It might be thought that natural utilization intensities would be unity, but
this is the case only under stationary conditions. Since adjustment costs lead
firms to adjust measured inputs to desired levels with some lag, we would expect
to observe firms using factor inputs which are below desired levels even if the
economy were experiencing steady growth. Thus the natural intensities associ-
ated with growth equilibrium will exceed unity by amounts which depend on the
natural growth rates of output and the wage/rental ratio and on the speeds of
adjustment of capital and labor. The natural utilization intensities are deter-
mined endogenously in the natural path solution as:
(10.19)
(10.20)
Cyclical fluctuations of output relative to the natural growth path will be accom-
panied, of course, by corresponding fluctuations of the actual utilization intensi-
ties relative to their natural levels.
Although algebraically equivalent to (10.8), the production function expres-
sion (10.18) for potential output is more than a redundant curiosity. It serves as
a reminder that capital as well as labor requirements must be satisfied along the
natural growth path, even though capital stock does not appear explicitly in
equation (10.8).
10.4. Estimation
The model was estimated over the sample period 1949-1982. The primary data
are from official US agencies. A distinction is made between output produced in
the housing and government sectors, on the one hand, and the nonresidential
sector on the other, with corresponding differences for capital and labor inputs.
Thus output in the aggregate production and factor demand functions is meas-
ured by gross private nonresidential product, the capital stock is net of housing
and inventories, and labor input excludes the services of government employees.
The level of potential GNP is then determined by adding real housing services
and real income originating in government to the model's prediction of potential
gross private nonresidential product. A separate housing model determines
residential construction for inclusion in the GNP identity and the saving-
investment process to determine actual GNP.
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Most equations were estimated by OLS, with correction for first-order auto-
correlation in the residuals where indicated. The key factor demand equations
(10.6) and (10.7) were estimated jointly by the seemingly unrelated regression
method, however, since they share common parameters from the production
function.
10.4.1. Expectations
The variables entering the factor demand functions are not actual but expected
output and factor prices. The expected price of capital goods is proxied by an
autoregression on the investment goods deflator. The expected wage is deter-
mined from a labor market Phillips curve, assuming that agents know the
parameters and estimate the expected wage on the basis of the unemployment
gap in the previous period. Expected output is equal to actual output in all the
models, since experiments with autoregressive output expectations failed to
improve the estimates of the factor demand systems
10.4.2. Technical progress
It is well established that a decline in the rate of growth of technical progress or
total factor productivity is partly responsible for the slow growth of labor pro-
ductivity in the OECD countries in recent years (Kendrick, 1983). In the HC
model this influence is captured in the estimates of the factor demand equation,
by allowing for piecewise breaks in the exponential trend term. A significant
reduction in the rate of technical progress is estimated for the USA after 1968
and a further deceleration occurred beginning in 1974.
Both factor demand functions for the USA are adjusted for serially corre-
lated errors. The estimated capital elasticity in the production function is 0.25,
and the estimated adjustment speeds of labor and capital are 0.65 and 0.19,
respectively. The estimated technical progress rate slows from 1.86% per annum
in 1950-1968 to 1.39% in 1969-1973 and 0.57% thereafter.
10.5. Productivity and Growth: Potential and Realized
Equation (10.11) provides an expression for potential labor productivity in terms
of the cumulative level of technical progress, the weighted potential wage/rental
ratio, and the rate of labor utilization. It may be rewritten as
(10.21)
where
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Working with the short-run labor demand function (10.6), one may derive
a similar expression for realized or observed productivity. Because the short-
term labor demand function is stochastic, however, the productivity equation
contains an error term:
PROD = CIt x A WQEt x UTMHt x ERMHt (10.22)
where the constant term is the same as before, A WQE depends on
WE / QE, UTMH on actual labor utilization, and ERMH on the stochastic dis-
turbance in the partial adjustment process for labor input [equation (lOA)].
A final set of analytical productivity measures is obtained by dividing
(10.22) by (10.21) to yield:
(10.23)
where
PRODR = PROD/PRODL, A WQR = A WQE/A WQL,
and
UTLR= UTMH/ UTL
These measures facilitate a term-by-term comparison of the sources of the
annual deviations of realized productivity from potential productivity.
Another useful interpretive expression may be obtained by rearranging
(10.22) and (10.21) and taking their ratio:
(10.24)
where UTPR = XNR/ XNRP is the ratio of actual to potential output (potential
utilization rate) and MHR = MH/ MHF is the ratio of actual and full-
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employment manhours. Thus the output gap is related quantitatively to the
corresponding productivity and manhour gaps. The latter gaps are clearly inter-
dependent, however, so that care must be exercised in interpreting the numerical
measures based on (10.24).
10.6. Productivity and the Growth Slowdown, 1956-1982
As shown in the second half of Table 10.1, the average annual rates of increase of
the total population, the working-age population, and the labor force were about
equal during 1956-1968. Pronounced rises occurred thereafter both in the pro-
portion of the population which is of working age and in the labor force partici-
pation rate, so that the labor force increased much faster after 1968 than before,
despite the slowdown which occurred in overall population growth. A
corresponding acceleration occurred in employment, although the gain was
moderated after 1973 by a rising unemployment rate.
Meanwhile, the growth rate of labor productivity, as measured by real
GNP per worker, was about halved in 1968-1973 and dropped almost to zero in
1973-1982. During 1968-1973 the acceleration in employment largely offset the
deceleration in productivity, so that real GNP increased nearly as rapidly as
before, but real growth decelerated sharply in 1973-1982 as both components
declined.
Corresponding calculations are shown in the top half of the table for the
estimates of annual growth rates along the natural growth path. The patterns of
potential and realized growth are much the same, but it will be seen that the
potential gains in employment and productivity were larger than those actually
realized after 1968, and especially after 1973, so that after 1973 unemployment
substantially exceeded the natural level and real GNP per capita increased at
only half its potential rate.
The investment requirements to sustain potential output along the natural
growth path are also shown in Table 10.1. The average share of net investment
decreased after 1973, owing to the deceleration of real growth, but the required
gross share was stable because of an offsetting rise in potential replacement
investment. A similar pattern is observed for the realized investment shares. All
of these figures refer to business fixed investment and exclude housing construc-
tion, inventory accumulation, and net foreign investment.
The proximate sources of the productivity slowdowns during 1968-1973
and 1973-1982 are quantified in Table 10.£, which is based on equations (10.21)
and (10.22). Since the aggregate production function excludes inputs and out-
puts from government employment and the housing stock, these new breakdowns
refer to a universe which is moderately smaller than in the previous table.
Another difference is that labor productivity is measured per manhour in Table
10.£ and per worker in Table 10.1.
Potential manhour productivity (PRODL) increased at an annual rate of
2.76% during 1956-1968, 2.05% in 1968-1973, and 0.65% in 1973-1982. Techni-
cal progress (G1) accounted for the largest portion of the gain during each period
and its deceleration explains about two-thirds of the decline in the growth rate of
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potential labor productivity between 1956-1968 and 1968-1973 and 60% of the
reduction from 1968-1973 to 1973-1982. The wage/rental component
(A WQL) was also important, however, especially before 1973. Reductions in the
growth rate of the potential wage/rental ratio account for roughly half of the
deceleration in potential manhour productivity in 1968-1973 and one-fourth in
1973-1982. Moderate swings in potential labor utilization (UTL) also contri-
buted to the calculated changes in potential productivity.
Realized productivity growth (PROD) exceeded its potential during
1956-1968, but fell short thereafter. The contribution of the wage/rental com-
ponent was virtually the same for realized and potential productivity growth
until 1973. After 1973, however, the expected actual wage/rental ratio (A WQE)
increased faster than potential, so that realized productivity was augmented on
that account. It nonetheless decreased more rapidly than did potential produc-
tivity, owing to a substantial reduction in the intensity of labor utilization
(UTMH).
The growth rate of potential gross private nonresidential output (XNRP) is
reported in the first column of Table 10.9 and split between its potential labor
productivity (PRODL) and potential manhour (MHF) components in columns 2
and 3. The breakdown of potential manhour growth between its average hours
(AHF) and employment (EPF) components is presented in columns 4 and 5.
The figures demonstrate strikingly how the sustained growth of the potential
labor force and employment cushioned the deceleration of potential output in the
face of the drastic decline of potential productivity growth after 1973.
The corresponding figures for realized inputs and output are also shown in
Table 10.9, part B. The output (XNR) shortfall from potential after 1968 is
reflected primarily in corresponding shortfalls in the growth rates of manhours
(MH) and employment (EP), although realized productivity growth (PROD)
was also affected adversely.
Realized and potential labor productivity are equally affected by the under-
lying rate of technical progress. As shown in equation (10.23), the ratio of actual
to potential labor productivity (PRODR) therefore depends only on the ratio of
the actual and potential wage/rental terms (A WQR), the intensity of labor utili-
zation (UTLR), and the stochastic disturbance in the labor demand function
(ERMH). The multiplicative contributions of each of these factors to the annual
productivity ratios are shown in columns 1-4 of Table 10.4. The table also
includes the breakdown from equation (10.24), giving the ratio of actual to
potential output (UTPR) in column 6 as the product of the productivity ratio in
column 4 and the ratio (MHR) of actual to full-employment manhours in column
5. The procyclical movement of realized productivity, which in the He model is
largely a reflection of the lagged adjustment of labor input to changes in output,
is readily apparent from a comparison of columns 4 and 6.
Until the mid-1960s, the deviations of actual from potential productivity
were generally moderate and the contributions of the three components were of
roughly equal importance. In later years, the variations in PRODR were dom-
inated by the relative price term A WQR. Since the expressions for QE and QF
share the same tax parameters and discount and depreciation rates, the variation
in A WQR is due solely to deviations of the expected and potential real wage
Bert G. Hickman 291
Table lO.,{ USA: Realized and potential productivity, manhours and output
(relatives). a
AWQR UTLR ERMH PRODR MHR UTPR
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1956 1.0065 1.0040 0.9901 1.0004 1.0140 1.0144
1957 0.9961 0.9900 1.0157 1.0016 0.9949 0.9965
1958 0.9934 0.9813 1.0179 0.9923 0.9600 0.9526
1959 0.9937 1.0114 0.9917 0.9967 0.9808 0.9775
1960 0.9946 1.0004 0.9760 0.9711 0.9815 0.9531
1961 0.9969 0.9906 0.9937 0.9812 0.9640 0.9459
1962 0.9968 1.0068 0.9899 0.9934 0.9765 0.9701
1963 1.0016 1.0021 0.9875 0.9911 0.9804 0.9717
1964 0.9979 1.0050 0.9902 0.9930 0.9896 0.9827
1965 1.0019 1.0087 0.9947 1.0052 1.0059 1.0112
1966 1.0115 1.0071 1.0202 1.0392 1.0195 1.0594
1967 1.0162 0.9998 1.0081 1.0243 1.0190 1.0438
1968 1.0116 1.0008 1.0145 1.0271 1.0206 1.0482
1969 1.0198 1.0033 0.9911 1.0141 1.0270 1.0415
1970 1.0239 0.9876 0.9939 1.0050 1.0030 1.0080
1971 1.0171 0.9899 1.0058 1.0126 0.9840 0.9964
1972 1.0080 1.0035 0.9945 1.0059 0.9904 0.9963
1973 1.0117 1.0061 1.0026 1.0204 1.0018 1.0223
1974 1.0302 0.9928 0.9744 0.9966 0.9881 0.9847
1975 1.0357 0.9777 0.9930 1.0055 0.9469 0.9520
1976 1.0065 1.0067 1.0003 1.0136 0.9590 0.9720
1977 1.0185 1.0073 1.0090 1.0352 0.9723 1.0065
1978 1.0249 1.0107 1.0078 1.0440 0.9920 1.0357
1979 1.0290 1.0024 1.0063 1.0380 0.9966 1.0344
1980 1.0319 0.9879 1.0088 1.0284 0.9740 1.0016
1981 1.0284 0.9938 0.9977 1.0198 0.9626 0.9816
1982 1.0235 0.9820 0.9954 1.0005 0.9302 0.9307
aSee text equations (10.23) and (10.24) for variable definitions and relations.
rates. When positive wage gaps became the rule after 1965, they were usually
accompanied by corresponding positive gaps between realized and potential pro-
ductivity. When the expected real wage is above the potential wage, additional
capital deepening is induced, raising measured productivity above the potential
level. With the demand for labor conditional on output, in other words, a higher
real wage reduces manhour demand and induces an equivalent increase in real-
ized labor productivity. Variations in UTLR or ERMH may mitigate or aug-
ment this effect, but in most years it is the magnitude of A WQR which accounts
for that of PRODR. Hence the principal lesson from Table 10.-1 is that a positive
productivity gap stemming from a positive wage gap is a symptom of labor
market disequilibrium rather than a lasting productivity gain.
In summary, the productivity slowdown appears along the potential growth
path as well as in the realized performance of the economy. Moreover, the short-
fall of realized productivity growth was not pronounced in any of the periods. In
particular, slack demand had only a minor effect on realized productivity
between 1973 and 1982. Positive wage gaps did frequently elevate realized pro-
ductivity levels, but this is symptomatic of adverse employment effects rather
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than fundamental improvements in output per worker or per manhour. What
slack demand could and did affect adversely after the early 1970s was full utiliza-
tion of labor and capital resources, as actual output lagged behind potential and
unemployment increased. The development of sizable real wage gaps during the
1970s also aggravated unemployment.
10.7. A Forecast of US Growth, 1985-2000
The forecast shown in Table 10.5 was made in early 1985 for a study of the
financial viability of the social security system (Coen and Hickman, 1985). The
complete model was used to generate endogenous forecasts of nominal as well as
real variables and of the actual as well as the potential path of the economy.
Realized growth is expected to average 2.8% in 1986-1990 and 2.4% in
1991-1995, as compared with potential rates of 2.5% and 2.2%. Unemployment
falls correspondingly, with some narrowing of the gap between the actual and
natural rates. In the last five years of the forecast, however, actual growth
declines a little, potential growth rises somewhat, and unemployment increases
modestly. Inflation averages 3.4% during the remainder of this decade before ris-
ing to 4% or more in the 1990s. Long-term interest rates, as represented by
Moody's Corporate Average, decline substantially over the forecast horizon. The
federal deficit also falls over time, from a 1985 ratio to GNP of 4.9% to an aver-
age of 0.9% during 1996-2000.
The gradual diminution of the growth rate over the forecast horizon reflects
both the demographic and economic constraints on aggregate supply and the
assumption of an anti-inflationary policy stance inhibiting the growth of aggre-
gate demand. A capsule summary of these forces is presented in Table 10.6.
To begin with labor supply, the growth rate of the noninstitutional popula-
tion aged 16 or over is shown in column 10. The noninstitutional population
provides the pool of potential entrants into the labor force, and it is an exog-
enous variable in our model, based on official demographic projections. The
decision to participate in the labor force is endogenous, however, and the aggre-
gate participation rate LPG is forecast to rise until the year 2000, so that labor
force (LGl) growth remains high despite the fall in population growth.
Were the demand for labor to increase at the same rate as the labor force,
the unemployment rate would remain constant. In the forecast, however, civil-
ian employment E is seen in column 7 to rise faster than the labor force in the
last half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, resulting in the unemploy-
ment reductions previously observed in Table 10.5. Similarly, an excess of labor
force over employment growth results in some increase of unemployment in
1996-2000.
The growth of labor demand depends on the growth rate of output and
manhour productivity. The relevant aggregate demand variable is gross private
nonresidential product XNR, shown in column 2 of Table 10.6. The wedge
between GNP and XNR is provided by real income originating in government
employment and in housing rent. A comparison of columns 1 and 2 shows that
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the growth rates of XNR and GNP are virtually the same, in view of the modest
uptrends of government employment and housing rent in the forecast.
Given the growth rate of XNR as determined by aggregate demand, one
may subtract the rate of increase of labor productivity in column 3 to obtain the
growth rate of private manhours in column 4. Since productivity growth is vir-
tually constant after 1990, manhours decelerate with output. The growth rate of
private employment EP falls accordingly, although it continues to exceed that of
private manhours by about 0.2 percentage points per year, owing to our endog-
enous forecast of a downtrend in average hours per worker AH at that rate.
Finally, we note that total civilian employment E increases a little less rapidly
than private employment during the late 1980s, owing to our exogenous assump-
tions about a slowdown of government employment.
Labor productivity, which is a key linking variable between the aggregate
demand for output and the derived demand for manhours and employment in
Table 10.6, is itself endogenous in the He model. The growth of labor produc-
tivity is basically governed by the rate of capital deepening (rate of increase of
the capital/labor ratio) and the rate of Hicks-neutral technical change (growth of
total factor productivity in the production function). The rate of capital deepen-
ing in turn depends on the income share of capital and the rate of change of the
real wage. (It also depends on tax policies affecting the rental price of capital,
but these policies are held constant in the forecast under existing law as specified
in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982.) In this projection, the rate of Hicks-neutral techni-
cal change has been fixed at 0.9% per year, or 0.3% above the rate for 1973-1982
as estimated from our factor demand functions. Had we simply extrapolated the
earlier estimate, the output growth rates in Table 10.6 would have been 0.3%
lower.
The growth of real aggregate demand in the forecast is conditioned by our
assumptions on macroeconomic policies and foreign economic developments.
Table 10.7 summarizes the key assumptions on fiscal and monetary policies.
The growth rate of nominal federal purchases of goods and services is set
exogenously and is assumed to decrease sharply after 1984-1985, in order to
decrease the federal deficit. After allowing for inflation, the result is an immedi-
ate sharp reduction in the rate of increase of real federal purchases, from a peak
of 6.7% in 1985 to an average annual rate of 0.9% in 1986-1990 and negative
growth thereafter.
With regard to monetary policy, the growth rate of Ml is assumed to be
reduced gradually over the forecast horizon, at a pace consistent with falling
interest rates and a relatively stable income velocity of money.
State and local purchases of goods and services are determined in the
model as a function of federal grants-in-aid, real personal income per capita, and
population growth. A declining pattern in nominal grants-in-aid is assumed,
again because of the desire to reduce the federal deficit. The negative effect of
reduced grants-in-aid on state and local spending was partly offset by adjusting
real purchases upward in the 1980s and 1990s, to forestall an incipient growth in
the state and local surplus. The net result of these policy assumptions IS a
deceleration of growth in real state and local spending after 1995.
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The key exogenous variables in the foreign sector are nominal export
expenditures and the price of oil and other imports (Table 10.8). We assume an
average growth rate of nominal export demand of about 10% between 1986 and
2000. After allowing for export price inflation, as determined endogenously by
domestic factors, real export growth is found to increase from 2.4% in 1985 to an
average rate of 7% in 1986-1990, before declining to about 6% in the 1990s.
The dollar price of imports is forecast exogenously to increase sharply dur-
ing the next few years, owing to an assumed depreciation of the exchange rate.
After peaking in 1986-1987, the rate of import price inflation is assumed to fall
gradually over the duration of the forecast (column 6). The path of demand for
real imports, as determined endogenously by changes in real income and the
relative price of imported and domestic goods, is shown in column 5 of the table,
and the nominal value of imports appears in column 4. Finally, the current
deficit on net exports (column 7) is forecast to be eliminated in the early 1990s
and to move into surplus thereafter.
In summary, the growth path of real output in this long-term forecast is
primarily determined by supply factors, including population growth, labor force
participation decisions, technical progress, and the economic incentives for capi-
tal deepening. Fiscal and monetary policies and international developments are
also influential, however, since they affect the adjustment of aggregate demand
to aggregate supply, with important consequences for the inflation and unem-
ployment forecasts. No attempt is made in this forecast to alter tax rates to
increase supply incentives or to augment aggregate demand by influencing con-
sumption or investment decisions, but discretionary changes in federal expendi-
tures do importantly affect economic performance and the federal deficit.
10.8. Driving Forces of Economic Growth
As in neoclassical theory, the major exogenous variables in the Bonn multi-
country growth model are the labor force, the aggregate saving rate, and the rate
of technical progress. Neoclassical theory is also the starting point for the HC
annual growth model, but our treatment varies in significant ways from that of
the Bonn group.
10.8.1. The production function
In the HC model, the aggregate production function is defined for gross private
nonresidential product and includes only capital and labor inputs. The Bonn
models utilize a three-factor function including imported goods as an additional
input and referring to total production minus domestic secondary inputs.
10.8.2. Labor input
Population growth is exogenous in our model, but labor force participation rates
and the natural rate of unemployment are both endogenous variables. Changes
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in the aggregate participation rate drive a wedge between population and labor
force, whereas those in the natural rate affect the amount of potential employ-
ment for a given potential labor force. As shown in Table 10.1, the potential
labor force increased about half of a percentage point faster than the noninstitu-
tional population during 1973-1982, and about the same margin is predicted in
future years (Table 10.6). However, the rate of population growth itself is pro-
jected to fall in the official sources. Simple trend extrapolation would over-
predict labor force growth, although extrapolation at the same rate as population
growth would not.
The growth of potential labor input also depends on the trend of average
working hours. The HC average hours equation implies a continuing downtrend
at about the historical rate (Tables 10.9 and 10.6).
The net result of these various forces is a predicted decline in the annual
growth rate of potential manhours from 1.5% per year in 1985-1990 to 1.2% in
1990--1995 and 1.0% in 1995-2000. The corresponding annual growth rate of
labor input in the Bonn model of the US averages 1.4% and shows a rising pat-
tern during 1985-2000.
10.8.3. Capital
The distinction in our model between output origination in housing and general
government, on the one hand, and gross private nonresidential product, on the
other, leads to a corresponding distinction on the side of capital and labor
inputs. As discussed above, business fixed investment is endogenous in the
model, and its equilibrium share of potential output is part of the solution for the
potential growth path. The equilibrium share for gross fixed business investment
was 10% in 1968-1982. The corresponding ratio in the Bonn model is much
higher because it includes residential construction with business fixed capital.
10.8.4. Technical progress
The principal differences between the two models concern the treatment of
technical progress or total factor productivity. In the Bonn model, Harrod neu-
trality is assumed, and the equilibrium rate of progress, which varies annually, is
estimated by correcting the realized change in manhour productivity each year
for the associated changes in the capital/output and import/output ratios, using
factor shares as weights. When smoothed with a five-year moving average, the
resulting annual estimates of technical progress follow a pronounced long swing
during 1956-1980, which is identified with a Kondratieff long wave or cycle
(Krelle, 1986b, 1987). In the HC model, the rate of technical change is estimated
econometrically from the interrelated system of factor demands and the produc-
tion function. It is assumed to be Hicks-neutral and to follow a piecewise
exponential trend rather than a long swing.
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The following observations are offered in support of the specification used
in the HC model.
The growth-accounting approach to estimation of an annual rate of techni-
cal progress relies on the counterfactual assumption that firms are always on the
production function for observed inputs of capital and labor. In contrast, our
model rests squarely on the well-established fact that factor utilization and, espe-
cially, capital utilization fluctuate cyclically and may often depart from full utili-
zation for years at a time. Business firms are normally off the production func-
tion for measured inputs of labor and capital, which must therefore be adjusted
for varying rates of utilization in order to derive the correct effective inputs
either for growth accounting or direct econometric estimation of the production
function.
As a corollary, realized labor productivity varies directly with changes in
capacity utilization and deviates from the path of potential productivity. Fluc-
tuations of aggregate demand induce procyclical changes in realized productivity
as firms adjust labor inputs with a lag to changes in output and relative factor
prices.
It was shown in column 6 of Table 10.4 that the US economy operated at
only 95% of potential GNP in the recessions of 1958 and 1961. A strong and
lengthy recovery began in 1962 under the stimulus of the Kennedy tax cuts and
was greatly accelerated by the Vietnam War beginning in 1965. The potential
utilization rate averaged 105% during 1965-1969 before declining to an average
of 101% in 1970-1973. These demand-induced output fluctuations in turn
induced parallel movements in the ratio of actual to potential manhours (column
5) and in the ratio of actual to potential labor productivity (column 4). The
latter ratio also responded to induced changes in the expected wage/rental ratio
(column 1), but was unaffected by the underlying trend in technical progress
since the latter impinges equally on realized and potential labor productivity.
Against this background, the doldrums of the 1970s are seen to result from
a reduction in the secular rate of technical progress and sporadic shocks to
aggregate supply and aggregate demand, rather than as an endogenous sequel to
a long upswing of technical progress in the 1960s. Figure 10.1, based on a simi-
lar chart by Krelle (1987), does show a pronounced swing in the smoothed
growth rate of actual labor productivity during the 1960s. No such swing is
apparent in the similarly smoothed growth rate of potential labor productivity,
however. Potential productivity varies moderately from year to year because of
changes in the potential wage/rental ratio, and from period to period because of
the trend breaks in the rate of technical progress in 1969 and 1974, but it does
not follow a long cycle. The swing in realized productivity growth is an artifact
of the major demand shocks of the 1960s rather than symptomatic of an underly-
ing long cycle in technical progress.
In the HC model, the trend rate of Hicks-neutral progress during 1973-1982
is estimated at 0.6% per year. The corresponding Harrod-neutral rate is found
by dividing the Hicks-neutral rate by the estimated labor elasticity of production
- a procedure which is justified by the multiplicative form of the Cobb-Douglas
function - and equals 0.8% per year. As noted earlier, however, the Hicks-
neutral rate was set judgmentally to 0.9% in our forecast for 1985-2000, which
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Figure 10.1. Actual (DPROD) and potential (DPROL) growth rates of labor produc-
tivity (five-year moving averages).
implies a Harrod-neutral rate of 1.2%. As shown in Table 10.6, the growth rate
of labor productivity converges to the exogenous Harrod-neutral rate of progress
in the 1990s. When combined with the falling pattern projected for labor input,
the result is a decline in the growth rate of potential GNP from 2.5% in
1985-1990 to 2.2% in 1990-1995 and 2.3% in 1995-2000, and corresponding pro-
jections for actual GNP of 2.8%,2.4% and 2.2%.
With regard to the Bonn model forecast, it was decided not to impose the
postulated Kondratieff upswing in technical progress in the growth projections.
Rather, Harrod-neutral technical progress at a constant trend rate of 0.8% per
year during 1985-1985 was assumed in the forecasts for the US economy.
Together with the projected average growth rate of labor input of 1.4%, this
results in an average growth rate of real GNP which is nearly constant at 2.2%
per year, although drifting upward slightly over the period owing to the gradual
rise in labor input.
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CHAPTER 11
Sectoral Output, Employment,
and Real Wages: Long-Run
Trends for the US Economy
Peter Pauly
Summary
This chapter reports on the results of an empirical examination of sectoral
employment dynamics for the US economy. We present a new model of labor
demand which includes the effects of real wage dispersion, approximated by the
conditional variance of real wages across industrial sectors. The model is based
on new econometric techniques to model conditional heteroskedasticity. Pooled
time-series cross-section results for 33 industrial sectors in the period 1964 to
1984 form the basis for a projection of sectoral employment levels for the
remainder of the decade.
11.1. Introduction
Structural changes continuously affect all sectors and markets in the economy.
Few consequences of these changes are, however, felt by economic agents as
directly as adjustments in the sectoral demand for labor. Shifts in final demand,
technologies, and relative prices lead to effects on output, employment, and real
wages that reflect the differences in sectoral sensitivities to the forces of struc-
tural change. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to focus on one particu-
lar aspect of this process for the US economy: the sectoral employment dynam-
ics. In particular, we examine the dependence of employment on real wages and
real wage differentials across sectors.
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The effects of real wages on employment dynamics have been examined in
numerous studies [e.g., Bils (1985), Grubb et al. (1983), Sachs (1983)]. In addi-
tion to providing additional evidence regarding these effects at a sectoral level,
we also focus the discussion on the role of real wage dispersion. It has been
argued that real wage differentials across sectors are an indication of the degree
of labor market flexibility. According to this view, a large variance of real wages
per se contributes to higher employment levels since it indicates the availability
of low-wage job opportunities to absorb laid-off workers from other sectors [see
Bell and Freeman (1985), Lawrence and Lawrence (1985), or Wachter and
Wascher (1983)]. We shall therefore examine whether, empirically, such a posi-
tive effect of dispersion can be found at the sectoral level, in addition to standard
real wage effects.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 11.2 we examine the causal
structure between employment, output, and real wages. In Section 11.3, we
present estimation results from labor demand equations for a cross-section of 33
industries (which are listed in detail in Table 11.2). The novel aspect here is the
use of the ARCH-M model [Engle (1982), Engle et al. (1987), Diebold and Pauly
(1988)], to model wage dispersion endogenously as the conditional variance of a
time-series process representation of real wages. Finally, in Section 11.4 we
report some predictions of sectoral employment dynamics based on this model.
11.2. Causality Tests
In principle, any sensible analysis of employment dynamics on an aggregate level
must be concerned with the feedbacks from employment to output and real
wages. On a sectoral level, however, in particular for an economy characterized
by centralized wage bargaining, it is not at all clear whether the real
wage-productivity nexus requires a simultaneous treatment.
To address that issue, we set up a simple Granger causality test in a panel
framework [Chamberlain (1982)] to explore the causal structure between
manhours (MH), real value added (Q), and real wages (Wjp). This involves the
estimation of a veetor-autogressive system of the form
(W jp)t-l
A(L) MHt_ 1 + et
Qt-l
(11.1)
where Ct = (cw Ct2' Ct3)' and A(L) is a matrix polynominal in the lag operator,
which can be partitioned into typical elements Aij(L) (i,j = 1,2,3). The null
hypothesis of weak exogeneity can be tested as a zero constraint on the parame-
ter set Aij(L) Vi,j (i =J j). The test statistic is distributed as X2(q), where q
denotes the number of constraints.
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The results of the relevant likelihood ratio tests can be summarized as fol-
lows:
Hypothesis Test statistic
(i) wages and output
endogenous vs. both exogenous 4.23
(ii) wages exogenous, output
endogenous vs. both exogenous 7.31
(iii) wages endogenous, output
endogenous vs. both exogenous 12.18
The test statistics are well below the 95% critical values. We therefore con-
clude that, based on this parameterization, real value added and real wages are
strictly causally prior to manhours. On a sectoral level, it is thus appropriate to
estimate labor demand equations in a single equation framework.
11.3. A Model of Sectoral Demand for Labor
Traditionally, estimates of labor demand are based on a model that explains the
rate of change of manhours (Mil) as a function of real value added growth (Q)
and the rate of change of real product wages (W / e = tV), i.e.,
MH = a + fJQ + fJQ + ,tV + u (11.2)
A preliminary pooled cross-section time-series estimate of (11.2) for 33 sectors
and a sample of 21 years (1964-1984) yielded the following result (t-values in
parentheses):
a = 0.74 (3.5)
fJ = 0.80 (45.7)
, = -0.62 (35.7)
The variance decomposition yields a cross-section component of 0.182, and time-
series and error components of 0.0004 and 0.0041, respectively.
While the model provides a rather satisfactory representation of the data
set at hand, such an aggregate estimate conceals the extent to which firms'
behavior differs on a sectoral level. Individual time-series for these sectors yield
production elasticity estimates which range from 0.05 to 1.45, and real wage elas-
ticities in the range between 0 and -1.52. It is thus obvious that detailed sec-
toral projections must be based on sector-specific estimates. In addition, there
appears to be a fair amount of cyclical variability in these estimates. A sequence
of cross-section estimates, while showing little variation in the output elasticity
(0.93 to 0.99) over 21 years, exhibits significant fluctuations in the real wage
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Table 11.1. Model.
with
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(11.3)
and
0 2 aOl all 0 £1 t-lw,l,t ,
0 2 a 02 a22 £2 t-lw,2,t ,
2 +°w,t
0 2 aOA: 0 ak/c £A: t-lw,A:,t ,
(11.4)
where
and
Notation:
Rate of change of manhours in sector i
Rate of change of real value added in sector i
Rate of change of real wages in sector i
Conditional variance of real wage increases in sector i
elasticity (-0.47 to -1.22). An interesting aspect of these preliminary results is
that the importance of real wage changes, after a high in the early 1970s, seems
to have been on a continuous decline since 1974, the year of the first oil shock.
[Detailed results are available upon request to the author.]
The model to be used in the remainder of this chapter seeks to combine the
standard labor demand model with a proper representation of the effects of real
wage variability across sectors (dispersion). Econometrically, the important
point here is to provide a satisfactory measure of dispersion. Earlier studies used
unconditional variances of real wages, generally in the form of moving averages.
Such a measure is, however, quite inappropriate since it does not reflect agents'
information sets. Rather, what is required here is a representation of the
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conditional variance. Unfortunately, in general, little information is available
about the appropriate conditioning sets. A convenient approximation can under
those conditions be provided by a version of Engle's (1982) ARCH model. Here
the conditional variance of a variable is approximated as an autoregressive pro-
cess of the forecast error variance of the structural representation of the variable
in question. The extension of the concept that applies in the present context is
that the conditional variance also enters as a regressor, thus affecting the mean
of the dependent variable. This is the ARCH-M model discussed in Engle, Lilien
and Robins (1987) and Diebold and Pauly (1988).
The model is summarized in Table 11.1. The labor demand equation (11.3)
includes as a regressor the conditional variance of a real wage model (11.4),
which in this case is a simple AR( q) model on a sectoral basis. The ARCH part
models dispersion as a first-order autoregressive process. The model could obvi-
ously be generalized by modeling sectoral real wages as a vector-autoregressive
process. Lack of degrees of freedom prevents us, however, from estimating such
a fully specified model.
The estimation results are quite encouraging. In about 60% of the sectors,
real wage dispersion enters significantly with the correct (positive) sign. The fit,
on the sectoral level, improves marginally, compared with the standard model.
Table 11.2 summarizes results for the two crucial elasticities in the model
[detailed results are available upon request]. Again, the most striking result is
the enormous variability of elasticities across sectors. The range of output elasti-
cities is very similar to the one obtained in the standard model, while the vari-
ance of real wage elasticities is somewhat reduced. An important result is that,
almost uniformly across sectors, the introduction of a significant effect of disper-
sion tends to reduce the real wage elasticity. Note that we obtain virtually no
wage effect at all for some of the services sectors.
11.4. Sectoral Employment Projections
The model estimated in the previous section will now be the basis for projections
of sectoral employment paths for the period 1985-1995. Note that the estimation
provides us with three sets of sectoral equations: an autoregressive representa-
tion of sectoral real wage dynamics, an ARCH model to describe the conditional
variance, and a manhours equation to determine labor input as a function of out-
put, real wages, and the dispersion measure.
For the purposes of these projections, sectoral output forecasts are taken
from Wharton Econometrics' annual model. A summary of historical growth
rates and the relevant projections is given in Table 11.2. In general the growth
rates reflect a further decline of average rates of expansion for a large number of
sectors. Examples of growth acceleration compared with the 1970s include the
construction industry, metal industries, motor vehicles, and chemical production.
The results of these projections are summarized in Figures 11.1-11.8. In
these graphs, we report the shares of output and employment for various sectoral
groupings. Employment is obtained by applying trend rates of decline of average
working hours to the projections of total manhours.
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Figures 11.1 and 11.2 represent two of the declining sectors. For both min-
ing and transportation, output and employment shares decline continuously.
The productivity trends are, however, quite different. While average produc-
tivity in mining continues to go down significantly during the forecast period, the
output share of transportation stabilizes with declining employment shares.
The aspect of structural change that has received most of the attention in
the past is the apparent decline in manufacturing (industrial) activity and the
shift toward services. That is, naturally, also reflected in our results. Fl'gures
11.9 and 11.4 illustrate the steep reduction in the number of manufacturing jobs,
from a share of more than 35% in the early 1950s to just about 15% projected for
the end of the century; the present share is about 20%. In contrast, the output
share remained remarkably stable over the past 30 years, and is expected to con-
tinue to be in the range of approximately 20%. These results reinforce the
important effects of productivity gains on employment structures. While the
qualitative results are greatly similar for both durable and nondurable manufac-
turing, there appears to be much more cyclical variability in the former than in
the latter sector.
Figures 11.5 to 11.7 cover various service sectors. The situation here is
entirely different. Rather than being characterized by constant output shares
and declining employment shares, these sectors are generally on a steady growth
path leading to increasing shares for both employment and output. For the
entire service sector, the employment share is expected to reach about 25% by
the end of the projection period, growing at roughly the same rate as during the
entire postwar period. Output shares grow much more slowly, indicating that in
these sectors job creation is aided by declining average productivities.
A slightly more complex picture emerges for the government sector. Con-
trary to popular perceptions, the output share of government has been on an
almost continuous decline since the early 1950s. At the same time the govern-
ment employment share had been rising until 1975, when a reversal occurred.
The present projection is for a continuation of this downward trend in the share
of government employment, though at a somewhat reduced rate.
Overall, our results suggest that there is little indication of change in the
pace of structural adjustment of employment shares over the next decade or so.
The decline of manufacturing shares will continue, while the service share will
increase at about the same rate experienced during the 1970s. Government's
share in employment will continue to fall, thus extending the trend established
since the mid-1970s.
11.5. Summary
In this chapter, we have examined long-run trends in employment shares for 33
sectors of the US economy. The particular focus was on sectoral differences in
the effects of real wages and on the importance of real wage dispersion for inter-
sectoral adjustment flows. A model of sectoral labor demand was estimated,
which incorporates an endogenous variability measure into a traditional employ-
ment function. Pooled estimates confirm the importance of dispersion effects,
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310 The Future of the World Economy
and the variance of real wage elasticities in this model is somewhat smaller than
in previous sectoral employment studies.
On the basis of this model, sectoral employment trends are then projected
for the period 1985-1995. The results suggest a continued increase in employ-
ment shares for services, at the expense of manufacturing industries. Despite a
moderate decline in average growth rates for almost all sectors, it appears that
no significant shift in the speed of intersectoral reallocations can be expected.
Employment patterns during the decade ahead will basically follow those trends
established in the 1970s and early 1980s.
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CHAPTER 12
Long-Range Modeling of the
USSR Economy
s. V. Dubovsky and O.A. Eismont
Summary
In this chapter the economic development of the USSR in the latest decades is
analyzed. Causes of the slowdown in economic growth are shown to be natural
resources depletion and relative decrease in the efficiency of new technologies. A
simulation model of economic growth, taking into account natural resources
depletion and endogenous technical progress, is described. Economic growth
forecasts for the USSR are presented for two scenarios: the "inertial" one with
the last decade's trends holding true for the future and the "accelerated" one
with increased labor activity and intensified technical progress.
12.1. Introduction
The statistics of the USSR's economic development up to the present time can
hardly be satisfactorily described and explained by means of traditional produc-
tion functions which use only three factors of production - labor, capital and
constant exogenous technical progress.
As is shown in Table 12.1, in the last 20 years the growth rates of the
USSR's economic development have slowed down. One of the major causes of
the slowdown is the decreasing rate of technical progress. The amounts of newly
developed machines and equipment have dropped from 4636 in 1961-1965 to
3134 in 1981-1985 (Statistical Yearbook, 1981 and 1986), which is an indicator of
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a decrease in the replacement rate of old technologies by new ones. Simultane-
ously, capital renewal rates have decreased due to the drop of average growth
rates in machinery and equipment production industries from 12.4% in
1961-1965 to 6% in 1981-1985. The depreciation rate has dropped almost by
half. Thus the assumption of a constant technical progress rate in the produc-
tion function is not valid for the present study.
Table 12.1. USSR national income growth rates.
A tJerage annual
growth rates (%)
1966-1970
6.9
1971-1975
5.0
1976-1980
4.2
1981-1985
3.1
During the last 10--15 years, as more accessible and less costly natural
resources in the central regions of the country have become considerably
exhausted, it has become necessary to move to less accessible and more costly
resources in the eastern parts of the country, much more distant from major con-
sumption centers, which is another major cause of the slowdown of economic
growth in the USSR.
Among all natural resources, energy takes a special place since the economy
as a whole is strongly dependent on it. On the other hand, the energy produc-
tion sector consumes a large fraction of material, labor and financial resources
and thus is dependent on the economy: the energy production sector accounts
for about 20% of investment (35% of industrial investment), 25% of industrial
capital and 2.5 million workers.
In the last 15 years (1971-1985) in all energy subsectors the output/capital
ratio has been decreasing: in electrical power generation by 22% (from 0.38 to
0.30), in the fuel industry by 52% (from 1.19 to 0.57), and in the oil industry by
64%. Besides that, extraction costs (excluding capital costs) have also been ris-
ing: by 2.8 times in oil production, 3.8 times in natural gas production, 1.6 times
in coal production, 1.3 times in electricity production. In addition, the quality of
energy resources is deteriorating. For example, average ash contents in coal pro-
duced in the USSR in these years has increased from 22.6% to 26.7% (Lalayanz,
1986).
As a result, while the energy/output ratio has been decreasing by 0.8%/Yr
the costs of energy resources have been increasing by 1.8%/yr, which means that
technical progress could not compensate for the deterioration of conditions of
energy production.
Keeping all the above factors in mind we must conclude that, when model-
ing the economic growth of the USSR, which is the world's main producer and
one of the world's main exporters of energy resources, it is necessary to take into
account processes of energy resource depletion. Introduction of endogenous
technical progress and natural resources depletion into the model might better
explain the existing statistics.
This chapter deals with economic growth modeling which takes into
account the aforementioned factors and the results of simulations.
s. v. Dubowky and O.A. EUl7IQnt
12.2. Technical Progress and Economic Growth
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Technical progress is considered as a process of permanent renewal of technolo-
gies and equipment. Each technology is associated with the capital of a specific
age. Thus in order to describe formally the process of technology renewal it is
necessary to know the age distribution of capital.
This distribution is described as follows [Dubovsky (1984); see also Dubov-
sky (1982), Dubovsky et al. (1983)].
a:: +~ =- ~(t, T)p
(12.1)
p(to' T) = ,p(T), p(t, 0) = P(t)
where t = current time, T= capital age, p(t, T) = age distribution of capital, ,p(T)
= initial age distribution, P(t) = new capital introduction rate and ~(t, T) =
capital depreciation rate.
In the majority of economic growth models capital age distribution p(t, T) is
replaced by capital described in an aggregate form:
00
K(t) = J p(t, T)dT
o
If ~(t, T) = ~(t), then while p(t, 00) = 0 from (12.1) the well-known equa-
tion for K( t) follows
K(t) = P(t) - ~(t)K(t)
If ~(t, T) = ~(T), then while 0 ~ T~ 00,
1"
p(to' T) = P(to - T) exp - J~(x)dx
°
it follows from (12.1) that:
00 [ 1"K(t) = P(t) - J ~(T) P(t - T) exp - J~(x)dx dT
o 0
(12.2)
(12.3)
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Let the total capital be characterized by the average technical level U(t).
This level is usually dependent on labor efficiency, capital/labor ratio,
energy/output ratio, etc.
Next, the relationship between the average technical level U(t) and the
technical level of newly introduced capital will be derived. It is assumed that the
technical level of capital of age r depends on the time of capital formation t - r
and is defined as u (t - r).
If the age distribution of capital is given by the function p(t, r), then the
average technical level of capital is given by the following expression:
00
U(t) = J pet, r)u(t - r) dr
o K(t) (12.4)
Taking the equality au/at =-au/ar into account together with relation-
ship (12.1), we get from (12.4) the equation
• • 00
. -_l[(!L _ Lf.!L - _1_ J -U(t) - K(t) U(t) + u(t 0) K(t) K(t) 0 J.L(t, r)p(t, r)u(t r)dr
from which two different types of equations are derived, depending on how the
depreciation rate is defined.
In the first case J.L(t, r) = J.L(t):
O(t) = i~~) [u(t - 0) - U(t)] (12.5)
In the second case J.L(t, r) = o(r - r l ) (0 = Dirac function, r l = capital life-
time):
. fl!L F(t - r l )U(t) = K(t) [u(t - 0) - U(t)] - K(t) [(u(t - rl) - U(t)] (12.6)
Equation (12.6) can be rewritten in the following form:
(12.7)
Xo = [u(t - 0) - U(t)] / U(t), xl = [u(t - rl) - U(t)] / U(t)
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where parameters Xo and xl can be readily interpreted in the following way: Xo
= relative increment of the newest technical level of capital compared to the
average one, xl = relative decrement of the obsolete technical level compared to
the averge one.
Thus, according to (12.7) the growth rate of the technical level of capital as
a whole depends on the capital renewal rate and the relative economic efficiency
of the newest technologies compared to the obsolete ones.
The assumption that the relative economic efficiency of newly introduced
technologies and the depreciation rate remain constant [xo, J.L = const] leads to
the traditional interpretation of technical progress in production functions as an
integral of equations (12.2) and (12.7)
(12.8)
However, this assumption is not always true. Using known statistics of
average indicators characterizing introduction of new technologies and discharge
of obsolete ones, it is possible to use equation (12.7) for estimating values of
xo, Xl as functions of time.
According to the capital growth, labor productivity and capital/labor ratio
statistics for the USSR industrial sector given in the Statistical Yearbook (1981
and 1986), the values of Xo for four five-year periods were estimated using a
simplified formula:
l:i.U [l:i.K Ilj= Xo j(+J.L
where l:i. U/ U = relative increment of technical level in five years, l:i.K/ K = rela-
tive capital growth in five years, J.L = relative capital depreciation in five years.
The results are given in Table 12.2.
Table 1£.2. Relative increment in cost of a newly created job and its productivity for
the industrial sector of the USSR compared to the preceding average level (in percent).
Increment in cost of a new job
Increment in productivity of a new job
1966-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985
60 68 70 76
56 55 31 37
When analyzing these estimates, it should be noted that the increase of job
costs in 1976-1985 was not followed by the equivalent increase of labor produc-
tivity. The hypothesis Xo = const did not correspond to reality, either.
Forecasting the dynamics of the technical level of new technologies presents
a special problem. Dubovsky (1984) analyzed different dynamic patterns of the
technical level. In the simplest case Xo is either a constant or is an exogenous
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function of time. This is equivalent to the introduction into the production func-
tion of "free of charge" but embodied technical progress.
A more sophisticated approach takes into account the R&D expenditures
(technological investment). In this case equation (12.5) can be reduced to the
following form:
where Y = GDP (FP), Cu ' a = parameters (0.5:::; a:::; 1), Uj;, Uu
shares in GDP (FP) of productive and technological investment.
(12.9)
relative
12.3. Natural Resources Depletion and Economic Growth
Now let us consider the problem of modeling natural resources depletion and its
influence on economic growth. It is assumed that the society extracts and con-
sumes first the most easily accessible and less costly natural resources and, as
these are exhausted, turns to less accessible and more costly ones. (It is ignored
that, in real practice, several reserves with different extraction costs are
exploited simultaneously.)
To illustrate this assumption, the specific extraction cost distribution den-
sity for natural resources q( CR , t) is introduced, where CR = specific extraction
cost. Natural resource extraction costs include labor and capital costs and
exclude all kinds of rent. In Figure 12.1 the qualitative graph of function
q( CR , t) is given, q( CR , to) being the initial extraction cost distribution. Solid
lines correspond to the actual process of natural resources extraction, when
resources of different costs are extracted simultaneously; broken lines correspond
to the model process, when at each moment only the least costly type of natural
resource is extracted.
It is assumed that natural resources extraction costs depend on the cumula-
tive extraction Q of natural resources and on the technical level UR of the
resource sector in the following form:
(12.10)
where
t 0
Q = J Rpr dt + Qo, Qo = J Rpr dt
o -00
where Rpr = natural resource production rate.
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q
Figure 12.1. Extraction cost distribution density for natural resources: solid line = ac-
tual process, broken line = model process, t 2 > t 1 > to'
It is assumed that the natural resource is not imported and all domestic
demand as well as all export needs are met by domestic production.
In Figure 12.2 the results of estimation of equation (12.10) for aggregate
energy resource in the USSR are presented (UR = U, fJ ~ 2.2, "I ~ 1.2). Equa-
tion (12.10) refers to the case when the natural resource is unsubstitutable. In
this case the extraction costs may grow indefinitely. In real life, however,
another case is more realistic, Le., where the natural resource is substitutable. In
this case the aggregate energy resource can be associated with the final energy
(electricity, heat, motor fuel, etc.) which is used for GDP (FP) production.
Final energy extraction costs can be defined accordingly. In this case due to
interfuel substitutability and introduction of practically inexhaustible energy
resources (for example, solar and fusion energy), the extraction costs will be lim-
ited. The corresponding qualitative behavior of function CR ( Q) is presented in
Figure 12.9.
12.4. A Macromodel of Economic Growth
Let Y be the production function associated with GDP (FP). Y is assumed to
depend on production factors of capital K, labor L, natural resource consump-
tion rate Re which is used for GDP (FP) production, technical level U, and accu-
mulated amount of produced natural resource Q:
Y = Y(K, L, Re, U, Q)
The production function is assumed to be linear homogeneous in K, L, Re:
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1.4 r--------,-----------,..---------,--------"
1.3 I-------+-------+--------+---~------j
1.2 t--------+----------1t------~~~~'-------l
1.1 b:::::------+-~~~=------+_---l
198019751965
1.0 .---------'-------+----------'-------'
1960
Figure 1e.£. Primary energy production cost in the USSR: 1 = model, 2 = statistics.
Q
Figure 1£.9. Final energy cost as a function of its cumulative production.
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(12.11)
The following hypothesis concerning the influence of resource depletion on
GDP (FP) is introduced:
(12.12)
The production function is assumed to be linear homogenous in capital and
the technical level of technology:
(12.13)
Profit maximization condition is used
(12.14)
where PL = average wage, PK = capital cost, PR = cost of the in situ natural
resource. The market price of natural resource will be
P = PR + CR
From (12.14) follows
(12.15)
ay
aR = PR
c
(12.16)
If the natural resource is used only for GDP (FP) production, then from
(12.12) follows
(12.17)
where function F can be interpreted as gross output of the economy composed of
two sectors: the resource-producing one and the rest of the economy.
On the other hand, if the natural resource is not a production factor and is
used only as a consumer product [its consumption being proportional to GDP
(FP)]:
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(12.18)
where aR = resource to GDP(FP) ratio, then from (12.12) it follows:
Y = rp(K, L, U) exp( -aR CR ) (12.19)
Using relationships (12.11)-(12.13), and (12.16) we can get the following
equation:
(12.20)
+ [PLL + PRRc ] (; _ R;r oCR
Y Y U Y oQ
If we assume that natural resource production cost does not depend on the
technical level [Le., CR = CR(Q)], then we can get
(12.21)
where
When UL = const, UR = const, Uc = const, equation (12.21) has the first
integral, which is a Cobb-Douglas production function with labor- and resource-
saving technical progress:
(12.22)
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Using (12.8) we get a production function which is not linearly homogene-
ous in capital, labor and the natural resource rate:
(12.23)
If instead of (12.13) the following hypothesis is used:
y= ay U
au (12.24)
then under the condition UL , UR' UC = const we get the following first integral:
(12.25)
In this case U can be interpreted as labor-, resource- and capital-saving technical
progress.
Now let us consider the problem of optimal extraction of natural resources.
If the natural resource is a private property (in a market economy), then the
resource owner tends to maximize his discounted profits, i.e.,
00J [p - CR (Q, U)] Rpr exp {-rt)dt -4 max
o
where r is a discount factor. Taking into account that
(12.26)
(12.27)
from (12.25), using (12.27) and the corresponding Euler equation we can get:
(12.28)
322 The Future of tM World Economy
Equation (12.28) coincides with the classical Hotelling equation [see Hotel-
ling (1931)] when there are no extraction costs.
In case that the natural resource is a state-owned property (in a centrally
planned economy), the goal is to maximize discounted FP. Then the maximiza-
tion problem will be as follows:
00
J Y(K, L, Rc , U, Q) exp (-rt)dt ~ max
o
(12.29)
It should be noted that the natural resource is used for GDP(FP) produc-
tion Rc' for consumer needs Rf and for exports Rex
(12.30)
Then using (12.27), (12.30) and the Euler equation corresponding to prob-
lem (12.29), we get:
d [ BY I BY- -- exp (-rt) - - exp (-rt) = 0
dt BRc BQ
(12.31)
From this equation, using (12.12) and (12.16), we get equation (12.28).
Thus, irrespective of the type of natural resource ownership, the equation
describing the behavior of its price is the same - namely, (12.28).
12.5. Computational Experiments
The model which has been described was combined with the corresponding
demographic and foreign trade models [Dubovsky (1980), Grechuha et al. (1985)]
and used in computational experiments performed for a whole range of scenarios
starting with the so-called "inertial" growth to the "accelerated" one. (The pro-
gramming, estimation and simulation were executed by V.M. Vasiliev and A.F.
Mironichev.)
The "inertial" scenario is characterized by the slowdown of economic
growth rates, which is caused not so much by the slowdown of labor growth
rates and natural resources depletion but mainly by a relative decrease of new
technologies' efficiencies.
The new situation in the USSR and the goals set up by the new Soviet
leadership presume acceleration of socioeconomic development of the USSR
based on speeding up technical progress and thus raising economic efficiency.
The "accelerated" scenario, which is formed on the basis of fundamental changes
in the economic control mechanism, was analyzed. In this scenario the relative
increment of new jobs efficiency compared to the past average is assumed to
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Figure H.i. "Inertial" (1) and "accelerated" (2) scenario of the USSR economic growth.
grow threefold in the years 1986-2000. At the same time, technical progress
should compensate for the rising costs of natural resources extraction and, as a
result, the energy/output ratio (expressed in cost terms) should not rise. Labor
activity is also assumed to grow: in 1986-1990 by 5%, in 1991-1995 by 10%, in
1995-2000 by 7.5% (the overall growth in 15 years will be 22.5%).
The simulation results for the two scenarios are presented in Figure I2.i.
The comparison of these scenarios shows the considerable potential possibilities
of technical progress in speeding up long-range economic growth and justifies
optimistic views on economic development of the USSR in the period up to the
year 2000, provided the measures aimed at perfecting the economic control
mechanism are fulfilled.
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CHAPTER 13
Driving Forces of Economic
Structural Change: The Case
of Japan in the Last Decade
Chikashi Moriguchi
Summary
Major economic structural changes in the near future are not likely to take place
either in robotization or in bio-related industries. On the other hand, changes in
Japanese agriculture, mining and some of the domestic service sectors are going
to be major or massive ones. The prolonged process of "internal" adjustment
will bring about economic frictions between Japan and its trading partners.
13.1. Introduction
In order to discuss economic structural change, we had better define what we
mean by a "structure". Here I should like to confine the concept to a narrow
and simple meaning, i.e., the relative size of industrial sectors that form the
industrial base of an economy. I am not going to deal with the so-called struc-
tural parameter changes of economic models, which are dealt with by many
authors elsewhere in this work.
I should like to stress the impact of relative price changes that can be said
to be a necessary condition for economic structural change to take place. Then I
am going to deal with the degree of competition among firms as the real driving
force behind structural change.
Finally, I shall touch upon technical progress as an endogenous factor that
is affected by relative price changes and market competition. Some implications
of the recent robot revolution will be discussed as a case in point.
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13.2. Relative Price Changes as a Source of
Structural Change
Let us make a quick survey of the trend of relative prices among major factors of
production.
13.2.1. Labor and capital
The relative price of labor and capital is defined by per capita wage earnings
divided by price of capital goods. The latter is given by a fixed investment
deflator. Here the modification by interest rate, corporate tax rate and the rate
of capital consumption is neglected for the sake of simplified international com-
parison.
As Figure 19.1 indicates, there has been a marked upward tendency of the
relative price of labor against capital goods in Japan, whereas in the USA the
same relative price change stays within a much smaller range. This difference is
generally attributed to a difference in labor productivity growth between the two
countries.
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Figure 19.1. Average wage earnings divided by the deflator of fixed investment.
(Sources: for Japan - National Income Account, Annual Report (Economic Planning
Agency); for the USA - Economic Report of the President (Council of Economic Advi-
sors. )
If there were a need for labor-saving investment or investment for
capital/labor substitution, it would certainly be Japan, not the USA, that faced
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a stronger investment pressure. And this process is self-sustaining: high invest-
ment raises both labor productivity and the wage rate, which increases the
wage/capital goods price ratio.
13.2.2. Capital and energy
It goes without saying that the relative price of energy plays a crucial role in
determining the direction of technological development and industrial structure.
During the rapid growth of the 1960s, we saw the relative price of energy
steadily decline, stimulating a massive shift to energy-intensive heavy industriali-
zation. This was a worldwide phenomenon, although the magnitude of change
varied among different countries. The relative price of energy and capital, for
instance, declined much faster in Japan than in any other country.
This can be seen from Figure 19.2, which compares Japan with the USA.
Japan made a fast shift to oil as its major source of energy. Other countries with
domestic coal mining industries had to pay substantial social costs for their tran-
sition to oil. Japan's pace of adjustment was the fastest simply because it had
no major domestic primary energy industry.
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Figure 19.2. Oil price divided by investment deflator in Japan and average fuel price di-
vided by investment deflator in the USA.
During the period of rapid increases of oil prices, Japan once again had to
adjust quickly because its dependency on overseas oil had reached more than
70% of total energy consumption. That made Japan's ratio of oil price to capital
goods prices the highest in the world, which compelled the country to pursue a
new wave of energy-saving capital formation. In all industries energy-saving
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efforts were made, and within ten years energy input per economic unit of gross
output was reduced by more than 30%.
One thing should be noted: the period of nationwide energy-saving efforts
coincided with a marked change in the import structure. Part of the energy-
intensive sector yielded to imports. Aluminum was a typical example. Japan
started to import energy that is embodied in aluminum and other energy-
intensive intermediate products, which made a significant contribution to the
reduction of energy consumption in Japan.
We have discussed capital goods prices and energy prices, but it would be
insufficient to look at these two inputs alone. Some empirical studies have
revealed that energy and capital (service) are not gross substitutes but comple-
mentary, while energy and labor as well as labor and capital are in fact substi-
tutes for one another [see Ban (1985), Kuroda (1985), and Murota (1983)]. This
finding might seem to conflict with the observation that a relative increase in
energy cost stimulated energy-saving investment. However, the observed com-
plementarity between energy and capital service use is based on ex post relations
with respect to a given stock of capital. It does not say everything about ex ante
capital investment plans.
13.2.3. Capital and other manufactured goods
The above observations seem to suggest the hypothesis that the larger the rate of
change in relative prices, the higher is the rate of capital formation.
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Figure 19.9. Investment deflator IG NP deflator.
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When we look further into the behavior of relative prices of capital goods,
we find that in Japan they have kept a downward trend for more than twenty
years (see Figure 13.3). The trend seems to have been strengthened by the
microelectronics revolution of these years. On the other hand, we do not see any
similar trend in the United States, where the relative price of capital goods has
stayed almost invariant, except for the recent few years when overvaluation of
the dollar brought down the import price of machinery and equipment.
What explains this large difference between the two countries? One under-
lying element seems to be the following fact: Japan is a resource-poor country -
natural resources imports do not compete with domestic resources. Thus,
import prices are exogenous variables, being determined in the world commodity
market. In the USA, on the other hand, most resource imports compete with
domestically produced goods. All prices are more or less determined
endogenously; even the domestic oil price tends to be determined by domestic
factors, at least in part. Thus, prices tend to fluctuate more proportionately in
the USA than in Japan. To put it in a different way, the scope of endogeneity of
the economy is wider in the USA than in Japan.
13.3. Competition as the Driving Force behind
Structural Change
So far I have emphasized the importance of relative price changes as a major
driving force behind economic structural change. However, there must be an
economic entity that implements and pursues it, and this entity is the firm that
competes.
There are several alternative ways to define the degree of competition
among firms in a market. The number of engaged firms, the degree of variations
of market price in a certain time period, and the degree of concentration are
some of them. Whichever measure is applied, it seems clear that Japanese
industries are the most competitive among major industrialized countries. Steel,
chemical and petrochemical industries are highly competitive with six to ten cor-
porations engaged in active competition. Automobile, electrical and electronic
machinery and precision instruments industries are growing with many compet-
ing firms. In these industries, Japan exceeds any other industrialized country in
terms of number of engaged firms or degree of concentration. Japan's semicon-
ductor industry is a new example of fierce oligopolistic competition.
The question is: what are the instruments of competition? Competition by
developing new products is a most successful strategy. But when one firm
succeeds, the competition ends. The Japanese strategy seems to have been based
more heavily on strong investment, inching up one's own relative share of the
market through the expansion of production capacity. This occurs particularly
when economies of scale prevail in the market.
The Japanese style of strong competition by means of capacity expansion
has resulted in the high speed of adjustment when sudden change in relative
prices occurs. A vacuum is quickly filled by keen competition, which expands to
the point of excess capacity. We can cite a long list of industries that have
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followed this pattern: steel, chemical fertilizers, petrochemicals, and synthetic
fibers, with semiconductors becoming a newer example.
The role of exports for Japanese economic growth has been a target of dis-
cussion and criticism. It seems an undeniable fact that sometimes excess produc-
tive capacity expansion caused the so-called "export drive". Active investment
among competitive firms is a basic condition for high growth. But this dilemma
of investment is that it creates demand, on one hand, and additional supply
capacity, on the other. Particularly when there are economies of scale, competi-
tive investment creates a larger supply capacity than might otherwise exist.
Under these circumstances, expansion in the world markets rescues the compet-
ing firms from the consequences of overproduction. This explains, at least in
part, why Japanese corporate firms engaged in export markets with so much
aggressiveness.
13.3.1. Fast deployment abroad
The export-orientedness of Japanese corporations should be studied more care-
fully. Certainly, MITI's strong policy encouraged the growth of new export
industries, but more truth seems to lie in the fact that competition among firms
highlighted the ample opportunities for profit in overseas markets.
The characteristics of competition in domestic markets are distinctly
different. While Japanese competitive firms are engaged in full-fledged free com-
petition in the world market, at home they seem to be subject to more coopera-
tive discipline, paying careful attention to domestic "order". In the world
market each competing firm comes much closer to behaving as an atomistic,
free-wheeling entity than in the home market. This would apply to any country,
but in the case of Japan the contrast seems to be remarkable.
13.3.2. Did domestic competition come to an end?
Thanks to the fairly large home market of more than 100 million people, domes-
tic competition under protection against imports did not have to end up with a
situation of monopoly or of a high degree of oligopoly. The government could
have employed trade liberalization policies earlier to maintain market competi-
tion, to the delight of potential foreign competitors. In fact, when the govern-
ment or MITI announced a "deadline" for trade liberalization, Japan's home
manufacturers stepped up their investment programs so as to improve their com-
petitiveness against the potential "invasion forces" from abroad!
However, many observers overestimate MITI's ability to predict the direc-
tion of economic structural change and draw up a new plan for Japanese indus-
tries to adjust to it. Looking back at 30 years of economic development, one can
easily pick up a certain number of counterexamples in which business firms did
not act in accordance with MITI's view and still achieved great success at their
own risk.
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Relative price changes are frequently brought about by technical progress that
occurs in particular industrial sectors. During the 1960s Japan imported various
technologies from overseas that centered around metal, chemical and petrochem-
ical industries. Heavy industrialization was accelerated by building large plants,
which yielded economies of scale. It was apparent that technical progress took
place exogenously in the form of imported or "borrowed" technology.
In the 1970s, the situation changed when the sources of new technologies
had been exhausted and new challenges of environmental control and energy
price shock arose. By that time Japan had accumulated its own expertise and
know-how, and in terms of the balance of technology trade Japan's deficit was
shrinking.
In the latter half of the 19708 there came a wave of revolutionary microelec-
tronics and robotics in which Japan displayed its comparative advantage in
R&D activity. Some of the technical progress at this time might have been the
result of the energy shock and other exogenous factors. The direction of techni-
cal development was toward the so-called "kei shou tan haku" (Japanese words
for "lighter, smaller, shorter and thinner"). The characteristics of the Japanese
attitude toward craftsmanship were most suitable; the manpower policy for sci-
ence and engineering that had started in the 1960s (as in the USA and major
European countries) returned unexpected fruits toward the end of the 1970s.
[See Peck and Tamura (1976)].
As exemplified by the semiconductor industry, Japanese economic growth
and technical progress in the last decade were typically borne by major corpora-
tions in Japan. Electronics giants, such as Hitachi, NEC and Toshiba, have
made and stepped up their investment plans competitively; the computer indus-
try involved a certain number of competing firms of almost similar size and
market share. Robots were developed by hundreds of manufacturing firms from
large shipbuilders to small machine tool makers.
The structural change that took place in this decade was characterized by
the growth of the machinery industry and the decline of primary metal and other
"smokestack" industries. Total manufacturing employment did not show any
sizable increase or decrease, but within industries only the machinery sector
showed increased employment.
The new structure was most dramatically observed in international mar-
kets, where Japan's relative share of machinery exports jumped. This was partly
because the US economy grew fast under the Reagan administration, and
income-elastic imports of home electronics goods and industrial machinery
exploded. On the other hand, the world market for steel had reached a stage of
stagnation: the US domestic steel market was being protected, and newly indus-
trialized countries started to export steel.
All of the industrialized countries increased their exports to the USA.
Their dependency on exports jumped, with the exception of the UK. However,
Japan (and Asian NICs) topped the group because of their faster adjustment -
that is to say, their fast investment in high-technology industries.
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Let me take as an example Japan's investment in robots. Starting from the early
1970s this investment has grown exponentially (see Figure l!LI). A simple log-
linear function is specified with three explanatory variables: (1) total business
fixed investment; (2) relative price of robots over wage earnings, and (3) the
number of different kinds of robots as a measure of the rate of technical progress
in robotics (see Table 19.1). Regression estimates show that investment in
robots is taking place four times faster than general business fixed investment.
The relative price of robots seems to playa significant role, although the elasti-
city is around unity.
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Figure 19.4. Investment in robots.
Table 19.1. Equation of investment in robots (1971-1983).
1980
LOG IFROB080 =
R**2
IFROB080
IP
ROBOECON
NKINDROB
-97.9089 3.99944 -1.11833
(-5.42) + (5.68) LOG IP (-9.07) LOG ROBOECON
+ 0.20402 above (0.84) LOG NKINDROB
(0.84)
0.9939 se = 0.18, DW = 1.510
Purchase of robots as deflated by the price index of playback robot
Total business fixed investment in 1980 prices
Price of playback robot divided by average wage earnings
Number of different kind of industrial robots
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As a matter of fact, various kinds of robots are being introduced for various
purposes. Labor-saving accounts only for a small portion of all changes.
Improving the quality of products by means of consistent, flawless work of robots
seems to be a major reason for introducing them. The number of direct produc-
tion workers who are being replaced by robots is not large. Many robots have to
be "taught"by skilled workers so that they can simulate human work; and while
robots play back the work they are programmed to do, humans work to develop
a more efficient production system or handle peripheral equipment which is
necessary to make robots work more efficiently.
In this way robots are not creating any major danger for employment in
general. To the contrary, an interesting phenomenon is the revival of small firms
which otherwise were dying due to shortage of young workers. (In Japan there is
an element of dual structure in the labor market: young workers have a strong
preference for employment offered by large corporations, which leaves only a
residual class of workers for small companies where the turnover rate is quite
high. However, this problem seems to have been at least partly solved by the
introduction of robots.) MITI set up a financial cooperative, named JAROL,
which aims at supplying low-interest-rate loans to those small firms that intend
to install industrial robots.
In the sphere of export markets, robotics seem to be changing the picture of
the international division of labor. Some of the labor-intensive export industries
of Japan that have suffered from rising wage costs and upward valuation of the
yen are making a revival by installing industrial robots to ease their high pay-
rolls. For example, by using robots, the cutlery and silverware industry is now
specializing in producing low-priced exports that can match keen price competi-
tion from Korea and Taiwan.
13.4.2. The role of government in R&D activity
During the period of importing technology, MITI intervened in the private sector
with respect to royalties or other conditions of contract so that a competitive bid
for buying overseas technology would not end up with an unfavorable outcome
for Japan. At the time of environmental control and the energy shock, MITI
tried to accelerate technological progress through investment tax credits. The
auto industry had to meet low air pollution standards, and competition for
government approval spurred the industry to enter the world market for automo-
biles. Research cooperatives for developing VLSI (very dense types of large·scale
integrated circuits) is a widely publicized case, though one may argue as to how
much it contributed to the development of highly condensed microchips.
It should be emphasized that MIT! could take advantage of the highly com-
petitive situation of Japanese industries. Cooperation and competition do not
seem compatible; however, in the circumstances of oligopolistic competition,
MITI's tactics worked well. But when MITI must deal not only with Japanese
firms but also foreign firms competing in Japan, MITI's hitherto-useful tactics
may not work any more. At the final stage of Japan's internationalization, the
driving forces of economic structural change might assume quite new features.
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Major economic structural changes expected in the near future are not likely to
take place either in robotization or in bio-related industries. R&D will be quite
robust in these developing fields; but from the viewpoint of visible structure,
changes in Japanese agriculture, mining, and some of the domestic service sec-
tors are likely to be major or massive ones. These industrial sectors have been
under heavy pressure as a result of wide price differentials between domestic and
overseas markets. For agricultural products, worldwide excess supply situations
coupled with the rising yen present a huge price gap. The situation is similar for
domestic coal mining.
Structural change will certainly be accompanied by the so-called negative
or backward adjustment policy, which will not enhance Japan's comparative
advantage in the public policy sphere. It will be a time-consuming process, and
the prolonged process of "internal" adjustment will bring about economic fric-
tions between Japan and its trading partners. The period of Japan's swift struc-
tural change on the basis of expanding export industries seems to have come to
an end.
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CHAPTER 14
A Long-Term Simulation of the
French Economy
Jean-Louis Brillet
Summary
A long-term scenario for the French economy is based on the Mini-DMS model,
a reduced version of the Dynamic Multi-Sectoral model used by the of the
National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) for its medium-
term forecasts. This scenario, covering 1987-2000, starts from assumptions
derived by aggregation of recent hypotheses used by DMS for its own forecasts
(for 1986-1991); the consecutive values follow constant trends. Thus, the final
evolution should be regular, as close as possible to a stable growth path. The
most important features and main properties of the Mini-DMS model are
described, as well as the assumptions used in the simulation. The results show
that the French inflation and growth rates, in the medium term, converge to the
foreign rates.
14.1. Introduction
The Mini-DMS model, a smaller version of the Dynamic Multi-Sectoral model
[Fouquet et al. (1978)], has been used for some time as a forecasting tool by
INSEE's medium-term forecasting unit, the Service des Programmes, in quanti-
tative studies made by the French Commissariat General au Plan. This model
has proved to be particularly convenient in the case of long-term forecasts,
because its limited size simplifies the stipulation of assumptions, and its stabiliz-
ing properties produce coherent results over a long period.
336 The Future of the World Economy
The model has recently been reestimated over the period 1961-1985 [see
Brillet (1986)]. The econometric coefficients as well as some equations have been
changed. Moreover, the general outlook on the long-term evolution of some cru-
cial variables, such as the franc/dollar ratio and the price of oil, changed in 1986
by a wide margin. Thus, we first used the modified model to produce a new
simulation; afterward, we checked its quality and used the favorable case as an
actual scenario of the long-term evolution of the French economy.
14.2. The Mini-DMS Model
14.2.1. Goal
As stated before, the Mini-DMS model is a reduced version of the Dynamic
Multi-Sectoral model, built in 1976-1978 at the National Institute for Statistics
and Economic Studies, as a medium term macroeconomic forecasting tool. DMS
is still used today (of course, in a much-improved version) to produce scenarios
of two types: more controlled ones for planning purposes (for the Commissariat
General au Plan)' and more spontaneous ones for an annual publication in asso-
ciation with the Bureau International de Provisions Economiques (BIPE) or for
particular customers (such as the French Senate).
The first version of Mini-DMS was designed in 1978 to study the
mathematical properties of DMS, using a set of mathematical methods, mostly
based on eigenvalue analysis, which were too expensive in terms of computer
time (and also in terms of human time needed to study the results) to be applied
to the full model. [For a description of the original model, see Fouquet et al.
(1978).] Then the range of applications grew steadily: first the model was used
for teaching quantitative macroeconomics, then to explore the implications of
potential changes in the formulations of the larger model.
This increased sophistication (and number of equations) improved the
quantitative properties of the model, until it was considered to be reliable enough
to be used on its own for operational forecasts. Of course, these forecasts do not
have the same detail, both in the assumptions and the results, as DMS or any
other large model; but the costs are also lower, due to the simplified assump-
tions, the shorter time needed to reach a satisfactory solution, and the reason-
able amount of results to study. For instance, a study on social policy might not
need the sectoral decomposition of large models.
14.2.2. Main features
We first give some general information. Mini-DMS is
• Annual.
• Dynamic: many of its formulations involve lagged influences (growth rates,
inertia factors).
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• Medium-long term: medium-term mechanisms are privileged, although
short-term and structural ones are present.
• Medium-sized: it has 190 equations, 65 of which are estimated, and 108
exogenous variables.
• It presents two activity sectors (or products): industrial/nonindustrial
(plus nonmarket).
• Its philosophy is mostly Keynesian, but supply-side influences prove to be
very strong in the medium term; it has almost no financial (or monetary)
sector.
As to particular features, the most important ones are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
The production function uses a Cobb-Douglas Putty-Clay formulation,
defining desired values of employment and investment.
Actual employment and investment adjust partially to these desired values.
Unemployment is estimated by using a constant activity flexion ratio.
The savings ratio is influenced positively by revenue growth, inflation (sav-
ings are considered in real terms), and unemployment (security savings).
The partition of household consumption into products follows a
Houthakker-Taylor formulation.
Imports and exports depend on demand (domestic or foreign), on price
competitiveness, and on the rate of use of productive capacity.
A Phillips-type equation determines the wage rate.
The price of value added is determined by a reduced form equation which
takes into account the unit wage cost, the profit ratio of the previous period
(a low ratio induces firms to recover their margins through a price
increase), and the rate of capacity utilization (if it is low, firms will try to
sell more by decreasing prices).
The exchange rate can be exogenous, or follow the PPP (purchasing power
parity) hypothesis, or be determined by an econometric equation.
Thus two instantaneous loops appear in the model: a Keynesian one allow-
ing the equilibrium between real demand and supply, and a second one relating
wages to prices.
We will not present the quantitative properties of the model in detail. The
most important ones appear in the presentation of the forecast. Suffice it to say
that a dynamic simulation over the estimation period gives good results (at least
comparable with the ones obtained by other similar models), and that the value
of the multipliers (both demand and supply ones) are acceptable from a theoreti-
cal point of view and coherent with the results obtained with models of the same
class (in particular, with DMS).
14.3. The Assumptions
14.3.1. Medium-term
The medium-term assumptions used by the model on the 1986-1991 period are
inspired by the assumptions established for a forecast of the DMS model itself.
338 The Future of the World Economy
This forecast, produced in June 1986 for the French Senate, was designed to give
a general picture of the evolution of the French economy and to point out the
problems which might arise in the future.
14.3.1.1. International environment
The following assumptions are used:
• Price of oil: growth from $18/barrel in 1986 to $22/barrel in 1991.
• GDP of our main partners: growth of 2.7% until 1989, 2.8% thereafter.
• Exchange rate: appreciation of the franc compared to the currency of our
main partners:
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
-1.0 1.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3
• Foreign inflation: for GDP, 2.6% in 1987, 3.2% in 1988, 3.35% thereafter;
for world trade, 1.1% in 1987,2.9% thereafter.
14.3.1.2. Policy assumptions
The main policy assumptions are:
• For investment, prices and wages, the equations of the model are used as
they are estimated. Considering the uncertainty of the political orientation
of France, we suppose that the influence of recent policies (deregulation,
freedom of prices, denationalizations) will not produce behavior different
from that estimated over the sample period.
• The number of hours worked per week does not decrease from the current
level of 38.5 hours.
• In the industrial sector, the productivity of capital decreases gradually, by
about 2% per year. This stems from the hypothesis that investment is
mostly (70%) designed not to increase productive capacity, but to replace
old equipment.
As to actual policy decisions, we assume that:
• The number of civil servants is kept constant over the period (this covers a
decrease in State employees and an increase in local administrations).
• Government investment grows slower (around J% per year on the average)
than consumption (about 2% on the average).
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• The different VAT rates stay constant over the period.
• The income tax rate decreases somewhat, especially at the end of the
period (from 6.1% to 5.9% with respect to the current rate).
• In order to help balance the social security account, the benefits (especially
unemployment ones) will be lowered a bit and the contributions increased.
This is postulated to be realized by a slight decrease of the employer rate
(0.5% on average) and a significant increase of the worker rate (by 3%,
from 19 to 22%).
14.3.2. Long-term
The assumptions used over the 1992-2000 period mostly represent a continua-
tion of the evolution observed at the end of the medium-term period, except
when this evolution was seen as being too strong to be sustained in the long run.
14.3.2.1. International environment
• Price of oil: $22/barrel for the whole period.
• GDP of our main partners: growth of 2.75% per year.
• Exchange rate: depreciation of the franc compared to the currency of our
main partners, of 0.3% per year (this covers a yearly appreciation of the
mark at 1.2% and a depreciation of the dollar at -0.8%).
• Inflation: for GDP, 3.35%; for world trade, 2.95% over the whole period.
14.3.2.2. Policy assumptions
• The number of hours worked per week stays at a level of 38.5 hours.
• In the industrial sector, the productivity of capital keeps decreasing, but at
a lower rate - about 1.2% per year - leading to a 25% decrease between
1986 and 2000.
As to actual policy decisions:
• The number of civil servants is still kept constant over the period.
• Government investment is restored to a 2% growth rate.
• The different VAT rates remain stable.
• The income tax rate decreases somewhat, especially at the end of the
period (from 6.1 % to 5.9% as compared to the actual rate).
• As to social security, the amount covered by contributions keeps decreasing
slightly (by something like 10% over the period), and the worker rate keeps
increasing, while the employer rate is stable.
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14.4. The Simulation
14.4.1. Results
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The results of the simulations are presented in Tables 14.1 to 14.4. They show,
respectively, the evolution of:
(1) Growth rates of main financial indicators: consumption, investment,
imports, exports, GDP (compared with foreign GDP).
(2) Production factors: capital, labor (for each of the two products), tensions
in the labor market and productive capacity.
(3) Prices and wages: different measures of prices (of consumption, produc-
tion, exports, imports, global demand and its foreign equivalent); real and
current wage rates.
(4) Other elements of the accounts of households, firms and government plus
indicators for the rest of the world.
Each of the tables shows first the complete annual evolution over the
1987-2000 period; then a summary presents the average growth rates for
specified su bperiods.
In addition, Figures 14.1 through 14.8 give a visual interpretation of the
most important evolutions.
Table 14.1. Growth rates of selected indicators, 1987-2000.
Indicator 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1999
GDP:
Foreign 2.63 2.73 2.77 2.77 2.74 2.74
Growth differential -0.23 -0.17 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.03
Total 2.40 2.56 2.92 2.85 2.81 2.77
Market 2.49 2.67 3.08 2.99 3.03 2.97
Imports 5.30 5.55 6.02 4.97 5.61 5.74
Household consumption 1.99 2.45 2.98 3.01 2.82 2.80
Investments:
Lodgings 2.42 2.61 1.97 2.14 3.81 1.99
Productive 6.27 6.74 6.70 3.93 4.70 5.35
Industrial 7.83 8.81 9.54 6.25 6.61 7.56
Government 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53
Financial 3.50 3.69 3.83 3.94 4.24 4.40
Total 4.69 5.04 4.93 3.38 4.21 4.24
Exports 4.71 4.94 5.05 5.33 5.63 5.61
Stock variations" 17.07 18.87 18.88 20.82 20.94 22.11 23.35
aIn constant 1970 francs.
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Let us first consider the development of GDP and its components, shown in
Table 14.1 and Figures 14.1 and 14.2. We first observe that the French GDP
develops quite similarly to the foreign one. The difference in the medium term
(after 1990) is almost constant and lower than 0.1% (but always positive). We
must admit that this close relation would not have been obtained in a straight-
forward solution of the equations, and that some corrections had to be made
with respect to the assumptions. But the limited nature of these corrections
(concerning only the purchasing power of the wage rate and the level of produc-
tive investment) shows that the model is stable.
The development of the components of GDP is also rather stable:
(1) Household consumption growth, in the medium term, increases at a con-
stant level of 2.8%, with a slight deceleration toward the end (to 2.55% in
2000). This decrease is partially offset, concerning household expenditures,
by a symmetrical evolution of housing investment.
(2) Productive investment growth, more sensitive to short-term fluctuations,
nonetheless keeps close enough to an average value of 5% per year.
(3) Imports and exports converge in the medium term to an almost identical
evolution, the common deceleration being of course due to the slower
growth of world trade.
Table 14.2 describes the evolution of the production process, by sector. We
observe in particular that industrial value added grows faster, as was indeed the
Table 1./.1. Continued.
199-1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 £000 1987-1990 1990-1995 1995-£000
2.74
0.06
2.80
2.99
5.52
2.84
3.02
4.41
6.37
2.53
4.55
3.91
5.66
24.22
2.74
0.06
2.80
2.99
5.48
2.87
3.11
4.35
6.28
2.53
4.67
3.91
5.59
24.92
2.74
0.08
2.81
3.00
5.51
2.87
3.20
4.61
6.30
2.53
4.79
4.10
5.51
25.59
2.74
0.09
2.83
3.01
5.56
2.82
3.26
5.14
6.64
2.53
4.89
4.45
5.43
26.29
2.74
0.05
2.78
2.96
5.33
2.72
3.30
4.74
5.97
2.53
4.98
4.23
5.41
26.83
2.74
0.04
2.78
2.96
5.42
2.65
3.37
5.38
6.68
2.53
5.06
4.65
5.30
27.42
2.74
0.01
2.74
2.92
5.26
2.55
3.41
5.15
6.35
2.53
5.13
4.53
5.28
28.01
2.68
-0.08
2.60
2.72
5.56
2.45
2.31
6.50
8.63
2.51
3.63
4.83
4.85
2.74
0.06
2.81
3.00
5.47
2.87
2.81
4.55
6.61
2.53
4.36
3.93
5.57
2.74
0.05
2.79
2.97
5.42
2.72
3.31
5.00
6.39
2.53
4.97
4.39
5.39
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Table L{2. Growth rates of productive factors, 1987-2000, by sector.
Factor
Industry
Value added
Production capacity
Rate of use
Capital
Apparent productivity
Hourly labor productivity
Activity
Work duration
Employment
In millions
Nonindustrial
Value added
Production capacity
Rate of use
Capital
Apparent productivity
Hourly labor productivity
Activity
Work duration
Employment
In millions
Total
Value added
Production capacity
Rate of use
Capital
Apparent productivity
Hourly labor productivity
Activity
Work duration
Employment
In millions
Tensions
Total employment
Offers of jobs
Unemployment in millions
Unemployment rate
1987
82.410
4.01
82.411
13.17
82.411
17.18
80.0
2.673
11.23
1988
2.84
2.48
82.584
4.82
-1.88
4.93
-1.99
-0.00
-1.99
3.93
2.35
2.19
82.584
2.06
0.28
2.57
-0.22
-0.01
-0.21
13.15
2.49
2.29
82.584
2.94
-0.43
3.14
-0.63
-0.00
-0.62
17.07
0.508
80.0
2.853
11.95
1989
2.88
2.63
82.905
5.12
-2.13
4.81
-1.84
-0.00
-1.84
3.85
2.53
1.95
82.887
2.06
0.47
2.80
-0.26
-0.01
-0.26
13.11
2.63
2.18
82.893
3.04
-0.40
3.28
-0.62
-0.00
-0.62
16.97
0.505
80.7
3.033
12.67
1990
3.22
2.95
83.384
5.22
-1.90
4.92
-1.62
-0.00
-1.62
3.79
2.94
2.50
83.712
2.07
0.85
2.99
-0.05
-0.01
-0.04
13.11
3.02
2.65
83.600
3.11
-0.09
3.44
-0.41
-0.01
-0.40
16.90
0.327
81.9
3.210
13.35
1991
2.96
4.03
83.395
5.54
-2.44
4.73
-1.69
-0.00
-1.69
3.73
2.95
2.09
84.132
2.15
0.78
2.98
-0.03
-0.01
-0.02
13.10
2.95
2.75
83.879
3.29
-0.33
3.37
-0.40
-0.01
-0.40
16.83
0.321
78.6
3.386
14.02
1992
3.35
4.05
82.846
5.60
-2.13
5.43
-1.98
-0.00
-1.98
3.65
2.88
2.26
84.852
2.08
0.79
2.66
0.21
-0.00
0.21
13.13
3.01
2.88
84.154
3.28
-0.26
3.29
-0.27
0.00
-0.27
16.79
0.219
68.5
3.537
14.58
1999
3.48
4.08
82.395
5.68
-2.03
5.51
-1.92
-0.00
-1.92
3.58
2.76
2.31
85.321
2.08
0.67
2.52
0.23
0.00
0.23
13.16
2.96
2.93
84.292
3.34
-0.36
3.20
-0.23
0.00
-0.23
16.75
0.190
60.3
3.680
15.10
case in past years. But the main difference concerns the evolution of factors: III
industry, a sustained investment level, combined with a constant decrease of
employment, leads to a fast growth of the share of capital. The productive capa-
city increases a little faster than production. Thus, we reach rather low values of
the utilization rate of capacity in the later periods. For the nonindustrial sector,
the opposite is true. With a continuous growth of the two factors (a rather
slower one for employment), the resulting productive capacity increases now
more slowly than production, in spite of a higher level (0.7%) of the autonomous
technical progress.
Jean-Low Brilld 345
Table 1./.2. Continued.
199-1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1987-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
3.50 3.49 3.50 3.51 3.46 3.46 3.44 2.95 3.36 3.47
4.01 3.97 3.91 3.87 3.79 3.76 3.71 2.66 4.03 3.81
81.932 81.525 81.154 80.842 80.525 80.269 80.017
5.85 5.89 5.93 5.96 6.02 6.02 6.07 5.00 5.71 6.00
-2.22 -2.27 -2.29 -2.31 -2.41 -2.41 -2.49 -1.95 -2.23 -2.38
5.41 5.21 5.03 4.84 4.63 4.45 4.28 4.84 5.26 4.64
-1.81 -1.63 -1.46 -1.27 -1.12 -0.95 -0.80 -1.80 -1.81 -1.12
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
-1.81 -1.63 -1.46 -1.27 -1.12 -0.95 -0.80 -1.80 -1.81 -1.12
3.52 3.46 3.41 3.37 3.33 3.30 3.27
2.78 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.74 2.72 2.67 2.58 2.83 2.74
2.26 2.26 2.30 2.38 2.40 2.46 2.48 2.19 2.24 2.40
85.768 86.253 86.743 87.202 87.555 87.869 88.085
2.11 2.08 2.04 2.04 2.09 2.12 2.20 2.04 2.10 2.10
0.66 0.68 0.72 0.73 0.63 0.58 0.47 0.52 0.72 0.63
2.54 2.51 2.49 2.47 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.76 2.64 2.46
0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.22 -0.18 0.18 0.27
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00
0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.22 -0.17 0.18 0.27
13.19 13.23 13.26 13.31 13.34 13.38 13.41
2.98 2.98 2.99 2.99 2.95 2.94 2.90 2.68 2.98 2.95
2.88 2.87 2.88 2.92 2.91 2.94 2.94 2.35 2.86 2.92
84.404 84.554 84.714 84.872 84.957 85.038 85.058
3.45 3.48 3.50 3.55 3.64 3.69 3.79 3.00 3.37 3.63
-0.45 -0.48 -0.50 -0.53 -0.66 -0.73 -0.86 -0.31 -0.38 -0.66
3.19 3.12 3.06 3.01 2.95 2.91 2.88 3.25 3.23 2.96
-0.20 -0.14 -0.07 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.55 -0.25 -0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.20 -0.14 -0.08 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.54 -0.25 -0.01
16.71 16.69 16.68 16.67 16.67 16.68 16.68
0.164 0.113 0.062 0.015 0.002 0.017 0.015 0.442 0.201 0.009
52.0 44.7 38.0 32.4 26.8 22.2 17.8
3.817 3.946 4.028 4.103 4.174 4.241 4.306
15.60 16.05 16.34 16.60 16.84 17.06 17.27
Aggregating the two sectors, we get a small rise in the utilization rate of
capacity (see Figure 14.9), and a constant decrease of employment (see Figure
14.4) which leads in the long term to a quasi-stabilized loss of 500,000 jobs
(-740,000 in industry, +240,000 in the complement). Simultaneously, unemploy-
ment rises by 1,600,000 persons. This must be seen against the background of a
growth of active population (which decelerates late in the period). It is due to
the fact that the loss of a job in the industrial sector is not compensated by an
equal increase in the nonindustrial sector, where a new job can not easily be
occupied by a previously unemployed (sometimes unqualified) person.
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Tobie 14.9. Growth rates of prices and wages, 1987-2000.
Indicator 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199£ 1999
Price index
Offoreign GDP 3.18 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.36 3.36
OfGDP 3.46 3.84 3.31 3.27 3.38 3.34
Differential 0.28 0.49 -0.04 -0.08 0.03 -0.01
Of value added 3.43 3.68 3.20 3.15 3.24 3.20
Of production 3.18 3.54 3.19 3.16 3.29 3.25
Of global use (excluding VAT) 3.09 3.45 3.09 3.08 3.32 3.27
Of consumption 3.30 3.57 3.22 3.21 3.17 3.15
Of exports 2.77 3.29 3.04 2.94 2.91 2.82
Of imports 1.99 2.71 2.56 2.53 2.85 2.77
Domestic price 2.94 3.48 3.21 3.17 3.03 2.89
Foreign price 2.88 2.96 2.93 2.90 2.95 2.95
Price differential 0.06 0.51 0.27 0.26 0.08 -0.06
Exchange rate 0.12 0.67 0.46 0.29 0.00 0.00
Wages
Nominal hourly rate 5.35 6.64 6.01 6.02 6.16 6.27
Real hourly rate 1.99 2.97 2.71 2.72 2.90 3.03
Nominal individual wages 5.35 6.64 6.00 6.01 6.16 6.27
Real individual wages 1.99 2.96 2.70 2.72 2.90 3.03
Total wages 4.93 6.20 5.77 5.79 5.94 6.09
Nominal available income 5.72 6.51 6.75 6.23 6.00 6.03
Real available income 2.34 2.84 3.43 2.93 2.75 2.79
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Figure 14.5. Prices and wages.
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Table 14.9. Continued.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 £000 1987-1990 1990-1995 1995-£000
3.36 3.36 3.35 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.26 3.36 3.36
3.50 3.29 3.36 3.36 3.35 3.39 3.38 3.50 3.32 3.37
-0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.03
3.15 3.15 3.23 3.25 3.25 3.32 3.35 3.40 3.18 3.28
3.22 3.22 3.29 3.30 3.32 3.37 3.38 3.27 3.23 3.33
3.24 3.25 3.31 3.30 3.31 3.34 3.34 3.18 3.23 3.32
3.12 3.12 3.19 3.20 3.22 3.27 3.29 3.33 3.15 3.23
2.76 2.75 2.78 2.79 2.79 2.83 2.84 3.00 2.83 2.81
2.78 2.78 2.79 2.78 2.81 2.80 2.82 2.39 2.74 2.80
2.81 2.79 2.84 2.84 2.85 2.90 2.91 3.18 2.94 2.87
2.95 2.95 2.95 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.89 2.94 2.96
-0.14 -0.16 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.05 -0.05 0.28 -0.00 -0.09
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.06 0.00
6.35 6.36 6.45 6.38 6.28 6.27 6.15 5.94 6.23 6.30
3.13 3.15 3.16 3.08 2.97 2.90 2.77 2.53 2.98 2.98
6.35 6.37 6.45 6.39 6.29 6.27 6.15 5.94 6.23 6.31
3.14 3.15 3.16 3.09 2.97 2.90 2.77 2.53 2.99 2.98
6.19 6.27 6.41 6.40 6.32 6.32 6.20 5.57 6.05 6.33
6.07 6.08 6.15 6.11 6.02 6.02 5.91 6.26 6.08 6.04
2.87 2.87 2.87 2.82 2.71 2.66 2.54 2.84 2.84 2.72
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Figure 14.6. Real wage rate and labor productivity.
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Table 14.4. Growth indicators for households, firms, and governments, 1987-2000.
Indicator 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1999
Households
Social security payments 8.19 8.87 8.27 8.06 8.30 8.40
Benefits 6.41 7.31 6.65 6.64 6.67 6.70
Savings ratio (in points) 14.84 15.23 15.66 16.03 16.02 16.05 16.05
Financing capacity 136.2 150.2 168.3 195.8 202.7 204.9 216.3
in points of GDP 2.62 2.73 2.87 3.14 3.06 2.91 2.89
Firms
Total wages 4.94 6.20 5.84 5.87 6.17 6.33
Social security payments 5.62 6.62 5.48 4.59 6.12 6.26
Autofinancing 6.16 8.55 8.89 9.33 7.35 6.61
Profits ratio (in points) 7.39 7.43 7.60 7.86 8.16 8.22 8.24
Industrial profits ratio 4.93 5.11 5.40 5.87 6.22 6.36 6.43
Financing capacity -48.54 -66.53 -71.45 -76.24 -50.38 -56.35 -73.64
in points of GDP -0.93 -1.21 -1.22 -1.22 -0.76 -0.80 -0.98
Government
VAT earnings 5.57 6.35 6.34 6.05 6.83 6.73
Other indirect taxes 6.08 6.64 6.62 6.57 6.40 6.35
Income tax 4.84 9.61 3.97 2.83 5.20 5.02
Tax on firm profits 17.46 0.92 8.16 9.12 9.45 6.98
Wages paid 5.01 6.31 5.68 5.69 5.43 5.54
Consumption 5.07 5.56 5.37 5.35 5.59 5.55
Investment 6.29 6.81 5.73 5.74 6.18 6.20
Interest paid (in billions) -104.2 -110.3 -117.9 -158.4 -166.8 -174.8 -182.4
Balance (in billions) -113.8 -101.5 -102.8 -134.9 -147.7 -139.9 -134.2
Balance in points of GDP -2.19 -1.84 -1.75 -2.16 -2.23 -1.99 -1.80
Earnings as part of GDP 44.84 45.14 45.32 45.30 45.14 45.36 45.57
Rest of the world
Interest balance (in billions) -17.8 -19.6 -20.7 -21.4 -22.3 -23.2 -23.8
Real export/import ratio 91.86 91.34 90.82 89.99 90.30 90.32 90.21
Terms of trade 0.77 0.57 0.46 0.39 0.05 0.05
Commercial balance (in billions) 31.7 36.6 39.6 36.5 50.9 56.5 60.0
National financing capacity 14.9 19.8 23.2 21.7 37.3 44.3 49.8
in points of GDP 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.35 0.56 0.63 0.67
The unemployment rate in the year 2000 reaches a level of more than 17%,
which, although it is technically feasible, could prove to be unacceptable from a
social point of view. It might call for a previously unobserved structural change
in the behavior of the labor market, favoring, for instance, part-time work or
work in teams (this would mean in fact an acceleration of an observed trend).
Indeed, the assumption of a constant weekly work time, though it is confirmed
by recent data and in accordance with medium-term anticipations, could hardly
be sustained in the context of this long-term study.
Jean-LotW Brillet 349
Table 1./.-1. Continued.
199-1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1987-19901990-19951995-2000
8.46 8.49 8.59 8.54 8.41 8.37 8.21 8.35 8.34 8.42
6.72 6.66 6.62 6.51 6.37 6.32 6.17 6.72 6.68 6.40
16.11 16.16 16.21 16.26 16.30 16.37 16.43
225.8 234.5 242.6 250.3 256.1 263.1 267.2
2.84 2.78 2.71 2.63 2.53 2.45 2.34
6.45 6.55 6.71 6.72 6.64 6.64 6.51 5.60 6.27 6.64
6.37 6.44 6.57 6.56 6.47 6.47 6.34 5.84 5.95 6.68
5.95 5.39 4.94 4.69 4.53 4.39 4.27 7.78 6.92 4.56
8.20 8.12 8.00 7.86 7.70 7.54 7.36
6.42 6.34 6.23 6.08 5.92 5.75 5.57
-88.96 -110.00 -141.09 -184.43 -229.36 -289.86 -355.70
-1.12 -1.30 -1.57 -1.94 -2.27 -2.70 -3.12
6.80 6.85 6.96 6.99 6.91 6.97 6.91 6.02 6.65 6.95
6.35 6.36 6.45 6.48 6.44 6.49 6.46 6.38 6.40 6.47
5.02 5.05 5.05 5.11 5.06 4.97 4.96 6.05 4.62 5.03
6.09 5.69 5.41 5.27 4.91 4.81 4.90 8.55 7.46 5.06
5.62 5.63 5.71 5.64 5.54 5.52 5.40 5.61 5.58 5.56
5.53 5.53 5.59 5.59 5.61 5.65 5.66 5.28 5.51 5.62
6.18 6.19 6.26 6.25 6.26 6.29 6.29 6.21 6.10 6.27
-189.5 -195.9 -201.3 -205.0 -206.8 -206.0 -202.2
-126.4 -113.8 -94.1 -66.3 32.0 10.9 63.8
-1.59 -1.35 -1.05 -0.70 -0.32 0.10 0.56
45.78 46.02 46.25 46.49 46.71 46.91 47.11
-24.1 -24.0 -23.4 -22.3 -20.4 -17.8 -14.4
90.33 90.42 90.42 90.31 90.38 90.28 90.30
-0.02 -0.03 -om 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.59 0.09 0.00
67.4 74.7 80.7 84.5 93.1 98.5 107.7
59.6 70.2 80.2 89.0 103.7 116.2 134.0
0.75 0.83 0.90 0.93 1.02 1.08 1.17
Considering prices (Table 1-1.9, Figures 14.5 and 14.6), we observe a very
stable evolution of each individual index, including the price of French GDP,
which grows at the same rate as its foreign counterpart. As to the wage rate, the
similarity of its development in real terms with that of labor productivity is
another factor of stability in the present situation.
Table 14.4 completes the study by showing, as expected, that social benefits
grow at a significantly lower rate than the contributions of workers (by some-
thing like 2% per year). If we go into the details of the government account, we
see that while the global expenditures grow at about 6%, almost the same as
GDP, indirect taxes (VAT and others) get in the long term more and more
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weight, particularly compared with the income tax. But as VAT is mostly paid
by households, the substitution between the two kinds of taxes should not much
affect purchasing power.
Figure 14.7 suggests that profits and savings ratios remain virtually on the
same level over the forecasting period.
Finally, the balances (Figure 14.8) show a constant improvement over the
period. The current account balance is always positive. In the long term it
reaches a value of over 1% of GDP (the trade balance shows the same develop-
ment). The government balance improves even more, from an initial deficit of
more than two points to a small positive value in the last periods. This evolu-
tion, while actually representing instability of an important ratio, is consistent
with the goals set by government itself. If the results of this forecast can be con-
sidered reliable, they mean that government budget equilibrium can be reached
in the long term without forcing the French economy to suffer a lower growth
rate than its foreign trading partners.
14.5. Conclusion
With this chapter, we hoped to achieve two goals: (1) present a coherent fore-
cast, conditional on rather moderate external assumptions, of the structural evo-
lution of French economy; and (2) prove that the Mini-DMS model is reliable
enough to be used in long-term studies, in spite of its reduced size and the fact
that it was not built for that purpose.
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CHAPTER 15
Implications of a Modernization
Strategy for the United Kingdom
Michael Landesmann and A ndrew Snell
Summary
The economic consequences of modernizing the UK's tradeables sector are
analyzed by computer simulations using Cambridge University's Multisectoral
Dynamic Model. These simulations assume that a combination of economy-wide
and industry-specific policy measures gradually improve the competitiveness and
quality of British goods and that productivity growth is brought into line with
that of the major West European competitors such that the UK's share of total
OECD exports no longer declines. Attention is focused on whether expansionary
fiscal policies can reduce the level of unemployment while, for a number of rea-
sons, the pressures on the balance of payments get released only very slowly.
Success in reducing unemployment levels then crucially hinges upon whether the
benefits from increased productivity growth can be diverted from real earnings
increases toward job creation (almost entirely in the services sector). A detailed
breakdown of employment generation possibilities in the non-manufacturing sec-
tor is presented and analyzed as to the policy measures required to sustain pro-
ductivity growth.
15.1. Introduction
The secular decline of the British economy and in particular of its manufacturing
sector in relation to its main industrial competitors is now well documented.
Since World War II the economy has been characterized by relatively low pro-
ductivity and output growth. Between 1979 and 1982 this gradual decline
turned into a nosedive, as manufacturing output fell by nearly 20% relative to its
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1979 peak to stand at its lowest level for 15 years. The gravity of the situation
was exposed further when in 1983, for the first time in its history, the UK
suffered a trade deficit in manufactured goods.
There is much debate as to the exact cause of this economic crash.
Treasury officials view it as an inevitable consequence of oil exports displacing
manufactured goods on the current account while others disagree, pointing to
high interest rates and an overvalued currency as the prime culprits. However,
on the causes of the secular decline there is more of a consensus. Levels of labor
productivity substantially lower than those of our competitors and a steady rela-
tive deterioration of the non-price competitiveness of British goods have been
identified in many studies [see, for example, Blackaby (1979), and the House of
Lords Select Committee on Overseas Trade (1985)] as the key causes of a
steadily worsening (non-oil) visible trade balance and low GDP growth.
In this chapter we examine the economic consequences of a modernization
strategy. It is envisaged that a combination of macro (economy-wide) and micro
(industry-specific) policy measures initiated by a government strongly committed
to an active industrial policy in 1988 gradually improves the competitiveness and
quality of British goods until, by the mid-1990s, the rate of productivity growth
is brought into line with that of the major Western European countries, and that
the share of UK exports in the OECD total no longer declines as these markets
grow.
Such a strategy is envisaged as taking place after the events of 1979 to
1981, when the sharp drop in manufacturing output and employment levels (and
an even sharper drop in investment activity) was followed by a period of unusual
productivity growth over the years 1982 to 1986. These developments are dis-
cussed in some detail in Appendix 15A [see also the discussion in Muellbauer
(1986)], and their interpretation is of great relevance for an evaluation of
whether a catching-up process of the UK tradeables sector with its competitors
can be or already has been set into motion.
It must be stressed, however, that the presentation of a detailed package of
policy measures together with an econometric assessment of their effects is not
attempted here. [For an attempt to do this, see, e.g., Landesmann and Pierse
(1986).] Evidence from past experience in this respect is likely to be scant and,
even if it is available, may lead to ambiguous conclusions. We consider a
number of interventionist scenarios that envisage substantial increases in the
growth of government spending both as an important component of an industrial
policy package (infrastructural investment, other investment, training and R&D
support) as well as initiating a fiscal expansion of the economy as a whole.
The scenarios are simulated using the Cambridge Growth Project's Mul-
tisectoral Dynamic Model [MDM; see Barker and Peterson (1987) for a full
description of the version used in this chapter]. The model is solved from 1986
to the year 2000 and the results are compared to a base run which closely
corresponds to Cambridge Econometrics' 1986 forecast.
Broadly speaking, the scenarios have been designed to address the following
question: If a modernization strategy were to be "successful" in the manner
described in the preceding paragraphs, how much scope would a government
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then have for reducing unemployment and to what extent would their actions in
this direction be constrained by the level of wage settlements?
Section 15.2 presents the details of the strategy and introduces the
scenarios and their assumptions. In Section 15.3 the latter are examined in more
detail, and then an overview of the results for the interventionist scenarios is
provided. The focus here is primarily on the macro variables and in particular
the relationships between unemployment, the balance of payments, the PSBR
and inflation.
Section 15.4 presents details of a market-oriented strategy and its associ-
ated scenario, the "Lawson Scenario". Here the benefit of the doubt is given to
the current government's claim that in the correct environment (one of weakened
trade unions, deregulated markets, etc.) industry will modernize itself and
market forces will drive the economy back to competitiveness. Section 15.5 deals
with compositional aspects of the results and compares the interventionist
scenarios with those of the market-orientated strategy. There are two subsec-
tions. The first analyzes the components of expenditure, helping to throw light
on the dynamics behind the macroeconomic results of the previous two sections.
The second provides details of structural change over the period to 2000. The
focus here is on the relative growth of the manufacturing and service sectors, an
issue which is currently the center of much debate. [See, e.g., Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin (1986).J
Section 15.6 asseses the degree to which the halving of the price of crude oil
at the start of 1986 affects the results. Finally, Section 15.7 provides a summary
and conclusion.
15.2. Details of a Modernization Strategy
The underlying assumption of the modernization strategy (MS) simulations is
that the average productivity growth (PG) rate for manufacturing industry is
about 1% to 1.2% p.a. higher than its historical trend, bringing it into line with
the average Western European performance. The results of these simulations
will be compared with a scenario which does not envisage a reversal in the trend
decline in the competitive position of the British economy. This is the position
taken in the Cambridge Econometrics Forecast of the British economy, which is
very similar to our base run. [See Cambridge Econometrics (1986) for a full dis-
cussion of this scenario. See Appendix 15A for productivity growth comparisons
with a number of OECD countries.]
The following questions must be posed when MS is envisaged:
(1) How could it be achieved?
(2) What other effects would accompany it?
(3) What is the likely course of developments in the rest of the world and how
sensitive are the results to this?
We answer these separately in the following subsections.
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15.2.1. The road to modernization
An interventionist strategy
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For this strategy major industrial policy programs would be introduced by an
interventionist government by the year 1988. These would include massive pub-
lic investment to overhaul the infrastructure (roads, rail, inner city facilities,
etc.), important initiatives in the area of training and retraining, an extension
and streamlining of public support for research and development (R&D) facili-
ties, various investment support schemes, incentives to introduce new technolcr
gies, measures to support export activity (in the area of product development
and marketing), etc.
A market-orientated strategy
Here we allowed for a longer-term effect of the present government's market-
orientated strategy upon sustained higher productivity growth. Relatively high
productivity growth rates have been achieved since 1981, but there is consider-
able controversy as to whether or not these rates are the short-run responses to
once-for-all scrapping and reorganization processes which took place in the
extremely deep recession of 1979 to 1981. This controversy is expanded in some
detail in Appendix 15A; see also the recent discussion in Muellbauer (1986). In
this scenario we give the benefit of the doubt to such a strategy and assume that
sustained improvements in the competitive performance of the market sector can
be achieved through continued industrial relations legislation leading to a further
weakening of the trade union bargaining position in plants and industries and a
change in the tactics of a number of trade unions along the lines of the engineer-
ing unions; through the incentive effects of reduced taxation and deregulation;
and through the continued shrinking of public sector services and the privatiza-
tion of publicly owned enterprises. The reason for exploring this scenario is to
analyze the implications for employment, income distribution and industrial
structure of this type of strategy in the longer run.
15.2.2. The consequences of modernization for wage behavior
and export performance
When considering a fundamental shift in the productivity performance of the UK
tradeable sectors two issues arise: one is the impact upon wages, and the other
concerns an accompanying change in the non-price attributes of British goods.
The effect on wages
Wage behavior in MDM is built around what is known as "real wage resistance"
behavior [see Lawson (1987)]. The idea behind this hypothesis is that underlying
wage bargaining there is an inherent expectation of rising living standards of
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around 2% p.a.; this trend has been shown to be persistent in the UK for almost
a century [see Tarling and Wilkinson (1982)]. Real (post-tax) wage demands
deviate from this trend only as a result of sharp changes in the rate of unemploy-
ment, and - as long as these are successful - as a result of incomes policies.
However, in both these cases reductions below the trend can be shown histori-
cally to be temporary, leading to pent-up wage demands which exert renewed
pressure as soon as the level of unemployment stabilizes and the incomes policy
is either lifted or breaks down. A productivity performance of the UK economy
below or near the 2% mark leads to distributional conflicts and can be used to
explain the underlying inflationary processes in the UK in the past.
There are broadly two reasons to assume that a change in the long-term
productivity performance would also affect the trend demand for real wage
growth. First, the modernization processes themselves (the introduction of new
techniques, new work practices, etc.) and also the accompanying job losses will
only get the tacit support or agreement of the remaining or new work forces if
they are accompanied by prospects for higher real wage growth. Furthermore, if
productivity growth outstrips real wage growth for some time, this will show up
in higher profitability, which would provide a strong incentive for unions in the
affected industries to claim a share in these improvements.
Second, if one were to compare the trend growth rates of real wages in
advanced economies, one would find that they are linked to their respective pro-
ductivity growth performance. [See, e.g., Kendrick (1984, pp. 177, 181) where
the inflationary implications are also pointed out in situations in which the trend
growth rates in productivity and real earnings diverge, as in the UK after 1973.]
Thus, if the UK economy moves toward a productivity growth path more in line
with its Western European competitors, it is quite likely that real wage growth
will adjust similarly. As we shall see, the relationship between additional real
wage growth and improved productivity growth (PG) is a crucial one for the
different MS scenarios.
The effect on non-price competitiveness
The increase in the rate of PG will affect wage demands (in the manner dis-
cussed above) and prices and the exchange rate (through the responses of the
model). These in turn will determine the price competitiveness of the different
UK industries in domestic and world markets. However, studies of the reasons
for the deteriorating UK trade performance in the past have pointed out the
importance of non-price factors [see, e.g., NEDO (1977)].
In MDM the effects of these non-price factors show up in the estimated
export equations in the form of low elasticities of UK exports with respect to
world demand growth. In our MS simulations we have taken account of an
accompanying improvement in non-price competitiveness by a gradual adjust-
ment of the demand elasticities in the export equations, so that by 1997 these
elasticities are broadly in line with those of our European competitors. By 1997,
then, the share of UK exports in OECD trade is assumed to have stopped its his-
torical trend decline, and to be in a transition phase where there is some scope
for regaining lost shares. (See Appendix 15B for a discussion as to whether there
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are grounds to believe that such improvements in export performance have
already occurred since 1982.)
Studies have shown that UK income elasticities of demand for imports
(except for particular branches of industry) are on average not particularly high
in relation to our main competitors. Also, a modernization process might entail
a widening of UK consumers' purchasing patterns, which would make a fall in
demand elasticities for imports unrealistic. Hence, no adjustments have been
made with respect to the estimated set of import equations.
15.2.3. Developments in the rest of the world
Any forecasts of developments in the world economy at the present time, and in
particular long-run forecasts, have to be approached with great caution. The
world economy is presently experiencing dramatic changes in the level, structure
and technological character of industrial production across the globe; the role of
the public sector is being fundamentally reviewed in many countries; and there is
little unanimity in the economics profession about the basis for fiscal and mone-
tary policy. Trade policy scenarios and, of course, developments in international
financial relationships, are far from certain and seem to exhibit features of
increasing instability. These developments greatly complicate the design of pol-
icy simulation exercises for national economies.
In simulation exercises using MDM the views about developments in the
world economy enter fundamentally in three ways: first, through the forecasts of
world demand (composed of demand in the major export markets of the UK
economy) and of world inflation; second, through exchange rate movements, rela-
tive financial policies (in particular, interest rate policies) and international capi-
tal flows insofar as they are relevant for the financial position of the UK econ-
omy; and third, through movements in the oil price, with its implications for
North Sea oil production and the UK balance of payments.
In our MS scenarios we made use of international forecasts concerning
development in world activity (see, e.g., DEeD's Economic Outlook), and we
show in Section 15.6 the sensitivity of our results with respect to an upward revi-
sion of world activity forecasts following the lower oil price scenario. We also
made sure that implicit consideration is given to the fact that developments since
the mid-1970s have also had strong effects upon industrial restructuring and
upon inflationary tendencies in competitor countries, and it is the relative speed
and strength of modernization processes which matter in evaluating its effects
upon the UK's competitive stance. Implicit in our simulations, therefore, is a
particular view about productivity growth rates and wage inflation in competitor
countries.
The analysis of exchange rate movements in the present international
environment is extremely difficult. MDM uses an exchange rate equation which
determines the value of sterling relative to a trade-weighted basket of other
currencies as a function of the balance of trade, the difference between US and
UK interest rates, inflation rates in the UK and those in its export markets and
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the value of UK oil reserves. For details on the exchange rate equation used in
MDM, see Snell (1987).
Interest rates in this model are seen as a tool of financial policy to relieve
some part of the pressure on sterling when it is subject to strong upward or
downward pressures due to a deterioration or improvement in the UK's balance-
of-payments (BOP) position. These movements are a direct consequence of per-
sistent borrowing to finance BOP deficits (and the reverse in the case of sus-
tained BOP surpluses).
15.3. Results for the Modernization Strategies
15.3.1. The different scenarios
Table 15.1 summarizes the different assumptions which underlie the different MS
scenarios.
The modernization scenarios A to E can thus be grouped in the following
way:
Figure 15.1 gives an idea of how the productivity performance over the
simulation period differs in the MS scenarios A and C from that in base run F
and how they compare with previous historical periods.
It should be noted, with reference to Figure 15.1, that adjustments to trend
productivity growth rates in MDM only partially determine actual productivity
growth rates. They are also influenced by changes in the rates of growth of pro-
duction levels and (in some cases) by the amount of investment undertaken in
the different industries. The outcome for actual productivity growth rates will
thus differ in scenarios A to E owing to different assumptions about real earnings
growth and government expenditure.
Against the background of the adjustments in the different scenarios of real
earnings targets, we analyzed the scope for fiscal expansion to relieve the severe
unemployment problem in the UK. The mix of real earnings growth and fiscal
expansion in scenarios A to E explores the range of possible outcomes which
could be derived from an improved competitive performance of the UK economy
in the long run.
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Table 15.1. Assumptions in modernization strategy (MS) scenarios.
Model adjustmentsa
Productivity Real F" 1 . b1sca expanS10n
and export earnings
Scenario competitiveness growth 1988-1992 1999-1996 1997-2000
A + 1-1.5% increase +5 +1.5 +1.5
B in trend produc- 0.5
tivity growthC +3 +3.0 +1.5
C plus adjustments +0 +5 3.0 +1.5
of demand elasti-
D cities of export +5 +1.5 +1.5
equations (see 1.0
E section 15.2.2) +3 +1.5 +1.5
B . dF 0 ase run assumptIOns
aExpressed in percentage differences from base run F.
b Annual percentage growth rates in real government current and capital expenditures.
cThe adjustments in productivity trends are differentiated by manufacturing and non-
dmanufacturing sectors. For details, see Section 15.5.
For details, see Cambridge Econometrics (1986)
%
8
6
4
2
0
1970
-2
-4
1980
~
1990 2000
Figure 15.1. Productivity growth: output per person employed in UK manufacturing -
past experience and projections for base run F and "modernization strategy" runs A and
C.
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Table 15.£. Unemployment and the balance of payments constraint.
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Scenario result 1988 199£ 1997 £000
Unemployment (in thousands)
A 3,390 2,667 2,430 2,203
B 3,484 3,384 3,069 2,890
C 3,357 2,568 1,717 1,272
D 3,421 2,762 2,461 a
E 3,516 3,473 3,628 a
F 3,283 3,383 3,857 3,852
BOP/GDP (in %)
A -0.55 -2.06 -2.33 -2.69
B -0.35 -1.29 -2.51 -2.53
C -0.41 -1.77 -2.48 -2.36
D -0.69 -2.29 -3.04 a
E -0.49 -1.58 -2.55 a
F +0.39 -0.94 -2.55 -2.38
GDP average annual growth rate 1987-9£ 199£-97 1987-97
A 2.90 2.99 2.90
B 2.23 3.02 2.62
C 2.78 3.15 2.97
D 3.02 3.29 3.16
E 2.35 2.82 2.59
F 1.07 1.36 1.21
aThe values for scenarios D and E over the last period have been omitted because of the unsus-
tainability of the developments associated with these runs (see discussion in text).
15.3.2. Fiscal expansion and the unemployment problem
Table 15.2 presents some of the macroeconomic results of scenarios A to F. The
basic dilemma that will confront the UK economy over the period 1988-1997
clearly emerges from this table.
It turns out that a major fiscal expansion set against the background of real
wage rate targets being revised in the light of the improved productivity perfor-
mance (by 0.5% p.a. in simulation A and 1% p.a. in simulation D) will be un-
sustainable. Over the period 1988-1992 the balance of payments deteriorates to
such an extent (accentuated by the fact that over this period the UK will become
a net importer of oil again) that a drastic cutback in the government's expendi-
ture program would have to occur. Even then, the BOP continues to worsen,
with the deficit/GDP ratio rising even after 1997. Certainly in scenario D this
would lead to another crisis point before the year 2000.
On the other hand, if a more cautious stance is taken with respect to
government expenditure in the early period against the background of increased
target rates of real earnings, as in simulations Band E, unemployment remains
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above the 3 million mark by 1998 in scenario B and actually worsens in scenario
E. Only in scenario C, in which the target rate of real wage growth remains on
its historical trend path in spite of the increase in the trend growth rate of pro-
ductivity, is there enough leeway for the government to mount a major attack on
the problem. In this scenario unemployment drops to 1.3 m by the year 2000
and the BOP/GDP ratio begins to fall toward the end of the simulation period.
15.3.3. The balance-of-payments constraint
In Table 15.9 we present the average annual rates of change of exports and
imports (both at constant prices), and changes in terms of trade over the periods
1987-92, 1993-97, and 1997-2000. We can see that, with regard to the longer-
term improvement in the UK's trading performance, there is indeed evidence
that the catching-up processes introduced into our modernization strategy
scenarios A to E yield the desired effects. From about 1993 onward, growth
rates of exports in real terms generally outstrip growth rates in imports.
However, these trends are not always dominant as far as the development
of the balance of payments is concerned. As a result of strong devaluations of
sterling after 1988/89, the negative terms-of-trade effect outstrips the positive
real movements of exports and imports for a number of years. This "J-curve"
effect, which describes an initial deterioration in the balance-of-payments posi-
tion following a devaluation, should be followed by an (overall) positive effect on
the BOP, as exports respond favorably to the devaluation.
On the other hand, our simulations, which start in the late 1980s with a
rapidly deteroriating BOP situation, show a continuing pressure toward further
devaluations, so that the negative initial effects of a sequence of devaluations get
superimposed upon each other. The situation worsens further as the interna-
tional borrowing required to finance the deficits leads to increasing flows of
interest payments abroad over the 1990s and, hence, to further pressures on ster-
ling.
This sequence of events reaches crisis point in those simulations in which
the BOP/GDP ratio (see Table 15.2) continues to rise in the second half of the
1990s (scenarios A, D and E). In scenario B that ratio stablizes, and in scenario
C it begins to fall, so that continued high growth is possbile without a worsening
in the BOP position.
The simulations show that if, during the important transition phase a BOP
crisis can be avoided, the fruits of a successful modernization strategy can be
reaped as a result of a reversal in the historically deteriorating trade perfor-
mance. The precise effects upon employment depend upon a number of trade-
offs to be discussed below. The pressures on the BOP in the longer term will be
reduced if the visible signs of success in the British tradeables sector attract
international investors to the UK. In the shorter and medium term, however,
during the critical transition phase, policies to avoid a crisis situation will be
important, since, otherwise, the entire strategy might have to be abandoned.
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15.3.4. The PSBR and inflation constraints
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Apart from the balance-of-payments problem, there are two other types of con-
straint which could restrict expansionary policy options in the UK - namely, the
size of the PSBR and inflation.
Table 15.4 gives the figures for the development of the PSBR/GDP ratio
under the assumption that the standard rate of income tax is maintained at 28%
from 1988 onward after having fallen to that level in 1986-1987. These projec-
tions reflect the intentions of the opposition parties (Labour and Alliance) to
(fully or partially) reverse any further reductions in the standard rate of income
tax introduced in the March 1987 Budget so as to concentrate on measures
which reduce the unemployment level.
The absolute increases in government current and capital expenditures
reflect the imposed rate of growth in real terms, already reported in Table 15.1.
The increases in the PSBR/GDP ratio in the early period 1988-1992 are quite
rapid, but they then stabilize at around the 4-4.5% mark from 1992 onward.
This increase reverses the decline under the Conservative administration; but in
historical terms and also in comparison with other industrial economies, the lev-
els reached by 1992 are not extraordinarily high. Although it is important to
evaluate how financial markets would react to such an increase, such an evalua-
tion is beyond the scope of this chapter.
As regards inflation, we can see from Table 15.4 that there is an upward
movement in inflation rates over the first part of the period, when the economy
absorbs the imported price increases associated with the devaluation of sterling.
However, in the late period (1997 to 2000), and in spite of continued devaluation,
inflation rates come down again as the cumulative increases in productivity lev-
els make sufficient room for high real income growth. Only the very high real
wage growth scenarios (D and E) experience strong inflationary pressures leading
to an inflation-devaluation spiral which the economy could not sustain without a
drastic change in the government's fiscal stance.
15.4. The Market-oriented Approach
We now turn to the market-oriented strategy referred to above, which we could
call the "Lawson Scenario" (LS), after the present Chancellor of the Exchequer.
This scenario envisages a continuation of the Conservative government's policies
aimed at secularly reducing the share of public spending in total expenditure.
The emphasis is on a tight control of inflationary pressures and on preventing
sharp devaluations of the currency.
We have already mentioned that there is much debate as to the per-
manence of the recent jump in PG. Although the effects of the present strategy
upon long-run PG are far from clear (see Appendix 15B), we assume here that
the market-oriented approach is successful on this account and that therefore the
economy is subjected to the same adjustments in PG rates and in non-price com-
petitiveness as are the MS scenarios. It remains a "low wage growth" scenario
(it shares this feature with scenario C) in that, in spite of higher PG, no
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adjustments to the "target rate of real wages" have been made, leaving room for
an increase in profitability. The results for the LS are presented in Table 15.5.
As we can see from Table 15.5, and in comparison with the results for the
other MS scenarios given in Table 15.2, the Lawson scenario will not exploit fully
the room that exists for additional output growth which could be obtained from
higher productivity growth. Given the structure of MDM, economic growth in
this scenario is "demand constrained" since increased investment and export
demand will not make up for the loss of immediate consumption demand and the
relatively tight control of public expenditure.
Table 15.5. Results from a "Lawson scenario".
Development
GDP growth (average annual rate)
Unemployment (in thousands)
Price inflation (average annual rate)
BOP/GDP
PSBR/GDP
TGE/GDP (in %):a
in current prices
in constant prices
$/£ a
1988
3,587
+0.4
3.52
23.8
23.2
1.29
1992
4,202
-.39
3.35
24.1
23.2
1.34
1988-1992
1.28
3.75
aFor comparison, we present the figures for (total government expenditure) TGE/GDP and ex-
change rate movements for one of our MS scenarios - scenario C:
1988 199£
TGE/GDP (in %):
in current prices 24.7 28.2
in constant prices 24.0 27.0
$/£ 1.27 1.15
Why are the other components of demand not compensating for low con-
sumption and low public expenditure? The profitability effects on investment
are small and insufficient to compensate for the lack of sales expectations, and
there are two conflicting effects on exports compared with the other MS
scenarios. Because of low real wage growth (comparable to scenarios C and F),
the effects on unit costs and low inflation rates should improve export prospects
relative to the other MS scenarios. However, low domestic demand improves the
balance-of-payments position, especially in the first five years of the simulation
period, and thus leads to much less pressure for a depreciation of sterling. The
consequence is that the beneficial effects of a series of strong devaluations of ster-
ling upon export growth are lost in comparison with the other MS runs. (The
Chancellor of the Exchequer might, of course, decide to induce further devalua-
tions in sterling through additional interest rate reductions, thus causing a
deterioration in the BOP in the short run, as in the MS scenarios. Developments
in this direction depend upon the government's strategy for exchange rate stabil-
ity, worry about inflationary pressures which devaluations could induce, etc.)
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We must emphasize that MDM in its present form is unable to track
developments in the UK economy well enough for an evaluation of a Lawson
strategy upon employment levels. The behavioral relationships embodied in the
structure of MDM (in particular, those in the wage and employment equations)
have been estimated from historical data [see W. Peterson in: Barker and Peter-
son (1987)] and they might be bad indicators for the responses, particularly
those in the labor market, which such a scenario would evoke.
Measures such as the abolition of the Wages Councils, tough industrial
relations legislation, and developments similar to the increase in the number of
people who are prepared to work part-time, the availability of a large pool of
unemployed, deregulation and various measures to support small firms, etc.,
might all lead to the emergence of a "low wage-low tech" sector of the economy
which might absorb a much larger number of the unemployed than a simulation
of MDM would suggest. In addition, given low employment prospects, the parti-
cipation rate would fall dramatically and with it the recorded unemployment
figure. However, even if all this were true, the results for the scenario indicate
the enormity of the task to be faced in overcoming the unemployment problem.
15.5. Where Will Jobs Come From? An Industrial Analysis
The most important issues here are the relative employment losses and gains in
the different sectors of the economy, the sensitivity of the results to PG assump-
tions in some crucial non-manufacturing industries, and the features of the sec-
toral pattern of output growth and employment creation against the background
of the different expenditure patterns.
Table 15.6 presents the employment losses and gains in different sectors of
the economy over the period 1987 to 2000. The first part of the table presents
industrial employment; the second part, government employment figures. It also
gives a breakdown of public sector employment for education and health services
which together are responsible for the creation of 1.5 million additional jobs by
the year 2000 in scenario C.
We can see that over the period 1987 to the year 2000 there will be, in
almost all scenarios, employment losses in all the sectors except for distribution
and the different service industries. In fact, the employment-creating potential
of the distributive and service activities is impressive, especially considering that
in 1987 half the labor force (50.2%) is employed in these activities. In the
highest employment scenario (C), the creation of over 2 million new jobs in this
area is projected (58% of the work force will be employed in it). The produc-
tivity growth projections underlying these trends in the different service activi-
ties will be discussed below. Losses of employment in the manufacturing sector
are projected to level off over the period. In the high employment scenario (C),
the manufacturing sector gains 200,000 jobs by the year 2000 as import penetra-
tion is kept under control, a direct result of the particular expenditure pattern
associated with the scenario (i.e., a high ratio of public versus private expendi-
ture). Further, UK industries become increasingly more competitive through
PG, quality improvements and the continuous devaluation of sterling.
Mic~l Landeamann and Andrew SmU 367
Table 15.6. Employment creation and job losses by sector.
Employment levels Employment increases/decreases
(in thousands) (in thousands)
for scenario C 1987 to flOOO for scenario:
Sector 1987 flOOO C A E F LS
Agriculture 606 275 -331 -309 -284 -131 -280
Mining 293 164 -129 -137 -146 -102 -122
Manufacturing 5,530 5,723 +193 -174 ---658 -53 -811
Construction 1,448 1,217 -231 -444 -652 -385 -702
Utilities 326 155 -171 -178 -141 -61 -181
Rail, road,
other transport 983 758 -225 -187 -182 -108 -298
Communications 430 382 -48 -62 -86 -9 -133
Distribution 3,583 4,563 +980 +854 +648 +307 +467
Business services 1,631 2,151 +520 +471 +382 +316 +162
Professional
services 1,274 1,382 +109 +19 -94 +34 -225
Misc. services 3,385 4,001 +616 +718 +853 +912 -749
Total (adjusted) 19,648 20,931 +1,283 +571 -402 +719 -1,374
Total government employ- 1987 199fl 1997 flOOO
ment under scenario:
A 4,529 5,651 6,104 6,416
B 4,529 5,135 5,879 6,180
E 4,529 5,135 5,547 5,831
F and LS 4,529 4,433 4,448 4,474
C 4,529 5,651 6,469 6,800
of which (for Scenario C):
National Health Service 1,306 1,630 1,859 1,849
Education 1,446 1,814 2,139 2,293
Job creation in the commercial sector as a whole is very dependent upon
assumptions made about PC, as is borne out by the difference between scenarios
F and LS (the two low-government-expenditure scenarios, with and without PC
increases, respectively). However, while technological change and associated PC
is well understood in the manufacturing sector and some other sectors, such as
agriculture and mining, the situation is quite different with respect to distribu-
tion and service activities.
Because of the high levels of employment in these industries, the lack of
information and the uncertainty concerning the future course of PC is very seri-
ous for economy-wide forecasts of employment. Slight differences in PC projec-
tions in these activities generate large differences for overall employment, espe-
cially if projected over a long enough time span.
The PC assumptions underlying the MS scenarios (and also the Lawson
scenario) were that the increases assumed for two of the service industries (busi-
ness and professional services) would be the same as those for the manufacturing
sector. The reason for this assumption was that these two service industries are
experiencing the rapid introduction of new technologies, particularly of
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information processing and communication technologies. On the other hand,
distributive trades and miscellaneous services (the latter composed of such
activities as hotel and catering, private health care, recreational and cultural ser-
vices, dry cleaning, hairdressing, specialized research, etc.) were exempted from
any productivity increases beyond their historically estimated trend growth
rates. The overall output and the PC figures in manufacturing and the service
sector which emerge in the different scenarios based upon these assumptions are
presented in Table 15.7.
We can see that higher real income growth and the disproportionate
increase in expenditure on services leads to a rapid growth in output in the ser-
vice sector, particularly over the period 1992-1997. In general, this growth
outstrips that of manufacturing (except in the Lawson scenario). This high
overall growth, as well as compositional changes within the service sector, also
lead to a speeding-up of productivity growth, narrowing the gap to the tradition-
ally higher productivity gains made in manufacturing.
The employment implications of these projections have already been
presented in Table 15.6. However, in order to demonstrate how sensitive the
overall employment projections are to slight changes in the PC assumptions in
these sectors, we carried out a simulation in which these two industries, distribu-
tion and miscellaneous services, experienced an additional 0.5% p.a. increase in
trend PC (about half the amount assumed for manufacturing and business and
professional services in the MS runs). This change resulted in a difference of
minus 827,000 jobs in a scenario similar to A, so that we would obtain a negative
net increase in overall employment in this scenario!
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15.6. Changes in Energy Prices and World Activity
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In this section we examine how sensitive our results are to changes in assump-
tions concerning world output growth, world inflation and oil prices in the
medium term. Since this chapter was started, oil prices have halved and, for the
purpose of our sensitivity exercise, it is assumed that they maintain this low level
for the next five or six years. World GDP is increased by about 0.7% p.a. and
world inflation reduced by about 1.3% for the exercise. These adjustments are
consistent with one another; lower oil prices may stimulate growth and would
almost certainly lead to lower inflation in the economy (the latter is already
occurring). We have chosen scenario B as our base run. Not only is it represen-
tative of the MS scenarios, but it is also the most useful run for analyzing the
sensitivity of the external balance to our proposed changes. The simulation is
medium-term and runs to 1992, but long-run implications may be drawn from it.
A summary of the results (and assumptions) of the simulation is presented in
Table 15.8.
Table 1S. 8. Assumptions and results for a low oil price - high world demand scenario. a
Assumptions:
World inflation*
World demand*
Real oil price
Results:
Real GDP (level)
BOP (£1980 m)*
BOP/GDP (%)*
Unemployment (1000s)*
Inflation
Real exchange rate
Exports (volume)
1986-19925
-1.3
+0.7
-30.0
1986
+0.2
-1927
-0.8
-2.3
+1.1
-1.8
+2.2
1987
+0.7
+1014
+0.4
-3
+1.7
+1.1
+3.4
1988-19925
+0.6
+1113
+0.4
+73
-0.4
+4.6
+4.0
aFigures indicate percentage above (+) or below (-) base, except those items marked (0), which
bindicates the difference in the respective quantities.
Yearly average.
In what follows we use the words "above", "surplus", etc., to indicate
"above base", "surplus over base", etc. The impact of lower oil prices on the
BOP is unfavorable in the first two years. The UK is currently a net oil exporter
so that the real value of our oil exports is halved in the first year. This feeds
into the exchange rate equation and depresses both the nominal and real value of
the currency. The boost to exports from higher world activity is insufficient to
avoid a large deficit in the first year; but as world demand continues to grow,
surpluses eventually appear and the balance grows to over £1 bn (1980 prices) in
the latter periods. However, the growth in exports is stifled by the appreciating
currency (a direct result of the surpluses), and they fail to keep pace with world
trade.
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The other components of demand are boosted little, with both consumption
and investment ending the simulation a mere 1% above base. The absence of
supply-side effects in MDM are much to blame here. (Many economists would
argue that supply-side effects would be most important in the context of lower
oil prices.)
The net result of minor improvements in investment and consumption and
only modest gains in exports is that GDP stands less than 1% higher at the end
of the simulation (where world output is 5% higher) and unemployment is
reduced by a paltry 100,000.
How is it that the UK economy is left sinking in a world of buoyant
demand? The answer lies in the fact that, despite large BOP surpluses, govern-
ment expenditure remains passive. In reality, we would expect some fiscal
response. This would stimulate GDP directly through multiplier effects on
investments and consumption, and indirectly by removing the BOP surpluses
(stemming the rise in the currency) and so stimulating exports.
Finally, following large positive jumps in the first two years (the result of a
currency depreciation), the domestic rate of inflation eventually becomes equal to
that of the rest of the world.
15.7. Conclusions
Simulations with the Cambridge Growth Project's model have shed light on a
number of important issues which would emerge were one seriously to consider
embarking on a "modernization strategy" for the United Kingdom.
Productivity and growth
An improvement in the long-term productivity performance would succeed to
some extent in overcoming the historical constraints which have characterized
the UK economy in the past. In particular, there would be a good deal more
space for increased real income growth without renewed strong inflationary
processes being generated; and the adversary trends in export and import growth
in real terms, which in the past led to the accelerated erosion of the positive bal-
ance in manufacturing trade, could be reversed. The implications for unemploy-
ment, income distribution and the BOP would, however depend to a large extent
on the precise nature of the MS and accompanying developments.
Unemployment
The question whether greater productivity and a better competitive performance
by UK industries would help to solve the unemployment problem is a compli-
cated issue. The simulations have shown that the creation of more employment
depends upon the degree to which the additional resources available from higher
productivity growth can be used for increased real income growth for those
already employed.
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The trade-off between real wage compensation from increased productivity
performance and higher public expenditure to create more jobs was the one
trade-off which could be shown explicitly by using the Growth Project's model.
These are, of course, not the only redistributive measures which can be
envisaged to free additional resources for the creation of jobs for the unem-
ployed. Unfortunately, a quantitative evaluation of the extent to which other
redistributive measures (such as increased taxation of the well-to-do) could con-
tribute toward job creation is not within the scope of this chapter. It must be
stressed, however, that any measures which have a negative impact upon invest-
ment activity, an integral and essential part of any modernization and develop-
ment process of UK industry, would be counterproductive.
Composition of employment
As regards the pattern of job creation, our scenarios have shown that most new
jobs which could absorb the unemployed will have to be generated in the non-
manufacturing sector. The determinants of job creation in that sector are com-
plex and different views contradict one another.
One view is that a "low wage" scenario with additional measures which
remove "rigidities" in the labor market (such as removing inhibitions for relative
wage rate movements; freedom to use labor in the production process and to
introduce new technologies as management sees fit; reducing restrictions in the
dismissal, hiring, and retraining of workers; etc.) will automatically lead to
employment expansion in both "high tech" and "low tech" sections of industry.
The other view is more skeptical about whether the above scenario would
in fact lead to more employment creation, and if so, whether these would be the
types of jobs that would safeguard the welfare aspirations of the British people.
An orientation toward a "low wage - low tech" sector would be counterproduc-
tive for any attempt to move "upstream" in terms of attracting skill-intensive,
high value-added industries to the UK within the international division of labor.
Furthermore, the emergence of such a sector would lead to a larger segment of
the population depending upon insecure, unskilled and low-paid jobs and a
widening income gap between them and the rest of the community.
The different scenarios showed that employment and output growth pat-
terns, particularly in the non-manufacturing sector, differed depending upon
which strategy was adopted. Since employment growth showed strong sensi-
tivity toward productivity growth projections in the different non-manufacturing
industries (especially in services) and the particular expenditure patterns linked
to the different scenarios, the forms of organization of these industries and the
backing of particular activities through public expenditure will be crucial for
employment growth in these areas. Although it is difficult to make exact numer-
ical calculations at the moment, there is no doubt that the employment implica-
tions will be very different depending on whether this sector will in the future be
largely organized along private market service lines or around a state-supported
welfare sector directed, in the first instance, toward the provision of social needs.
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Although the remarks made above about sectoral composition and particular
expenditure patterns associated with the different scenarios have implications for
the balance of payments, it is worth reemphasizing that the balance-of-payments
problem will reemerge as the binding constraint upon UK economic policy
options in the 1990s.
The predicament of the UK economy by the late 1980s, when its North Sea
oil production starts to decline and it reaches a position with a negative balance
in manufacturing trade, has been widely debated recently [see, e.g., House of
Lords Select Committee on Overseas Trade (1985), Coutts et al. (1986), and the
thorough discussion of balance-of-payments issues confronting the UK economy
in Rowthorn and Wells (forthcoming)]. Here we limit ourselves to pointing out
that, in spite of the fact that our modernization strategy was designed in such a
way as to improve greatly the trade performance in the longer run (from 1993
onward the growth of exports exceeds the growth of imports in real terms at his-
torically high levels of domestic activity), the balance-oJ-payments problem
remains critical on the transition path until the late 1990s. As we have shown,
the gradual character of the catching-up process, and the large amounts of
resources (including imports) needed to embark on such a strategy, suggest a
delicate path will have to be followed between an expansionist scenario (which
facilitates the modernization process) and the extent of the balance-of-payments
disequilibrium (which could conceivably be financed and tolerated by interna-
tional financial markets over the transition path).
The simulations discussed in this chapter show one thing very clearly. A
movement of the UK economy toward international competitiveness is not in
itself, under the present circumstances, sufficient to cope with the severe
economic and social problems. In particular, resolution of the unemployment
problem would not be automatic. It depends crucially upon the readiness of
those in work to share the gains of a successful modernization process with those
presently unemployed, and upon the determination of a government to pursue
two essential targets at the same time: employment creation and modernization.
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Appendix 15A. Productivity Growth under Thatcher and
Prospects under the Different Scenarios
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The following graphs and tables give some information about the productivity
performance (output per person-hour and output per person employed) in UK
manufacturing industry.
Table 15A.l, reproduced from OECD's Economic Outlook (1986), shows
the pattern of productivity growth (output per person-hour) in manufacturing
industry for a number of OECD economies including the UK. The well-known
picture of the slow growth in labor productivity in the USA and the UK relative
to the other OECD countries over the 1960s and 1970s emerges clearly. How-
ever, over the period 1979 to 1985 (and also over the subperiods 1979-82 and
1982-85) UK productivity growth (measured as output per person-hour)
outstrips that of its main industrial competitors with the exception of Japan (see
also Figure 15A.5).
Table 15A.1. Labor productivity growth in manufacturing (gross value added/total
hours worked).
Country 1960-69 1969-79 1979-82 1982-85 1979-85
UK 5.8a 2.2 3.5 4.8 4.1
USA 4.3 2.5 1.7 4.2 2.9
Germany 6.9 4.5 1.7 4.1 3.5
France 7.7 5,4 2.9 4.1 3.5
Italy 7,4b 5.1 3.6 3.9 3.5
Sweden 7.6 3.6 2.0 5.7 3.8
Japan 11.7a 8.3 7.0 4.8 5.9
a1966-69.
b1965-69.
Source: OECn, Economic Outlook (May 1986).
Figure 15A.l and Figure 15A.2 present, on a log-scale, time series on out-
put, employment, output per person employed and output per person-hour in
UK manufacturing over the period 1963 to 1985. The following features emerge
from the graphs:
(1) Over the period 1963 to 1973, growth in output and growth in output per
person employed move, insofar as trends are concerned, more or less in
parallel. Cyclically, the relationship is more complicated, but this does not
concern us here. The average figures for productivity growth (growth in
output per person employed) over the period 1964 to 1972 is 3.1% p.a.
From 1973 to 1979, overall productivity growth rates in manufacturing
declined markedly and the level of output in manufacturing was no higher
in 1979 than in 1973. The average productivity growth rates (output per
person employed) per annum are 2.09% for the period 1973 to 1979 (2.0%
p.a. for output per person-hour) and 0.9% p.a. for 1974 to 1979 (1.08% p.a.
for output per person-hour).
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(2) Productivity performance under Thatcher is marked by annual rates of
output growth per person-hour and per person employed, over the years
1979 to 1986, as shown in Table 15A.2. The year-to-year changes in output
and output per person employed have been plotted in Figure 15A.3. We
can clearly see the much sharper decline in output than in output per per-
son employed in the years 1979 to 1981 (the years in which a major
"shake-out" of labor occurred), after which the growth rates in output and
labor productivity started to move in parallel. The productivity growth
rates achieved in the period 1981 to 1984 are indeed historically very high,
similar to those achieved in the peak periods of the 1960s and early 1970s,
and far beyond anything achieved over the period 1973 to 1979. As output
growth slowed down in 1985 and 1986, productivity growth declined even
more (3.06% in 1985 and 1.80% in 1986 for output per person-hour), with
evidence, however, of output and productivity growth recovering toward
the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987.
Table 15A.£. Productivity growth in UK manufacturing, 1979-1985.
Output 1979- 1982-
growth (%) 1979 1980 1981 198£ 1989 198../ 1985 1986 1986 1986
Per
person-hour 1.68 -1.48 4.80 5.25 7.80 4.45 3.06 1.80 3.42 4.47
Per
person employed 1.57 -3.94 3.50 6.57 8.52 5.51 3.48 1.91 3.39 5.70
Source: Emplo1fl'TUnt Gazette (March 1987).
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Figure 15A.9. Yearly growth rates of output and output per person employed in UK
manufacturing.
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There are basically two interpretations of the productivity growth experi-
ence since 1979. [On the productivity performance under the Conservative
government since 1979, see Jones (1983), Mendis and Muellbauer (1983), 8mith-
Gavine and Benett (1985), Coutts et al. (1986) and Muellbauer (1986).]
One view is that the recovery of productivity growth since 1981 is the
result of a major shake-out of labor and of a once-for-all additional scrapping
process of old capacity which has changed the plant and firm composition of a
number of manufacturing industries. However, according to this view, this
change amounts only to a once-for-all level change and will leave long-term rates
of productivity growth unaffected. The critics of the Conservative government
point furthermore to the abysmal performance of investment in manufacturing -
see Figures 15A.4 and 15A.5 - and believe that an investment slump of that
magnitude will be followed by very low rates of productivity growth. Only high
rates of growth of output and of net investment can ensure high productivity
growth in the future.
The other view is that something fundamental has changed in British
industry over the 1979 to 1986 period which will - independent of any fiscal
expansion by the government - have long-term implications for the growth and
productivity performance of the UK economy. Proponents of this view point
toward the change in the industrial relations climate partly induced by changes
in industrial relations legislation, in work practices, and attempts made by the
government to deregulate industry and privatize publicly owned enterprises.
They also point out that compositional changes (mentioned in the previous para-
graph) can have once-for-all effects not only on industrial performance but also
upon longer-term growth.
In our view, the information so far available is still insufficient to judge the
long-term effects of the Thatcher experiment upon productivity growth in
manufacturing. The recent closing of the gap between output and productivity
growth, however, indicates that, after the major labor shake-out period, any
further sustained improvement in productivity performance will again be closely
linked to output growth and a sustained recovery in investment activity.
In our simulations we have taken both the above interpretations of recent
productivity performance on board, and they are reflected in the projections for
productivity growth in the different scenarios as shown in Figures 15A.6 and
15A.7.
As discussed in the main text, scenarios F and L8 represent two versions of
the effects of restrictive government policies upon the long-term growth of the
UK economy. Scenario F represents a pessimistic view of the longer-term pro-
ductivity growth outlook in such conditions (the productivity growth rates are
similar to those representative for the period 1973 and 1979), while scenario L8
(the "Lawson scenario") allows for continued higher productivity growth into the
1990s much more in line with the pre-1973 experience.
The latter is also true for scenarios A to E which represent M8 scenarios
with expansionary government expenditure programs and different real wage
growth rates (see main text for discussion).
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Figure 15A.6. Productivity growth (output per person employed) in UK manufacturing
- past experiences and projections in simulations LS and F.
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Figure 15A.1. Productivity grow~h (output per person employed) in UK manufacturing
- past experiences and projections in simulations A and C.
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Appendix 15B. Is There Evidence of an Improvement in UK
Export Performance?
In this appendix we give some empirical substance to the hypothesis that the
recent turnround in the UK's productivity performance in manufacturing has
gone hand in hand with a transformation of the demand for its exports of
manufactured goods. We hope that this goes some way toward justifying the
adjustments we made to MDM's export equations for the MS scenarios. We
investigated the hypothesis here, by analyzing the behavior of UK manufacturing
exports over the past 14 years through the "eyes" of a simple but adequate
demand equation.
Explicitly, we used the following specification:
5
DXt = 0: + f3 WXt + ~ Ct - i
i=O
where
Ct = an index of competitiveness
DXt = the volume of UK manufacturing exports
WXt = the volume of world manufacturing exports
t = time measured in quarters
(15B.l)
All variables are natural logs. The Ct index (taken from CSO's Economic
Trends) measures UK to world export prices in dollars and reflects the relative
importance of each foreign country in the world market place. WXt was con-
structed by taking the exports of the nine largest OECD economies (in dollars)
and dividing by an index of their prices. The former series (taken from OECD's
International Trade Statistics) accounts for over 90% of OECD exports while the
latter (taken from IMF's International Financial Statistics) pertains to all OECD
countries. DXt was taken directly from the CSO's Monthly Digest of Statistics.
Although DXt is a seasonally adjusted series, Ct and WXt show no seasonal pat-
tern so seasonality should not raise any problems for the estimation of (15B.l).
Henceforth, "manufacturing" is suppressed, and we refer to just "exports".
Ct and WXt were found to be nearly orthogonal to a set of seasonal dummies.
Specification (15B.l) has a dual interpretation: (a) it is an ad hoc explana-
tion of the share of UK exports in the OECD total (corrected for competitive-
ness); or (b) it is an export demand function. For (b) it is necessary to envisage
a direct link between exports and world GDP. No such complications arise in
(a). In (a)'s view (15B.l) provides a direct assessment of how the UK has fared
against its competitors in the battle for a share of the world market, and it is
this interpretation that we prefer.
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An assumption common to both views, however, is that market reactions to
competitiveness (relative prices) are spread across many periods, whereas reac-
tions to the size of the market are instantaneous. This is plausible for two rea-
sons. First, price changes involve substitution between goods, and this may be
costly or difficult to invoke immediately. No such cross-substitution is involved
when the market expands or contracts. Secondly (and perhaps less convinc-
ingly), relative price changes may take time to detect.
As a starting point, we estimated (15B.1) for the whole period of 58 quar-
ters starting in 1972(1) and ending in 1986(2). Omitting wholly insignificant
terms we get
DXt = 6.45 + 0.54
(19.1) (14.7)
WXt - 0.36 Ct - 4 + 0.40 Ct- 5
(4.9) (1.6)
(lSB.2)
2 -2 )R = 0.80, R = 0.80, D W = 1.3 (t-ratios in parentheses
If we look only at the fit and t-ratios, we might be quite satisfied with (1SB.2).
However, the D W statistic indicates substantial error autocorrelation; the long-
run effect of competitiveness is perverse; and an inspection of the residuals (not
presented here for lack of space) shows that the model overpredicts in 1979 and
1980, but underpredicts in the last few years of the sample. This is not incon-
sistent with our hypothesis that underlying changes in trend PG fundamentally
affect export demand; our data straddle the productivity divide associated with
the Thatcher administration (documented in Appendix 15A).
In the light of all this it seems natural to split the data into a pre-Thatcher
and a Thatcher era and estimate (15B.1) for both subperiods. Using data from
1972(1) to 1979(2), and dropping insignificant competitiveness terms, gives
DXt = 5.82 + 0.59
(8.2) (10.0)
WX t - 0.62 Ct - 4 + 0.40 Ct- 5
(2.6) (1.7)
(1SB.3)
2 -2R = 0.82, R = 0.79, DW = 2.2
Statistic (15B.3) does not exhibit error autocorrelation, has a reasonable fit and
passes structural stability tests. Dropping five observations from the beginning
and end of the sample for a Chow test gives F (5,21) values of 1.3 and 2.2, which
are satisfactory. Further, the "income elasticity" (henceforth referred to as (3) is
significantly less than unity (t 26 = 6.4), and this reflects the secular decline in
export shares of the pre-Thatcher era documented in the text and elsewhere.
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Estimating (15B.1) for the 1979(3) to 1986(2) subperiod (again dropping
insignificant terms) gives
DXt = 5.79 + 0.58 WXt - 0.22 Ct - 2
(7.6) (5.6) (1.3)
2 -2R = 0.68, R = 0.66, D W = 0.57
(ISBA)
The estimate of (3 is identical to that of the earlier period and, if we knew
nothing about econometrics, the story would end there and our hypothesis would
fail. However, even the most casual statistical inspection shows that (15BA~ is
grossly inadequate. The competitiveness term is not very significant, the R is
unsatisfactory (considering that DXt and WXt are trended), the model is very
unstable and there is substantial error autocorrelation. Dropping the first five
observations for a Chow test gave an F (5,22) value of 4.1.
To shed light on this subperiod, we allowed the parameters to vary over
the sample by the use of a simple technique. We looked at (ISBA) through a
"window" of 17 observations. Moving the window one quarter at a time across
the sample gives 12 regressions from the 28 observations and, hence, 12 esti-
mates of (3(~). This gives an idea of the nature of any parameter instability in
the subperiod. Choice of window size is never a trivial matter. A smaller win-
dow gives a better idea of the parameter regime at a particular point in time, but
only at the expense of precision from having too few degrees of freedom. Thus,
while we should let the data "breathe" and allow the parameters to vary, we
should not let them "hyperventilate" and suffer imprecise parameter estimates.
The choice of 17 quarters was a compromise between these two extremes.
Shorter windows of 12 and 14 observations were tried, but made little qualitative
difference to the results.
Because our hypothesis primarily concerns the elasticity (3, we present the
results for this coefficient only. The right-hand graph of Figure 15B.l plots the
progress of the estimate ~ as we move the window of 17 quarters from 1979(3)
startpoint [1983(3) endpoint] to a 1982(2) startpoint [1986(2) endpoint]. For
completeness, the left-hand graph presents the corresponding result for the pre-
Thatcher sample. Care must be taken when interpreting the varying estimate ~:
it is not an estimate of (3 at one point in time but an estimate of its "average"
value (in some sense) over 17 quarters.
The results are very informative. While ~ is reasonably stable in the pre-
Thatcher subsamples (averaging just below 0.6), the equation breaks down com-
pletely in subsamples that use any data from the 1979(3) to 1980(2) period. A
stable relationship reemerges in the post-1980(4) subsamples, but this time the
values for ~ vary around unity rather than 0.6.
The 1979(3) to 1980(4) period was a tortuous time for UK manufacturing.
In the face of a very severe recession, output fell by nearly 20% and manufactur-
ing exports by about 10%. This may explain the breakdown of our relationship
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Figure 15B.l. The time path of the estimate of f3 from 17-quarter subsamples.
in subsamples that include these quarters. However, it was also a time of re-
structuring and consolidation, a process that continued into the 1980s and which
may have generated the high PC rates experienced from 1981(1) onward. If our
empirical work is to be believed, this productivity "miracle" has been accom-
panied by a transformation in the nature of the demand for UK exports. Taking
interpretation (a) or (b), above, of our export specification, it would imply that
UK goods are no longer inferior in the world markets (their income elasticity of
demand having risen from 0.6 to unity). As a result, the secular decline in
market share suffered by UK goods prior to 1979 has been arrested (our exports
now grow in line with world trade).
Finally, we can model the "recovery" depicted in the graph by means of a
time trend on (3 starting in 1979(3) and ending in 1984(4) leaving (3 constant
from 1985(1) to 1986 (2). This choice of trend was suggested by an inspection of
Figure 15B.1. Incorporating this scheme for (3 in (ISBA) gives
DXt = 6.5 + (0.64 + 0.022 T) WXt - 0.35 Ct - 2
(11.9) (8.7) (5.2) (2.9)
(15B.5)
Michael Landumann and Andrew Snell
2 -2R = 0.83, R = 0.82, DW = 1.82
383
where T = 1 in 1973(3); T = 2 in 1979(4); ...; T = 22 in 1984(4); but then
stays constant - T = 22 in 1985(1); ...; T = 22 in 1986(2).
(15B.5) has no error autocorrelation, is remarkably stable [dropping five
observations from the beginning and end of the sample gives F (5,19) values of
0.8 and 1.4, respectively], has a correctly signed and significant role for competi-
tiveness and fits quite well. It gives an initial estimate for f3 [for the point in time
1979(3)] of 0.66 and a final value [for the point in time 1986(2)] of just over
unity.
Although the results here were qualitatively robust to changes in measure-
ment (various measures of export volume, world export volume and competitive-
ness were tried), they are indicative rather than conclusive. A more detailed
study would use disaggregated data and incorporate qualitative information.
The current results are nonetheless very encouraging for future work.
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CHAPTER 16
Prospective Structural Changes in the
West German Economy
Jiirgen B. Donges, Henning Klodt, and Klaus-Dieter Schmidt
Summary
Projections up to the year 2000 show that the West German economy will
undergo deep transformations as per capita income rises. Service activities will
expand at a rate above average, while manufacturing and building industries are
going to shrink in relative terms. We expect labor displacement in industry to
continue, whereas the labor absorption capacity of the services sector might grow
steadily. As industrial employment in West Germany has been found to be still
higher than one would derive from "normal patterns", the projected decline of
industry's share in labor input implies that, by the year 2000, the overall
employment structure should be closer to the country's level of development
than it is nowadays.
16.1. Introduction
The West German economy, once praised for its exceptionally successful postwar
development, has been struggling with deep-seated problems over the past 15
years. Since the early 1970s, the growth of potential output slowed down
markedly (from about 4-5% a year during the 1960s to less than 2% in the early
1980s); an extended period of full employment came to an end (unemployment
increased sharply, affecting more than 2 million workers or 9% of the labor
force); and industry lost ground in certain high-technology areas (such as the
information technologies). The problems are structural rather than cyclical;
their main roots are on the supply side and not on the demand side. As has
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happened in most Western European countries, the West German economy has
also unduly delayed needed adjustment to rapidly changing global economic con-
ditions, energy saving being the notable exception to this rule [Fels and Schmidt
(1980), Schmidt et al. (1984), and Wolter (1984)].
The pressure to adjust is likely to remain strong in the years to come, if
only for such reasons as the shrinking and aging population, sudden increases
and decreases in energy prices, continued fluctuations of real interest rates and
exchange rates, rising costs of environmental control, new waves of revolutionary
technologies, and further growing intensity in international competition. The
West German economy has to pass, with success, the test of its capacity to
adjust, should there be a chance for achieving sustained growth and for improv-
ing employment opportunities over the long term.
It is against this background that the present chapter proposes to explore
how the structure of production and employment of the West German economy
will have changed by the year 2000, under alternative assumptions about the
rate of long-term growth. The analysis, an extended version of which has been
carried out by the authors elsewhere [Donges et al. (1986)], follows the familiar
Clark-Fourastie-Kuznets-Chenery "three-sector hypothesis" and constitutes a
reappraisal of comprehensive projections of structural patterns for West Ger-
many up to 1980, which were undertaken at the Kiel Institute in the early 1970s
[Fels et al. (1971); hereafter called the FSW study].
16.2. Structural Change in Retrospect
One message of the FSW study was, as it may be recalled, that West Germany
became over-industrialized during the 1950s and 1960s. The share of industry in
gross domestic product (more than 40% on average) was permanently higher
than what would be expected of a "representative" country with similar per cap-
ita income and population; moreover, this share increased over time, whereas it
declined in other advanced European countries, such as France and the UK. In
anticipation of the profound exchange rate adjustments which were to occur dur-
ing the 1970s after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, and by expecting
major shifts in the international division of labor, which were to be induced by
the emergence of new competitors on the world market, the FSW study
predicted that West Germany's industry would begin to decrease its relative
weight in the sectoral composition of production from the mid-1970s onward.
As Table 16.1 shows, this prediction has been confirmed by actual develop-
ments, at least as far as the reversal of industry's trend is concerned, to which,
however, several factors additional to those mentioned in the FSW study (e.g.,
wage explosion, profit squeeze, sluggish investment) contributed to a significant
extent [Schmidt et al. (1984)]. Since 1970 the share of industry in both the gross
value added and the labor force fell sharply. The pattern of resource allocation
shifted from industry (and manufacturing) to services (whereas the primary sec-
tor continued the trend previously observed). But the shift was not accom-
plished at full employment. On the contrary, while the industrial sector lost 2.3
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Table 16.1. Structure (%) of production and employment, 1960-1985.
Indicator 1960 1970 1980 1985
Gross value addtda
8.6 4.6 3.1 2.8Primary sector
Secondary sectorc 50.4 50.4 43.5 41.1
of which: Maraufacturing 40.3 40.2 33.9 33.2
Tertiary sector 49.0 45.0 53.4 56.1
Active labor for~
15.9 9.7 6.4 6.3Primary sector
Secondary sectorC 45.8 47.7 43.2 40.1
of which: Maraufacturing 36.9 38.1 34.2 32.0
Tertiary sector 38.3 42.6 50.4 53.6
~At current market prices.
Agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining and quarrying.
~Manufacturing;electricity, gas and water; construction.
Trade, transport and communications; banking, insurance and real estate; public administra-
tion; other services.
Sources: Stati8ti6chu Bunduamt, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Fachserie 18, Reihe
S.8: Revidierte Ergebnisse 1960-84 (Stuttgart, 1985); lrkm, Reihe I: Konten und Standardta-
bellen 1985 (Stuttgart" 1986); own calculations.
million jobs in the period 1970-1985 (manufacturing: 1.9 million), the tertiary
sector absorbed only a fraction of the displaced workers - and this in spite of the
extraordinary expansion of employment in public administration by more than 1
million [Schatz and Wolter (1982); Schmidt (1984)].
16.2.1. Changes in final demand
In the long run a country's capability to achieve sustained economic growth and
to bring about the necessary structural changes is determined by its propensity
to invest. Table 16.2 provides information about the trends in aggregate expen-
ditures during the period 1960-1985. While the shares of private and public con-
sumption increased and that of foreign trade (exports minus imports) remained
almost constant, the share of gross fixed capital formation decreased. This shift
from investment to consumption is a most remarkable aspect indeed. It helps to
explain why the West German economy has been lagging in modernizing produc-
tive capacities and in creating new jobs until recently [Schmidt et aI. (1984)].
Shifts in the demand structure have not been confined to aggregate expen-
ditures. It is well known, for instance, that there are long-term changes in the
pattern of private consumption on account of Engel's law: the steady improve-
ment in standards of living have altered the style of life of the West Germans
and shifted preferences of private households away from food and other basic
needs toward durable consumer goods and services. This unquestionably has
clouded the development prospects of the producers facing an income elasticity
of demand of less than unity. Table 16.9 shows how markedly the pattern of
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Table 16.2. Distribution (%) of gross domestic product at current market prices,
1960-1985.
Demand component 1960 1970 1980 1985
Private consumption 52.0 54.4 56.3 56.4
Government consumption 18.6 18.4 19.6 19.8
Gross fixed capital
formation 24.2 24.2 21.5 19.5
Change in stocks 2.2 2.1 1.2 0.4
Exports of goods and
non-factor services 17.0 22.6 29.5 35.0
Less: imports of goods
and non-factor services 14.0 21.6 28.1 31.1
Gross domestic product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: As for Table 16.1.
Table 16.9. Structure (% of total expenditure) of private household consumption,
1960-1985.
Expenditure item
Agricultural products
Manufactured goods
Services
Sources: As for Table 16.1.
1960
33.3
36.9
29.8
1970
27.3
40.7
32.0
1980
22.3
43.1
34.6
1985
20.9
41.9
37.2
private household demand changed. In a sense, these shifts are consistent with
the changing structure of production and employment mentioned above: the
increase in purchases of foodstuffs has been slower and that of services has been
sharper than that of consumption in general, in particular since 1970.
Having said this, it should be noted that the shifts on the demand side can-
not completely explain the gains and losses of sectors in terms of production and
employment. Above all, the relative decline of manufacturing since the early
1970s is not in line with the stable shares of manufactured goods in total con-
sumption during the past 15 years. An explanation for this apparent contradic-
tion is that German manufacturers lost shares in world trade, mainly with
regard to investment goods rather than consumer goods and particularly in the
domestic markets rather than in third markets.
16.2.2. Changes in the international division of labor
The difficulties encountered by West German producers of manufactured goods
during the 1970s reflect, broadly, a weakening of the competitive strength and
the emergence of new competitors such as Japan and a number of newly indus-
trializing countries [Donges (1984)]. The share in world exports, which had risen
from 3.6% in 1950 to 9.7% in 1960 and to 11.9% in 1970, has slightly decreased
over the past 15 years. A loss of share in international trade is a normal
Jjjrg~n B. Donge!, Hennil1lJ Klodt, and Klaw-Di~urSchmidt 389
phenomenon for a mature industrial country. In the case of the West German
economy, one can even argue that the previously excessive weight, by interna-
tional standards, of the tradeables sector in comparison to the non-tradeables
sector was corrected to some extent [Fels and Schmidt (1980)].
However, this process of adjustment becomes evident more on the import
side than in exports. As Table 16.,. shows, the share of final manufactured goods
in exports has remained, more or less constantly, on a high level (predominantly
investment goods); by contrast, final manufactures have increased sharply their
weight in imports, which is a consequence of the rising market penetration by
developing countries, in particular the newly industrializing ones (textiles, cloth-
ing, electronic consumer goods and the like). These shifts in the composition of
trade in manufactures are ignored in a recent paper by Lawrence (1986), who
has stressed that "domestic use, rather than international trade performance,
accounts for the weakness of manufacturing output" (p. 56).
Table 16.40 Structure (%) of foreign trade by major product categories, 1960-1985.
Product categories 1960 1970 1980 1985
Exports
Foodstuffs 3.5 3.5 5.3 5.2
Raw materials 4.5 2.6 1.9 1.6
Semi-manufactures 10.3 7.7 8.8 7.6
Final products: 81.7 86.2 84.0 85.6
consumer goods 9.3 10.6 11.5 11.7
investment goods 52.1 54.7 51.4 54.0
Imports
Foodstuffs 26.6 19.4 12.8 12.5
Raw materials 21.9 13.7 17.5 12.4
Semi-manufactures 19.0 16.3 17.8 18.7
Final products: 32.5 50.6 51.9 56.4
consumer goods 10.2 22.5 22.9 14.1
investment goods 11.0 13.2 15.4 27.1
Sources: Stat:Uti!ch~! Bunduamt, Aussenhandel, Fachserie 7, Reihe 1, various issues; Idem,
Jahrbuch filr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, various issues; own calculations.
The ongoing changes in the international division of labor have three fun-
damental implications for the West German economy:
(1) As Germany has achieved a prominent position in technological develop-
ment, it cannot benefit as much as before from importing and applying
technology developed in other countries. Having come closely to the tech-
nology frontier, competitive strength can only be maintained, or restored, if
the country's own technological base is deepened adequately.
(2) In the course of their catching up, the newly industrializing countries have
intensified competition in high-tech markets. Hence, pressure to accelerate
the pace of scientific innovations and of product and process innovations as
well is likely to increase further.
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(3) The developing countries embarking upon industrialization will continue to
exploit, to the largest extent possible, their comparative advantage deriving
from the almost unlimited supply of low-skilled labor. Thus, traditional
labor-intensive industries in West Germany will be subjected to marked
import competition in the future, too.
16.2.3. Changes in the global technological environment
Typically, a country's ability to invent and innovate, and to effectively use tech-
nologies developed abroad, is a key factor in the patterns of specialization in
foreign trade. (West) Germany has a long tradition as a technologically leading
country. Indicative of this strength is the robust competitive position which
human capital- and research-intensive branches, such as chemicals, pharmaceuti-
cals, medical technology, engineering goods and motor cars, have been displaying
even during the 1970s, when the world economy was struck with many tur-
bulences.
And yet, the West German economy (as in other European countries) has
found it hard to keep abreast with the microelectronics and other revolutionary
technologies, even allowing for the fact that a notable competitive strength could
have been achieved early in some important segments (such as videotex or sen-
sors and systems for robots) and that there was considerable success in nuclear
power, aircraft industries, military equipment, and rocket launching (backed by
massive government support). As can be seen in Table 16.5, West Germany
lagged behind the United States and Japan regarding the robotization of the
economy or the extent of use of microelectronics. Even in numerically controlled
machine tools, in which German companies have long been strong leaders, Japan
has caught up. Moreover, new technologies were often applied with the main
purpose of reducing labor costs, Le., process innovations were given priority over
product innovations by many German firms. The consequences have been both
losses in foreign sales and increased import competition in several high-tech
fields [Hartel and Langer (1984); Klodt (1984)].
In recent years much of the technological gap seems to have been made up.
Intensified R&D efforts by firms, in conjunction with more aggressive marketing
strategies, were indispensable for this catching-up process to happen, but it
should also be noted that the West German high-tech industry benefited a great
deal from the strong US dollar (until early 1985). However it happened, the
technology challenge will not vanish in years to come. On the contrary, the new
technologies carry an enormous potential for developing new markets for entirely
new goods and services facing a high income elasticity of demand, for locational
decentralization of economic activities, for inducing fresh investment, and for
improving job opportunities in branches which are not themselves high-tech
[Giersch (1982); Perez (1985)].
To put it another way: new technologies such as robotics, computers, and
telecommunications will rapidly alter the production and employment structures
as well as the organization of work life both in factories and offices of the West
German economy. If one is to characterize future structural change in terms of
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Table 16.5. Indicators of technological change in West Germany, the USA and Japan.
Technology Year West Germany USA Japan
Integrated circuits:
Consumption per capita 1977 5 13 8
(value in US $) 1980 13 21 19
1985 19 53 39
Share in world 1982 6.5 48.9 25.9
consumption (%) 1985 5.0 56.0 21.0
Share in world 1982 2.0 69.5 23.4
production (%) 1985 1.9 66.8 26.7
Electronic goods:
Share in world 1980 9.1 40.0 15.7
production (%) 1986 7.2 41.8 16.3
Industrial robotsa
Installed units 1974 0.1 1.2 1.5
(thousand) 1980 1.2 4.5 6.0
1985 7.5 20.0 25.0
Units per million 1974 5 15 30
employees 1980 50 50 100
1985 300 200 400
NC machine tools:
Installed units 1975 8 40 14
(thousand) 1980 25 80 28
1985 40 100 120
Units per million 1975 300 400 250
employees 1980 950 800 500
1985 1,600 1,000 1,000
a Here we define industrial robots as handling or working machines which are freely program-
mable with three or more motion axes.
Sources: OECD (1985) Verband Deuucher Mwchinen- und Anlogenbau, Fachgemeinschaft Mon-
tage, Handhabung, Industrieroboter im VDMA (unpublished data); Idem, Fachgemeinschaft
Werkzeugmaschinen im VDMA (unpublished data); Franzmeyer et aI. (1986); own calculations
and estimates.
new technologies, this might be sketched as follows: more small-scale and less
large-scale production; more automation and less mechanization; more engineer-
ing skills (brainpower) and less routine (manpower); more product-orientation
and less processing-orientation; more services and less manufacturing.
16.3. Prospects for Structural Change
16.3.1. Model and data
Structural change and economic growth are interrelated: the redeployment of
production factors away from shrinking activities into expanding sectors pro-
motes the growth of the whole economy, and a rapid pace of economic develop-
ment facilitates structural adjustments. Since this chapter is concerned with
future structural trends in West Germany, it states one specific direction of
causality - namely, that the level of per capita income determines those trends.
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Thus, the sectoral structure of the West German economy will be regarded as an
endogenous variable, whereas the explanatory variable is assumed to incorporate
the relevant, and often interacting, basic supply and demand factors underlying
economic growth.
Beyond all doubt, there is a variety of factors determining shifts of the sec-
toral structure of an economy. Economic growth is only one among others. In
West Germany, e.g., reconstruction after World War II, the integration into the
European Common Market, the realignment of exchange rates in the early 1970s,
the two oil price shocks in 1973-1974 and 1979-1980, and the rise and decline of
the US dollar in the 1980s all might have had a significant impact on the perfor-
mance of different industries. Analyses of past trends of structural change
should obviously take account of those effects, as some indeed have done [Fels
and Schmidt (1980); Schmidt et al. (1984)]. However, as such singular events are
difficult to predict (if they are predictable at all), an assessment of future trends
must concentrate on more permanent factors. A long list of econometric studies
of structural change, which were pioneered by Chenery (1960) and include also
the Kiel FSW study [Fels et al. (1971)], has revealed that the level of per capita
income satisfied this requirement for long-term projections.
As is usual in this type of analysis, we derive the projections from "normal
patterns" of structural change that occur in the process of economic growth.
These patterns are measured by OLS regression analyses, using the following
equation [Donges et al. (1986)]:
[ k· IIn I' A = a + bY,. + c In Y,. + D100 - ..I'
where A ii = percentage share of industry i in total output (or total employment)
of country j; Yi = per capita income of country j; D = raw material dummy, in
order to take account of the impact on the industrial structure of a rich natural
resource endowment in some sample countries. The "dummy" takes the value of
1.0 for Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Norway, in addition to the UK
since 1979; for all other countries the dummy variable is O.
The data on sectoral structure were taken from OECD statistics on
national accounts. We used the information regarding 24 different industries in
20 countries. Luxembourg has been excluded due to insufficient sectoral
disaggregation of data. For an analysis of the production structure, the sectoral
contributions to gross domestic product seem to be appropriate. The structure
of labor input is measured by the sectoral shares in total employment. The
annual data have been pooled for the period 1970-1982. As compared to simple
cross-section analyses, this combination of cross-section and time-series data has
two main advantages: (1) distortions of estimates due to singular events in par-
ticular years are reduced; (2) an overestimation of sectoral shifts is avoided,
which could occur if pure cross-section parameters were used for projections over
time because cross-section elasticities are higher than time-series elasticities
[Kuznetz (1966)].
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Per capita incomes as indicator of the sample countries' level of economic
development are converted to US dollars at 1975 prices. In order to avoid distor-
tions from short-term fluctuations of exchange rates, the international compari-
sons are calculated at purchasing power parities, which are taken from Summers
and Heston (1984). This source provides information on the period up to 1980.
For more recent years, the data on per capita income were derived from IMF
statistics (current issues).
16.3.2. International "normal patterns" at a sectoral level
For the three major sectors of the economy, the estimated coefficients are given
in Table 16.6. The regression results for 20 branches are presented in Fels et al.
(1971).
Table 16.6. Estimated coefficients for the relationship between the sectoral structure
and the level of per capita income (GECD sample)a
Share 0/: a b x 10-3 y. c In Y j D R
2 F n1
GDP
Primary 15.48 0.18 -2.22 0.55 0.65 138.4 225
sector (6.72) (2.35) (-7.05) (8.32)
Secondary -12.36 -0.34 1.59 -0.25 0.41 56.7 243
sector (-11.11) (-9.47) (10.49) (-7.60)
Tertiary -0.37 -0.10 0.01 0.07 0.55 93.3 232
sector (-0.43) (3.49) (0.06) (2.84)
Total employment
Primary 69.67 1.02 -8.98 -0.14 0.65 88.8 142
sector (6.03) (3.75) (-5.92) (-1.56)
Secondary -27.22 -0.74 3.57 -0.15 0.43 36.8 141
sector (-8.85) (-9.47) (8.76) (-3.75)
Tertiary 7.58 0.44 -1.15 0.23 0.67 92.7 137
sector (2.29) (5.20) (-2.62) (6.66)
aCoefficients for the equation
[ A.. 1In 100':: A
ij
= a + b x 10-3 Yj + c In Yj + D
The coefficient of determination 112 has been adjusted for the degrees of freedom; F gives the
F-value for the whole regression; the figures in brackets refer to t-values; n is the number of
observations.
Each of the regressions for the three major sectors is statistically
significant, as indicated by the F-valuesj according to the t-statistics most of the
coefficients are significant, too. This lends support to the fundamental
hypothesis that there is a close statistical relationship between structural change
and economic development. The estimated equations, therefore, could be
regarded as the description of a kind of "normal" changes in the economic struc-
ture of the GECD countries, as per capita income rises.
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A graphic illustration of this pattern could help in interpreting the
coefficients. The lines in Figure 16.1 represent the regression results for the pro-
duction structure. According to these results an economy faces a permanent
decline of its primary sector during the process of economic growth (Engel's law
effects), whereas the secondary sector expands its share as per capita income
rises. Beyond a $4,500 US income level, the secondary sector also shrinks. Such
a level of income was achieved in West Germany in the late 1960s; nowadays the
per capita income in Italy has reached this point. The tertiary sector shows a
continuously increasing share in gross domestic product. These results obviously
fit the three-sector hypothesis described above.
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Figure 16.1. Per capita income and sector shares in gross domestic product for an
OEeD sample. (Sources as for Table 16.1.)
Furthermore, Figure 16.1 shows the deviations of the West German econ-
omy from "normal patterns" for selected years. As in other OECD countries,
the relative importance of the primary sector has diminished, the tertiary sector
was constantly growing and the secondary sector has passed a maximum. It
should be noted, however, that the level of the secondary sector's share is still
substantially above the "normal" levels, whereas the primary and tertiary sectors
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are of a comparatively small size. This deviation from the international average,
already emphasized in the FSW study, was reduced during the 1970s, when
structural adjustment in West German industry consisted, to a large extent, in
scaling down the level of activity. In the 1980s, the pace of shrinkage slackened,
and the gap between the sectoral structure of West Germany and the interna-
tional average has not been narrowed.
16.3.3. Projected structural changes in West Germany
The production and employment structures that one can conceive for the West
German economy in the year 2000 are sensitive, according to the model used, to
the rate of growth of per capita income. Three alternative scenarios have been
chosen:
(1) In a "base scenario" we assume that gross domestic product per capita, in
real terms, will increase at an annual rate of 3%. This assumption is, by
and large, consistent with the growth trend recorded during the past 25
years and implies that the policy reforms initiated in recent years will be
maintained.
(2) In a more "pessimistic scenario" the annual rate of growth is assumed to be
1% lower than in the "base scenario". The underlying premise is that inap-
propriate domestic macro- and microeconomic policies generate distortions,
which hold back economic growth.
(3) In a more "optimistic scenario" we expect significant policy improvements
domestically, great headway in completing the internal common market in
the EC and a substantial trade liberalization resulting from the new GATT
round of multilateral negotiations (the "Uruguay Round"), which would
stimulate a faster growth rate than in the "base scenario". The projected
rate of growth is 4%.
The main tools for projecting structural trends are the regressions for "nor-
mal patterns" discussed above. Nevertheless, it would surely be inappropriate to
base the forecasts on those regression results alone. This would imply, for exam-
ple, the prediction that West Germany's primary sector is going to increase its
weight in the economy, since the estimated share of this sector in gross domestic
product at high income levels is about 4%, whereas the actual share in West
Germany is below 3% (Table 16.1). There is nothing in the foreseeable coal-
mining and agricultural policies which could lead us to expect a reversal in the
historical structural trend of this sector.
Therefore, the results of the regression analyses were adjusted according to
information available from other Kiel research projects on structural change
[Fels and Schmidt (1980); Schmidt et al. (1984 and 1986)]. Table 16.7 shows the
predicted sectoral shares in gross domestic product and in labor input for the
three scenarios in terms of overall economic growth as well as the actual shares
in selected previous years.
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At the three-sector level, the primary sector will continue to lose relative
weight in the West German economy, both in terms of value added and employ-
ment. Moreover, there will be a fundamental shift in production and employ-
ment from the secondary to the tertiary sector, and this the more so the faster
the economy grows. This is consistent with the ongoing move toward an
information- and communication-based economy.
At a more disaggregated level, manufacturing and construction emerged as
the main losers. In the case of construction, the decline of population in combi-
nation with a comparatively high degree of saturation in housing and road build-
ing provide a reasonable explanation for the decrease. In the case of manufac-
turing, a major impact might come from the unrelenting industrialization effort
in the Third World and the concomitant changes in the international division of
labor; hence, consumer goods industries will face a faster relative shrinkage than
investment goods industries.
The expanding sectors of the future are to be found among service indus-
tries. But not all of the service industries are expected to increase their share in
gross domestic product or in employment. The predicted shares of wholesale
and retail trade, restaurants and hotels and of transport and storage are below
the level of 1985. The major winners are communications, business services and
personal services. It should be noted that the share of these activities in employ-
ment increases, which should help to dissipate apprehensions (quite widespread
in this country) about the job-killing effects of the new revolutionary technolo-
gies
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CHAPTER 11
Growth of the West German Economy:
Forecast by the Bonn Model II
Wilhelm Krelle and Hermann Sarrazin
Summary
The Bonn Model 11 solutions for the FRG are compared with those of the
Bonn-IIASA world model. The models were constructed for different purposes
and according to different principles. In general, the forecasts of the Bonn Model
11 are more pessimistic than those of the world model.
11.1. The Bonn Model 11
The model consists of 480 equations, 151 of which are behavior equations. It is a
yearly model constructed to deliver medium-term forecasts. Table 17.1 indicates
the submodels and the number of definitional and stochastic equations within
these submodels. The table shows that the model emphasizes the government
sector and the social insurance system. The administrative regulations are
modeled in detail, following the administrative laws and rules of behavior.
The model as it stands now is a pure economic one in the sense that politi-
cal decisions as well as the variables describing the world economy are taken as
exogenous. There are four important domestic exogenous variables:
(1) The nominal wage rate agreed upon by employers and trade unions, which
is the result of a bargaining process that has not been modeled. The actual
wage rate differs from it by the wage drift, which is endogenous. For the
forecasting period we assumed a yearly rate of growth of 4.5% of the nomi-
nal standard wage rate.
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(2) Public investment at current prices, which depends on political decisions
that cannot be explained only by the economic situation. For the forecast-
ing period we assumed a yearly rate of growth of 5.4% of the value of
government investment.
(3) The central bank's supply of high powered money. For the forecasting
period we assumed a yearly rate of growth of 5%.
(4) The discount rate, which depends on the monetary policy of the Bundes-
bank. For the forecasting period it is kept constant at the 3.5% level.
Table 17.1. Number of behavioral and definitional equations in the submodels of the
Bonn Model 11.
Behavioral Definitional
Submodel equations equations Total
Domestic product and national income 13 42 55
Private final demand 5 20 25
Prices 17 39 56
Capital stocks, capacity and utilization ratio 2 11 13
Labor market 12 44 56
Foreign trade and balance of payments 12 35 47
Monetary sector 29 8 37
Public sector including 61 130 191
Total public sector (1) (46) (47)
Federal, state, local government (34) (40) (74)
Social insurance system (26) (44) (70)
Total 151 329 480
Tax rates and the rates of social security contributions are also held at the
actual level.
There are four important foreign exogenous variables:
(1) The real world market demand. We chose total world imports (in billions
of 1975 dollars) as an indicator and used the forecasts of the world model;
see Table 20 in Annex 3.
(2) The price level on the world market. We chose as an indicator the price
level of total world imports (in $) as forecast by the world model. This
series is not reproduced in Annex 3. We present the growth rates in Table
17.2.
(3) The foreign interest rates. We kept the long-term foreign interest rates
constant at 8%, the short-term and the Eurodollar rate at 6%.
(4) The exchange rate index of the DM with respect to all other OECD curren-
cies. We assumed a 1% appreciation of the DM per year. This, of course,
is a very crude approximation which is only used for the purpose of com-
parison. Otherwise, we use a special subsystem to determine the exchange
rates; see Krelle and Sarrazin (1985).
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Table 11.£. Rate of inflation on the world market = rate of growth of the price index of
total world imports.a
Year Rate of inflation (%) Year Rate of inflation (%)
1980 18.18 1990 3.86
1981 -2.97 1991 4.36
1982 -3.58 1992 4.74
1983 -0.51 1993 5.04
1984 -1.02 1994 5.25
1985 -6.37 1995 5.42
1986 -2.89 1996 5.53
1987 1.11 1997 5.60
1988 2.51 1998 5.64
1989 3.29 1999 5.66
aEstimated by the Bonn-I1ASA world model, see Annex 2. Up to 1984: observation; from
1985-1999: forecasts.
Thus, the Bonn Model 11 is only connected with the world model insofar as
it takes over the world market forecasts from this model. In all other respects it
works independently.
It is not possible to describe the real part of the model in detail, due to lack
of space. We can only briefly sketch the most important behavior equations.
The consumption function follows the permanent income hypothesis; the invest-
ment functions (as far as equipment and nonresidential structures are concerned)
are of the neoclassical Coen-type. The model explains investment in residential
structures, in nonresidential structures, in equipment and in inventories. The
perpetual inventory method is used for calculating the corresponding capital
stocks. They form an important link between the demand and supply sides of
the economy, because the maximal production capacity of the private sector
depends on the gross real capital stock and on the corresponding productivity.
Prices are determined by cost-push and demand-pull elements, the latter
being approximated by a measure of the capacity utilization. The value-added
tax burden has been considered separately for the various components.
Gainfully occupied persons are subdivided into persons employed in the
private and in the public sector, the first group again into employed and self-
employed persons. Employment (in manhours) in the private sector follows from
real production (which is determined by real demand) and from a labor
coefficient. The trend of the labor coefficient depends on the trend of the factor
price ratio and on the state of technology which in turn is explained by the aver-
age capital/labor ratio and a time trend. Short-term fluctuations of the labor
coefficient during the business cycle are taken care of by introducing the growth
factor of private GNP as an additional explanatory variable. Employment (in
number of employees) follows from employment in manhours and from the aver-
age yearly working hours per employee which varies over the cycle and is
explained endogenously. The actual labor supply results from the product of the
potential labor force (exogenous) and of the corresponding labor participation
rate. This rate is determined by a behavioral equation. It takes into account
hidden unemployment by using the "discouraged" and "additional" worker
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hypothesis. The number of unemployed follows from the labor market identity
as a residual.
Imports and exports are subdivided into goods, capital services, labor ser-
vices, and other services. They are explained by domestic and world market
prices, the exchange rate, appropriate activity variables and other items.
The monetary part of the model explains the allocation of financial wealth
and various domestic interest rates. The holdings of money, call deposits, saving
and time deposits of private households, of enterprises and of the government
sector are estimated by behavioral equations which follow from portfolio theory.
The ratio of each of these assets to the total wealth of the sector in question
depends on interest and inflation rates, activity variables and other items. The
monetary part of the model explains different domestic interest rates on the basis
of the discount rate, the free liquid reserves of the commercial banks, foreign
interest rates, the inflation rate and other items. For details, see Krelle and Sar-
razin (1985) and Sarrazin (1986).
17.2. Solution of the Bonn Model 11
We solved the model for three world trade scenarios - optimistic, medium and
pessimistic - which coincide with the solutions of the world model for the
optimistic, medium and pessimistic scenarios. Of course, this does not mean
that solutions of the model for the FRG, which is part of the world model, and
those of the Bonn Model 11 are consistent. The underlying assumptions are
different for the two models in other respects. If they arrived at similar solutions
nevertheless, we would feel encouraged to accept the results.
Table 17.9 shows some comparisons. We see from Table 17.9(a) that the
Bonn Model 11 forecasts more modest growth rates. The reason is that the rate
of technical progress is endogenous in the Bonn Model 11 and declines slowly in
the future (as it did in the past), whereas the rate of technical progress is exog-
enous in the world model and is supposed to recover from the decline in the past
(see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2). This may be seen from Table 17.9(J): the growth
rate of labor productivity decreases in the Bonn Model 11 whereas it increases in
the world model, with the exception of the pessimistic case. The results of the
pessimistic scenario are rather similar in both models as far as the growth rates
of GDP and of labor productivity are concerned. The assumptions of the
optimistic scenario in the world model seem to be too optimistic. Thus, we
should concentrate on the medium and pessimistic scenarios.
In Table 17.9(c), the consequences of the different approaches with respect
to the exchange rates used in the models become visible. In the Bonn Model 11
the exchange rate is an exogenous variable. Thus we are in a regime of fixed
exchange rates. A higher world market demand (as in the medium and optimis-
tic scenarios) yields higher prices [see Table 17.9( b) ] but cannot influence the
exchange rate. Therefore the current account surplus is larger in the optimistic
case, and the deficit is larger in the pessimistic case, than in the world model
where the exchange rate is endogenous and shields the country from external
influences to a certain degree. Given the actual exchange rate system now, the
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Table 17.9. Comparison of forecasts: the Bonn Model 11 versus the Bonn-IIASA World
model.
Bonn Model 11 scenario Bonn-IIASA World Model scenario
Optimistic Medium Pessimistic Optimistic Medium Pessimistic
(a) Real GDP growth rates (%)
1985 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.5 2.9 2.3
1990 2.7 2.2 1.5 3.9 3.0 2.1
1995 2.3 2.0 1.4 4.0 3.0 1.9
1999 2.4 2.0 1.4 4.0 3.0 1.9
(b) Rate of inflation = rate of growth of GDP deflator (%)
1985 2.2 2.2 2.2 3.5 3.9 4.3
1990 3.2 2.6 2.1 2.2 3.4 4.5
1995 4.0 3.1 2.2 1.1 2.7 4.2
1999 3.6 3.2 2.3 1.0 2.5 4.1
(c) Foreign trade balances (billion DM)a
1985 44.6 44.6 44.6 48.6 25.1 5.7
1990 75.5 38.0 3.9 99.8 48.7 6.5
1995 169.2 44.7 -58.4 106.9 42.3 -6.6
1999 319.9 78.5 -148.4 116.8 39.1 -15.9
(d) Growth rate of GDP per working hour = growth rate
of labor productivity (%)
1985 2.8 2.8 2.8 4.0 3.3 2.7
1990 2.1 2.5 2.8 4.3 3.4 2.5
1995 1.3 1.8 2.3 4.4 3.4 2.4
1999 1.3 1.5 2.0 4.4 3.4 2.3
a For the Bonn Model 11: current account balance [LeistungsbilanzsaldoJ. For the
Bonn-IIASA World Model: trade balance, including services, estimated by multiplying the
current S trade balances (including services) from Table 1!5 in Annex 3 with the S/DM ex-
change rate forecast in Table 1!9.
results of the world model are more realistic than those of the Bonn Model 11.
But even here corrective actions would be taken if the current account balance
increased as in the optimistic case or decreased as in the pessimistic case. As
already stated in Chapter 2 and as is apparent from Table 29 in Annex 3, the
preliminary exchange rate equations used in the world model should be replaced
by more sophisticated ones along with lines of the exchange rate system which
we originally wanted to use and which is presented in Chapter 8.
The effects of the different approaches to explain the price level are visible
in Table 17.9(b). We assume in both models that the monetary authorities fol-
low the monetarist line and fix the rate of money supply in advance. In the
world model the price level is explained by Fisher's equation. Therefore, an
increase of GDP will decrease the price level, if the velocity of money does not
change too much. This comes true in the forecasts of the world model: the more
optimistic scenarios yield lower rates of inflation. In the Bonn Model 11 the
general price level follows from prices which are determined by costs and by a
mark-up which varies in relation to the degree of capacity utilization. Costs are
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Table 17.-/. Unemployment forecasts from the Bonn Model 11.
Optimistic scenario Medium scenario Pessimistic scenario
Unemployed Rate Unemployment Rate Unemployment Rate
Year (millions) (%)a (millions) (%)a (millions) (%)
1985 2.30 8.27 2.30 8.27 2.30 8.27
1986 2.25 8.05 2.35 8.41 2.43 8.72
1987 2.23 7.97 2.46 8.82 2.67 9.58
1988 2.10 7.46 2.45 8.76 2.77 9.96
1989 1.93 6.99 2.45 8.75 2.88 10.36
1990 1.81 6.38 2.41 8.59 2.96 10.68
1991 1.59 5.59 2.31 8.22 2.98 10.77
1992 1.39 4.88 2.23 7.94 3.02 10.93
1993 1.17 4.10 2.12 7.56 3.03 10.99
1994 0.90 3.15 1.95 6.98 2.98 10.88
1995 0.63 2.20 1.78 6.37 2.93 10.74
1996 0.35 1.24 1.59 5.70 2.97 10.55
1997 0.09 0.32 1.40 5.04 2.81 10.37
1998 0.00 0.00 1.20 4.30 2.73 10.13
1999 0.00 0.00 0.92 3.50 2.64 9.83
aWith respect to the working population (Erwerbspersonen).
predominantly labor costs. They also increase if demand goes up. Thus, we
have the opposite effect: in the optimistic case the rate of inflation is higher than
in the pessimistic one. The Bonn Model 11 seems to be more realistic than the
world model in this respect. The world model does not have a submodel to
explain the nominal wage rate for the DEeD countries. This implies that this
rate is supposed to have no influence on the price level, and this means that
money wages follow the value of the marginal product of labor.
The world model does not provide unemployment figures directly. They
are interesting, of course. Thus, we present these figures as forecast by the Bonn
Model 11 in Table 17.4.
We see that in the optimistic case unemployment will disappear only in the
middle of the 1990s. In the medium scenario it will decrease very slowly, but
still be present at the end of this century. In the pessimistic scenario the unem-
ployment rate will still increase and only decrease from the middle of the 1990s,
but not much. Thus, in each case we have to live with unemployment for a long
time if the regulations and institutions of the labor market are not changed sub-
stantially, which is not assumed in our model.
11.3. Conclusions
The comparison of the solutions of both models shows that the models forecast
qualitatively similar developments of the German economy, with the exception of
the rate of inflation. The Bonn Model 11, in which the rate of technical progress
is an endogenous variable, comes up with more pessimistic forecasts since the
rates of technical progress assumed in the world model are higher. It is apparent
Wilhelm KreUe and Hermann Sarrazin 405
that the exchange rate equations should be improved in both models and that
the nominal wage rate should be introduced into the world model for OEeD
countries. The ranges of possible future development of the West German econ-
omy which are spanned by the world model include, by and large, those which
are covered by the Bonn Model 11, with the notable exception of the current
account balance for which the world model yields much tighter bounds.
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CHAPTER 18
Strategic Planning and
Economic Growth in Bulgaria
O. Panov and J. Djarova
Summary
The main characteristics and factors in the economic development of Bulgaria,
as well as their manifestation over a period of nearly 30 years, are considered.
The results of a macroeconomic model can serve the goals of strategic planning,
enabling an analysis and forecasting of various national policies that show prom-
ise of leading to economic growth.
18.1. Introduction
The problem of maintaining high and steady rates of growth is a problem for
every economy at each stage of its development. Economic growth is one of the
most important criteria of an economic system's vigor and of its capacity for pro-
gressive development. Basically, economic growth relates to three factorss of
production, namely: labor resources, production funds, and natural conditions
and wealth. While in the beginning of its socialist development, mainly in order
to speed up its industrialization, Bulgaria paid special attention to the manage-
ment of production volume and to the coordination of the factors of economic
growth, during the past 15 years economic policy has been reoriented to reveal
and activate qualitative impacts. For the increase of the final social product,
priority has been given to labor productivity, to the effective use and develop-
ment of productive resources and to the fulfillment of the individual and collec-
tive needs in society.
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Combining the qualitative and quantitative aspects to study economic
growth is a necessary condition for reaching the right results and conclusions and
for making meaningful management decisions. The goal set to achieve economic
growth for our country can be defined in the widest terms as a striving after
fuller satisfaction of the material, intellectual and cultural needs of society. This
will be fulfilled by growth of production and productive resources and, particu-
larly, by the efficiency of their utilization and the distribution of the social prod-
uct in line with the social economic tasks at the economy's stage of development
and the goals of society as a whole.
When the goal is to plan and manage the process of economic growth, the
mere analysis and management of the main production factors is not sufficient.
The factors of production show up in a specific way; in a particular environment
they create the driving forces of economic growth. Organizational and manage-
ment factors play an important role in this environment. The organizational fac-
tors are mainly related to economic structures, while the management factors are
related to the strategic planning of the socioeconomic development of the coun-
try. Strict differentiation is not possible, just as it is not possible to separate the
economic factors of production from one another. The type of structures, their
dynamics and structural changes are an outcome of strategic decisions. At each
stage the strategy has to conform to the actual state of the structures. The two
types of factors of economic growth - the productive factors and organizational-
management factors - do not exist independently of each other, either. The pro-
ductive factors create an environment of structural changes and strategic plan-
ning. At the same time, we cannot speak of strategic planning or structural
changes apart from the concrete state of production. Connections between the
two types of factors turn economic growth into a process, organized and
managed in a planned way.
18.2. Strategic Decisions - An Integrating Factor in
Economic Growth
The management of economic growth as a planned dynamic and continuous pro-
cess is mainly related to strategic decisions made toward the social and economic
development of a country. Strategic planning reveals the main problems of each
stage of economic development that are connected with the weakening of the
impact of some factors or with the predominant influence of some factors of
economic growth; one also seeks to discover the structures in the national econ-
omy that are most appropriate for reaching the goals of the country's economic
development. The strategic decisions are made in response to the problems
revealed, and form the nucleus of the country's social and economic policy.
As far as Bulgaria is concerned, some important strategic decisions can be
shown to have influenced, and still to be positively influencing, economic growth.
These decisions activated the impact of one or another factor at a certain period
of time according to the concrete need.
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The transition from extensive to intensive development emphasizes the
importance of the qualitative aspects of the factors of economic growth, mainly:
the efficient use of labor resources and fixed assets. The main goal of the stra-
tegy of introducing scientific-technical progress on a wide basis is to increase
production efficiency. Maintaining high and steady rates is mainly related to the
faster development and adoption of modern technologies in the country. A com-
plete restructuring of the economy and of production is planned on the basis of
computerization, of biotechnology and of new materials. The renovation of the
present technical equipment of the country is the main tool to implement the
goals of economic development in order to ensure a drastic increase of labor pro-
ductivity, an improvement of product quality, a reduction of the material costs,
environmental protection and, as a final result, the rapid increase of total pro-
ductive efficiency.
At present, the strategy of scientific-technical development has a complex
impact on the factors of economic growth. Qualitative changes in technology
and in the organization of production increase labor productivity, productive
efficiency and product quality. Changes in production technologies and new
product development aim at solving the problems of reducing the use of raw
materials, of other materials and of energy. Technology improvement is related
to labor productivity growth to compensate for diminishing labor resources and
to permit the restructuring of the labor force.
The development of the Bulgarian economy during the last 10 years, based
mainly on the newest achievements of science and technology, can be character-
ized as an intensive development. The productivity of the new technology is
nearly 40-50% higher than the average productivity in the country. Improved
skills of labor contributed significantly to the increase in national income. Thus,
at a constant assets/persons employed ratio, the growth of the national income
as a result of scientific-technical progress is 65% due to the improvement of skills
and 35% due to the higher productivity of the fixed assets [Angelov (1985)]. The
accelerated renovation of production in recent years has led to the increase of the
relative share of improved and new products in the volume of net material prod-
uct from 5.5% in 1980, to 13.3% in 1985, and 8.9% in 1986 [Statistical Reference
Book (1987)].
An important strategic document directly related to economic growth is the
"Program for Raising the Living Standard" of the country. The relationship
between social development (i.e., of man and society) and economic growth is
bilateral. Accelerated social development is a condition for the full reproduction
of labor resources and for increasing the efficiency of the persons employed in
production. On the other hand, the increased efficiency of the labor force as a
result of the influence of the social program accelerates economic growth. Stud-
ies show that the personal consumption of people employed in material produc-
tion as an indicator of the living standard has a positive effect on economic
growth. On the other hand, economic growth determines the dynamics of
change of the two basic funds, "accumulation" and "consumption", and is a
precondition for increasing personal consumption. Thus, during the recent 10
years at an average annual rate of growth of the national income of nearly 6.3%,
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the consumption fund has increased by 5.1% and the real income per capita has
increased by 4.1% [Factors 0/ Efficiency... (1985)1.
The program of increasing living standards influences the labor force and
helps to overcome the highly diminished potential for an extensive economic
growth. It creates conditions for turning labor force efficiency into an active fac-
tor.
The regional allocation of productive factors - to develop the country's
regions - is also of strategic importance for the economic development of the
country. The regional policy, formed on the basis of a complete accounting for
natural wealth and historical heritage and aims, has disclosed the possibilities for
a most effective development, in spite of its complexity. The regional allocation
of the productive factors restructures them in such a way as to bring production
closer to labor resources and to sources of raw materials and energy. This
increases production efficiency by coordinating the productive factors in a favor-
able way.
The regional policy's social orientation strengthens the impact of each
region's concrete conditions for the reproduction of labor resources and improves
the distribution of the financial resources for the socioeconomic development of
the region. The complex influence of the regional development strategy is a
premise for bringing all regional rates of growth closer together. The increased
economic independence of the regions is a premise for the search of specific forms
of economic and social vigor in the specific territory. Thus, the greater part of
the small and medium-sized advanced technological enterprises in the country
have been established in the regions.
It can be said, in summary, that the economic development policy of Bul-
garia has provided dynamic balance of the social and economic goals of growth.
According to the specific historical period, economic growth was the objective of
many strategic decisions. These decisions created conditions for the mobilization
of some factors of production and, above all, for increasing their efficiency.
18.3. Characteristics of Economic Growth in Bulgaria
Since its founding, the People's Republic of Bulgaria has achieved great
successes in the development of its economy. The gross national product has
increased more than 18 times, and the national income more than 14 times.
Compared to 1952, in 1985 the fixed assets had increased more than 10 times,
the foreign trade exchange more than 29 times, and exports alone over 30 times.
The social productivity of labor has increased 15 times. Nearly all the annual
growth of the national income is due to increased labor productivity. Industry
now produces 69.9% of the GNP and 60.6% of the national income. As a result
of the growth of the industries most closely connected with scientific and techni-
cal progress, machine-building and the chemical industry became the basic
industries in the structural composition of industry. About 15% of the total
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industrial production is attributed to ferrous/nonferrous metallurgy, to the
energy industry, and to the petrochemical industry [Statistical Reference Book
(1986)].
The volume of production of the traditional Bulgarian sector - agriculture
- has increased nearly 3 times in the period 1952-1985.
In the same period, social care increased substantially. Social funds per
capita increased nearly 12 times, and real income per capita 4.3 times.
The analysis of the real economic growth in Bulgaria is very important for
revealing the possibilities to control the factors of future growth. (All figures in
the text relate to the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which was founded in 1944.
Data and comparisons in the chapter refer to the period 1950-1985.) In our
analysis, we use the dynamics of the national income as a main indicator of the
economic growth. The factors to be considered in quantitative and qualitative
terms include (1) size of labor resources and labor productivity, and (2) size of
means of production and efficiency of use.
The dynamics of the country's national income are characterized by the fol-
lowing growth rates (based on data from the statistical annals of CMEA
member-countries) :
1951 0.357 1963 0.117 1974 0.070
1952/54 0 1964 0,089 1975 0.085
1953 0.182 1965 0.067 1976 0.063
1955 0.049 1966 0.110 1977 0.062
1956 0.016 1967 0.087 1978 0.053
1957 0.118 1968 0.058 1979 0.064
1958 0.067 1969 0.069 1980 0.055
1959 0.189 1970 0.073 1981 0.050
1960 0.073 1971 0.069 1982 0.043
1961 0.030 1972 0.073 1983 0.028
1962 0.019 1973 0.079 1984 0.044
These data suggest:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
By 1955, an increase of the national income at a very high rate.
By 1960, a tendency toward a decrease in the rate of growth but still at a
relatively high level.
In 1961-1965, the first fall in the rate of growth.
By 1970, an increase in the rate of growth of the national income.
After 1970, a constant decrease of the rates of growth - they reached their
lowest value at the end of 1970 and the beginning of 1980s.
The rates of growth of the national income are an indicator of the speed of
growth, while its absolute growth determines the possibilities to enlarge produc-
tion and to introduce qualitative changes in economic development. With the
exception of 1952 and 1954, the absolute growth of the national income has been
positive throughout the years of the country's development.
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18.4. Economic Growth and Labor Resources
Labor resources as a factor of economic growth have their concrete features, con-
nected with the biological laws of labor force reproduction and its cycle. The
analysis of the demographic processes in Bulgaria in the past shows that
economic growth has been only modestly influenced by the availability of labor
(defined as persons employed in material production). There is a tendency for
the number of those employed in material production to decrease in the period
considered, excluding the years 1965-1975. The exhaustion of the quantitative
impact of labor resources in the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the
1980s influenced the growth of the national income and had its impact on the
absolute decrease of growth. At the same time, in the largest material branch -
industry - more than 40% of the national income growth produced in it can be
attributed to the growth of the labor force. The positive impact of the extensive
growth of those employed in industry, building, and transport is mainly a result
of the restructuring of labor resources at the industry level.
The reasons for the smaller impact of the labor resources factor with
respect to its size are the following:
(1) Decline of both the birth rate and of the death rate.
(2) Fall in the growth rate of the active population as a result of the slowing
down in the rate of growth of the youngest age group (0-15) and its share
in the total population, and as a result of a growth in the share of the age
group over 60. (In Bulgaria the active age is 16-60 for men and 16-55 for
women).
(3) An increase in the number of employees in the unproductive sphere at the
expense of the total engaged in material production.
The trend toward a decreased impact of extensive labor force growth on
economic growth can be observed in all developed countries, more or less. In
this situation the role of labor efficiency becomes increasingly important. Pro-
ductivity as a main measure of labor force efficiency depends directly on the level
of skills, on the perfection of production and labor organization, on the techno-
logical level of production, and the right balance of those employed in industry
compared to those employed in other sectors. In the period considered, average
annual growth rates (%) of Bulgarian labor productivity were:
1951-1955
1956-1960
13.0 11961-1965
11.2 1966-1970
7.2
8.2 1
1971-1975
1976-1980
7.7
6.2
which had the following percentage effects on the growth of the country's
national income (in %) [source: Angelov (1985)]:
1951-1955
1956-1960
105.7 1 1961-1965
114.4 1966-1970
105.1
83.3
1971-1975 96.2
1976-1980 96.2
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Studies show that the ratio assets/persons employed in material production
had a considerable effect on labor productivity; the first grew faster than the
latter. The relationship of the two depends directly on the use of the production
funds.
18.5. Economic Growth and Fixed Assets
Fixed assets are the basis for the growth of the national income (Table 18.1).
Observations show that the fixed assets have increased in volume at relatively
high rates according to the country's stage of development. The quantitative
effect of that factor on the growth of the national income was, and still is, posi-
tive.
Table 18.1. Dynamics of the fixed assets and growth of the national income as a result
of basic assets growth.
Indicator 1961-1965 1966-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980
Growth of basic assets 162.2 168.1 153.4 147.0
Growth of national income based
on growth of basic assetsa 162.0 131.0 117.0 135.0
aEstimated according to the formula: growth of fixed assets (in %) X 100 divided by the
growth of national income (in %).
Source: Angelov (1985).
In terms of quantity, fixed assets have a direct impact on the volume of the
final product; and in terms of quality, they influence the national income through
the growth of labor productivity. An important characteristic of the efficiency of
growth is the output/capital ratio in the material sphere measured as the ratio of
the net material product to the value of the productive fixed assets. In spite of
the fact that the qualitative factors of production are now the main source of the
country's economic growth, the output/capital ratio is decreasing in the present
stage. This tendency is mainly related to the following circumstances:
(1) The cost of the modern means of production is steadily growing. This
creates a problem for the efficiency of the basic assets.
(2) The renovation of assets is not in correspondence with their age structure
at each stage of economic development.
As a result, the age structure of the fixed assets deteriorates. Thus, in 1970
the renovation coefficient was 12.7%, in 1975 it was 6.57%, and in 1982 it
reached 7.57%. To improve the quality of fixed assets, a strategy was pursued in
the 19708 which gave priority to the use of investment for reconstruction and
modernization. Some 70-75% of the total volume of investment in material pro-
duction has been used for that purpose. But adoption of the new technologies is
not always the rule, and sometimes it is not implemented on a high technological
basis. Moreover, fixed assets are not always used to their capacities.
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(18.1)
These factors, which influence the qualitative level of the fixed assets in a
negative way, also have a negative effect on labor productivity, which is the main
source of economic growth. Therefore, the policy of the country with respect to
science and technology is directed toward overcoming the restriction of extensive
growth of the fixed assets by influencing their quality level positively.
18.6. Forecasting the Economic Growth of Bulgaria
The main devices to support the strategic planning of economic growth are
models based on production functions or functionals. In Bulgaria the IMPRESS
model has been used as a tool for strategic planning. The name of the model is
an acronym for Interactive Model for Forecasting the Economic Development of
the Socialist countries (in Russian). The model is a result of joint work at the
International Research Institute of Management Problems (in Moscow), the
International Institute of Economic Problems of the Socialist Countries (in Mos-
cow), and the Institute of Social Management (in Sofia.)
18.6.1. General model characteristics
IMPRESS differs from traditional models of economic growth based on the use of
production functions and two main factors of growth - the number of persons
employed in material production and the size of fixed assets - by the following
features:
(1) The model incorporates as main factors the skilled labor force and the per-
sonal consumption of persons employed in material production. It allows
for a quantitative expression of the social factors of labor productivity
growth and identifies the effect of the complex factor of scientific and
technical progress expressed in live labor. The nature of the impact of
these factors on the issues of economic development is determined by the
use of elasticity coefficients. They are nonlinear functions depending on
many other factors.
(2) The growth path is described by a growth functional (18.1), in which each
factor is defined by its own trajectory. The functional is a nonlinear rela-
tionship describing the connection between fixed assets growth rates and
national income growth rates.
As a differential expression the functional can be presented as follows:
d Y + S dL + S dK + S dL 1 + S dC
Y L L K K L, L 1 c C
where Y is the produced national income; L is the number of persons employed
in material production; L 1 is the number of specialists in higher education,
employed in material production and research; C is the size of the personal
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consumption of those employed in material production; SL' SK' Se, SL are non-
1
linear functions of L, K, C, L, which express the elasticity of national income
with respect to the corresponding variables.
The elasticity coefficients present nonlinear functions of various other fac-
tors (fixed assets/persons employed, personal consumption, etc.). They are
mostly exponential functions of the following form:
(18.2)
(18.3)
(18.4)
(18.5)
where
In x, x ~ 1
q(x) = 0 , 0:::; x < 1
Kh=y, C/3 =-L
The decision (scenario) variables which determine the concrete solution of
the model are:
(1) The share of personal consumption in national income.
(2) The share of productive investment (investment in the material sphere) in
national income.
Apart from the hypotheses on the dynamics of these control parameters for
the specific forecast, exogenous estimates of the demographic situation and of the
skills of the workers in material production are also used.
Insofar as the model considers the change of the consumer's value
expressed by the physical value of the corresponding indicator, constant prices
are used. The parameters of the functional result from an estimation on the
basis of the economic development of Bulgaria in 1950-1984 in real terms.
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We tried different versions (scenarios). As a result some tentative forecasts
have been obtained for the years 1985-2004. They relate to the following group
of indicators:
(1) Absolute values, indexes and average annual rates of growth of national
income, fixed assets, and personal consumption of the population.
(2) Absolute values and average annual rates of growth of the efficiency as
return of funds (national income/fixed assets ratio, labor productivity,
assets/persons employed in the material production ratio).
(3) The contribution of each growth factor to the growth of labor productivity.
18.6.2. Use of the model
The forecasts are obtained by determining different scenarios for the decision
and exogenous variables. In designing these scenarios, the socioeconomic
development of Bulgaria by the year 2000 has been considered, and a strategy of
high intensification of production has been supposed as a basis for the increased
role of the intensive factors of growth. Scientific-technical progress should
become the leading factor of development. The strategy implies a continuous
improvement of the living standard. Moreover, data from demographic forecasts
to the year 2000 are used for the country.
Many versions of the model have been used. They form groups of charac-
teristic versions. At a constant share of the national income used for personal
consumption and for fixed assets in material production, different groups of
scenarios have been experimented with:
(1) An increase every five years in the relative share of national income used
for personal consumption.
(2) An increase every five years in the relative share of the national income
used for fixed assets.
(3) Mixed scenarios where the strategies described in the first two postulates
take turns every five years.
The model is solved for the period 1984-2000. The results presented below
are given as a value index with respect to 1984.
The basic version follows the tendencies of the economic development that
took place in 1950-1984. In 1990 it ensures an increase of the national income of
about 20% of the social productivity of labor as well as a growth of investment of
33% and personal consumption per capita of 21%. It shows an increase of 1.62
times in the national income in the year 2000 with an average annual rate of
growth of 2.5%. Labor productivity increases 1.57 times. According to this ver-
sion, the tendency toward a fall in the average annual rates of growth of the
national income continues, the return of funds (national income/fixed assets
ratio) decreases but at a slower rate, and labor productivity grows more slowly
than both personal consumption per capita and national income.
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The forecasts are best if the relative share of national income used for per-
sonal consumption is maintained in the first five years, and then grows by 0.05%
every year during the second five years, and by 0.1% every year until the end of
the forecast period. By the year 2000 national income and labor productivity
more than double as compared to 1985. Labor productivity grows faster than
personal consumption per capita. The return of funds decreases, but at a slower
rate, and stabilizes at the end of the period. All growth rates stabilize. The rate
of growth of national income in the year 2000 is 4.2%. This coincides with the
rate of growth observed in the year 1985.
Practical experience shows that strategic planning should be oriented to
manage the key factors at each stage of the country's economic development.
Forecasting models can serve as a basis for decision making.
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CHAPTER 19
The Growth of the Polish Economy
and Prospects for Structural Change
Adam B. Czyzewski and Wladyslaw Welle
Summary
Sources of economic growth and slump in the Polish economy in the 1970s and
the early 1980s are analyzed, with major emphasis placed on the role of foreign
trade. The model W-5 and the foreign debt submodel, briefly presented, are
used to perform simulations and construct forecasts of economic growth and
structural change during the next 10-15 years. Their dependence on foreign
debt servicing is analyzed in some detail. Then the assumptions and results of
the forecasts are discussed, with stress laid on the role played by imports of tech-
nology, under alternative assumptions of foreign credit availability. Increasing
rates of growth can be expected by the end of the present century, assuming
structural changes toward development of export-oriented, high-tech industries.
19.1. Introduction
The long-term prospects of the Polish economy are naturally determined by the
expected development of the main factors of growth, including capital equipment
and labor, their productivity being dependent on technical and organizational
progress, implementation of industrial research and development, and effective
management motivation systems. There are, however, barriers to growth of
these factors - the social and technical constraints in expanding investments,
labor force problems, declining resources of nonrenewable raw materials (coal) as
well as environmental constraints. We know from past experience that the utili-
zation of potential capacity may undergo serious fluctuations accompanied by
deep disequilibria. More specifically, we must acknowledge that in the middle of
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the 1980s - the starting point for future projections - the underutilization of
industrial capacities and shortages in commodity supplies were two of the main
characteristics of the Polish economy.
The integrated annual model W-5 of the Polish economy serves as the main
tool for the quantitative analysis and projections. The framework of the model,
including 13 groups of industries, determines the level of disaggregation of the
analysis [1]. The chapter begins by discussing the background of the develop-
ment of the Polish economy. Then the most likely structural changes on the
macro-level are outlined and the prospects for growth of the Polish economy
until the year 2000 are estimated. Special attention is given to the trade balance
deficit, which is analyzed by using a special submodel [Czyzewski (1986)].
19.2. Economic Background of the Polish Crisis
The 1970s were dominated by the policy of "accelerated growth", adopted in the
first half of the decade, yielding 10% rates of growth of the net material product
(NMP). By 1976, this was replaced by the policy of "economic maneuver" in an
effort to slow down the investment process and the foreign debt increase. Its
failure was one of the main sources of the decline of all economic activities in the
late 1970s and the early 1980s, a decline that was especially deep in the invest-
ment sector. The program of recovery, realized during the years 1983-1985,
brought a steady increase of economic activities, with the investment rates of
growth exceeding the planned levels. However, by 1985 the general activity lev-
els had not reached the previous (1978) values (see Table 19.1 and Figures
19.1-19.6).
One of the main reasons for the economic crisis was the failure of the policy
to expand exports in the 1970s, which were necessary to cover the foreign debt
servicing and imports. First, foreign demand proved to be insufficient to expand
the output of new plants to their full capacity levels (deep depressions being due
to oil crises and to trade and political restrictions, which were especially severe
in the early 1980s). Second, the pressure of domestic markets weakened export
propensities - this could be clearly observed in the meat market. The motivation
system did not favor production of exports. As a result, the growth rates of
exports were far below those of imports, especially during the second half of the
1970s, which led to rapidly growing hard currency indebtedness.
The balance of payments crisis with regard to the hard currency area,
which occurred in 1981/1982, and the lack of further foreign financing for either
current trade transactions or debt servicing, especially after the introduction of
political restrictions, caused a sharp decline in imports - exercizing a strongly
negative impact on the utilization of capacities and, at the same time, producing
a positive balance of trade. Since that time, despite the increased supplies of raw
materials and intermediate commodities from the USSR, imports remained the
main constraint for both higher utilization of growing capacities and investments
and implementation of new technology as well (see Table 19.2).
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Reduced possibilities of imports from developed countries in the late 1970s
affected, first of all, imports of consumer goods. Absence of efficient policies
aimed at slowing down the rate of growth of domestic demand led to the overall
domestic disequilibria, beginning with the consumer markets. Because of price
rigidities, excess demand easily spread from separate markets (durables,
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Figure 19.9. Growth rates of imports, exports, and net material product, 1970-1985
(constant 1982 prices).
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Figure 19.-4. Logarithmic growth of imports, exports, net investment, personal con-
sumption, and distributed national income, 1970-1985 (constant 1982 prices).
foodstuffs - see Table 19.9) to the overall market for consumer goods, leading to
rationing or quasi-rationing associated with an enormous increase in forced sav-
ings. Retail price increases, started in the late 1970s, were not sufficient to clear
the markets.
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Figure 19.6. Sectoral shares of net material product, 1970-1985 (constant 1982 prices).
These inflationary phenomena were accompanied by compensatory
increases in wages (29% annually in the years 1980-1985) and incomes, contri-
buting to the inflationary spiral. More specifically, a serious decline (9.8%) of
supplies of consumer goods in 1981-1982, reflecting substantial import cuts (by
10.2%) and decline of domestic output with rising nominal wages (51%), brought
about deep market disequilibria. For social reasons, the price increases,
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although quite high (in 1982 they doubled, and in the next years they increased
by 25% and 15%, respectively) were not sufficient to restore equilibrium.
The policy launched in the early 1980s, aimed at introducing important
changes in the management and planning system, is known as the economic
reform. It was expected to expand substantially the decision making at the plant
or enterprise level (including wages and, partly, price formation), leaving for the
central planner less direct commands and more financial instruments. The pol-
icy was intended to ensure more efficient use of production factors, and promote
a more rational investment process.
This policy was implemented in a rather unfavorable environment, as the
disequilibria prevailed over the early 1980s, with diminishing strength, related to
the general anticrisis policy. The latter, started in 1982, was aimed at increasing
exports (loosely import-dependent, such as coal) and extending the working
hours; it brought a partial recovery. High rates of growth of the NMP by 6.0%
in 1983, and by 5.6% in 1984 followed. However, a decline in the growth rate to
3.2% in 1985 showed that the new economic mechanisms were not fully at work
and the economy suffered from several weaknesses, the most important being:
(1) Notorious underutilization of capacities.
(2) Aging capital stock.
(3) Persisting inflationary spiral.
(4) Continuing increase of foreign indebtedness.
The above features were to be taken into account by the official programs
for the years 1986-1990 and those up to the year 2000.
19.3. The Integrated Model W-5
Economic development of Poland in the late 1970s and at the beginning of the
1980s brought a general decline in all activities, Le., it amounted to an economic
crisis. As this was not the consequence of the lack of effective demand, no
demand-determined models were used. Nor was it a result of underdevelopment
of production capacities. Therefore, the traditional approach to the construction
of econometric macro-models of the socialist countries, which assume full utiliza-
tion of production capacities, proved to be unsuitable to explain and forecast the
setback of economic activity and its expected revival.
The characteristics of the Polish crisis thus necessitated a search for new
solutions in construction of macro-models. They should be capable of integrat-
ing long-term mechanisms of economic growth of the socialist economy and
adjustment behavior patterns of more and more autonomous economic entities to
short-term constraints producing shortages and disequilibria. This motivated
the construction of the model W-5. Its special version, which makes an intensive
use of input-output relationships, called the integrated model W-5 of the Polish
economy, is briefly described below.
Adam B. Czyuwaki and Wlad!/81aw Welfe
19.3.1. The structure and main characteristics of the model
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The W-5 model is a simulation-type forecasting model with more than 1,000
equations; among them, more than 400 are stochastic. There are no more than
60 exogenous variables, excluding the dummies. They embrace strictly exog-
enous variables (characteristics of international trade, weather conditions and
demographic phenomena) as well as variables which are instruments of the
economic policy. The data for the model cover annual time series for the years
1960-1982, expressed, for the most part, in constant prices of 1982. Regression
equation parameters were estimated by OLS on the basis of annual data for
1963-1982.
The model covers not only real processes of production and distribution of
the NMP, but also - its distinctive feature - financial processes, together with a
subsystem generating the movement of prices. It was divided into 15 blocks of
equations which encompass:
(1) Employment, time worked, shifts worked.
(2) Investment outlays, investments put into operation.
(3) Fixed assets, scrappings, depreciation.
(4) Capacity output in terms of potential net output, degree of utilization.
(5) Net output, gross output and sales, deflators.
(6) Distributed national income.
(7) Market deliveries, retail sales, household purchases, deflators.
(8) Stocks of inventories, stock increase, deflators.
(9) Exports, imports, deflators.
(10) Money incomes, expenditures of households and the nonsocialized sector.
(11) Wages, wage bilI, pensions and other incomes; personal incomes, savings,
deflators.
(12) Financial accumulation of enterprises, other nonmaterial costs.
(13) State budget: income, expenditures.
(14) Balance of payments.
(15) Prices.
The degree of disaggregation is not particularly deep (it is lower than in the
standard 1-0 tables). It embraces the following sectors and branches in the
sphere of material production: construction; agriculture divided into plant,
animal and other production; forestry; industry divided into groups of branches
encompassing mining and power, raw material industries, Le., metallurgy, chemi-
cal and mineral industry, electro-engineering, light industry, food processing and
other branches; transport and communications; and trade. In the sphere of non-
material services, housing and communal services were distinguished. Specific
classifications of product flows directed to the groups of final users were adopted.
They refer to households (7 groups of expenditures), investments (3 kinds),
stocks of inventories and foreign sector (5 groups according to the SITC
428 ~ Future 011M World Economy
classification). The model generates information concerning the above blocks in
both constant (1982) and current prices and in US dollars for the foreign trade.
The feature that distinguishes the W-5 model from other models is that its
basic blocks can generate information about not only the resources and flows
realized in economic processes, but also about potential values of variables that
are unobservable. This refers to capacity output and its utilization and, espe-
cially, demand and supply and, additionally, excess demand. As for consumer
goods, it allows estimation of the excess demand for particular groups of these
goods as well as their global level (forced savings).
We should underline here that the W-5 model is the first large model for
the socialist economy which explicitly poses and tries to solve the above prob-
lems [2]. In particular, it was proved that the traditional use of a two-factor pro-
duction function is not sufficient to explain the decline of output in a period of
economic crisis. The role of material inputs must be analyzed and treated as the
crucial constraining factor which determines the utilization of capacities. Thus,
a clear distinction was drawn between the concept of the production function
suitable for long-term analysis - used to generate capacity output - and short-
and medium-term adjustments in the output levels reflected in the degree of
capacity output utilization. These adjustments, which are mainly due to the
constraints in supply of production factors, have been mostly interpreted in the
spirit of Kalecki's (1963) theory of growth barriers. As a result, we were able to
estimate jointly the adjusted production function parameters, including those
showing the impact of the capacity output utilization, and to generate not only
the expected output (offer), but also (unobservable) capacity and the degree of
its utilization (see Table 19.2).
The second important characteristic of the W-5 model stems from the
recognition that the traditional understanding of a demand function (for con-
sumer goods as well as for investment goods and materials - both domestic and
imported) is not sufficient to explain the real phenomena under disequilibrium
conditions. Thus, we suggest generalizing the concept of a demand function.
The effective demand - besides its notional value (being in accordance with
equilibrium conditions) - must contain additional elements showing spillovers
resulting from:
(1) Forced substitution - intergroup transfers.
(2) Postponement in its fulfillment - intertemporal transfers.
(3) Anticipation of changes in intensity of disequilibria.
The budget constraint must be redefined to include additional sources of
demand financing (mainly, forced savings). Moreover, a specific concept of dis-
equilibrium indicators for estimating the excess demand was formulated. The
difference between the effective demand function and that of excess demand
(both variables are unobservable) yields the equation explaining the expenditures
(realizations) which are observable. This enables the estimation of the param-
eters of this equation and also the separation of the effective and excess demand
[3] (see Table 19.9).
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19.3.2. Mechanisms of economic growth and balancing the economy
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The description of the mechanisms of growth follows M. Kalecki's analysis
(1963). The model identifies the basic relationships that explain investment and
production decisions. It defines the feedbacks between investment outlays and
output, changes in the efficiency of the investment process and changes in the
use of the capital stock by constrained capacities.
There is a "supply-type acceleration" rule defined in the model, which con-
sists of the following feedback. Investment outlays materialize in the form of an
increase of the capital stock after the time needed for accomplishment of the
investment process. Given the degree of capacity utilization, this induces an
expansion in the sector producing investment goods, too, which is further
accelerated due to technical progress. The national income growth achieved in
this way involves - given the investment/NMP ratio (especially "productive"
investment/NMP ratio) - a further increase of investment outlays (also in the
investment goods sector, see Figure 19.7). This autonomous growth process may
be cyclical if, for example, outlays for new start-up investment projects are con-
centrated in the first years of a five-year plan (which could not be confirmed for
Poland). It may be accelerated (delayed) by regulatory measures aimed at:
(1) Change of the investment share in national income and also in the share of
productive investment.
(2) Change in the length of the investment cycle.
(3) Change in the degree of utilization of capital stock depending upon, among
other things, barriers encountered in the production process.
To properly describe the phenomena of the period of the economic crisis,
we included broadly in the model - in the production functions - the growth bar-
riers concerning both fixed assets (equipment) and labor force supply, and also
foreign trade barriers (mainly against imports of fuel and raw materials). The
model offers the possibility to analyze the expected results of measures aimed at
enlarging (or limiting) labor force supply, mainly by means of social policy deci-
sions. Foreign trade barriers are presented in the model by making total imports
and their components dependent on exports and an assumed (exogenous) balance
of trade (by groups of countries), which obviously depends on external net
financing (debt servicing in the last few years). The high intensity of the above
barriers explains the decline in capacity output utilization and production itself
in the years of the economic crisis and their relaxation - the process of recovery,
especially in its initial stage (see Figure 19.8). The possibilities of relaxation (or
tightening) of supply constraints are also incorporated by introducing material
inputs (cost shares by industries) to the model; these depend on the foreign trade
constraints and institutional settings.
The modeling of the distribution and utilization of the NMP and national
income is closely related to the requirements for analyzing imbalances occurring
in the national economy and its particular sectors as well as recovery policies.
The model allows direct generation of the supply of consumer goods (deliveries
for the market, supply of domestic and imported commodities, retail sales, etc.)'
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as well as investment goods. At the same time, the model allows us to generate
directly final demand, especially for consumer goods (mostly that of households),
investment demand, foreign demand and demand for imported commodities.
Total demand for products by industries is obtained by using either the
input-output approach (including the use of bridge matrices) or its stochastic
approximations. The demand for labor is generated by using equations derived
from the production function. The demand for fixed assets is not directly
specified.
The possibilities of balancing demand and supply appear in the model in
almost all phases of the production process while the number of autonomous,
especially market-clearing, price mechanisms of adjustment is limited. It is
assumed that price sensitivity is shown mainly by households (demand
responses) and production units in connection with changes in prices of
imported commodities relative to domestic ones. As a result, the model gen-
erates the values of variables, showing directly the degree of balance tensions
(mainly, excess demand), (a) by the direct comparison of demand and supply on
the consumer goods market, forced savings, and total demand and supply by
industries at the producers level; or (b) indirectly by means of specific disequilib-
rium indicators in exports and material supplies.
It should be underlined that the central planner's measures aimed at re-
storing equilibrium have been partly endogenized. This takes place in the case of
investment goods when it is assumed that initial demand of economic organiza-
tions for investment outlays is modified according to the policy targets (e.g., pro-
tecting consumption levels during an economic crisis). Similarly, the demand for
imported goods by commodity groups is adjusted respectively to the financial
possibilities defined by the central planner. In the model, there are also many
other options available, including central planner interventions.
As for financial processes, we paid attention to the fact that wage increases,
being the main source of personal income increase, were related mostly to the
growth of living costs and to the growth of labor productivity but also to the
increase in tensions in the labor market. The possibility of the central planner's
interference is also considered in the model. The wage increase is one of the
main factors of cost and price increases. Thus, the inflationary loop was intro-
duced explicitly. It reflects the fact that growing living costs of household cause
a slightly less than proportional growth of nominal wages, which results in an
increase in labor costs (partly compensated by the increase of labor productivity)
and, therefore, an increase in production costs (if not compensated by saving of
energy and materials). These cost pressures finally lead, after some time lag, to
an increase in producer prices, wholesale and retail prices, and household living
costs (see Figure 19.9). The interference of the central planner, by limiting price
growth in an administrative way, is of short-term significance only. It is associ-
ated with the increase of subsidies, etc. After some time, it is followed by "com-
pensatory" price increases.
It is worth indicating that the model creates modest, yet interesting possi-
bilities for the analysis of the consequences of financial, monetary and fiscal poli-
cies, including loans offered by the banks, taxes by the budgetary authorities,
and government spending.
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19.4. External Debt and the Submodel of Foreign Debt
19.4.1. Foreign debt model
Observing the dependence of the economy on external conditions was the start-
ing point for elaboration of the long-term development scenario to be simulated
on the W-5 model. More specifically, the impact of alternative paths of growth
of foreign trade on convertible currencies external debt was one of the main
objects of our study. For this purpose, a special foreign debt model was con-
structed [see Czyzewski (1986)].
This model calculates the expected levels of foreign debt in response to the
assumed rates of growth of national income and the elasticities of total exports
and imports in convertible currencies with respect to the national income. These
three quantities are key characteristics of general economic efficiency in the
foreign trade area. Other assumptions, which can be altered, include: foreign
trade prices in convertible currencies, interest rates and overhead charges on the
assumed interest rates for delayed debt repayments and outstanding interest
(delayed principal and outstanding interest payments are explicitly defined in the
debt model). Assumed rates of growth of exports and imports in nonconvertible
currencies help to determine the rate of growth of domestic expenditures
(distributed national income).
Poland's debt model, used for convertible currency debt simulations over
the ten years' perspective, is built around the balance of payment equation and
contains the following variables.
(1) On the current account side: exports, imports of goods and the balance of
trade; balance of services and transfers, and interest on credits received
(iong- and medium-term only, including refinancing credits).
(2) On the capital account side: long- and medium-term credits received
(drawings, repayments) and refinancing credits (drawings, repayments).
Unlike many other models of Poland's debt, this model explicitly utilizes
information about time distribution of current credit repayments and
refinancing credit repayments since different types of arrears are charged
different interest rates.
The results provided by the debt model are helpful in understanding what
are the most desired general directions of structural changes from the point of
view of Poland's external financial commitments. After choosing the most favor-
able solution from the examined set of various admissible assumptions, an
attempt was made to determine the possible mechanisms for turning the solution
into economic reality, given the existing structure of the economy and historical
development trends.
Adam B. Czyuw8A:i and Wladydaw Welle
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The analysis of scenarios based on the debt model was preceded by an examina-
tion of the sensitivity of the results to isolated changes of individual assumptions
which compose a scenario [see Czyzewski (1987)]. The solution which served as
a basis for comparisons was defined by the following assumptions:
(1) Annual rate of growth of the national income: 3%; elasticities of convert-
ible currencies exports with respect to the national income: 1.5%; and
imports: 1.2%.
(2) For convertible currencies (annual rates of growth): import prices increase
by 4.5%; decline of terms of trade by 0.5%; increase of balance of services
and transfers by 6%.
(3) Interest rates: for long- and medium-term credits = 7%; for refinancing
credits = 9%; and charge for delayed principal and outstanding payments
= 10%.
These assumptions were combined with 5.5% and 4% rates of growth of noncon-
vertible currencies exports and imports, respectively, in order to get implied
rates of growth of the national income distributed. Table 19.4 shows the results
of this solution.
Sensitivity analysis led to the conclusion that the debt path is very sensi-
tive to changes in elasticities of exports and imports with respect to national
income. High sensitivity was observed especially with respect to changes in the
elasticity of exports. An increase in this elasticity from 1.5 to 1.75 caused a
decrease in the debt level in 1995 of $5.6 billion (18%), whereas a decrease in
imports elasticity from 1.2 to 1.0 produced a decline in the debt level in 1995 of
$3.4 billion (11 %). It follows that structural changes should aim at increasing
the propensity to export. A change in the rate of growth of national income
(3.5% as against 3%) resulted in a 1995 debt level which is $2.1 billion lower
(7%) than in the base solution, whereas lowering the rate to 2.5% yields a debt
level of $2.0 billion (6%) above the baseline solution. Finally, equal rates of
growth of export and import prices in convertible currencies lower the debt level
in 1995 by $3.9 billion (12%) compared with the base solution.
The above results were used to combine the assumptions into various alter-
native scenarios. The most interesting scenarios assumed the availability of new
credits of $0.5 billion p.a. in the years 1987-1989. Their analysis led to the con-
clusion that new loans will substantially contribute to setting back the debt
increase if the acceleration of economic growth is accompanied by significantly
higher rates of growth of convertible currencies exports than imports.
Table 19.5 shows the results of three scenarios of debt development in the
years 1987-1995 which assume an increase in foreign trade efficiency due to
foreign credits. These scenarios are denoted by letters A, Band C. The
assumptions composing scenario A are as in the base solution (Table 19.4),
except for interest rates for refinanced credits, delayed principal and outstanding
interests repayment (here 8.75%, 9% and 11%, respectively) and for the rate of
growth of nonconvertible currencies imports (here 3.6% p.a.). Scenarios Band C
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Table 19.,/. Results of the baseline solution of the debt model (in billions of US$).
Variable 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1999 199,/ 1995
Trade balance (1985
constant prices) 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.4
Current account balance --Q.6 --Q.6 --Q.5 --Q.4 --Q.4 --Q.3 --Q.l -0.0 0.3
Debt 29.7 30.3 30.8 31.2 31.6 31.9 32.0 32.0 31.7
Source: simulation based on debt model POLDEBT.
Table 19.5. Scenarios of development of convertible currencies debt.
Variable Scenario 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1999 199,/ 1995
Assumptions:
National income (% p.a.) A 3.0
B&C 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6
Exports elasticity A 1.5
B&C 1.5 1.5 1.55 1.6 1.65 1.7
Imports elasticity A 1.2
B 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
C 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35
Utilization of foreign A none
creditsa B&C 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0
Results:
Trade balance (1985 A 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4
constant prices)il B 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5
C 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.8
Trade balance (current A 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.1
. )a B 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.1prices
C 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.5
Interest payments dueil A 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2
B 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1
C 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9
Current account balanceil A --Q.6 --Q.5 --Q.4 -0.3 --Q .1 --Q.O 0.2 0.5 0.8
B -0.6 --Q.5 --Q.4 --Q.2 --Q .1 +0.0 --Q.3 0.6 0.9
C --Q.6 -0.5 --Q.3 -0.2 +0.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.5
Total debt il A 29.6 30.0 30.4 30.7 30.8 30.8 30.6 30.2 29.4
B 29.6 30.0 30.4 30.6 30.7 30.7 30.4 29.9 28.9
C 29.6 30.0 30.4 30.5 30.5 30.3 29.7 28.7 27.3
Domestic expenditures A 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6
(% growth rates) B 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2
C 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
'lIn billions of US$.
Source: simulations based on debt model POLDEBT.
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anticipate the availability of new credits ($0.5 billion p.a. in 1987-1989) which,
since 1988, are associated with increases both in rates of growth of the national
income and in the size of export and import elasticities.
19.5. Growth and Structural Changes of the Polish Economy
to the Year 2000
The simulation experiments performed by using the debt model and forecasting
exercises based on econometric macromodels have clearly supported the long-
term policy goals, which anticipate deep structural changes of the Polish econ-
omy. They should be accompanied by parallel changes in the planning and
management system toward increased economic efficiency. The external condi-
tions, especially the enormous foreign debt and the necessity for its repayment,
call for directing structural changes toward increased export capability and
efficiency. Thus, the criteria of structural changes should be similar to those of
the international specialization of production. The additional criterion, or rather
constraint, comes from the existence of domestic disequilibria and policies aimed
at restoration of the internal equilibrium.
19.5.1. Factors of economic growth
The natural point of departure in considering possible future changes in
economic structures is, of course, the existing structure of the national economy,
which can be analyzed from various aspects. Its most important characteristic is
the material structure of output determined both by composition of final demand
and availability of production factors. The next step is the identification of
structures expected to accomplish the economic and social goals, taking into
account potential resources and expected external constraints.
Analysis of the likely paths of growth linking present and future structures
reveals that the impact of extensive factors will be limited. Acceleration may be
expected solely from intensive factors leading to improved economic efficiency.
Employment in the material product (MP) sector, which grew in 1960-1983 by
1.4% annually while the population increased by 0.9%, will remain approxi-
mately constant in the period 1986-2000, except for the last five years, as the
population is expected to increase by only 0.7% and unfavorable changes in its
age structure will occur. The growth of fixed assets will continue, but its
momentum will be much lower than in the 1960s and the 1970s. In 1960-1980,
fixed assets in the MP sector grew by 7%, whereas the expectations for the com-
ing 15-year period do not exceed 3% in the 1980s and 4% by the end of the cen-
tury.
On the other hand, the growth of capacity output in the past was charac-
terized by a low utilization rate. In the same period of 1960-1980, despite an
increase in employment and adoption of advanced technologies in the 1970s,
national income grew only by 5.6%. As for the future, we can assume an
improved use of the production potential, due to some extent to restructuring.
Thus, taking into account the estimated effects of embodied technical progress
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(1 % of the increase of fixed assets is associated with an additional 0.6-0.8%
increase of output due to technical progress) and the average elasticity of output
with respect to fixed assets (= 0.5), we may expect rising efficiency of investment
efforts and capital stock use. As a result, the rate of growth of national income
should exceed the rate of growth of fixed assets.
The stagnation of employment and the pressure of the balance of pay-
ments, which will significantly constrain material and energy inputs, do not
allow us to presume that any major increase in the utilization of capacities will
occur in the next five years. The pressures to increase investment outlays will
thus arise either from new industries (structural changes) or from economic units
interested in modernizing their capital stock in order to increase their efficiency
(decrease labor and material inputs).
It must not be forgotten that the policy of protecting consumption, pursued
in the late 1970s and the early 19808, led to a continuous drop in investment
outlays. it was stopped only in 1983 as its continuation threatened decapitaliza-
tion and, in retrospect, a likely new stage of the economic crisis. Thus, despite
the low level of capacity utilization in the economy, there was a need to increase
net investment outlays (by an annual rate of 7%). After 1985, growth rates were
squeezed again to 3-4%, which postpones the restructuring process in industry to
the late 1980s. Faster growth of investment outlays would presumably lead to
deterioration of the economic situation in the short run. Its acceleration seems
feasible only in the 1990s, provided new imported technology is available on
credit terms. The level of fixed assets, however, should not be considered a
significant constraint of economic growth in the next years as the utilization of
capacities will probably remain on the low side. Moreover, under such condi-
tions, it might be profitable to slow down the increase of the capital stock by an
accelerated scrapping of old equipment and a simultaneous increase in the level
of utilization of the modern one (increasing the number of shifts worked in indus-
try, etc.)
Let us briefly examine the requirements with respect to growth rates from
the demand side. The minimum rate of growth should ensure maintenance of
the present level of consumption per capita. This means a 0.7% growth rate of
consumption, equal to the growth rate of the population. Together with the
required level of accumulation sufficient for a 7% increase of net investment
outlays, this calls for an approximately 3.3% annual rate of growth of distributed
national income. The rate of growth of net material product should be equal to
at least 3.5% because of the necessity to maintain a positive balance of trade. A
comparison of the likely impact of the extensive factors of production on the
growth rate of the NMP (estimated at the rate of 1-2%) with the lowest required
growth rate shows that at least 1.5-2.5% of the growth rate has to be brought
about by improved economic effectiveness, which according to our previous cal-
culations might be provided by embodied technical progress; in fact, it might be
considerably higher if we take into account the other sources of efficiency
Increase.
One of the most important factors determining economic effectiveness is
participation in the international division of labor (driven by export expansion),
conditioned in the case of the Polish economy by appropriate structural changes
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toward increasing export capacities. The gains from exports are linked, first of
all, with dynamics of the NMP which is, to a large degree, determined by import
possibilities.
The required rate of growth of intermediate imports is closely connected
with the dynamics of output and of national income. In 1960-1983, intermediate
imports grew by 6.2% while national income grew by only 4.4%. Thus, the
observed average income elasticity of these imports was equal to 1.4. It is
expected that an increase of the economic efficiency accompanied by appropriate
structural changes may lower this elasticity to the average level of 1.2 over the
period 1986-2000. The necessity to restore and modernize the capital stock
creates heavy demand for investment imports, which are the main carriers of
embodied technical progress. Thus, the share of investment imports should
attain the average level of 15-20%, depending on the rate of growth of national
income (in 1983 its share was equal to 7%, while in the 1970s it reached 22-24%
and never went below 13%). In practice, the level of investment imports will
depend mostly on preferred directions of product specialization. Imports of con-
sumer goods, whose share was comparatively low, should grow slightly to reach
the level of 15%, irrespective of the growth rate of the economy. Simultaneously,
a significant change in the structure of these imports should occur (now its main
component is food). It follows from these assumptions that the share of inter-
mediate imports should go down to 65-70% (depending on the desired rate of
growth).
The target dynamics of the Polish imports are conditioned by the availabil-
ity of foreign currency inflows, with exports being the main source. To estimate
the required dynamics of exports, additional circumstances, such as change in
capital accounts determined by the net increase of foreign credits and costs of
debt servicing, should be considered. Then, terms of trade changes and world
inflation rates must be taken into account to link the balance of trade expressed
in constant prices with the balance of capital accounts expressed in current
prices.
For the 1986-1995 forecast, it might be assumed that Poland's positive bal-
ance of trade with nonsocialist countries will be maintained (a slight growth
from 1.0 in 1986 to 2.4-2.8 in 1995 of billions of constant US dollars), but its lev-
els will be lower than the interest payments falling due in the forecasting period
(see Table 19.5). For trade with socialist countries, a slow improvement in the
balance was assumed, yielding approximately US$1.O billion in 1995.
Under these assumptions, a 3.6% growth rate of national income requires a
5-5.5% growth rate of total imports and 6.3-6.5% growth rate of total exports.
The results envisage structural changes which lead to an increase of the marginal
propensity to export under the assumption of a constant or slightly increasing
income elasticity of intermediate imports. However, these results reflect the
assumption that imports of technology and consumer goods will be further con-
strained due to balance-of-payments barriers.
Relaxing the above constraints and allowing for higher rates of growth (as
in Table 19.6) would lead to an increase in growth rates of the NMP in the 1990s
from 4% to 4.8%, accompanied by an increase in exports from 6.5% to 7.5%.
The growth rate of total imports would stay at the level of ca. 7%, assuming that
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accelerated imports of technology will be one of the main factors of increased
NMP growth rate.
19.5.2. The forecasts
The basic forecast of the main economic indicators is summarized in Table 19.6
and illustrated in Figures 19.10-19.12. The assumptions of the forecast were dis-
cussed at length in the last section. It may be seen that employment is constant
until the middle of the 1990s and increases thereafter. Fast growth of invest-
ment outlays and accelerated scrapping, which allow for the restructuring of cap-
ital stock, will induce changes in the sectoral structure of employment. These
changes reflect a decrease in employment in industry and simultaneous increase
in employment in other branches of the MP sector (see Table 19.6 and Figures
19.10 and 19.12).
( National income
NMP originating in industry
('
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Figure 19.10. Net investment ratio, national income, and NMP originating in industry,
1981-1985 (observed) and 1986-1999 (estimated), in constant 1982 prices.
The impact of declining employment on the level of output in industry is
compensated for by higher labor productivity in the 1990s in this sector, result-
ing from intensive factors. Labor productivity in the MP sector is assumed to
grow in the last five years of the forecasting period (see Figure 19.11). Therefore
the growth rate of NMP is expected to rise, from 4% in 1991-1992 to 4.8% in
1999 (Figure 19.12). Exports are expected to grow 1.5-1.6 times faster than
NMP over the whole forecasting period. Imports will grow at a higher rate than
exports until 1993, and then their growth rate will stabilize. Faster growth of
imports in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s is connected with the
growing share of investment outlays in national income, which in turn requires
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Figure 19.11. Growth rates of NMP deflator and labor productivity, 1981-1985 (ob-
served) and 1986-1999 (estimated), in constant 1982 prices.
Billions of
1982 zlotys
Millions of
persons
16.5
15.5
14.5
5.2
5.0
4.7
NMP industry
Employment
"'-....._-------...
..............--..............
Employment in industry ---.........
9000
7000
5000
3000
2000
1981 1985 1990 1995 1999
Figure 19.1fJ. Logarithmic growth of employment and net material product, 1981-1985
(observed) and 1986--1999 (estimated), in constant 1982 prices.
additional imports of investment goods and also compensating imports of con-
sumer goods. The forecast anticipates the use of new credits in years 1988-1990
to finance the increase of imports.
The picture of the development of Polish economy which we get from the
forecast shows that the effects of structural changes which are currently being
introduced will manifest themselves no sooner than in the late 1990s.
Adam B. Czyuw~ki and Wlady~law Welle
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[1]
[2]
[3]
A comprehensive description of the W-5 model is provided in the papers of W.
Welfe (1985a, b, c), prepared for I1ASA within the project Economic Growth and
Structural Change, ECO-I-1 and ECO-I1-l.
There are interesting attempts to apply the disequilibrium econometric framework
to small macro-models, accentuating the short-term adjustments mostly of the
central planner, but neglecting the production process. See Portes et al. (1983).
As for demand for consumer goods, this problem has found its widest presentation
in the series of studies by A. Welfe (1984, 1985, 1986). We also used here some
suggestions of Kornai (1982).
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CHAPTER 20
Structural Change in the Czechoslovak
Economy to the Year 2000
Karl Zeman
Summary
This chapter summarizes the basic findings from analytical and forecasting work
on feasible methods of restructuring of the Czechoslovak economy in the period
until 2000. The chapter concentrates on changes in the basic proportions of the
reproduction process under conditions of intensive economic growth and basic
trends in structural development. These trends are tested by a model based on
the assumption of linkage between the achieved level of economic development
and the structure of net material product and employment.
20.1. Introduction
The implementation of the long-term economic strategy for the comprehensive
intensification in the reproduction process requires structural changes in the
whole Czechslovak economy.
The structure of the national economy represents a socioeconomic system
that connects the division of labor and the efficiency of productive resources with
economic interests and objectives. Its optimum development is the outcome of
necessary changes in the combination and efficiency of utilized internal produc-
tive resources, the technical and economic level of the country, its participation
in the international division of labor, and its priorities and objectives of
socioeconomic development [Komarek (1985)].
The scope of structural changes connected with the intensification of the
Czechoslovak economy in the period until the year 2000 can be compared with
the scope of structural changes which occurred in the 1950s. They become more
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demanding when we assume that the implementation of these necessary struc-
tural changes will take place essentially on the basis of utilizing internal
resources while providing at the same time an increase in living standards and
strengthening the social confidence of the people [Pota~ (1986)]. When foreign
resources are called for, it will be necessary to limit them to specific purposes
and to assure their rapid economic repayment.
20.2. Changes in the Proportionality of the Reproduction
Process under Transition to Intensive
Economic Growth
The transition to economic growth with a predominance of intensive factors will
change the proportions of the reproduction process, which will have direct
consequences for the structure of Czechslovak economy.
In the period 1986-2000 the following changes in the proportionality of the
Czechslovak reproduction process will occur [see Hlavni smlry... (1986),
Komarek (1985), Pota~ (1986), ~edivy (1985), Vertelaf (1986), and Vintrova
1985)]:
(1) There will be faster rates of growth of produced net material product
(NMP) in comparison to the rate of growth of the gross output, which will
be reflected in a decrease of productive consumption and an increase in the
final product obtained from each unit of raw material and capacity. This
trend was already apparent in the period 1981-1985 and is a component of
plans for the period 1986-1990 (Table 20.1).
A change in the cited proportions of the reproduction process will
translate into slower rates of growth in the primary sectors of the economy
(agriculture and the extraction of raw materials). Other consequences will
include lower requirements for investments in the primary sectors of the
economy, which are usually more fixed asset-intensive. A decrease in fixed
asset intensity will in turn exert an influence toward decreasing the rate of
productive investments and hence slowing down the growth rate of produc-
tion of the means of production (machines and installations for invest-
ments).
(2) There will be more rapid growth of NMP than of industrial production.
For the first time in the history of a planned economy in Czechoslovakia,
the relation between rates of growth of both these indicators will change in
an essential manner. In the period 1986-1990 it is assumed that average
annual rates of growth of NMP will be 3.5% and of gross industrial output
2.9%, while in the period 1981-1985 the average annual growth rate of
NMP was 2.1% and gross industrial output 2.4%. This development in the
relative growth rates of both indicators should also predominate in the
1990s [Vertelcif (1986)].
(3) There will be a slowing down of the growth rate of production of the means
of production (a) in relation to growth rates in the production of consumer
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goods, and (b) as a consequence of decreasing the share of material costs in
the gross output (gross social product) and decreasing the rate of produc-
tive investments.
(4) There will be a slowing down of the decrease of the fixed assets/ out put
ratio, which until now has been decreasing in most branches of the econ-
omy. It is assumed that in the second half of the 1980s a slowing down of
the decrease of effectiveness will occur. Average annual rates of decline of
the fixed asset/output ratio (characterized by the volume of NMP per unit
of fixed assets in the material sphere), should achieve -1.1% during
1986-1990 as compared to -3.8% during 1981-1985 [VertelM (1986)].
(5) There will be the requirement that a decisive part of NMP increments be
covered by the productivity of labor: in the period 1986-1990 in the range
of 92-95%, as compared to over 80% in the period 1981-1985. According
to the findings of the long-term forecast for the Czechoslovak economy for
the period 1986-2000, it is assumed that the average annual rate of growth
of the social productivity of labor will be approximately 3.4%, while the
average annual rate of growth of NMP will reach a minimum of approxi-
mately 3.5%, which would essentially be covered by an increase in the
social productivity of labor (Le., by 96%) [Hlavn( smlry... (1986)].
Table !!0.1. Growth of basic indicatorsa in the Czechslovak reproduction process (aver-
age annual percentage change).
Indicator
Gross output (gross social product)
Productive consumption (without depreciation)
Gross NMP produced (including depreciation)
~In comparative prices.
Figures for 1985 represent expectation.
c Preliminary.
Source: V~rtehif (1986).
1981-1981J
1.7
1.3
2.1
1986-1990 c
2.2
1.2
3.5
The work which has already been done on the long-term forecast for the
Czechoslovak economy, as well as findings of research forecasting analyses, make
it possible to identify basic trends and directions which structural changes will
take in the period up to the year 2000.
The largest structural change will be the strengthening of the share of the
tertiary sector (which includes productive and nonproductive services) and
within its framework nonproductive services and an optimization of the share of
industry in the structure of the material sphere [Hlavn( smlry... (1986), Komarek
(1985), Sedivy (1985), and Vintrova (1985)].
A markedly lower share of the tertiary sector represents the greatest devia-
tion in the structure of the Czechoslovak national economy in the middle of the
1980s. A strengthening of the share of this sector is evidently connected with an
essential and long-term trend in the intensification process, which should also be
implemented in the Czechoslovak economy.
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The growth of the share of the tertiary sector should also be projected onto
the allocation of resources, especially labor. Some forecasting hypotheses are
based on the view that the absolutely predominant part of increments in employ-
ment during the next 15 years (if not their whole increment) should be oriented
toward the tertiary sphere [Summers and Heston (1984)]. The implementation
of this requirement is in harmony with the assumed objective, according to
which the predominant part of the increment of NMP will be covered by an
increase in the social productivity of labor [Hlavn( smery... (1986)]. The growth
rate of productivity of labor in the material sphere in this period would set free
labor and/or would make it possible to direct increments in the labor force dur-
ing the next 15 years to the tertiary sector.
It should be assumed, at the same time, that even when the tertiary sector
receives priority in the allocation of resources, its share in the Czechoslovak
economy in the year 2000 will still not have achieved levels which exist in com-
parable, developed market economies.
The basic macrostructural change within the material sphere will be the
optimization of the share of industry. Changes in the relation between the rate
of growth of industrial output and NMP in the period 1986-1990 will reflect this
trend, which will continue throughout the 1990s, also as a consequence of
assumed changes in the internal structure of Czechoslovak industry [V~rtelaJ
(1986) and Zeman (1984,1985)].
20.3. A Model for Testing Development Trends in the
Structure of the Czechoslovak Economy
Our model for testing development trends in the structure of the Czechoslovak
economy is based on an understanding of economic growth as a transformation
process. In its course, changes in the structure of the Czechoslovak economy
depend upon changes in economic (and other) conditions. In this context the
linkage between the achieved level of economic development and the structure of
NMP produced (and used) is considered to be of basic importance. This
transformation process contains elements of both continuity with past develop-
ments and of breaks that guide the development of the economy to new trajec-
tories of economic growth.
The strategy of a transition to the intensification of economic growth
adopted by the European member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) has many common features, which are reflected in the struc-
tural adaptation of their economies. For this reason we have made use of com-
parisons with such trends in other selected European CMEA member countries
in testing the model of development trends in the structure of the Czechoslovak
economy. Our basic critierion for selecting these countries was the level of
economic development they have achieved (a higher level as far as the CDR is
concerned, and a lower one for Hungary and Poland) and the fact that they are
found in the same economic region of Europe as Czechoslovakia.
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Our hypothesis for the testing (verification) of development trends in the
macroeconomic structure of the Czechoslovak and other selected European
CMEA economies was based on the assumption of a linkage between the
achieved level of economic development, the structure of NMP, and employment.
The existence of this linkage is also reflected in the changes which - on the basis
of input-output relations - exist in the structure of factors of economic growth.
With the increased development of productive forces, opportunities for combin-
ing productive factors change. Opportunities for substitution exist between both
factors of economic growth (labor force, fixed assets, natural resources) and the
factors which influence the efficiency of the reproduction process as a whole (Le.,
the qualification of the labor force, attitudes and values of people in the repro-
duction process, production technologies and structure of the total economy).
The assumption that each stage of economic development in a specific
country is related (ceteris paribus) to a specific structure of the national
economic complex [UN (1963, 1977) and UNIDO (1980)] has been strengthened
by the theory of economic complexes in the world economy, for the purpose of
analyzing the economic development of the socialist countries [Tauchman (1971,
1981].
On the basis of this theory, we can formulate a working hypothesis accord-
ing to which changes in the structure of national economic complexes in time
and space (in relation to other national economic complexes) are the outcome of
changes in economic conditions, i.e., the achieved level of development of produc-
tive forces (characterized in a summary manner by the indicator of economic
level), natural conditions and the status of the given complex relative to the
national economic complexes of other countries.
20.3.2. Specification of a model
The working hypothesis cited above has been applied with the aid of a model
which makes it possible to distinguish two basic types of development of mutual
links between the structure of national economic complexes (vertical-input and
horizontal-output) and the level of economic development:
(1) A monotonic type of development which takes place when the share of a
given part in the whole grows or declines with the growth of the absolute
level of economic development.
(2) A nonmonotonic type of development, which takes place when the share of
a given part in the whole grows with an increase in the level of economic
development and in further stages of development declines and/or is stabil-
ized or vice versa.
On the basis of existing experience, the following regression function has
proved to be best suited for expressing a nonmonotonic type of relationship since
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it makes it possible to project the structure of a given aggregate indicator
directly (without any corrections and external intervention, i.e., fulfilling the
requirement that the sum of elements or shares in the analyzed aggregate =
1.00) [Scheper and Reichenbach (1973)1:
slog -- = log a + b log U + n1 - s
where:
log = base-lO logarithms
s = share of partial component in whole
a = const.
b = regression coefficient
U = absolute magnitude of economic level
n = random variable
(20.1 )
Regression function (20.1) in a modified form was used for the purpose of
making a projection of the structure of the NMP and employment (naturalloga-
rithms were used):
8 1In S = b + a In U
2
(20.2)
in which 8 Ii8 2 = the relation of complementary groups.
To obtain the dependent variables sand/or 8Ii8 2, it is always necessary to
divide the unit under analysis (NMP, employment) into two complementary
groups, because the adding-up constraint is preserved only in that way. Thus, a
whole sequence of divisions into two parts was applied [1].
By using function (20.1) and/or (20.2) we can estimate the ratio of shares
of complementary subgroups in the higher groups as a function of the absolute
magnitude of economic level (U). Estimation functions (20.1) and (20.2) also
make it possible to identify the nonmonotonic links that "forecast" the develop-
ment of the individual shares in a logistic trend, which corresponds to the real
development of national economic structure and productive forces.
In spite of the fact that this estimation function "forecasts" a slower
development of structural change than, for instance, exponential types of func-
tions, if we accept the hypothetical assumption of unlimited economic growth
(i.e., a situation where U ----+ 00), its application would lead to a situation where
the share of one industry would approach one and all others would approach
zero. This theoretical finding could also lead us to the conclusion that we are, to
a certain extent, over-valuing the speed of structural changes, even when we are
using this type of function.
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The specification of the model makes it clear that the forecasting analysis
has been developed on the basis of the genetic method. A model of logistic
trends based on analyses of the development of time series has been used. This
introduces the assumption that a similar type of development of links between
economic level (an explanatory variable) and the shares (relations) of comple-
mentary groups (dependent variables), which occurred in the interpolated period
(analysis), will also occur in the projected period (extrapolation) of the model.
20.3.3. Statistical information
Analysis of development trends in the macroeconomic structure of the Czechoslo-
vak economy (and comparison countries) was developed on the basis of statisti-
cal data obtained from IIASA [Dobrinsky (1986)] and CMEA [Statisti~eskij...
(n.d.)] statistical sources, which characterized:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The development of the structure of NMP in national currencies and con-
stant prices during 1960-1982, extrapolated to the year 1985 with the help
of a net material product (NMP) index.
The development of the structure of population employed in the material
sphere and in the whole national economy.
The level of achieved economic development (U) on the basis of an interna-
tionally comparable per capita indicator of gross domestic product (GDP)
(in comparable currency equivalents - US dollars). Data from international
UNO projects have been used for this purpose [Summers and Heston
(1984)].
The analysis has been carried out by considering individual branches of the
material sphere, i.e., agriculture (including forestry), industry, construction,
transportation and communications, trade and others (their sum = 100.0%) and
branches of the material and nonmaterial spheres (in terms of employment), i.e.,
agriculture (including forestry), industry, construction, transportation and com-
munications, trade and the nonmaterial sphere (NMS), according to a CMEA
classification of branches.
Interpolation of the model was carried out for two periods, to which two
alternative extrapolations of the model (1986-2000) correspond: A = 1960-1985;
B = 1970-1985. The choice of these periods was determined by the
differentiation (change) of targets and means found in economic growth trajec-
tories and in adaptation of the structure of the national economy to changes of
foreign and domestic conditions in Czechoslovakia and the comparison countries.
20.4. Ex ante Simulation
The purpose of extrapolating the model's parameters was not to compare alter-
native macroeconomic projections of the Czechoslovakian national economic
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complex (characterized by the structure of NMP and by employment) with those
of the selected European CMEA countries, but rather to identify the conse-
quences of adaptation to changes in domestic and foreign economic conditions.
For this reason the cited alternative projections should not be understood as
forecasts of the actual development of macroeconomic structures in the countries
being compared, but as the verification of changes in their structure and valida-
tion of the links between variables in the model for the period of extrapolation
(1986-2000) [2].
For interpolation (and extrapolation) requirements, NMP and employment
have been divided into complementary groups (8) of branches according to cri-
teria derived from our working hypothesis, i.e., according to the development of
their share, depending on the achieved level of economic growth, which is charac-
terized by the indicator of economic level (U).
The following changes have taken place in the structural proportions of the
sphere of material production (i.e., net material product and employment),
together with the growth of absolute magnitudes of economic level (U = expla-
natory variable) during the period 1960-1985:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
The share of agriculture has been declining.
A deceleration of increases in the share of industry, including construction,
in the structure of material production (without agriculture) has occurred.
Unit increments of the share of industry have been accompanied by
decreasing increments in the share of construction.
The structure of productive services (transport, communication and trade)
has changed in favor of trade.
As far as the structure of employment within the whole national economy is
concerned, an increase in the absolute magnitude has been accompanied by
the following changes during the period 1960-1984:
The share of material sphere branches has declined.
The share of agriculture in the structure of material sphere productive
branches has declined.
The share of the nonmaterial sphere (services) in the structure of the
tertiary sector has increased (material and nonmaterial services).
Changes in the share of industry have been accompanied by smaller
increments in the share of construction.
The structure of productive services (transport, communication,
trade) has changed in favor of trade.
Our interpretation of the findings obtained by extrapolating the parameters
used in the model for the period 1985-2000 are based on the assumption that
these structural trends will continue and will be influenced by the assumed
acceleration of economic growth rates in all the countries compared. This
acceleration should also be reflected in accelerated annual rates of growth of
GDP per capita (U) in the period 1985-2000 (CSSR 3.0%, GDR 4.6%, Hungary
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3.1%, Poland 3.2%), when compared with the period 1961-1984 (CSSR 2.0%,
GDR 3.3%, Hungary 2.6%, Poland 1.9%) [UN (1986); Summers and Heston
(1984)].
20.4.1. Structural shifts within the material sphere
A characteristic development in the branch structure of the material sphere,
both in Czechoslovakia and the comparison countries during the past 25 years
(1960-1985), was the creation of a structure that corresponds to the achieved
high level of economic and industrial development. Both in Czechoslovakia and
the countries compared with it, as the absolute magnitude of the economic level
increases, the share of agriculture decreases and the share of industry, in the
structure of both net material product (Table 20.2) and employment in the
material sphere (Table 20.9), increases.
The differences in the shares of agriculture and industry that exist among
the countries under comparison, to a great extent, reflect differences in their
achieved level of economic development (U). Interpolation of our model indi-
cates a generally very close linkage between economic growth and declining share
of agriculture (including forestry) in the structure of both NMP and employment
in the material sphere (details on the econometric estimations are available upon
request).
During the period 1970-1985 the tight nature of these links decreased, espe-
cially in Hungary and Poland. This was due to the influence of economic policies
oriented in a more marked manner toward achieving agricultural self-sufficiency
in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, the increased importance of this branch in
creating the specialization profile of the economy in Hungary, and dealing with
the specific conditions which existed in the national economy of Poland (espe-
cially in the period 1980-1984). These influences have been projected into the
extrapolated parameters of the model according to alternative B (with the excep-
tion of the structure of the NMP produced in Czechoslovakia, where the decline
in the share of agriculture has been accelerating).
The real development of the share of agriculture in the structure of the
NMP, both in Czechoslovakia and the countries under comparison, in the period
up to the year 2000 will probably tend toward a slower decline, depending upon
the increased role of agricultural output in creating a specialization profile in
these countries (for instance, in Hungary and Poland). Decreases of the share of
agriculture in employment in the material sphere will depend on opportunities
for increases in the productivity of labor in this branch.
The strategy for economic development in Czechoslovakia and in the coun-
tries under comparison for the next 15 years is based on the assumption of main-
taining the dominant role of the industrial complex. On the other hand, we can
assume that during this period growth rates of the share of this branch in the
NMP structure will slow down.
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Construction's share in the structure of net material product will, to a
greater extent, be influenced by that branch's structural adaptations to new
requirements for the reconstruction of housing and the modernization of the pro-
ductive base. Pressures to increase efficiency in this branch in all countries will
probably lead to a stabilization of its share in the structure of the NMP and
employment in the material sphere.
The continuation of development trends from the past period (1960-1984)
into the period for which the model has been extrapolated (Tables 20.2 and 20.9)
would lead to a reproduction of existing characteristics of structural proportions
in the material sphere, Le., a fairly high share for industry (including construc-
tion) and insufficient development of productive services (transportation, com-
munications and trade). Analyses and forecasting studies agree that one of the
decisive prerequisites for the intensification of the material sphere, especially in
the economically highly developed European CMEA member countries (i.e.,
Czechoslovakia and the GDR), is the adequate (proportional) development of
productive (and nonproductive) services [Komarek (1985), Sedivy (1985), and
Vencovsky (1986)].
Extrapolations of the model indicate that a continuation of existing produc-
tion trends would mean a general continuation of the decline in the share of
transportation and communications (which is very marked in Czechoslovakia)
and of the trade sector in the GDR and Poland. Only in Czechoslovakia and
Hungary is a trend toward a continuing increase in the share of trade in the
structure of the net material product in evidence. These trends are also
apparent in the development of employment structures in the sphere of material
production.
20.4.2. Structural shifts within the national economy
The available statistical data make it possible to characterize the development of
the structure of the whole national economy in Czechoslovakia on the basis of
the structural proportions of total employment.
Employment development in Czechoslovakia (and the countries under com-
parison) is characterized by a significantly close link between economic growth
and decline in the share of agriculture (including forestry), a slight decline or no
change in the share of industry (including construction) and an increase in the
share of the nonmaterial sphere.
The branch structure of employment (Table 20.4) in the analyzed countries
allows us to identify the influence of differences in the achieved level of economic
development in these countries: a lower share of agriculture and a higher share
of industry (including construction) in Czechoslovakia and the GDR in com-
parison with Hungary and Poland. Smaller differences exist among Czechoslo-
vakia, the GDR and Hungary as far as productive and nonproductive services
are concerned.
A continuation of existing development trends in the structure of total
employment will strengthen an increase in the share of the tertiary sector (Le.,
transport and communication, trade and nonproductive services), as well as
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458 The Future of the World Economy
more marked increases in the share of nonproductive services (Table 20.4). The
share of nonproductive services within the structure of the tertiary sector is
increasing in all the countries analyzed (only in Hungary is this share stable).
We can assume a continuation of this trend for the period until the year 2000.
The development of the employment structure within the national economy
of Czechoslovakia (and the countries compared) indicates that objective trends
exist which are characteristic links between degrees of economic development
and structure of national economic complexes, just as in other developed coun-
tries. But t.hey are modified by the influence of preceding historical develop-
ments and the different target function for the economies of the socialist coun-
tries.
In the context of the achieved level of economic development in Czechoslo-
vakia (and the countries compared), there will be a more marked tendency
toward optimization in the share of agriculture, stabilization in the share of
industry and an increase in the share of productive and nonproductive services in
the structure of the national economy. The trend toward an increase in the
share of the tertiary sector is in harmony with the requirements and demands for
improved living standards. The efficient development of productive and nonpro-
ductive services also creates the prerequisites for an intensification of production
in the primary and secondary sectors. The growth of nonproductive services is
of particular significance for the quantitative and qualitative reproduction of the
labor force. On the other hand, the development of the tertiary sector depends
upon increases in the productivity of labor in the secondary sector (and in the
primary sector), especially from the point of view of freeing and transferring
labor from this sector to the tertiary sector.
The cited development trends in the structure of employment in the period
for which the model was extrapolated will be corrected by the specific economic
conditions under which the planned development of the Czechoslovak national
economy will be implemented. Under these conditions, transfers of labor force
among the three sectors will be influenced by opportunities for increases in the
productivity of labor in those sectors which will free labor (especially in various
branches of manufacturing and partially also agriculture). We can thus assume
that the above-cited alternatives (A and B) for the development of the employ-
ment structure express conditions for the division of labor in the national econ-
omy which accompany the growth of the economic level. It seems that a clear
relationship exists between the efficient development of the secondary sector
(and the whole national economy) and the development of the tertiary sector.
Karl Zeman
Notes
[1] The subdivision of NMP is as follows:
459
The subdivision of employment follows this scheme.
[2] Regression analysis was performed by J. Hutal', research member of the Central
Institute of Economic Research, Prague.
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CHAPTER 21
Economic Development of the CSSR:
Analysis and Conditional Forecasts
Ivan Su;"an
Summary
This chapter contains the results of analysis and forecasts of the Czechoslovak
economy covering the period 1970-2000. We have used an econometric macro-
model which explains the relationships between basic indicators of the
Czechoslovak economy, as well as the foreign trade flows between European
CMEA countries. The ex post analysis indicates the sources of slowdown in
economic growth: deterioration of some external economic conditions and rela-
tive exhaustion of extensive growth resources are identified as the main negative
factors. Conditional forecasts show that the planned long-term growth targets
would be feasible under certain changes in economic structure and management,
e.g., more investment to reduce the material and energy intensity of production.
21.1. Introduction
During the past 15 years the Czechoslovak economy has faced serious problems
in external and internal economic conditions. Similar to other Eastern European
countries, these problems resulted in a slowdown of economic growth [UN
(1986)]. The average annual growth rate of gross national income (GNI, i.e.,
national income originating in the material sphere extended by depreciation
charges - the main synthetic planning indicator in Czechoslovakia) declined from
5.85% in 1970-1975 to 3.83% in 1975-1980 and 2.16% in 1980-1985.
In published official documents a certain acceleration of economic growth
at an annual rate of at least 3.5% is envisaged for the period 1986-2000 [Hlavna
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smery... (1986)]. This development strategy is mainly based on the assumed
transition to an intensive (resource efficient) path of economic growth.
In this chapter some results of an ex post analysis and conditional forecasts
of the most important indicators of the Czechoslovak economy are presented.
The main purpose of the ex post analysis (Section 21.3) is to identify the sources
of slowdown in the growth rates in 1980-1985 as compared with the period
1970-1980. Conditional forecasts (Section 21.4) show the feasibility of long-term
growth rates until the year 2000 in several variants under different scenarios.
Both the ex post analysis and conditional forecasts are based on computer simu-
lations using our econometric macromodel
21.2. The Econometric Macromodel
In our simulation analysis and forecasts, we used an econometric macromodel
which consists of two partial models:
(1) A central econometric model of the Czechoslovak economy (version CEM-4
consisting of 218 equations and 349 variables).
(2) A matrix model of foreign trade between European CMEA countries (ver-
sion MMZO-3.2 consisting of 43 equations and 129 variables).
Both partial models are parts of the System of Models for Macroeconomic
Analyses (SMMA), which has been developed in the Institute of Socio-Economic
Information and Automation in Management (VUSEI-AR, formerly Computing
Research Center UNDP) in Bratislava [Klas (1985)]. The models are stochastic,
dynamic and nonlinear.
A description of the models used may be obtained from the author. Infor-
mation on the earlier (slightly different) versions of these models is given in
Sujan (1984) and Sujan and Strauch (1986).
21.3. Economic Growth in the CSSR, 1970-1985
21.3.1. The simulation procedure
We identified 17 significant factors (see Table 21.2 below), classified into five
groups (see Table 21.1), which contributed to the changes in growth rates of the
main macroeconomic indicators. Each factor is represented by a group of exog-
enous variables of the joint econometric macromodel. A set of dynamic simula-
tions was used to separate the contributions of each factor to the growth rates of
endogenous variables in the period under investigation.
This simulation procedure was used separately for the periods 1970-1980
and 1980-1985. Positive or negative changes in the factor contributions to the
average annual growth rates of endogenous variables in the two periods indicated
the sources of acceleration or deceleration in economic growth.
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Table 21.2. Factor contributions to the growth rates of GMP produced and used (in
constant prices).a
Factors
Gross national
income (GN!)
70- 80-
80 85 ~
Domestic use
o/GN!
70- 80-
80 85 ~
Total average annual
rate of growth (%)
Contributions of:
4.84 2.16 -2.68 4.30 0.62 -3.68
World economic activity
Position of the CSSR
economy in CMEA
Availability of raw
materials at foreign
markets
Changes in foreign prices
of raw materials
Other external factors
Efficiency of CSSR
foreign trade
Changes in CSSR
export performance
Changes in material
intensity of production
Contribution of technical
progress
Changes in employment
Energy consumption in
material sphere
Regulation of investment,
structure of production
and sales
Regulation of wages
Increase in retail prices
Inertial factors from
preceding periods
Other internal factors
Random factors
0.15
-0.01
0.97
-0.66
-0.06
0.01
0.01
0.36
1.10
-0.07
2.03
-0.00
-0.12
0.03
1.21
0.02
-0.13
-0.05
0.26
-0.03
-0.86
0.04
0.11
0.00
0.50
0.95
om
0.76
0.12
-0.06
-0.25
0.45
-0.09
0.30
-0.20
0.27
-1.00
-0.20
0.10
0.10
-0.01
0.14
-0.15
0.08
-1.27
0.12
0.06
-0.28
-0.76
-0.11
0.43
-0.36
0.07
1.43
-1.16
0.04
-0.56
-0.15
0.43
1.33
-0.02
2.39
0.08
-0.24
-0.10
1.28
-0.01
-0.15
-0.20
0.23
-0.03
-2.10
0.11
-0.34
-0.17
0.58
1.15
0.04
0.93
0.06
-0.02
-0.41
0.64
-0.31
0.46
-0.16
0.16
-1.46
-0.94
0.07
0.22
-0.02
0.15
-0.18
0.06
-1.46
-0.02
0.22
-0.31
-0.64
-0.30
0.61
aThe method used to estimate these figures is indicated in Appendix 2IA.
The aggregated main results of the simulation analysis with respect to the
six most important macroeconomic variables are presented in Table 21.1. Table
21.2 contains more detailed results for gross national income produced and used.
Each group of factor contributions in Table 21.1 is an aggregate of individual
factor contributions in Table 21.2, e.g., group A = Al + A 2 + ... + As, etc.
The main results of the ex post analysis are interpreted and evaluated in the next
subsections.
Ivan Sujan
21.3.2. Growth of production and contributions of
the most significant factors
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According to the results of our simulation analysis, one of the main sources of
slowdown in the growth of gross national income (GNI) produced was the
deterioration of external economic conditions (Table 21.1). In the total slow-
down of -2.68 percentage points, the contribution of this group of factors was
-1.03 points, i.e., 38%. Most damaging were the negative impacts of decreasing
availability and increasing prices of imported raw materials (mainly crude oil),
and the slowdown in world economic activity (Table 21.2).
Another significant source of the slowdown was the unfavorable develop-
ment of extensive growth resources (44% of total slowdown). Other internal fac-
tors accounted for -0.44 points of total slowdown in GNI. Within this group of
factors, the negative influence of inertial factors from preceding periods was most
significant.
In order to reduce the foreign debt of Czechoslovakia, the direct influences
of central management were concentrated on the planned deceleration in the
growth of production in 1981 and 1982. In 1983-1985, however, the efforts of
central management were oriented to the acceleration of economic growth.
Therefore, the total contribution of this factor over the whole period 1980-1985
was almost negligible.
The positive contribution of "intensive" growth factors to the change in the
growth rate of production in 1980-1985 versus 1970-1980 was relatively small.
Some favorable results were achieved in decreasing the material intensity of pro-
duction, but the results were still slow and insufficient as compared with the
most developed economies. However, due to a considerable decrease in the con-
tributions of extensive growth factors, the share of "intensive" growth factors in
the total growth rate of GNI increased from 31% in 1970-1980 to 71% in
1980-1985.
21.3.3. Foreign trade, terms of trade and external equilibrium
The rate of growth of Czechoslovak exports (in constant domestic prices) in
1980-1985, 5.40%, was 2.5 times higher than the rate of growth of GNI. On the
other hand, Czechoslovak imports grew substantially more slowly, at the rate of
1.01%. The slowdown in the growth rate of imports during the period 1970-1980
was more than -3.5 percentage points.
According to our simulation analysis, external factors accounted for -0.56
percentage points of total slowdown (-0.88 points) in the growth rate of exports
in 1980-1985 as compared with the period 1970-1980 (Table 21.1). Within this
group of factors, the negative contribution of the slowdown in world economic
activity was extremely high. It lowered the demand for Czechoslovak exports,
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the average annual growth rate dropping by -3.5 percentage points. This nega-
tive contribution was partly compensated by improving the relative position of
the Czechoslovak economy in CMEA (contribution of +1.8 points to the growth
rate of exports). Besides, the volume of Czechoslovak exports had to be
increased due to the sharp rise in prices of crude oil and other raw materials
imported from the USSR.
As expected, the simulation analysis showed that the main part of the slow-
down in growth of Czechoslovak imports was caused by external factors (Table
eLl). Among them, the negative contributions of both the slowdown in world
economic activity and the unfavorable changes in availability and prices of
imported raw materials (including fuels) were most significant. On the other
hand, the contribution of the position of the CSSR in CMEA was positive.
As a result of maintaining the high growth rate of exports and imposing
strong restrictions on imports, the surplus in the Czechoslovak trade balance in
constant domestic 1977 prices increased from 9.2 milliard (= 109) crowns in 1980
to 50.7 milliard crowns in 1985, which was about 24% of real exports and 9% of
GNI produced. However, our analysis showed that the major part of this real
trade surplus (about 32 milliard crowns in 1985) was absorbed by the continuing
decrease in the Czechoslovak terms of trade, which was caused mainly by the
sharp rise in prices of imported raw materials from the CMEA countries. There-
fore, the growth of the trade surplus in current prices was much slower and
varied over territories. The trade surplus with the market economies was used
to reduce the Czechoslovak foreign debt, but at the same time a growing trade
deficit with the USSR was created.
21.3.4. Domestic utilization of GNI, internal equilibrium
and economic efficiency
As a consequence of the unfavorable development of external economic condi-
tions and the necessity to reduce foreign debt, the growth rate of domestic use of
GNI in 1980-1985 was considerably lower than that of GNI produced. More-
over, the sharp slowdown in the growth of imports influenced negatively the
growth of production and consequently also its domestic use. The growth rate of
the domestic use of GNI in 1980-1985 was only 0.62%, i.e., -3.68 points below
the growth rate of the period 1970-1980. During 1981 and 1982 the volume of
domestic use of GNI declined by -1.5% a year, which was followed by a slow
growth at the rate of about 2% during 1983-1985.
According to our analysis, external factors accounted for 55% of the slow-
down in domestic use of GN!. The contributions of other factors were similar to
the case of GNI produced.
The slowdown in domestic use of GNI varied over end-use categories. The
most dramatic change occurred in investment: a turn from growth at the annual
rate of 5.77% in 1970-1980 to decrease at the rate of -1.10% in 1980-1985. At
the same time the growth rate of real personal consumption declined from 3.22%
to 0.98%. It should be noted that this growth rate of personal consumption was
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the lowest among all the European CMEA countries (except for Poland) in
1980-1985 [UN (1986)].
Our analysis showed (Table 21.1), that the direct influences of central
management partly improved the growth rate of personal consumption (by 0.71
percentage points) at the expense of a reduction in investment. The downturn in
investment was also considerably influenced by the negative contribution of iner-
tial factors from the preceding periods.
The positive influence of central management on personal consumption in
1980-1985 was achieved by regulation of both the supply of consumer goods and
of wages (allowing for faster growth of average wage rates than of labor produc-
tivity). At the same time, certain increases in retail prices were necessary with a
negative impact on consumer demand. However, these central interventions
were not fully balanced and, due to evoked shifts in consumer demand, the share
of excess demand in total demand for industrial consumer goods increased
(according to our estimates) from 4.6% in 1980 to 6.9% in 1985. Our analysis
showed that about 25% of this excess demand was substituted by an additional
supply of food and the rest was allocated to forced savings of the population.
The slowdown in the growth of GNI produced and used, as well as the
deterioration of terms of trade, resulted in the unfavorable development of
economic efficiency. Our analysis showed a considerable downturn in the indica-
tor of total economic efficiency, from the annual growth of 2.64% in 1970-1980 to
the decline of -1.57% a year in 1980-1985. It should be noted that one of the
main sources of this downturn was the negative contribution of inertial factors
from the preceding periods. The positive contributions of intensive growth fac-
tors (mainly the decrease in material intensity of production) were not sufficient
to overcome those factors by 1985.
21.4. Conditional Forecasts of Economic Growth
in the CSSR, 1986-2000
21.4.1. Scenarios of the conditional forecasts
Scenarios and input data for conditional forecasts have been prepared using
information from the published Czechoslovak planning documents [Hlavne
smery... (1986)], United Nations studies (1986), and many other relevant sources
published in Czechoslovakia and in the other CMEA countries. We have taken
into consideration also some general assumptions contained in the Bonn-IIASA
Research Project papers [Dobrinsky (1985), Krelle (1985), and Zeman (1986)].
Common assumptions in all scenarios for 1986-2000 are as follows:
(1) Acceleration in the growth of world economic activity, especially In the
CMEA region.
(2) Stabilization of the position of the Czechslovak economy in CMEA (e.g.,
the Czechoslovak share in the total CMEA machinery production, etc.).
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(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
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Continued deterioration of the availability of raw materials in foreign
markets.
Slowdown in the growth of the import prices of raw materials, especially in
the CMEA market where certain lagged impacts of the recent world price
developments are expected.
Stabilization of the efficiency of Czechoslovak foreign trade corresponding
to the expected more favorable development of the Czechoslovak terms of
trade.
Slight improvement of the Czechoslovak export performance as related to
the relevant external and internal conditions.
Continued slowdown in the growth of primary energy resources and energy
consumption in the material sphere.
Continued growth of the share of machinery industry (especially electronic
industry) in the structure of industrial production.
Structural changes in fixed capital investment: rising share of machinery
investment and rising allocation of investment to the nonmaterial sphere.
Accelerated growth of social consumption.
Slower growth of average wage rates in relation to labor productivity.
Slowdown in the growth of the aggregate retail price index.
Relative improvement in the supply of nonfood consumer goods, including
imported goods.
Other important exogenous assumptions differ for individual variants.
Variant 0 (basic scenario)
The basic scenario of our conditional forecasts is supposed to simulate the
development of the Czechoslovak economy according to the assumptions of the
8th Five-Year Plan (for the period 1986-1990) and the long-term prospects up to
the year 2000 [Hlavne smery... (1986)]. The scenario of this variant contains cer-
tain important assumptions which are very ambitious regarding the strategy of
intensification of the Czechoslovak economy:
(1) Considerable decrease in the energy and material intensity of production:
Energy intensity of GNI produced is supposed to decrease in 1985-1990 by
the annual rate -2.9%, which is almost twice as fast as in 1980-1985 (-1.5).
The overall material intensity of production is supposed to decrease in
1985-1990 by -0.97% a year, i.e., three times faster than in 1980-1985.
Almost the same decreasing rates are supposed also for the long-term
period up to the year 2000 (see Table 21.9). At the same time, the invest-
ment ratio is also supposed to decrease by -1.4% a year.
(2) Relatively high Czechoslovak credit participation abroad, especially in the
other CMEA countries: Consequently, the transition from negative to posi-
tive trade balance (in current foreign prices) with socialist countries is
expected. Current positive trade balance with nonsocialist countries is
expected to fall gradually, reaching a slightly negative position in the year
2000.
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(3) Strictly limited growth of employment in the material sphere: Expected
higher growth of total employment in the period 1990-1995 (following from
the demographic waves) would be allocated to the nonmaterial sphere.
Supposed annual growth rates of employment in 1985-2000 are 0.3% in the
material sphere, and 1.8% in the nonmaterial sphere, respectively.
The scenarios of additional forecasting variants contain certain
modifications of the above three assumptions. These variants are supposed to
simulate impacts of less favorable developments of external and internal
economic conditions and to evaluate the eventual necessary changes in the
development strategy to cope with the problem.
Variant 1 (higher energy and material intensity of production)
This variant is subdivided into two subvariants. Taking into account past
trends and real possibilities of their future changes, in subvariant 1.1 a slower
decrease in the energy intensity (-2.13% a year) and material intensity (-0.52% a
year) of production is expected in 1985-2000, with negative impacts on the
growth rates of all macroeconomic indicators.
Subvariant 1.2 simulates a possible partial solution of this problem. A cer-
tain additional volume of the fixed capital investment is supposed to ensure a
faster decrease in the energy and material intensity of production. Of course, the
decrease in the investment ratio would be much slower in this case.
Variant 2 (higher credit participation abroad)
In this variant a higher Czechoslovak credit participation abroad than in
scenario 0 is supposed. This assumption follows mainly from the expected higher
costs of production and transport of some raw materials imported from the
USSR (especially natural gas and iron ore). Also, growing machinery exports to
nonsocialist countries would require higher Czechoslovak credit participation in
the related investment projects. As a consequence, higher positive trade bal-
ances and imports restrictions are expected up to 1995, reversing in the period
1995-2000 as a consequence of higher credit installments.
Variant 9 (higher employment in the material sphere)
In this variant it is supposed that the absorbing capacity of the nonmaterial
sphere with respect to the growth of employment is rather limited. Thus, the
assumed growth rate of employment in 1985-2000 in this variant for the nonma-
terial sphere is lowered to 1.33% and for the material sphere is raised to 0.49% a
year. In this case a slightly faster decrease in working time would be possible.
On the other hand, annual labor productivity in the material sphere would be
lower than in scenario o.
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Variant 4 (combined variants 1.2 + 2 + 3)
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This combined variant simulates a growth path of the Czechoslovak economy for
the case if all three problems outlined in the scenarios of the variants 1.2, 2 and
3 were to occur simultaneously.
21.4.2. Main results of the conditional forecasts
The main results of our conditional forecasts of the Czechoslovak economic
development up to the year 2000 are presented in Tables 21.9 and 21.4.
Scenario 0 (baseline)
The growth rates of the most important macroeconomic variables simulated in
this variant are very close to those in the 8th Five-Year Plan for the period
1986-1990 and the official long-term prospects up to the year 2000 [Hlvane smery
... (1986)]. The growth rate of GNI produced (about 3.5%) would be higher by
almost one percentage point than that of GMP (Table 21.9). That would mean a
considerably slower growth of intermediate consumption as a result of intensive
(resource efficient) economic growth.
In the period up to 1990, the forecasted growth of exports is considerably
higher than that of imports; but after 1990 the forecasted growth rates of exports
and imports are very close (Table 21.4). Consequently, the growth rate of GNI
used in 1985-1990, about 3%, would be about 0.5 percentage points below that
of GNI produced, but after 1990 this difference would be only 0.1 points.
Among the end-use categories, social consumption would have the highest
growth rate - more than 6% a year. The growth rate of personal consumption
(2.57%) would be higher than that of investment (2.06%). The growth rates of
these two indicators would be considerably higher than in the last five years, but
not as high as the growth rate of GNI. On the other hand, due to fast develop-
ment of the nonmaterial sphere, the growth rate of the approximation of GDP
would be higher (3.85%).
As the accelerated growth of GNI would be achieved at the expense of very
slow growth of employment in the material sphere, the growth of labor produc-
tivity would accelerate to 3.2%. This would be considerably higher than the
forecasted growth of the average nominal wage rate (2%). Consequently, even at
the relatively slow growth of consumer prices (0.7% a year), the estimated share
of excess demand in the total demand for nonfood consumer goods would fall
from 6.8% in 1985 to 5.3% in 2000.
Faster growth of labor productivity, a considerable decrease in the material
intensity of production, as well as the stabilization of Czechoslovak terms of
trade and fixed capital productivity would result in a transition of the synthetic
efficiency indicator from previous decline to growth at the average rate of 2.11%
up to the year 2000.
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Table 2Lf Selected results of the conditional forecasts for five-year periods, 1970-2000:
average annual percentage growth rates under scenario variants.
Actual Forecasts
Variablea Variant 70-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-2000
GMP 0 4.70 1.74 2.30 2.79 2.58
1.1 2.13 2.34 2.01
1.2 2.13 2.63 2.49
2 2.12 2.67 2.61
3 2.30 3.00 2.61
4 1.95 2.61 2.54
GNI produced 0 4.84 2.16 3.53 3.63 3.40
1.1 3.13 2.78 2.45
1.2 3.13 3.42 3.26
2 3.35 3.40 3.42
3 3.53 3.84 3.41
4 2.96 3.40 3.29
Exports 0 6.28 5.40 5.07 4.54 3.63
2 5.05 4.50 3.64
4 5.03 3.97 3.09
Imports 0 4.52 1.01 3.94 4.57 3.43
2 2.66 4.81 3.93
4 2.69 4.65 3.76
Domestic use
ofGNI 0 4.30 0.62 2.99 3.52 3.30
1.1 2.48 2.55 2.12
1.2 2.56 3.47 3.34
2 2.38 3.44 3.49
3 2.99 3.76 3.33
4 1.94 3.54 3.56
Personal
consumption 0 3.22 0.98 2.24 2.98 2.51
1.1 1.89 2.21 1.64
1.2 1.88 2.77 2.41
2 2.00 2.74 2.53
4 1.65 2.50 2.42
Investment in 0 5.77 -1.10 2.04 2.12 2.02
fixed assets 1.1 1.53 1.08 0.28
1.2 2.38 2.98 2.96
2 1.34 1.72 1.98
4 1.71 3.05 3.14
aln domestic constant 1977 prices.
Variant 1 (higher energy and material intensity of production)
A supposed slower decrease in the energy and material intensity of production
according to the scenario of the subvariant 1.1 would lead to slower growth rates
(in comparison with the basic variant) of GNI produced (-0.7 percentage points)
and GNI used (-0.9 points). This slowdown would accelerate in time, reaching,
e.g., for GNI used, almost -1.2 percentage points in 1995-2000 (see Table 2l.-n.
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A simulation according to the scenario of the subvariant 1.2 has shown a
possible increase of investment, which would reduce the differences in energy and
material intensities of production between variants 0 and 1.1 by about 65%.
Similar effects would be reached for the growth rates of GNI and personal con-
sumption in this case. The growth rate of GNI produced from the basic scenario
(3.5%) would be lowered in variant 1.1 to 2.8%, but in variant 1.2 to only 3.3%.
However, improvements over variant 1.1 would only be reached after 1990.
Variant 2 (higer credit participation abroad)
In this variant higher positive trade balances connected with slower growth of
imports (especially before 1990) would lead to slower growth of GNI produced
and used. On the other hand, in the period 1990-2000, imports would grow
more rapidly (see Table 2L~) due to credit installments with positive impacts on
GNI produced and used. However, over the period 1985-2000, the average rates
of growth would be slightly worse than in the basic variants (Table 21.9).
Variant 9 (higher employment in the material sphere)
A simulation according to this scenario has shown slightly faster growth of GNI
produced and used after 1990 as a consequence of higher employment in the
material sphere. On the other hand, labor productivity in the material sphere
would be lower, with negative impacts on wages and personal consumption. The
growth rate of social consumption would be lower, too, due to less employment
in the nonmaterial sphere. However, the partial shift in employment from non-
material to material sphere would not affect GDP (Table 21.9).
Variant 4 (combined variants 1.2 + 2 + 3)
The results of this combined forecasting variant represent a certain aggregation
of the deviations of the growth rates simulated in variants 1.2, 2 and 3 from
those simulated in the basic scenario. As a result, the long-term growth rates of
almost all macroeconomic indicators in variant 4 are 0.3-0.5 percentage points
lower. On the other hand, the simulated growth rate of investment is higher
(2.63% in variant 4 versus 2.06% in variant 0; see Table 21.9).
The deviations from the basic variant in the gowth rates are not equal over
time (Table 21.4). In the period 1985-1990 the growth rates in variant 4 differ
from those in variant 0 more significantly, being lower for GNI produced by
0.57%, for GNI used by 1.05%, for personal consumption by 0.59%, etc.
21.6. Conclusion
The results of our ex post analysis of the Czechoslovak economy have revealed
that the main sources of the slowdown in economic growth in 1980-1985 versus
1970-1980 were unfavorable development of external factors (mainly the availa-
bility of raw materials from foreign markets) and relative exhaustion of extensive
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growth resources (mainly the supply of energy to the material sphere). Negative
effects of these factors were not sufficiently compensated by positive contribu-
tions of intensive growth factors (technical progress, decrease in material inten-
sity of production, etc.). The current planning and management system was not
efficient enough to create favorable conditions for intensive growth.
Our results may also be compared with some general assumptions on the
driving forces of structural changes and economic growth formulated in the
framework of the Bonn-IIASA Research Project [Dobrinsky (1985) and Krelle
(1985)]. It is true that capital accumulation, measured by the investment ratio,
decreased considerably in the period 1980-1985. However, according to our
findings, this is not the primary cause of the slowdown in economic growth. It
results from the deterioration of external economic conditions and exhaustion of
extensive factors. In such a situation, the efforts to restore the external equilib-
rium by increasing exports and putting restrictions on imports, as well as the
efforts to maintain at least a minimum growth of personal consumption and
sufficient growth of social consumption, led inevitably to the considerable
decrease in investment.
With respect to labor supply, no substantial changes have been observed.
However, changes in its sectoral structure may be significant [sectoral changes in
employment and production in the CSSR are analyzed separately in Zeman
(1986)].
For the contributions of technical progress we have found an only slight
decrease. According to our results, only a small part of the observed decreasing
difference between growth rates of production and the weighted average rates of
direct factors may be interpreted as a decreasing rate of technical progress. The
greater part of this difference reflects the negative contributions of the slowdown
in energy resources and imported raw materials - factors that can hardly be
replaced by fixed capital or labor.
The results of our conditional forecasts have indicated that the official
growth targets for the Czechoslovak economy up to the year 2000 might be feasi-
ble, but they depend crucially on substantial structural changes, which may be
reached only under efficient changes in the planning and management system.
The transition to the intensive path of economic growth requires more time,
more investment, and more creative activity of enterprises and individuals. The
crucial problem is the substantial decrease in the energy and material intensities
of production, which require additional investment. The nature of this problem,
as well as the problem of necessary higher Czechoslovak credit participation in
certain foreign investment projects, indicates that major positive effects may be
expected only after 1990. Hence, a considerable tension follows from the planned
targets for 1986-1990 because of the necessity to look for additional growth
resources as well as to speed up the efficiency changes in the planning and
management system.
/txJn Sujan
Appendix 21A. Estimation of the Contributions of
Individual Factors to the Growth Rates
of Macroeconomic Indicators
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In the model used for ex post analysis, each structural equation contains 3-8
explanatory variables. For parameter estimation, annual time series of 25 obser-
vations (1961-1985) have been used.
In a typical structural equation some explanatory variables are exogenous
and some are endogenous, explained in other equations which also may contain
exogenous and endogenous explanatory variables. Substituting step-by-step
exogenous variables for endogenous ones, we can express any endogenous vari-
able as a function of only exogenous variables and lagged endogenous variables
(with higher-order lags). This reduced (or final) form of the model explains each
of the endogenous variables with a high number of primary factors represented
by exogenous variables. Inertia from preceding periods is represented by lagged
endogenous variables.
In large dynamic nonlinear models, the analytical expression of the reduced
(or final) form of the model may be extremely complicated. Therefore, in our ex
post analysis we have used a simulation procedure to estimate the contributions
of primary factors to the growth rates of macroeconomic indicators. Each pri-
mary factor under consideration was represented by a group of relevant exog-
enous variables. The contributions of each factor were estimated as differences
between corresponding growth rates of values of selected endogenous variables
generated by two subsequent dynamic simulations. In the first of these simula-
tions the values of exogenous variables representing a factor under consideration
were kept constant over the whole analyzed period at the values of the starting
year. In the next simulation the actual values of a given factor were used. The
values of all other exogenous variables were equal in both simulations.
Using this simulation procedure, we decomposed the growth rates of
selected macroeconomic indicators for a given period to the contributions of indi-
vidual primary factors, inertia factor and random disturbances. The results for
periods 1970-1980 and 1980-1985 are given in Table 21.2.
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CHAPTER 22
Analysis and Forecasts of Growth
of the Hungarian Economy
A ndras Simon
Summary
Hungary has a small open economy, depending heavily on foreign markets. This
feature underlies the specification of the model that generates forecasts to the
year 2000. Though output is determined by demand, as in market economies,
other features distinguish the economy from a typical market economy. Personal
income and investments can only be explained by policy behavior. The model of
the economy explains domestic variables in constant prices. Only a few price
effects are included in the model. Employment is determined by demographic
factors independent of the rate of utilization of capacity. Simulations show a
0.2-0.3 elasticity of GDP with respect to world trade and an expected growth
rate of 2.0-2.4% for the next 15 years.
22.1. The Driving Forces of Structural Change
The model underlying our analysis of the Hungarian economy may seem rather
heretical in comparison to the neoclassical models usually applied when modeling
growth. As a model of a planned economy, it is even more out of line by exhibit-
ing features of a demand-driven economy. Let us try to justify this specification,
not claiming that our approach is the only one that would produce reasonable
simulation of actual developments.
For market economies it is usually accepted that short-run changes in out-
put may be better explained by demand, while neoclassical growth models may
be adequate tools for capturing more long-run developments. For planned
economies output is often considered to be capacity-determined even in the short
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run; and capacity is modeled by a production function, with capital and labor as
the main explanatory variables. Let us review the arguments against this
approach by considering the economy in both long-run and short-run perspec-
tives.
22.1.1. Demand pull in the short run
It is common to assume that one main difference between a centrally planned
and a market economy from a modeling point of view is the following: In a
market economy there is always enough free productive capacity to allow the
level of output to adjust to an increase in demand. Thus, in a market economy,
modeling output usually means modeling demand. A centrally planned econ-
omy, on the other hand, operates at full capacity because at given prices, which
are set administratively, demand always tends to exceed supply. Hence, when
designing an econometric model for a centrally planned economy, it is usually
thought to be enough to set up production functions to model capacity, and by
the identity of output and capacity we arrive at production. This conclusion,
however, is too simple to be fruitfully applicable in modeling. Without going too
deeply into theoretical arguments, let us make some refinements regarding the
relations of output and capacity.
Excess demand in these countries means shortages in supply. Shortages,
however, are stochastic phenomena. They may appear in a market economy,
too, in the market for manufactured goods. Here prices are fixed by the firm and
kept constant for a longer period. Demand in the model of this market is a ran-
dom variable which occasionally may exceed supply. The firm, however, has
good reasons to set prices sufficiently high that the probability of failing to meet
demand is fairly low. This means that it will keep reserve capacities and a
sufficient stock of inventory.
In a planned economy, prices are set administratively with less attention to
the relation of expected demand to capacity. Two cases of shortages may arise
in this economy. In the first case, aggregate demand is higher than aggregate
productive capacity, but for each firm the expected value of demand is rather
close to capacity. This entails a high probability that the firm cannot meet
demand. This results in a situation of frequent shortages, bottlenecks and forced
substitution, but it does not mean that output cannot adjust to demand. Several
countries with planned economies show this feature; nevertheless, macro-
economic modeling in these countries can use the same approach to explain out-
put as models of market economies. In the second case of shortages, the dise-
quilibrium on the market is more severe. Here aggregate demand is so high,
compared with capacity, that demand cannot be met by forced substitution.
This is the case where forced saving appears. The production function approach
to modeling output here is even less adequate than in the former case. Namely,
output is constrained not by the optimal combination of labor and capital, but
rather by scarcities in some key intermediate inputs. Labor and capital are not
fully utilized, and the level of output may be directly connected to a scarce input,
such as imports.
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Which kind of shortages are typical for a planned economy? Past experi-
ence has shown that industrial output in Hungary does fluctuate over time.
These fluctuations are too large to be explained by changes in the level of capital
and labor inputs in a production function. This phenomenon raises the following
question:
Are output fluctuations the result of variations in the supply of scarce
intermediate inputs, or are they results of changes in demand? There is no a
priori argument for either of these cases. In fact, there is much reason to think
that, depending on the actual conditions, sometimes the first explanation, and
sometimes the second, is valid. Before analyzing the two cases, let us summarize
again some ideas which are relevant in addressing this question.
Centrally planned economies are sometimes characterized as economies in
which excess demand constantly prevails. Excess demand in a macroeconomic
sense can, however, be defined in several ways. According to our definition, an
excess demand situation is one in which prices are kept administratively lower
than they would be in a free market. This definition implies a higher rate of
capacity utilization in the excess demand case than in the "equilibrium" situa-
tion. It does not imply, however, that output necessarily has to be determined
by the level of capacity. When looking at the actual experience of most of the
centrally planned economies, we see that in normal circumstances excess demand
appears in the form that conditions for purchasing a good are difficult: the pro-
duct to be bought is, for example, out of stock, deliveries are not in accordance
with orders, the selection of goods is not the desired one, some of the goods are
not available for shorter or longer periods, etc. These conditions are the result of
a lack of capacity reserves in the economy, due to higher than equilibrium capac-
ity utilization. In the aggregate, however, there is no forced saving in the econ-
omy because aggregate demand is met by aggregate output. There is even some
flexibility in supply since higher demand results in higher output. During peaks
as well as troughs of demand, shortages exist, although in peaks it is probably
more difficult to procure goods than during troughs, but not necessarily. This
means that even in a "shortage economy" output can be modeled correctly from
the demand side. However attractive the symmetry between the demand-driven
market economy and the capacity-driven planned economy may be, it cannot be
accepted as a true description of the normal functioning of centrally planned
economies.
The fact that the level of output in the short run is determined by demand
in these economies does not mean that some disequilibrium situations may not
appear. Usually, changes in demand policy are accompanied by changes in
import policy. The aim is to keep a normal level of shortage of imports - not
lower than that of the domestic goods, but at the same time not so high as to
cause bottlenecks in production. This behavior is the basis of imports in the
model used for our forecast. These equations explain the level of import demand
as a function of output. The balance between demand policy and import policy,
however, may be disturbed. Severe import restrictions may result in an unin-
tended disruption of production or in distortions in the structure, quality or
quantity of output. These adverse conditions may show up in several areas: in
its milder form, the domestic market may adjust to them without forced saving,
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and only the export performance may be affected; in a more severe case, there
may be an unintended fall in output such that forced substitution is not possible,
and as a consequence forced saving occurs.
When modeling an individual economy, the specific characteristics in each
country have to be considered. There are some countries in which a supply con-
straint seems to occur over shorter or longer periods. This has been the case in
Poland and, more or less, in Romania in recent years. In Poland, constraints on
imports forced whole factories to stay idle and put manpower and capital out of
work for an extended period.
What is the main difference between the macroeconomic relationships of a
demand-pulled economy and those of an import-constrained one? In both cases,
output and imports are strongly related to each other. Whether it is output or
imports in this relationship that determines the other variable will show up in
export performance or in the consumption function. In demand-controlled situa-
tions a cutback in domestic use eases tensions on the domestic market and spurs
exports. In the acute shortage case a decrease in domestic output may be cou-
pled with a decrease or a leveling off in exports. This behavior of exports can be
seen, for example, in the Polish case, while the behavior of Hungarian exports
indicates a demand-controlled situation.
22.1.2. Demand pull in the long run
What kind of specification is most suitable for a model to explain growth of the
Hungarian economy up to the year 2000? Calculations have shown that the
current level of industrial output in Hungary is about 10% lower than the level
estimated on the basis of a production function fitted on data from the last 25
years. There were several options to handle this discrepancy in a model that is
expected to make forecasts for 15 years into the future:
(1) To consider this 10% as a short-term vagary of demand that is going to be
corrected either by automatic forces in the economy or by wise demand pol-
icy, and to take the values of the production function as forecasts. This
option seemed to be too optimistic to be chosen.
(2) To interpret the falling of the level of output below its estimated value as a
result of an historical decrease in the rate of technical progress and use a
lower value for the parameters of the technical progress in simulations.
This option seems to be feasible, and forecasts for output would presum-
ably be low enough to be in line with our expectations; but underlying
parameters of the forecast would have to be plucked from the air and not
from the model.
(3) To analyze the economic structure and the exogenous variables by a model
that creates the 10% discrepancy between capacity and output, to assess
whether these exogenous and endogenous factors would continue to prevail,
and to make the forecast conditional on these factors. This is the option
we strived to take.
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What was the reason that output has fallen below its long-term potential in
the past 5-10 years? The answer may be found in an increased import intensity,
owing to a deterioration in the terms of trade and a slackening export potential.
In the present structure of exports there is no hope that exports would pull the
economy out of its slump. More than 60% of exports to the hard currency area
consists of food and basic materials. The markets of both commodity groups are
stagnating, and they are going to continue to stagnate even if the rest of the
world economy is expected to boom. If the economy had enough flexibility to
substitute for imports and increase competitiveness in more dynamic segments of
world economy, it could have compensated for the slow growth of its traditional
exports. At present, there are no signs of such an increased flexibility. This
causes the growth of the economy to be trapped on a path determined by the
elasticity of demand for its exports and by the import elasticity of output. This
trap has been holding the economy for a long time and seems to determine its
long-run growth. For shorter periods, say, 3-5 years, economic policy can
separate growth from this long-run path, but only at the expense of balance-of-
payments deficits. The ambitious policy of trying to separate domestic growth
from recessions in the rest of the world succeeded temporarily. But the final
result was only a delay in the effects of adverse developments in the world
market.
All this indicates that the slackening growth of output is not a result of a
cyclical or other transitory lack of demand, but is caused by the weak capability
of the economy to adapt to new situations.
Is there a reason to expect this deeply rooted feature of the economy to
change in a longer perspective of 10-15 years? We do not feel that we have
sufficient information for a definite answer. We decided to use the parameters of
the model as they are, running "no-change-in-the-system" forecasts.
In this demand-pulled model, export elasticities are manifestations of tech-
nical progress in the home country compared with that in the rest of the world.
Obviously, this approach has some unattractive features: growth is determined
independently of employment. This is a weak point of the model, even if we take
into account the peculiar nature of planned economies that guarantee full
employment, regardless of the actual utilization of labor.
22.2. Selected Features of the Economy
Let us summarize the features of the model that are used to produce forecasts for
the Hungarian economy. This description at the same time may serve as a short
description of the working of the economy.
22.2.1. General structure of the model
As mentioned before, the economy may be characterized as being export-pulled.
Thus, the economic growth possibilities of the country are limited by its export
potential. Output is highly import-intensive, and imports for the most part are
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basic materials or high-technology goods for which domestic production is not
substitutable. As imports in the longer run are paid for by exports, the rate of
growth of the economy depends on how much exports can be sold on the world
market. This, in turn, depends on the rate of expansion of the world market and
the demand and price elasticities for Hungarian exports. For a shorter period,
say, three to five years, the trend of growth can be strongly affected by a policy
that has a direct effect on the balance of payments by deliberately separating the
trend in exports from that of imports through borrowing, or by external factors
such as terms of trade changes, changes in conditions of borrowing, etc. When
specifying the model these factors were taken into account.
In a more refined picture, the export pull is less direct. Exports affect the
economy through two channels: in the short run, they affect output as a com-
ponent of demand. In the longer run, as an item in the balance of payments,
export earnings help determine the external debt situation of the country, and
through this, the main policy decisions of personal income, government con-
sumption and investment. These decisions, however, are also determined by a
series of other factors mentioned above.
In the model, these factors are all pooled into one variable: the external
debt of the economy. There is always a certain level of indebtedness, which is
considered to be tolerable both by the creditors and by the user of credits.
Without trying to define the exact limits of the level of acceptable indebtedness
by prior argument, an analysis of the actual behavior of policy makers as they
responded to various debt levels in the past has been undertaken. The estimated
equations show that during the observation period there was a response on the
part of policy with a one- or two-year lag. The interaction of policies and the
balance-of-payments constraint brought about a cyclical movement in the course
of Hungarian economic development.
22.2.2. Prices and incomes
Prices and incomes in a planned economy are usually under the direct and strict
control of the government. This does not mean that prices are constant or that
there are no economic forces behind price changes that do take place. Both rela-
tive prices and the general price level change in response to changes in underly-
ing economic conditions. These price changes, however, usually take place
within the context of general price reforms, which do not necessarily follow
changes in domestic costs or in import prices. However large the economic costs
of, for example, keeping domestic fuel prices considerably below their world
market prices may be, it is nonetheless a feasible policy. Hungary pursued this
policy for five years, and some other countries of the region still have not
changed oil prices since 1973. Modeling this policy behavior seems to be beyond
the capabilities of econometric methods.
In recent years the Hungarian price system underwent major changes.
Decision making became more decentralized and dependent on the behavior of
enterprises. Our model, however, is not yet able to include this new feature of
the economy.
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22.2.3. Employment and the labor force
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The labor market has very similar features in every centrally planned economy.
The demand for labor absorbs all the working force available, independent of the
rate of capacity utilization. Major unemployment did not appear even during
the Polish crisis, when output dropped by two-digit percentage points. The rea-
sons, for full employment in these countries are not simple. Any explanation
would refer to the following factors:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Institutional arrangements: state-owned enterprises comply with the public
view that laying off workers is an anti-social and immoral act.
Enterprise behavior: there is a motivation on the part of firms to maximize
output rather than profits.
Price policy: owing to subsidized consumer goods and services, the mar-
ginal product of labor is much higher than the wage level.
There is no definite answer from economic theory on the question as to
which of these factors is the most important. For our limited purposes, for-
tunately, we do not need an answer. What we have to assume when building a
model is that employment is equal to labor supply. With regard to the participa-
tion rate of the labor force, any economic explanation is very dubious. Even if
economic variables played a role in determining labor force participation, they
would be far less important than the role played by demographic and institu-
tional factors. For the purpose of the model, it was assumed that total employ-
ment was equal to the total labor force determined by demographic factors.
22.3. Expected Economic Development until 2000
The growth rate of the Hungarian economy up to the year 2000 depends largely
on the performance of its exports (see Tables 22.1, 22.2 and 22.9). In our fore-
cast, we had to make some assumptions beyond the assumed rate of world trade.
Both agricultural exports and exports of base materials (mostly oil products)
were forecasted independently of aggregate world market demand. For food it
was assumed that a rate of growth of 2% can be sustained. This entails a rate of
penetration in - mostly West European - markets that does not invoke protec-
tionist steps and is feasible from the supply side. Similar to the case of food,
constraints are present for exports of base materials on both the supply and
demand side. Here exports are determined in the model by the difference of
imports from the rouble area and domestic use, but the resulting growth rate of
exports to the hard currency area of 1.5-2.0% is probably just the rate that can
be absorbed by a stable world market for these commodities.
About 60% of total exports to the hard currency area are now determined
independent of the growth rate in the world economy. In the case of a 2% yearly
expansion of total world demand, the aggregation of the assumed and calculated
1.5-2.0% rates in this portion of exports and the higher rates of exports in the
rest of Hungarian trade results in a 2.4% rate of growth of total exports.
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Table 22.1. Forecast for selected variables: assumed growth of world trade = 2%.
Variable 1989 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Growth rates (%):
gross output, industry 1.25 1.83 0.80 0.30 3.92 0.91 0.94
gross output, agriculture 0.68 2.60 -6.00 -0.60 2.00 1.20 1.20
gross output, construction 0.64 1.55 -7.70 0.20 0.08 -2.89 2.34
gross output, services 3.73 2.17 1.29 3.35 0.99 0.96 1.60
exports to non-CPEs, real 16.35 4.33 -10.37 -3.51 5.75 3.28 3.16
imports from non-CPEs, real 5.30 -1.56 -0.62 -1.27 -2.30 -0.24 3.17
GDP 1.39 1.78 -0.01 0.72 -0.48 0.57 1.12
employment -0.64 -0.61 -0.60 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50
productivity 2.02 2.38 0.59 1.22 0.02 1.07 1.62
personal consumption 0.51 0.88 1.26 2.90 -1.66 -0.75 -0.17
investment, fixed assets -2.11 -0.6 -0.3 0.64 1.52 -1.74 3.11
Investment ratio (%) 22.90 22.90 22.22 22.20 22.65 22.12 22.56
Current acct. balance ($) 0.30 0.33 -0.02 -0.41 -0.17 -0.07 -0.09
Table 22.2. Forecast for selected variables: assumed growth of world trade = 4%.
Variable 1989 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Growth rates (%):
gross output, industry 1.25 1.83 0.80 0.30 4.72 1.26 1.19
gross output, agriculture 0.68 2.60 -6.00 -0.60 2.00 1.20 1.20
gross output, construction 0.64 1.55 -7.70 0.20 0.19 -1.46 4.25
gross output, services 3.73 2.17 1.29 3.35 1.22 1.24 1.87
exports to non-CPEs, real 16.35 4.33 -10.37 -3.51 8.06 3.97 3.96
imports from non-CPEs, real 5.30 -1.56 -0.62 -1.27 -2.28 0.29 4.31
GDP 1.39 1.78 -0.01 0.72 -0.24 0.87 1.54
employment -0.64 -0.61 -0.60 -0.50 .50 -0.50 -0.50
productivity 2.02 2.38 0.59 1.22 0.26 1.37 2.04
personal consumption 0.51 0.88 1.26 2.90 -1.62 -0.58 0.13
investment, fixed assets -2.11 -0.6 -0.3 0.64 1.52 -0.47 4.83
Investment ratio (%) 24.80 22.90 22.22 22.20 22.59 22.29 23.01
Current acct. balance ($) 0.30 0.33 -0.02 -0.41 -0.08 0.02 -0.01
Table 22.S. Forecast for selected variables: assumed growth of world trade = 6%.
Variable 1989 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Growth rates (%):
gross output, industry 1.25 1.83 0.80 0.30 5.43 1.63 1.53
gross output, agriculture 0.68 2.60 -6.00 -0.60 2.00 1.20 1.20
gross output, construction 0.64 1.55 -7.70 0.20 0.27 0.61 6.50
gross output, services 3.73 2.17 1.29 3.35 1.37 1.54 2.24
exports to non-CPEs, real 16.35 4.33 -10.37 -3.51 10.64 4.75 4.77
imports from non-CPEs, real 5.30 -1.56 -0.62 -1.27 -2.25 1.09 5.56
GDP 1.39 1.78 -0.01 0.72 -0.12 1.33 2.03
employment -0.64 -0.61 -0.60 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50
productivity 2.02 2.38 0.59 1.22 0.62 1.83 2.53
personal consumption 0.51 0.88 1.26 2.90 -1.56 -0.33 0.50
investment, fixed assets -2.11 -0.6 -0.3 0.64 1.52 1.42 6.85
Investment ratio (%) 24.80 22.90 22.22 22.20 22.51 22.53 23.59
Current acct. balance($) 0.30 0.33 -0.02 -0.41 0.02 0.12 0.08
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Table 2!U. Continued
1990 1991 1991 1999 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 f!OOO
1.31 1.10 1.12 1.19 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.25 1.26 1.26
1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
1.35 2.20 2.70 3.00 3.14 3.16 3.10 3.03 2.95 2.90 2.85
1.86 0.79 0.96 1.08 1.16 1.22 1.25 1.27 1.28 1.28 1.29
2.84 2.59 2.54 2.48 2.45 2.43 2.42 2.41 2.40 2.39 2.38
1.53 1.81 2.24 2.30 2.39 2.46 2.47 2.46 2.44 2.43 2.41
1.28 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.65 1.67 1.68 1.69 1.68 1.68 1.68
-0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50
1.78 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.15 2.17 2.18 2.19 2.18 2.18 2.18
0.28 0.61 0.84 1.01 1.13 1.21 1.26 1.29 1.31 1.32 1.33
2.04 2.37 2.80 3.04 3.15 3.16 3.11 3.04 2.97 2.92 2.89
22.73 22.95 23.24 23.57 23.92 24.27 24.60 24.93 25.25 25.55 25.86
-0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
Table 22.2. Continued
1990 1991 1992 1999 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1.65 1.49 1.53 1.61 1.65 1.68 1.70 1.72 1.74 1.76 1.79
1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
3.50 4.33 4.71 4.84 4.82 4.73 4.61 4.51 4.43 4.39 4.36
2.22 1.21 1.40 1.53 1.62 1.68 1.71 1.74 1.76 1.78 1.80
3.60 3.36 3.35 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.33 3.34 3.34 3.34 3.34
2.56 2.81 3.28 3.31 3.37 3.40 3.39 3.37 3.36 3.36 3.36
1.78 1.94 2.05 2.14 2.19 2.21 2.22 2.23 2.24 2.26 2.27
-0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50
2.28 2.44 2.55 2.64 2.69 2.71 2.72 2.73 2.74 2.76 2.77
0.67 1.07 1.35 1.53 1.66 1.75 1.80 1.83 1.86 1.89 1.91
3.93 4.24 4.55 4.65 4.62 4.53 4.42 4.33 4.27 4.23 4.21
23.50 24.03 24.62 25.23 25.83 26.41 26.98 27.53 28.08 28.62 29.16
0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -om -om 0.00 0.01
Table 22.9. Continued
1990 1991 1991 1999 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
2.07 1.96 2.01 2.12 2.19 2.24 2.30 2.35 2.41 2.47 2.52
1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
5.68 6.34 6.53 6.52 6.42 6.28 6.17 6.08 6.03 6.01 6.01
2.65 1.68 1.89 2.04 2.14 2.22 2.28 2.33 2.39 2.44 2.50
4.44 4.25 4.29 4.30 4.34 4.38 4.42 4.46 4.49 4.52 4.55
3.66 3.87 4.33 4.35 4.39 4.42 4.43 4.44 4.46 4.49 4.53
2.33 2.51 2.63 2.73 2.79 2.83 2.87 2.91 2.95 3.00 3.05
-0.5 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50
2.83 3.01 3.13 3.23 3.29 3.33 3.37 3.41 3.45 3.50 3.55
1.13 1.58 1.89 2.10 2.25 2.35 2.42 2.49 2.55 2.61 2.67
5.86 6.02 6.17 6.15 6.05 5.93 5.83 5.76 5.72 5.72 5.72
24.41 25.25 26.12 26.99 27.84 28.68 29.51 30.32 31.14 31.96 32.79
0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.16
486 '!he Future 0/ the World Economy
Although the elasticity of exports with respect to world demand in the rest of
Hungarian trade is much higher than 1.0, as a result of aggregating the two
groups the marginal elasticity of the growth rate of total Hungarian exports to
the growth rate of total world trade is not more than around 0.5--0.6.
Elasticity for total imports seem to be around 1.5. Considering the rate of
growth of 2.4% in exports, this means that in the baseline forecast an equili-
brium path of trade volumes allows a GDP growth of about 1.7% yearly.
Increasing the assumed rate of world trade, each percentage point brings about a
0.5--0.6% increase in the rate of exports, and a similar increase of imports makes
room for an additional 0.3--0.4% in the growth rate of GDP.
These growth rates have magnitudes that we have become used to in the
last five years, or even higher by a fraction of a percentage point, but they are
definitely lower than the rates of the late 1970s. Considering the fact, however,
that growth in the 1970s was largely based on borrowed foreign resources, and
that the forecast includes an estimated debt position that does not deteriorate in
the long run, the figures for the period 1987-2000 seem to be in line with
developments of the past 10-15 years.
CHAPTER 23
Structural Adjustment, Productivity and
Capital Accumulation in Austria
Stefan Schleicher
Summary
The declining trend of GDP growth, accompanied by a similar tendency in labor
productivity and increasing evidence of structural deficiencies in the sectoral
composition of GDP, has become a matter of increasing concern for economic
policy in Austria. We present empirical evidence and some causal interpreta-
tions about structural adjustment, changes in productivity and capital accumula-
tion that have occurred over the past 20 years in the Austrian economy. Extend-
ing previous work on Austrian labor productivity (Bayer, 1983; Mitter and
Skolka, 1984), we apply a growth accounting framework (Baily, 1981; Nadiri,
1980) to obtain empirical evidence about sectoral changes in productivity.
23.1. Analytical Tools and Data Base
In order to evaluate the relationship between factors of production and output,
we make use of the following aggregate or sectoral production functions:
(23.1)
where: Q = output; F = total (factor) productivity; K = capital input; and N =
labor input.
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In this production function framework, labor productivity Q/ N follows as
Q/N = F * (K/N)b (23.2)
where K / N denotes the capital/labor ratio or the capital intensity.
Denoting by q, f, k and n the relative rates of change of the above defined
variables for output, total factor productivity, capital and labor and substituting
for the output elasticity of capital b the corresponding factor share, we end up
with the usual framework for decomposing the factor contributions to output
growth
q = f + b * k + (1 - b) * n
and growth of labor productivity
q - n = f + b * (k - n)
(23.3)
(23.4)
Equation (23.3) is used to evaluate the relative changes of total factor pro-
ductivity f. In this calculation all rates of change of actual data x were
smoothed by the following exponential filter to eliminate short-term cyclical
fluctuations:
Yt = Yt-l + 0.3 * (xt - Yt-l) (23.5)
These smoothed variables Y will be interpreted as potential values in con-
trast to the actual unsmoothed figures x.
Annual data for the Austrian economy disaggregated into 19 sectors from
1964 to 1985 were used; these stem from the WIFO Databank, the data base of
the Austrian Institute for Economic Research. Output is measured in value
added, labor input comprises employed persons, and gross capital stocks as cal-
culated by Hahn and Schmoranz (1983) are used for capital input.
23.2. Aggregate Economic Growth and Productivity
According to Table 29.1, the potential value of aggregate economic growth has
slowed down from 5% in the early 1970s to 2% in the most recent years.
Using the production function framework presented in the previous section,
this potential growth rate can be decomposed into growth of both capital and
labor and an unexplained residual, which is usually termed total (factor) produc-
tivity. Table 29.1 reveals that the contribution of capital to economic growth
has dropped only slightly from 1.0% in the 1960s to 0.8% in the most recent
years. Labor scarcely affected output growth in the 1960s, peaked at 1.4% in
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Table 29.1. Aggregate economic growth and factor productivity (% change).
Potential value added Potential labor productivity
Actual
value Value Total Labor Total Capital
Year added added product. Capital Labor product. product. intensity
1965 3.1 4.3 3.4 1.0 -0.0 4.3 3.4 1.0
1966 5.2 4.6 3.6 1.0 0.0 4.5 3.6 1.0
1967 3.1 4.1 3.4 1.0 -0.2 4.5 3.4 1.1
1968 4.3 4.2 3.6 1.0 --0.3 4.7 3.6 1.1
1969 5.7 4.7 3.8 1.0 -0.1 4.8 3.8 1.0
1970 6.5 5.2 4.0 1.0 0.2 4.9 4.0 0.9
1971 4.9 5.1 3.6 1.0 0.5 4.4 3.6 0.8
1972 5.9 5.4 3.4 1.1 0.9 4.1 3.4 0.8
1973 5.1 5.3 2.7 1.2 1.4 3.3 2.7 0.6
1974 4.3 5.0 2.4 1.2 1.4 3.0 2.4 0.6
1975 -0.4 3.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 2.0 1.3 0.8
1976 4.8 3.8 1.8 1.1 0.9 2.5 1.8 0.8
1977 4.5 4.0 1.9 1.1 1.0 2.6 1.9 0.7
1978 1.1 3.2 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.9 1.2 0.7
1979 5.1 3.8 1.9 1.1 0.8 2.5 1.9 0.7
1980 3.2 3.6 1.8 1.0 0.7 2.5 1.8 0.7
1981 0.2 2.6 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.7 1.0 0.7
1982 1.4 2.2 1.1 0.9 0.2 2.0 1.1 0.9
1983 2.0 2.1 1.3 0.9 -0.1 2.2 1.3 0.9
1984 2.3 2.2 1.3 0.8 0.0 2.1 1.3 0.8
1985 3.0 2.4 1.5 0.8 0.1 2.2 1.5 0.7
Source for all tables in this chapter: WIFO Databank.
1974 and slowed down to zero again in the 1980s. By far the most important
source for economic growth has been total factor productivity which, however,
shows a pronounced downward trend from 4.0% in 1970 to 1.5% in 1985.
Table !!S.l also contains a similar analysis for potential labor productivity.
The decline from almost 5% labor productivity growth in 1970 to approximately
2% in the 1980s is mainly due to a corresponding decline in total factor produc-
tivity. The contribution of capital intensity growth to labor productivity growth
is fairly stable around 0.8%
23.3. Structural Adjustments at the Sectoral Level
The aggregate figures for growth and productivity conceal the considerable
adjustments that took place at the sectoral level.
Table !!S.!! indicates that between 1965 and 1985 the share of the primary
sector in total value added declined from 7.3% to 5.3%, but the shares of both
the secondary sector (from 40.6% to 41.1%) and of the tertiary sector (from
52.1% to 53.6%) expanded.
The corresponding shifts in employment are more pronounced and
different, as can be seen from Table !!S.S. Employment in the primary sector
dropped between 1965 and 1985 from a share of 4.9% to 1.6%. The labor share
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Table !!9.!!. Structural changes in value added.
Sector shares (%) Changes in sector shares (%)
Sector 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985
Primary:
Agriculture 6.32 6.04 5.37 5.03 4.80 -0.29 -0.67 -0.34 -0.23
Mining 0.95 0.74 0.61 0.52 0.49 -0.21 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04
Secondary:
Food 4.76 4.91 4.82 4.90 4.72 0.15 -0.09 0.09 -0.18
Textiles and apparel 3.68 3.50 2.91 2.57 2.31 -0.17 -0.59 -0.34 -0.26
Wood products 2.13 2.19 2.12 2.24 2.22 0.06 -0.07 0.13 -0.02
Paper products 2.39 2.16 2.03 2.03 2.19 -0.23 -0.13 0.00 0.15
Chemical products 1.65 2.15 2.52 2.85 3.00 0.50 0.37 0.33 0.15
Petroleum industries 2.06 2.05 1.69 1.38 0.95 -0.01 -0.37 -0.31 -0.43
Nonmetallic minerals 1.77 1.82 1.85 1.82 1.86 0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.04
Basic metals 2.55 2.77 2.17 2.37 2.27 0.22 -0.60 0.20 -0.10
Metal products 8.37 9.64 9.83 10.80 11.93 1.26 0.19 0.97 1.13
Energy and water 2.74 2.97 3.19 3.35 3.34. 0.23 0.23 0.16 -0.01
Construction 8.56 8.53 9.00 7.75 6.34 -0.02 0.46 -1.25 -1.41
Tertiary:
Wholesale and
retail trade 13.91 13.62 14.50 13.96 14.16 -0.29 0.87 -0.54 0.20
Restaurants
and hotels 3.85 3.54 3.31 2.98 2.79 -0.31 -0.23 -0.33 -0.18
Transport and
communication 4.85 5.16 5.69 6.34 6.62 0.31 0.53 0.65 0.28
Financial services 9.16 9.84 10.79 11.80 12.83 0.69 0.95 1.01 1.03
Other services 5.36 4.41 4.20 3.94 3.81 -0.95 -0.21 -0.26 -0.13
Public services 14.95 13.96 13.41 13.37 13.38 -1.00 -0.55 -0.04 0.01
employed in the secondary sector fell from 49.5% to 39.6%. The tertiary sector
absorbed the working force no longer needed in the other sectors by expanding
its share from 45.6% to 58.8%.
A comparison of the changes in the sector shares in Tables 29.2 and 29.9
reveals some interesting details. Whereas all sectors in the primary and secon-
dary sector have lost labor shares over the last five years (except for energy and
water), a number of industries in the secondary sector have expanded their
shares in total value added: metal products, nonmetallic minerals, chemicals and
paper products. The latter three industries belong to the raw material- and
energy-intensive industries and hint at the fundamental structural problems of
Austrian industry.
23.4. The Labor Productivity Slowdown at the Sectoral Level
Table 29.~ contains a concise summary of the labor productivity slowdown at the
sectoral level which occurred over the last 15 years. For all 19 sectors relative
changes in potential labor productivity are partitioned according to equation
(23.4) into components due to relative changes in total factor productivity and
relative changes in capital intensity.
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Table £9.9. Structural changes in employed persons.
Sector shares (%) Changes in sector shares (%)
Sector 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985
Primary:
Agriculture 3.69 2.45 1.67 1.34 1.13 -1.24 -{l.78 -0.33 -0.21
Mining 1.26 0.90 0.67 0.53 0.46 -{l.36 -{l.23 -0.15 -0.06
Secondary:
Food 4.68 4.47 4.07 3.84 3.70 -0.21 -{l.40 -0.23 -0.14
Textiles and apparel 7.43 6.71 5.38 4.59 3.93 -0.71 -1.34 -0.78 -0.66
Wood products 3.38 3.11 3.03 3.22 3.12 -0.26 -{l.08 0.19 -0.10
Paper products 2.80 2.68 2.41 2.17 2.02 -0.12 -0.27 -{l.24 -0.15
Chemical products 2.38 2.75 2.66 2.54 2.36 0.37 -{l.09 -0.12 -{l.18
Petroleum industries 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.32 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.03
Nonmetallic minerals 2.25 2.00 1.86 1.67 1.49 -0.24 -0.14 -0.20 -0.17
Basic metals 2.76 2.61 2.60 2.44 2.13 -{l.15 -{l.01 -{l.16 -{l.31
Metal products 11.68 12.30 12.53 12.35 11.46 0.62 0.23 -0.18 -{l.89
Energy and water 1.17 1.23 1.21 1.13 1.23 0.06 -{l.03 -{l.08 0.10
Construction 10.55 9.88 9.70 9.21 7.89 -0.67 -{l.18 -0.48 -1.33
Tertiary:
Wholesale and
retail trade 11.14 11.58 12.78 13.31 13.67 0.45 1.20 0.53 0.36
Restaurants
and hotels 3.25 3.53 3.38 3.80 4.24 0.28 -0.15 0.42 0.43
Transport and
communication 7.84 7.75 7.61 7.31 7.56 -{l.09 -{l.15 -0.30 0.25
Financial services 4.70 5.29 2.86 3.26 3.58 0.59 -2.43 0.40 0.32
Other services 3.38 3.00 11.82 12.85 14.09 -{l.38 8.81 1.03 1.24
Public services 15.28 17.40 13.39 14.09 15.63 2.11 -4.01 0.70 1.54
The current labor productivity growth rate of 2.2% for the whole economy
can be attributed to an increase of 0.7% in capital intensity and an 1.5% rise in
total factor productivity. These numbers, however, do not reflect the wide span
of sectoral differences.
Highest labor productivity growth can be observed in the secondary sector:
metal products (5.7%), paper products (5.4%), chemical products (4.9%) and
nonmetallic minerals (4.7%). These branches also show the highest growth rates
of capital intensity and of total factor productivity.
On the lower end of current potential labor productivity growth, we find
the service sector branches of restaurants and hotels (-1.3%) and other services
(--0.5%) together with the petroleum industries (--0.7%). The latter two
branches exhibit the disturbing fact of a deteriorating total factor productivity
despite an above-average growth of capital intensity.
A look at the dynamics of the relative labor productivity changes and their
relationship to the relative movements of total factor productivity and capital
intensity suggests that in the early 1970s the capital intensities grew at a slightly
higher rate than in the 1980s, but were accompanied by a remarkably higher
contribution of total factor productivity. In addition branches with declining
output shares seem to exhibit lower growth both in capital intensities and total
factor productivity.
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23.5. Econometric Evidence for the Total Factor Productivity
Slowdown
The crucial role of total factor productivity growth, which emerged in the
decomposition of labor productivity growth, calls for causal interpretations. We
will focus on the hypotheses that cyclical behavior of the economy and capital
intensity may have an impact on the productivity of a factor.
We tested these propositions with the following econometric specification:
1= ao + a; 1-1 + a; (qaet -q) + a; (k - n) + res. (23.6)
Thus, growth of total factor productivity I is to be explained by a constant,
lagged factor productivity growth 1-1 for dynamic adjustments, the difference
between actual and smoothed output growth (qaet - q) as an indicator for capa-
city utilization, growth of capital intensity (k - n) and a residual. Table 23.5
summarizes the estimation results for the sample period 1966 to 1985.
Table !!9.5. Regressions for potential total factor productivity 1966-1985.
Estimated coefficients
Total
production Capacity Capital R 2
Sector Constant lagged utilizatio n intensity adjusted
Primary:
Agriculture -0.185 1.009 0.429 0.979
Mining 0.505 0.832 0.390 0.921
Secondary:
Food 0.197 0.951 0.401 0.981
Textiles and apparel -0.627 0.830 0.280 1.017 0.931
Wood products 0.523 0.758 0.371 0.938
Paper products 0.634 0.752 0.329 0.928
Chemical products 0.496 0.749 0.324 0.717 0.904
Petroleum industries -0.067 0.891 0.383 0.962
Nonmetallic minerals 1.408 0.623 0.306 0.859
Basic metals 0.526 0.831 0.396 0.925
Metal products -0.052 0.750 0.313 0.768 0.943
Energy and water -0.364 0.911 0.420 0.959 0.979
Construction 0.222 0.890 0.180 0.926
Tertiary:
Wholesale and retail trade 0.033 0.724 0.352 0.395 0.943
Restaurants and hotels -3.128 0.538 0.448 2.117 0.927
Transport and communication -0.696 0.761 0.380 1.271 0.987
Financial services 1.099 0.640 0.402 0.938 0.882
Other services -0.934 0.150 1.678 0.809
Public services -0.109 0.695 0.309 2.034 0.956
All sectors -0.455 0.807 0.308 1.112 0.988
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For the whole economy the effect of changes in both capacity utilization
and capital intensity turned out to be highly significant. The lagged dependent
variable indicates the adjustment process which is caused by changes in the
other dependent variables.
The sectoral results stress the importance of capacity utilization for
explaining total factor productivity. The economic rationale behind this
phenomenon is the observation that it is costly for firms to make adjustments to
factor inputs. In response to demand shocks, firms may vary factor utilization
levels in the short run, leading to changes in observed factor productivity.
To what extent capital formation fosters productivity growth is still rather
controversial (Olson, 1982; Lindbeck, 1983). In the data base used for all sectors
a significant influence of relative changes in capital intensity on growth of total
factor productivity could not be found. This effect is pronounced, however, in
textiles, chemicals, metal products, energy and in almost all services sectors.
Equation (23.3) may be interpreted as a labor demand function for each of
the 19 sectors considered, the growth rate of total factor productivity being
explained by equation (23.6). With actual sectoral output and capital formation
determined by effective demand, this yields a nea-Ricardian perspective of a mul-
tisectoral economy, which seems to be very adequate for Austria since both capi-
tal formation and composition of output have been strongly influenced in the
past by the political decision process, which has often overruled economic factors
such as changes in structural composition of demand and relative prices.
23.6. Prospects and Conclusions
There is no evidence that growth of the Austrian economy was seriously ham-
pered by supply conditions. Over the last 20 years the contribution of capital to
economic growth has been very stable. When domestic labor turned scarce at
the end of the 1960s foreign workers expanded the stock of the available labor
force.
Like almost all other industrial nations, Austria experienced a substantial
slowdown of total factor productivity which affected labor and capital produc-
tivity. Econometric evidence suggests that this slowdown mainly reflects
underutilization of existing production capacities caused both by a drop of
overall demand and shifts in the sectoral composition of demand. In a number
of manufacturing branches and in almost all services, overall factor productivity
has been significantly influenced by capital intensity.
Extrapolating past trends of demand and capital formation, Austria should
have no problems in maintaining an average annual GDP growth rate of 2 to 3%
over the next decade. More crucial, however, seems to be the decision about the
composition of output and the decision about the corresponding production tech-
niques. The econometric results obtained indicate a substantial impact of the
decision about size and composition of capital on growth of output, factor pro-
ductivity and labor demand.
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As in other studies (Aiginger, 1987), we want to emphasize that the supply
structure of the Austrian economy only sluggishly follows the considerable shifts
in the composition of demand. In some resource-intensive industries, such as
paper and chemical products, sectoral shares in total value added have even
expanded over the last years, which leads us to question the functioning of the
structural adjustment process toward a technologically advanced industrialized
economy.
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PART III
Analysis and Forecast of World Trade,
the Debt Situation, and
North-South Economic Relations

CHAPTER 24
Structural Change in World Trade:
Analyses and Forecasts of the FIND Model
Georg Erber
Summary
This chapter presents six scenarios run with the FIND submode I of North-South
trade for different commodity groups. The results show that different assump-
tions about real growth of world trade and world inflation lead to considerable
structural shifts in the composition of the commodity structure of intra- and
interregional trade relations of both country groups until the year 2000. A key
role in balancing the North-South trade relationship is played by the develop-
ment of world energy prices and the possibility of the developing countries enter-
ing the markets of the developed economies for manufactured products.
24.1. Introduction
The Forecasting Interindustrial Development Model (FIND) is a large-scale
econometric model for the Federal Republic of Germany, developed by a
research group of the German Institute for Economic Research (Deutsches Insti-
tut fur Wirtschaftsforschung) in Berlin. Its development started in 1983 in
cooperation with the Special Research Department 21 of Bonn University Icf.
Krelle et aI. (1982)]. A number of publications summarizes the current state of
the research project: Erber (1986a, 1986b), Erber et aI. (1983, 1986), Horn
(1986), Meier (1986), and Nakamura (1986).
FIND is an annual input-output model of 51 industry sectors. Its modeling
concept rests on a bottom-up approach by modeling each single sectoral activity
on the demand and supply side. An overview of the input-output structure of
the model is given by Erber (1986a). As far as possible, microeconomic
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foundations for deriving factor demand systems, household demand systems, or
other simpler sectoral single-equation demand functions are used. The model
explains real and price variables. It includes a detailed investment and capital
accounting model based on a capital vintage approach. The capital and capacity
utilization submodel distinguishes between equipment and structure. For the
explanation of foreign trade, German export and import activities are linked with
a small world trade model by two country groups - developed and developing
market economies, and their inter- and intraregional trade matrix by seven one-
digit SITC classifications [ef. Erber 1986b)]). Its fairly detailed government and
social insurance submodel consists of an integration of the already available
parts of the aggregated long-run forecasting model of the German Institute for
Economic Research [ef. Blazejczak 1986)]. The complete model consists of about
7,000 behavioral and definitional equations.
The FIND model is applied to analyze the past development of structural
change [cf. DIW (1983), Erber and Haas (1983)]. Additionally, it is now used for
current research projects considering questions of consumer tax harmonization in
the EEC, and the analysis of the impacts of the technological change on employ-
ment (META-Study II of the Ministry of Research and Technology). The world
trade model was used in the following study to run different scenarios for the
future development of North-South trade relations until the year 2000.
24.2. Methodological Aspects of Long-Range Forecasting
with Econometric Models
Since the publication of the book Limits to Growth by Meadows et al. (1972) and
the The Global 2000 Report to the President by Barney (1980), there has
developed a growing awareness on the long-run impacts of changes in global
socioeconomic trends by a broader public. Many people now understand that
these developments should be regarded in current decision making to avoid
long-run structural disparities and negative consequences, on the one hand. On
the other hand, forecasts over a long time horizon are always conditional on
assumptions on future trends that are difficult to assess - owing to instability of
international political conditions caused by lack of appropriate international pol-
icy coordination [ef. Artis and Ostry (1986)], unexpected basic innovations such
as the microelectronic revolution, sudden booms and depressions triggered by
speculative bubbles in the international finance markets with long-lasting effects
or general changes in cultural preferences shifting demand patterns in an unex-
pected way. This shattered the belief in the usefulness of quantitative forecasts.
The critical evaluation of long-range forecasts [e.g., Hugger (1974)] strengthened
the view that results of such investigations should not be taken as unassailable
truths.
Despite uneasiness about reliability of forecasts and how much trust should
be placed in quantitative forecasts, there is still the necessity to use all the best
available information in current decision making. That this lIASA-Bonn
Research Project on Economic Growth and Structural Change is subject to
doubts and questions is obvious to the participating members [ef. Ross (1986)],
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but we hope that this model will nonetheless contribute to the understanding of
future possible developments and give insights that cannot be obtained by other
approaches.
24.3. Forecasts of Structural Shifts in North-South Trade by
Commodity Groups
Builders of national forecasting models always face the problem of modeling
foreign trade relationships of a sectoral (disaggregated) nature. Since the
development of world trade has a major impact on the performance of the
domestic economy, a forecast can be severely biased by bad predictions of the
competing foreign demand and supply conditions, exchange rate movements, and
transfer of capital or technology. Therefore, it is necessary to forecast disaggre-
gated variables of world market activities, which give a closer link to the single
markets of the industry of a country. Aggregate variables of world trade activi-
ties in many cases give unsatisfactory results if used as explanatory variables in
sectoral import and demand equations. To solve this forecasting problem more
satisfactorily and in a consistent manner without having to predict a great
number of world trade variables in an ad hoc fashion, a small world market
model was constructed in the context of the FIND model.
24.3.1. Specification of the world trade model
The world trade model of the FIND project explains the inter- and intraregional
trade shares of two country groups, developed and developing market economies,
by seven different commodity groups of the SITe classification. Since it needs
only four aggregate world trade variables - the total volume of imports of the
developed and developing market economies together with the corresponding
price indices - it can be run independently from the rest of the FIND model,
which uses the results as inputs for its sectoral export and import equations.
The SITe submodel has 224 equations. There are 56 behavioral equations
explaining trade shares in current prices and prices by commodity groups. The
remaining 168 equations are definitional equations partly necessary to guarantee
consistency of the accounting framework and partly adding up the different
aggregates to get the corresponding aggregate world trade variables for all
market economies or all commodities. Table 24.1 shows the classification used
by the model.
For this classification two import demand systems were estimated. As
Armington (1969) has proposed, demand is derived by a two-stage decision pro-
cess. One country or country group decides at the first stage how to allocate its
total import demand between different goods, and thereafter it decides from
which country it orders what amount for each commodity or commodity group.
Figure 24.1 illustrates this two-stage allocation process. The behavioral equa-
tions of the demand system are derived from the almost ideal demand framework
of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
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Table £-1.1. Classification used by the world trade model.
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I.
II.
Country Groups:
SITC goods classification:
0+1
2+4
3
5
6+8
7
9
Developed market economies
Developing market economies
Food and live animals (0), and
Beverages and tobacco (1)
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (2), and
Animal and vegetable oils and fats (4)
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
Chemicals
Manufactures classified chiefly by material (6), and
Miscellaneous manufactured articles (8)
Machinery and transport equipment
Commodities and transactions not classified
Source: UN (various years), covering the period 1960-1980. Base year for price and volume in-
dices: 1976 = 100.
(a) Developed countries XN. WD
~I~
XN. WD.01 XN. WD.24 XN. WD.3 XN. WD.5 XN. WD.68 XN. WD.7 XN. WD.9
/\ /\ /\ /\ /\ /'\ /\
XN.DD.Ol XN.GD.Ol XN.DD.5 XN.GD.5 • .•.... XN.DD.9 XN.GD.9
(6) Developing countries XN. WG
~~
XN. WG.Ol XN. WG.24 XN. WG.3 XN. WG.5 XN. WG.68 XN. WG. 7 XN. WG.9
/\ /\/\ /\ /\ /\ /\
XN.DG.Ol XN. GG.Ol XN.DG.5 XN.GG.5 XN.DG.9 XN.GG.9
Figure £-1.1. Simplified scheme of the FIND-SITC submodel, for (a) developed coun-
tries, and (b) developing countries.
G~org Er6~r
The symbols of Figure 24.1, also used in the equations below, are:
XN = exports in current prices
W = all markets economies
D = developed market economies
G = developing market economies
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The import demand systems were estimated by the full information max-
imum likelihood (FIML) method. Tables 24.2 and 24.9 summarize the results of
the coefficient estimates. For a discussion of the results, see Erber (1986b).
The second stage of the import demand systems was chosen from a static
and dynamic, almost ideal demand system with respect to the results obtained
after the estimation.
XN.GD j [P.XGD j ] [XN. WD j ]
XN. WD j = aj + bj log P.XDDj + Cj log PStone
XN.GD j [P.XGDj ] [XN. WD j ]
XN. WD j = aj + bj log P.XDD j + Cj log PStone
24.3.2. Results of the different Bonn-IIASA scenarios
(24.1)
(24.2)
A number of alternative scenarios proposed by the Bonn-IIASA project for the
future development of the world market were run with this model. Since
currently the model has data available for all variables only from 1960 to 1980,
we used the already available data for the aggregates of the two country groups
published by the International Monetary Fund (1985, Table 19 of the Statistical
Appendix, which also contains estimates for 1986) for the time period 1981 to
1986. The dynamic simulation of the model begins in 1975 in order to let the
model adjust to its dynamics. From 1981 to 1986, the IMF data were used to
forecast the endogenous variables. From 1987 to 2000, the assumptions of Table
24.4 were applied to the volume and price indices of the total imports of each
country group.
Because it is impossible to present all results in this chapter we selected
some outcomes to indicate that the model generates reasonable results.
First, the results for the structural development of world trade by the seven
commodity groups are discussed. The following tables present the results for the
years 1980, 1990, and 2000 for the scenarios II, IV, and V. To compare the fore-
casted development with the historical structure, the values for the year 1960,
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Table 2,{9. Estimation results of the second stage AIDS models determining the import
shares for the different SITC groups (t-values in parentheses).
Parameter
SITe goods classification a· b· c· d· R2I I I I
(a) From developing to developed market economies:
0+1 Food, etc. 0.47 0.25 -0.067 0.91 0.93
(8.41) (7.49) (7.66) (8.43)
2+4 Raw materials excl. fuels 0.25 0.11 -0.028 0.63 0.88
(2.05) (2.04) (1.71) (2.20)
3 Fuels, etc. 0.51 0.16 0.003 0.70 0.67
(6.06) (3.49) (0.19) (4.98)
5 Chemicals 0.031 0.007 0.003 0.99 0.72
(5.50) (2.18) (3.72) (4.98)
6+8 Other manufactures 0.015 0.012 0.025 0.78 0.88
(1.19) (0.49) (3.29) (4.12)
7 Machinery 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.52 0.78
(2.04) (1.16) (2.37) (2.58)
9 Commodities not classified 0.1 -0.084 0.047 0.02
(1.83) (0.21 ) (1.35)
(b) From developed to developing market economies:
0+1 Food, etc. 0.65 0.06 0.026 0.49
(65.52) (2.04) (4.69)
2+4 Raw materials excl. fuels 0.53 0.31 0.062 0.62
(36.31) (3.23) (6.34)
3 Fuels, etc. -0.018 0.1 0.024 0.47 0.89
(0.67) (3.48) (2.26) (3.52)
5 Chemicals 0.92 0.029 -0.023 0.91
(364.47) (2.07) (14.19)
6+8 Other manufactures 0.91 0.019 -0.051 0.87
(93.12) (0.35) (13.05)
7 Machinery 0.97 0.031 -0.012 0.62
(128.92) (1.74) (5.61 )
9 Commodities not classified 0.92 0.17 -0.023 0.11
(31.87) (0.78) (1.38)
Table 2,4.,4. Assumptions about the world market development of the Bonn-IIASA Pro-
ject.
Scenario
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Percentage growth of the
volume index of world trade
2
4
6
2
4
6
Percentage growth of the
price index of world trade
5
5
5
8
8
8
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Table £-1.5. Exports from all countries to all market economies in current prices (billion
US$) for scenarios II, IV, and V.
SITe
Scenario II:
0+1
2+4
3
5
6+8
7
9
Total
1970
35.16
27.66
24.82
19.06
77.16
77.90
4.16
265.93
1980
164.11
113.12
421.87
127.61
431.06
440.47
21.31
1,719.27
1985
153.01
94.33
380.30
128.32
420.34
461.84
21.82
1,659.96
1990
211.15
118.13
655.80
203.41
639.80
719.90
26.23
2,574.43
1995
289.22
144.75
1,114.49
315.80
959.64
1,102.55
34.63
3,961.08
£000
396.08
172.25
1,880.08
486.29
1,433.88
1,677.95
48.09
6,094.6
Scenario IV:
0+1 35.16
2 + 4 27.66
3 24.82
5 19.06
6 + 8 77.16
7 77.90
9 4.16
Total 265.93
164.11
113.12
421.57
127.61
431.06
440.47
21.31
1,719.27
153.01
94.33
380.30
128.32
420.34
461.84
21.82
1,659.96
263.62
139.94
714.90
195.20
637.42
706.79
39.36
2,670.21
384.28
226.25
1,341.84
280.72
941.86
1,040.20
85.26
4,300.41
644.36
384.95
2,480.50
384.23
1,366.26
1,483.53
182.03
6,925.86
Scenario V:
0+1
2+4
3
5
6+8
7
9
Total
35.16
27.66
24.82
19.06
77.16
77.90
4.16
265.93
164.11
113.12
421.57
127.61
431.06
440.57
21.31
1,719.27
153.01
94.33
380.30
128.32
420.34
461.84
21.82
1,659.96
240.55
136.36
766.80
182.01
694.25
778.72
35.07
2,869.76
396.98
210.55
1,571.56
362.98
1,144.20
1,299.40
71.84
5,057.50
677.54
343.28
3,172.64
585.34
1,859.17
2,119.17
155.88
8,913.02
1970, and 1985 are added. Table 24.5 shows the trade volume in billions of US
dollars for the seven commodity groups traded between all market economies.
If we define as primary products the SITC groups 1, 2, 3, and 4, and as
secondary products the SITC groups 5, 6, 7, and 8, we observe that low real
growth of world trade and high inflation in world trade prices induce a share
shift from the secondary products to the primary products. The share of energy
goods, especially, increases from 24.5% in 1980 to about 35.6% or 35.8% for an
inflation rate of 8% and 2% or 4% real growth of world trade. Only if inflation is
comparably low at 5% and real growth of world trade is at 4% does the share of
energy commodities increase less.
For scenario II this increase in world trade of energy goods is completely
compensated by the decrease in the trade shares of food and other raw materials.
In scenario II the share of raw materials is nearly identical in the year 2000 to
the share in the year 1980. The decline of inflation of world market prices,
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especially the decline of oil prices, helps the industrialized countries to partici-
pate successfully in the world markets. A similar effect results from higher real
growth of world trade by constant inflation in prices.
Comparing the outcomes of scenarios IV and V, one sees that the increase
in real growth induces higher export shares of industry products balanced by a
decrease in exports of food and raw materials. The world trade share of fuels
remains nearly constant in both scenarios.
For industrial products, the share of other manufactures (SITC 6+8)
decreases for the year 2000 compared with 1980 in scenario II, while the shares
of chemical products and machinery increase. Therefore, for the growth of the
world economy and the related growth in world trade, machinery and chemicals
are more important than other manufactures. This kind of reaction can be
observed for the other two scenarios, IV and V.
Table 24.6 gives the corresponding percentage shares for the three
scenarios.
Table £-1-6. Percentage shares of growth in world trade for scenario II, IV and V.
SITe
Scenario II:
0+1
2+4
3
5
6+8
7
9
Total
Scenario IV:
0+1
2+4
3
5
6+8
7
9
Total
Scenario V:
0+1
2+4
3
5
6+8
7
9
Total
1970
13.22
10.40
9.33
7.17
29.02
29.29
1.56
100.0
13.22
10.40
9.33
7.17
29.02
29.29
1.56
100.0
13.22
10.40
9.33
7.17
29.02
29.29
1.56
100.0
1980
9.55
6.58
24.52
7.42
25.07
25.62
1.24
100.0
9.55
6.58
24.52
7.42
25.07
25.62
1.24
100.0
9.55
6.58
24.52
7.42
25.07
25.62
1.24
100.0
1985
9.22
5.68
22.91
7.73
25.32
27.82
1.31
100.0
9.22
5.68
22.91
7.73
25.32
27.82
1.31
100.0
9.22
5.68
22.91
7.73
25.32
27.82
1.31
100.0
1990
8.20
4.59
25.47
7.90
24.85
27.96
1.02
100.0
9.87
5.24
26.77
7.31
23.87
26.47
1.47
100.0
8.38
4.75
26.72
7.60
24.19
27.14
1.22
100.0
1995
7.30
3.65
28.14
7.97
24.23
27.83
0.87
100.0
8.94
5.26
31.20
6.53
21.90
24.19
1.98
100.0
7.85
4.16
31.07
7.18
22.62
25.69
1.42
100.0
£000
6.50
2.83
30.85
7.98
23.53
27.53
0.79
100.0
9.30
5.56
35.82
5.55
19.73
21.42
2.63
100.0
7.60
3.85
35.60
6.57
20.86
23.78
1.75
100.0
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Additionally we present in Table 24.7 the percentage shares of the inter-
and intraregional trade development of the two country groups for scenario II,
which seems the most likely under the current circumstances.
Table £4.7. Percentage shares of exports from ... to ... market economies for scenario II.
SITe 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 £000
From developed to developed countries:
0+1 10.84 9.59 8.91 8.27 7.73 7.26
2+4 9.72 7.31 6.00 4.82 3.79 2.82
3 3.75 8.42 7.37 7.60 7.64 7.49
5 7.90 9.77 10.43 11.15 11.82 12.48
6+8 32.60 30.98 30.86 30.83 30.78 30.77
7 33.70 32.50 35.05 36.29 37.32 38.30
9 1.50 1.42 1.37 1.04 0.92 0.88
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
From developed to developing countries:
0+1 10.83 10.66 10.12 9.62 9.13 8.68
2+4 4.63 4.42 4.51 4.46 4.41 4.38
3 1.48 2.40 1.46 1.46 1.32 1.13
5 10.81 10.93 9.83 9.71 9.55 9.36
6+8 28.03 26.61 24.73 24.31 23.82 23.32
7 41.15 43.53 46.79 48.22 49.82 51.43
9 3.08 1.46 2.55 2.22 1.95 1.71
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
From developing to developing countries:
0+1 18.36 9.27 9.37 8.06 6.86 5.84
2+4 14.03 6.42 6.21 5.44 4.70 4.06
3 34.69 54.73 52.65 55.04 57.23 59.31
5 3.62 3.25 3.14 3.10 3.03 2.94
6+8 19.24 17.07 19.03 18.77 18.60 18.35
7 9.27 8.24 9.08 9.15 9.18 9.17
9 0.08 1.02 0.53 0.45 0.39 0.33
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
From developing to developed countries:
0+1 24.55 8.70 9.31 7.23 5.60 4.33
2+4 18.34 6.59 5.51 3.89 2.65 1.72
3 34.38 66.98 66.30 70.50 74.13 77.20
5 1.22 0.94 1.11 1.10 1.07 1.02
6+8 17.42 13.31 14.08 13.83 13.29 12.66
7 3.59 2.75 3.11 3.05 2.91 2.76
9 0.47 0.74 0.58 0.41 0.34 0.32
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Obviously, the intraregional trade of the developed country group will
increase the shares of the manufactured, chemical, machinery and transport
equipment commodities and reduce the trade share for agricultural products and
raw materials except fuels. The trade share for fuels is relatively stable over the
forecasting time horizon.
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The intraregional trade from the developed to the developing countries
shows a share shift that increases only for machinery and transport equipment.
This commodity group has the greatest growth potential for the developed
market economies. It is interesting to notice that the trade share of the
commodity group of SITC 6+8 decreases moderately in the exports from the
developed to the developing countries. This shows the growing potential of at
least a number of developing countries, e.g., the NICs, to substitute trade with
developed countries for trade with developing economies. The reverse effect does
not appear: developing countries cannot export an increasing share of industrial
goods to the developed countries. Because the demand for agricultural products
and raw materials (except fuels) loses some importance, only fuel exports are
increasing in the intraregional trade relationship between the developing and
developed economies. This finding offers little hope for overcoming the debt
problem of the majority of the developing countries caused by long-lasting trade
deficits.
P=5%;
o P = 5%;
6. P = 8%;
X P = 8%;
35
30
25
~ 20
'"~
~
III
.. 15
..cI
~
~ 100..
1IO
Gi 5;:l
~
~ 0
-5
-10
1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
R =4%
R =6%
R =2%
R =4%
1995 2000
Figure 2,/.2. Exports of crude materials, fats, etc. (except fuels) from developed to
developed market economies: historical observations, 1962-1980; forecasted values,
1981-2000.
Figures 2.i-2, 24.3, and 24.4 show the development of three variables from
1962 until 2000 (forecasted from 1981 to 2000) for the six scenarios. As we can
see, the model adjusts after a couple of years to a stable path. This is reasonable
since the aggregate variables driving the system were set to a constant growth
trajectory. As soon as there is less steady variation in the aggregate variables,
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the shape of the forecast of the endogenous variables is much more similar to the
historical observations. This is obvious from the development of the variables in
the years 1981 to 1986, where IMF data were used. The model is able to follow
up-and-down swings of world trade and can adjust to the two oil price shocks, as
ex post simulation of the model has shown.
24.4. Summary
This chapter presented some results of six different ex ante forecast scenarios
with the SITC submodel of the FIND project. The two-stage, almost ideal
demand systems used to explain import demand of the developed and developing
countries produced reasonable results. They showed that changes in the rate of
inflation and real growth of world trade had considerable impacts on the struc-
ture of commodities traded and, thereby, on the growth potential of the two
country groups.
Slow growth and high inflation favor the producers of raw materials,
whereas faster growth increases disproportionately the demand for industrial
goods. As long as the supply conditions of the developing countries do not
change in the direction of more industrial goods, which could be traded with the
developed countries, North-South trade is trapped in an unbalanced state.
Second, energy prices largely determine how the shares between
North-South world market exports split up. The presented scenarios suggest
that the share of the commodity group of fuel (SITC 3) would increase under all
assumptions - a finding that should be reconsidered in light of the current
decline of energy prices. The effects of energy substitution through conservation
and increased use of nuclear and alternative energies would have an impact,
which is not fully accounted by the model. A reestimation with more recent data
from 1981 to 1985 may correct for some biases that result from using a data set
ending in 1980.
Further investigation should check this outcome with respect to the sensi-
tivity of the transfer of world price inflation to the energy prices. Since the esti-
mation period of the model included the two oil price crises, this could bias the
forecast. Additional scenarios that investigate unequal growth between the two
country groups should give more insights into different development strategies.
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CHAPTER 25
Foreign Debt and the Structure
of World Trade
Peter Pauly
Summary
The dramatic increase in the level of external debt of a large number of Third
World countries has no doubt significantly affected the volume of world trade in
the early 1980s. In this chapter, we examine whether, in addition, the structure
of trade, i.e., the direction of trade flows, has been altered through financial con-
straints. The aim of the chapter is to examine the causal relationships between
various global measures of structural change in bilateral trade flows and develop-
ing countries' debt. The results are largely affirmative, and suggest that
medium- and long-term projections of world trade structures will have to be
based on an assessment of monetary conditions as well as relative prices and
technological trends. The analysis indicates the need for an in-depth analysis of
these mechanisms based on the dynamics of bilateral trade shares.
25.1. Introduction
The dramatic increase in the net external debt position for a significant number
of developing countries has been one of the most important disruptions of the
global economy during the first half of the 1980s. Beyond the immediate impact
of both the inflow of foreign capital into these countries, and the subsequent
adjustment policies imposed by private and official creditors on the debtor coun-
tries themselves, the world economy as a whole has been affected severely. It is
well understood that the observed variability in growth rates of world trade over
the period 1977-1985 is, among other things, related to the sharp swings in trade
activities in debtor countries. Little attention has so far been paid, however, to
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the effects of the debt crisis on the structure of world trade flows. It is the pur-
pose of this chapter to address that issue.
Based on a highly aggregated trade matrix analysis, we shall examine the
trade flows between the largest debtor countries and other regions. The primary
intention is to identify interregional reallocations of trade that can be traced to
the accumulations of foreign debt in these countries. Clearly, an aggregate
analysis cannot immediately be translated into a forecast of structural change.
Here an examination of the dynamics of trade shares based on detailed matrices,
disaggregated by country and commodity, is in order. Unfortunately, however,
such an econometric study is, at present, infeasible due to the short history of
available data. It is therefore most appropriate to look at the present exercise as
a pilot study toward that ultimate goal.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 25.2 we review briefly the
history of the debt crisis, with special reference to the 10 major countries under
investigation in this study. Section 25.3 contains a discussion of the evolution of
trade shares between major regions in the world. In Section 25.4, we propose
various measures for structural change based on trade share analysis as well as
bilateral flows. In Section 25.5 we report the empirical performance of those
measures over the period of investigation, and attempt to test for a significant
impact of the surge in foreign debt on various measures of structural change.
Section 25.6 contains a short summary of our results.
25.2. The Accumulation of Debt since 1914
For the purposes of this analysis we concentrate on the 10 largest debtor coun-
tries, based on data available from 1985. In Table 25.1 we summarize the level
of outstanding debt, current interest payments, and the 1985 trade balances for
those countries. With regard to the stock of debt, these countries account for
about $450 billion of the total developing country debt of $600 billion; other
significant debtor countries not included here are Colombia, Peru, Nigeria, Thai-
land and Algeria. With two exceptions, the current interest burden for these
countries equals or exceeds available foreign exchange receipts from merchandise
transactions; the fall in oil prices in 1986 has worsened the situation for Mexico
and Venezuela significantly.
The rapid buildup of external debt by these countries has certainly aug-
mented their purchasing power in world markets in the late 1970s and early
1980. But it would be a mistake to assume that this borrowing was associated
with large merchandise trade deficits in all cases. While it is impossible to trace
how the purchasing power provided by external creditors was utilized, the five
Latin American countries as a group matched all of their imports with exports of
merchandise.
As shown in Table 25.2, the cumulated trade deficits of Brazil, Chile and
Mexico were less than one-fifth as large as their buildup in external debts.
Argentina, Venezuela and Indonesia ran substantial cumulative trade surpluses.
Korea and the Philippines did show cumulated trade deficits equal to about
two-thirds and one-half, respectively, of their buildup in external debt - a
Peter Paul"
Table £5.1. Debt and debt service in 1985 (billion USS).
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Country
Mexico
Brazil
Argentina
Venezuela
Chile
Korea
Indonesia
Philippines
Egypt
India
Total debt
96.7
100.1
47.8
32.4
20.4
46.7
34.3
26.5
32.0
21.7
Interest payments
8.8
9.5
5.9
3.2
1.8
4.1
2.4
2.3
2.2
0.7
Trade balance
8.7
10.9
4.3
7.4
0.7
0.1
5.4
-0.3
--6.1
-5.4
Table £5.£. Cumulated stock of debt since 1973 and its sources in 1982 (billion USS).
Change in Net service
gross Increase in and other Increase in
external official current account Trade private claims
Country debt reserves payments deficit on nonresidents
Mexico 82.6 -0.1 36.4 9.0 36.3
Brazil 93.5 -1.3 68.0 15.6 11.4
Argentina 32.6 2.3 20.1 -9.8 20.2
Venezuela 27.0 9.1 26.0 -33.3 25.5
Chile 15.4 2.6 10.8 3.2 0.1
Korea 33.6 5.8 -1.1 21.3 5.9
Indonesia 28.1 6.6 3.1 -14.8 33.2
Philippines 19.9 2.4 0 13.4 3.9
Egypt 26.1 2.1 0.8 19.8 3.4
India 18.0 3.0 1.2 12.0 1.8
Source: Dooley et aI. (1986) and own calculations.
pattern more typical of developing countries as a group. Hence, one cannot
assume that the buildup in external debt was related to net imports of goods, or
growth in productive capacity, in any simple manner [Dooley et al. (1986)].
The most important net use of foreign exchange for a number of countries
was net service payments, largely in the form of interest payments on existing
debt. The buildup in official reserve assets was an important use of funds for
only three countries: Chile, Korea and Venezuela. In contrast, the accumulation
of private claims on nonresidents accounted for more than half of the buildup of
external debt for Venezuela and Argentina and accounted for 20% or more of the
buildup for four other countries.
The estimates for private claims on nonresidents are based on a residual
calculation, and as such, subject to potential errors. For example, if trade values
are consistently misreported, perhaps to conceal capital flight, this estimate
would be biased downward. It should also be noted that gross capital inflows
and outflows are not in themselves the cause of debt problems. Many countries
have gross external debts which are roughly offset by gross external assets. This
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situation is a problem only if the external receipts are not available to those who
have to make payments on external debt.
There is enough evidence to show that the source of external debt has
varied considerably among the countries examined here. Nevertheless, it is our
contention that as far as the effects on trade structures are concerned, an aggre-
gate analysis will still be sufficient; for a detailed analysis, see Cline (1984) and
Dornbusch and Fischer (1985).
25.3. The Structure of Aggregate World Trade
Before we turn to the formal analysis of intertemporal changes in the structure
of world trade, a brief historical overview is in order. We base our analysis on
aggregate trade for SITC categories 0 to 9. The data base was compiled by the
United Nations for the period 1965 to 1983. Extrapolations for 1984 to 1986
were obtained as preliminary estimates based on the Direction of Trade Statis-
tics. The definition of regional groupings for the purposes of this analysis is as
follows:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Group 3:
Group 4:
Group 5:
Group 6:
Group 7:
Group 8:
10 largest debtor countries (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela,
Chile, Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Egypt, India) [DEBT]
United States [USA]
Japan [JAPAN]
EEC [EEC]
Rest of OECD [OECD]
OPEC (excl. Venezuela, Indonesia) [OPEC]
Other LDCs (non-oil, non-debt, incl. China) [LDC]
Centrally planned economies [CMEA]
The historical structure of world trade is summarized in Table 25.3, where
we report export shares for all 8 regional groups for three representative years:
1965, 1975, and 1985. In comparison with 1965, the structure for 1975 is already
affected by the first oil shock, while the table for 1985 also reflects the effects of
the debt crisis. Generally, the EEC countries account for a little more than one-
third of world trade, with the USA and the rest of OECD contributing about
15% each. The share of CMEA countries is about 10%, but declining - about
the same size as the non-debtor developing countries. The debtor countries and
Japan account for about 6% of merchandise trade, respectively. Note that
export shares add up to unity row-wise.
Elements on the main diagonal indicate the extent of intraregional trade
which is substantial for both the EEC and the CMEA countries. However, while
the EEC share is slightly increasing, the CMEA share shows a significant down-
ward trend after 1975.
The particular interest of this chapter is centered around the behavior of
trade flows between debtor countries and other regions over time. In Figures
25.1 and 25.2, we summarize trade between group 1 and groups 2-8. Figure 25.1
reports shares of exports to groups 2-8 in total exports of the group of major
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Figure 25.1. Export shares of debtor countries 1965-1986.
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Figure 25.2. Import shares of debtor countries 1965-1986.
debtor countries, while Figure 25.2 reports import shares defined analogously.
The data cover the period 1965 to 1986; of particular interest in the present con-
text are the years 1977 to 1986, corresponding to the debt buildup. On the
export side, it appears as if, after the initial demand stimulus following the
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inflow of funds, the share of intradebtor countries trade has fallen sharply.
Minor reductions seem to have occurred for exports to other LDCs and to Japan.
Upon first inspection, the USA seems to have absorbed the bulk of the adjust-
ment. On the import side the important question is whether the reduction in
real imports, caused by domestic stabilization programs in the debtor countries,
has been distributed evenly across regions [see also Dornbusch (1985), Marquez
and McNeilly (1986)]. It appears that initially imports from the USA and the
EEC have been affected more than proportionally, while the intradebtor share
and the share of other LDCs remained unaffected. Imports from Japan have not
been affected noticeably, while the CMEA share has improved somewhat. A
more formal analysis of these developments is deferred to Section 25.5.
25.4. Measures of Structural Change
A natural way of analyzing the structure of world trade over time focuses on the
dynamics of trade shares. Generally, a structure can be characterized by an n-
dimensional vector of trade shares. Two structures, at different points in time,
(t 1, t2) can be compared through the angle that these two vectors form with each
other. A convenient measure of structural change is then
n
"s't ·s·t
.LJ I, 1 I, 2
1=1
A = arccos (25.1)
where si t. (j = 1,2) denotes the trade shares in both periods. This measure has
, J
the following useful properties:
A(St , St ) = 0 if sJ' t = sJ' t Vj1 2 , 1 , 2
A(St1, St) = A (St2' Stl )
A(St , St ) < A (St , St ) + A (St , St )1 s- l2 2 S
(25.1a)
(25.1b)
(25.1c)
Alternatively, one can attempt to focus on bilateral balances directly.
Arrange the cumulative shares of exports and imports of countries in world trade
in monotonic order of their export/import ratio (Xi / Mi ). These shares thus are
t n
~ X j / ~ Xj = SXi for exports
j=l j=l
t n
~ M j / ~ M j = SMi for imports
j=l j=l
(25.2)
(25.3)
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The locus of each point (SXj , SMj ) in Figure 25.9 resembles the Lorenz
curve in income distribution analysis. The shaded area in the diagram is equal
to
lIn
A = - - - ~ (SK - SK 1) (SM· - SM· 1)2 2.~ 1 1- 1 1-
1=1
(25.4)
and the area relative to the triangle is
n
C = 1 - E (SXj - SXj _ 1) (SMj - SMj _ 1)
j=1
(25.5)
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Figure £5.9. Cumulative trade shares.
This measures the extent of global bilateral trade imbalance. If SXj = SMj for
all i, then C = o. Hence, 0 :s C :s 1. An intertemporal change in the value of C
is proportional to the shaded area, which allows us to evaluate the extent of glo-
bal maladjustment numerically [Nakamura and Nakamura (1983)].
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Based on the various measures introduced in the previous section, we now evalu-
ate the dynamics of world trade structures numerically. In Table 25.-1 we report
the time profile for three indicators for intertemporal comparison:
Axs, based on comparison of export shares in subsequent periods.
AMS' based on comparison of import shares in subsequent periods.
t::.. c, based on comparison of bilateral trade balances in subsequent
periods.
For the purposes of this study, we concentrate on trade of group 1 (the 10 larg-
est debtor countries) with all other regions.
Table £5.-1. Measures of structural change.
Year
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Axs
0.029994
0.046854
0.084184
0.072258
0.045710
0.059537
0.024062
0.098764
0.135160
0.075653
0.067549
0.037334
0.049396
0.079895
0.052769
0.061565
0.177499
0.105099
0.087808
0.028183
0.047773
AXM
0.030084
0.046995
0.084436
0.072475
0.045847
0.059716
0.024134
0.099060
0.135565
0.075880
0.067751
0.037446
0.049545
0.080135
0.052928
0.061750
0.178032
0.105414
0.088071
0.028268
0.047916
c
0.071
0.002
-0.013
-0.017
-0.025
-0.083
-0.091
0.041
0.009
-0.023
-0.042
0.016
0.033
0.042
0.158
0.132
0.062
0.081
0.144
0.116
0.102
Upon first inspection, there does indeed seem to be an increase in the order
of magnitude of structural change beginning in the second half of the 1970s.
This holds in particular for bilateral balances. A comparison of the coefficient of
variation for the periods 1965-1976 and 1977-1986 confirms this shift to be sta-
tistically significant.
The question of interest here is to what extent that shift can be attributed,
at least in part, to the emergence of the debt cycle. We base our formal analysis
on the estimation of a simple transfer function model of the form
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with
A(L) Yt + B(L) Dt = C(L) Ut
Y = {AXS t, AMS t, ~ Ct}, ,
A(L) = (1 - a 1)
B(L) = (bo + b1)
C(L) = (1 + c1)
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(25.6)
~Dt denotes the change in the stock of debt, and ut is a white noise residual.
The idea behind this specification is similar to the standard Granger non-
causality tests: effects of the change of debt on the structure of trade will only
be identified if they contribute to a time-series behavior that cannot be ascribed
to an ARMA representation for the measure of structural change.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 25.5. It is clear that over
the entire sample period - based on an F-test of the joint hypothesis bo = b1 = 0
- the null of no effect of the debt cannot be rejected. This holds for all three
measures. In the case of trade share measures, a pooled estimation of both
import and export share equations allows us to reject the null at the 5% level.
Furthermore, focusing on the relevant time period by eliminating the early
observations in the sample tends to generate statistically significant rejections of
the null. We therefore conclude that there is some evidence for an impact of
increased debt on trade structures, even though the relatively short experience
with this phenomenon makes a statistically sound statement rather difficult.
Table 25.5. Estimation results (t-values in parentheses).
Dependent
R2 jFvariable Period a 1 bo b1 c1
AXS 1966-1986 0.920 0.002 0.016 0.122 0.985
(7.91) (1.18) (0.98) (2.22) 1.05
1976-1986 0.895 0.024 0.008 0.992
(6.05) (1.86) (1.65) 2.48
AMS 1966-1986 0.903 0.007 0.030 0.267 0.970
(12.1) (1.12) (0.48) (3.32) 1.16
1976-1986 0.914 0.035 0.011 0.981
(10.2) (2.18) (1.37) 2.56
[AXS' AMS] 1966-1986 0.908 0.005 0.018 0.205 0.955
(14.7) (1.99) (1.54) (2.67) 2.40
1976-1986 0.907 0.029 0.010 0.960
(12.0) (2.65) (2.05) 3.45
~C 1966-1986 0.985 0.123 0.156 0.912
(15.2) (1.04) (1.62) 1.85
1976-1986 0.975 0.407 0.284 0.963
(18.1) (2.34) (3.07 4.02
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It has been the purpose of this study to examine the effects of the surge in
foreign indebtedness for a significant number of developing countries on the
structure of world trade. Based on various measures of structural change, we
performed statistical tests for bilateral relations between debtor countries and
seven other world regions, using aggregate trade data. The statistical evidence is
somewhat supportive of the original hypothesis, even though the data set
appears to be too short to provide conclusive answers. It is hoped that further
analysis on a pooled set of disaggregated trade measures will overcome these
difficulties. However, even these preliminary results suggest that projections of
world trade structures will have to be based on an assessment of financial condi-
tions, in addition to more standard relative price mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 26
The Debt Situation of the
Developing Countries:
A Medium-Term Scenario Analysis
Jiirgen Richtering
Summary
The present chapter attempts to evaluate quantitatively the growth prospects of
the different regions of developing countries up to the year 2000 with special con-
sideration paid to the evolution of their external financial situations. Starting
with a baseline scenario, which is an extrapolation of current trends, two alterna-
tive scenarios are presented to assess the impacts of changes in key assumptions.
The analysis shows that external financial obligations will continue to be a criti-
cal constraint on growth of most developing countries in the medium term.
Exporters of manufactures are likely to benefit more from additional import
demand in the developed market economies than those of primary commodities.
The analytical framework used for this exercise is UNCTAD's System for Inter-
linked Global Modeling and Analysis (SIGMA).
26.1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the 19808 a large number of developing countries have
been faced with severe problems in meeting their external financial obligations.
In consequence, many of them carried out strenuous adjustment measures, often
in conjunction with debt rescheduling operations and in compliance with IMF
programs. The adjustment efforts made by developing countries in many cases
have resulted in a very significant strengthening of their trade and current
account balances. For example, from 1982 to 1985, the current account
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deficit/exports ratios for the major eurocurrency borrowers improved from -23%
to -1% while their trade balance has been positive by a substantial margin since
1983. There has, however, so far not been any improvement in their aggregate
debt/exports ratio. The adjustment efforts have put a heavy burden on many
developing countries; GDP per capita declined in Africa and in Latin America in
the first half of this decade. The outlook for the medium term is not very
promising as the accumulated debt and its associated debt-servicing obligations
continue to be a critical constraint on growth in many developing countries.
Non-oil primary commodity prices have declined dramatically in the past three
years, reaching a 3D-year low, while real interest rates continue at historically
high levels; and there is not much hope that GECD growth rates will pick up
significantly in the medium term.
The present chapter attempts to evaluate quantitatively the growth pros-
pects of the different regions of developing countries up to the year 2000 with
special consideration paid to the evolution of their external financial situations.
Starting with a baseline scenario, which is an extrapolation of current trends
under broadly realistic assumptions for the major variables of the world econ-
omy, two alternative scenarios are presented to assess the impacts of changes in
key assumptions. The analytical framework used for this exercise is UNCTAD's
System for Interlinked Global Modeling and Analysis (SIGMA). Section 26.2
gives a brief description of the SIGMA system, followed by an analysis of the
various scenarios in Section 26.3 and conclusions in Section 26.4.
26.2. The Analytical Framework
UNCTAD's SIGMA system has been developed as an aid to the analysis of the
medium- and long-term prospects of developing countries, taking explicit account
of the implications of current account deficits for capital flows and consequent
debt accumulation. The system may be used to project the capital requirements
of the different regions of developing countries for a given set of assumptions
concerning the domestic and the international environment. Alternatively, the
availability of foreign capital may be made subject to behavioral assumptions
and a search carried out for a growth path consistent with the given financial
constraints.
The SIGMA system consists of 15 regional macroeconomic models linked
together by bilateral trade and financial flows. (Appendix 26A contains a listing
of country groupings.) The specification of each regional model, which consists
of five blocks of equations, is standardized. In the first block, aggregate demand
relations are determined. GDP is either set exogenously (capital requirements
mode) or solved iteratively to satisfy imposed constraints on the growth of
private debt (debt constraint mode). Consumption functions are estimated on a
cross-regional basis taking into account income per capita and dependency
ratios. Gross fixed capital formation is explained by the availability of imported
capital goods and the level of GDP. Total imports and exports are aggregates of
SITC groups derived in the trade block.
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In the second block of equations, total output is disaggregated into seven
production sectors, viz. food, non-food agriculture, mining and quarrying,
manufacturing, construction, utilities, and services, using sectoral share functions
estimated on a cross-regional sample with GDP per capita as the main explana-
tory variable.
In the trade block, imports for five categories of goods are determined using
income elasticities estimated on a regional basis. The five trade sectors are food,
non-food primary commodities, fuels, heavy equipment, and other manufactur-
ing. For each commodity group exports are derived by applying the correspond-
ing bilateral trade matrix to the relevant import margin and are then passed to
the regional models. Imports and exports of non-factor services are determined
by their historical relationships to imports and exports of goods, respectively,
but with the latter adjusted to be equal to imports of non-factor services at the
global level.
In the balance of payments block, the current account balance and the net
flow of foreign capital are determined. Factor payments, consisting mainly of
interest charges and direct investment income are calculated from estimated
stock figures. Other factor payments, mainly labor income, are linked to the
GDP of the region where the payments originate in the case of debits, or to the
GDP of the developed market economies or the oil-dominant countries in the
case of credits. Net private transfers are related to the GDP of donor regions.
The stock of reserves is adjusted so as to cover, on average, three months of
imports of goods in the simulation period. For the developing regions, the
current account balance is financed through six types of international capital
flows. These flows are assigned in the financial flow module which is described
below.
Regional GDP deflators are based on the weighted average of their import
and export prices and the regional exchange rate index. Import prices are calcu-
lated as trade share-weighted averages of the export prices of the exporting
regions. Export prices are assumed to follow world prices. At present, the
exchange rate index is kept constant at its 1983 level since a regional subsystem
of prices has yet to be developed. The differences in regional inflation rates
therefore reflect the differences in structures of regional trade.
The international dollar prices of capital goods and other manufactures are
provided by an estimated function which includes, as explanatory variables, the
US inflation rate, change of the US dollar/SDR index as well as the real growth
rate of both world trade and GDP in the developed market economies. In turn,
the prices for primary commodities (including fuels) are determined by the
respective growth rates of world trade in each of these commodity groups, GDP
growth in the developed market economies and the price index for manufactured
goods. The nominal interest rate (one year LIBOR) is assumed to be sensitive to
inflation and real GDP growth in the developed market economies.
For each of the five categories of traded goods, time series of 15 x 15 bilat-
eral trade share matrices have been estimated up to 1983. Although the model
allows for trade share adjustments over time, trade shares in the present exercise
are kept constant at their 1983 levels. Regional export volumes and import
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prices for each of the commodity groups are determined by applying regional
import volumes and the export prices to the relevant trade share matrices.
The financial-cum-debt module keeps track of six types of international
capital flows, viz. public grants, official development assistance (ODA) loans,
other official flows (OOF), private long-term financial flows, direct investment
and short-term flows. Separate submodels are used to determine the terms
structure of bilateral and multilateral ODA, OOF and private flows as well as
the level and distribution of new gross flows. In contrast to the relatively
comprehensive treatment of commodity trade, the financial flow model contains
full details only for the developing regions. For each bilateral ODA, OOF and
private flows, the module keeps account of debt outstanding, commitments, dis-
bursements, amortization, interest payments, interest rates, grace period and
repayment period. Short-term flows and direct investment are treated only on a
pooled basis. The allocation of new flows to a recipient region in a given year
depends upon the type of flows. Bilateral and multilateral ODA grants and
ODA loans are related to the GDP of donor regions. Other official flows depend
on the imports of recipient regions. Short-term flows are determined on the
basis of debt outstanding and imports. Direct investment is tied to the export
performance of the recipient region. Flows are allocated in a predetermined
order of priority, depending on the current account deficit of a recipient region as
well as previously commitmented flows. As a rule, OOF and private flows are
scaled to fit the financing gap.
For each year of the projections period, the system is solved by means of a
double iterative loop. First, each module is iterated until convergence is
achieved, and linkage variables passed to other relevant modules. When all
modules have converged, a new pass is started with the updated linkage vari-
ables. The process is repeated until each individual module requires only one
iteration to converge.
26.3. Debt Simulations
The scenarios presented below are intended to illustrate the magnitude of the
debt problem of the developing countries and its potential repercussions on their
economic performance. These projections (capital requirements exercises) pro-
vide indications of the situations that developing countries may face under a
given set of assumptions and are not intended as forecasts. It is not the inten-
tion here to analyze how the different developing regions might adjust their
domestic economies to potential external constraints, for example, via import
substitution or export expansion. The fact that certain results may seem unreal-
istic, especially in the year 2000, serves to indicate the need for policy changes.
26.3.1. The baseline scenario
The baseline scenario assumes that variables of central importance to the inter-
national economic environment are in line with current trends (see Table 26.1).
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The fairly low growth of GDP of the developed market economies in the medium
term is a reflection of the expectations of a modest reduction in unemployment
rates and a decline in the growth of the labor force. (The growth rates for GDP
for the developed market economies and the socialist countries up to 1990 are
taken in large part from the October 1986 forecast of Project Link.) The GDP
deflator of the United States is assumed to maintain a level of around 4% growth
throughout the projection period. Nominal interest rates are set to decline
slowly to about 7% in the year 2000, leaving real rates at a level of 3% to 4%,
which is relatively high in view of historical trends.
Table £6.1. Development of key variables in the baseline scenario, 1985-2000 (in %).
Variable 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
GDP of developed market economies 2.5 2.4 2.3
US dollar inflation 4.0 4.0 4.0
LIBOR 7.5 7.3 7.1
International prices
Food 1.4 2.4 2.4
Raw materials 0.8 3.7 3.6
Energy -8.1 4.4 4.3
Heavy equipment 6.2 2.9 2.9
Other manufactures 7.0 4.4 4.3
Import income elasticity
Developed market economies 1.7 1.6 1.6
Developing countries
Africa 0.9 1.3 1.4
Asia 0.9 1.5 1.5
Latin America 0.7 1.3 1.3
of which
Least developed countries 1.0 1.7 1.7
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations based on SIGMA projections.
Note: Africa does not include Algeria, Libya and Nigeria; Asia does not include the oil-
dominant countries of West Asia. The reported growth rates are period averages.
The projected rather low rate of inflation as well as the projected slow real
growth in the developed market economies cannot be expected to create enough
demand to raise the depressingly low non-oil primary commodity prices
significantly. This observation is supported by the fact that competition among
debt-ridden developing countries tends to become more intensive as they try to
improve their foreign exchange earnings through export expansion. The price of
fuels, after having declined in dollar terms by 45% in 1986, is assumed to rise in
accordance with the prices of manufactures other than heavy equipment. The
US dollarjSDR rate is kept constant from 1987 onward.
Assumptions regarding import income elasticities are of crucial importance
to the growth prospects of developing countries at a time when the access to
external capital is rather restricted. At the beginning of this decade, many
developing countries were forced to compress their imports radically owing to
mounting external financial obligations. In Latin America, import volume fell by
more than 20% from 1980 to 1986, while in Africa it increased only marginally.
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In contrast, Asia, which had less accumulated debt, was able to maintain
moderate rates of import growth. The observed import compression should be
seen as a short-term reaction to the debt crisis rather than as a fundamental
shift in policy. Therefore, in the various scenarios one should not expect the
extremely low and even negative import income elasticities to be maintained in
the medium or longer term, if growth prospects are not to be jeopardized.
Accordingly, import income elasticities in 1987 are assumed to return to their
historical levels, estimated on the basis of data for 1970-1983. Consequently,
import/GDP ratios, especially in Latin America, remain for a considerable
number of years far below the levels reached before the debt crisis in 1982.
Allowance for import/GDP ratios to reach the precrisis levels in the next few
years would imply a very substantial increase in external financing.
Import income elasticities of the developed market economies play a key
role in the simulation exercise as they affect the export earnings of the develop-
ing countries, their main source of foreign exchange. The estimated import
income elasticities are not adjusted to allow for the current rise in protectionist
tendencies nor for increased market penetration of developing countries' exports
in the developed market economies.
Within the context of the above mentioned assumptions and in view of the
restricted availability of additional foreign capital, growth prospects for develop-
ing countries are rather limited. (The term "developing countries", as used in
the discussion of the scenario analysis, is meant to comprise all developing coun-
tries other than the following: Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Because of the
complete dependence on oil exports for their foreign exchange earnings, the
development in these countries is not comparable with that of other developing
countries. )
The results of the baseline scenario, presented in Table 26.2, show that the
average growth rate of GDP in the developing regions is assumed to surpass that
of the developed market economies only by about one percentage point. In spite
of this modest GDP growth of the developing countries, their capital require-
ments are expected to increase, with debt growing at an average of 1.4% in
1986-1990 to 5.9% in 1996-2000. The marked resurgence of debt growth and the
subsequent reduction of output growth toward the end of the projection period
are the results of an ever-increasing current account deficit. The situation is
attributable, in part, to the deceleration of GDP growth in the developed market
economies due to demographic patterns. Inasmuch as the growth rates of debt
are lower than those of nominal exports and GDP for the developing countries as
a whole, the ratios of interest payments and debt to exports and GDP in the
year 2000 are substantially lower than present levels. Partly responsible for the
initial decline of the interest payments/exports ratio from 1985 to 1990 is a fall
of about two percentage points in LIBOR rate.
At the regional level, Latin America and Asia manage to increase their per
capita GDP and lower their debt ratios simultaneously. Africa and the least
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Table 26.2. Baseline scenario, 1985-2000 (%).
Regional group/ 1985- 1990- 1995-
variable 1985 1990 1990 1995 1995 2000 2000
Total of regional groupings
Growth of GDP 3.8 3.4 3.3
Growth of debt 1.4 3.2 5.9
Growth of GDP per capita 1.6 1.3 1.3
Current account balance/exports -5 -6 -8 -12
Interest payments/exports 11 8 6 5
Debt/exports 145 115 92 84
Debt/GDP 38 29 24 22
Africa
Growth of GDP 2.5 2.6 2.5
Growth of debt 11.9 9.9 9.6
Growth of GDP per capita -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
Current account balance/exports -42 -54 -57 -60
Interest payments/exports 14 20 24 27
Debt/ exports 271 378 434 494
Debt/GDP 67 91 108 127
Asia
Growth of GDP 4.9 3.7 3.5
Growth of debt -0.8 3.0 9.1
Growth of GDP per capita 2.9 1.9 1.8
Current account balance/exports -0 -0 -5 -10
Interest payments/exports 5 3 2 2
Debt/ exports 78 52 40 42
Debt/GDP 23 15 12 13
Latin America
Growth of GDP 3.1 3.2 3.2
Growth of debt -1.7 -2.1 -2.7
Growth of GDP per capita 0.9 1.2 1.4
Current account balance/exports -3 -5 -2 -1
Interest payments/exports 22 16 9 5
Debt/exports 231 177 112 69
Debt/GDP 49 35 22 14
Least developed countries
Growth of GDP 2.8 2.7 2.7
Growth of debt 7.9 9.8 12.0
Growth of GDP per capita -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Current account balance/exports -75 -67 -79 -97
Interest payments/exports 11 9 11 16
Debt/exports 360 372 423 534
Debt/GDP 60 64 74 96
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations based on SIGMA projections. More detailed results
are available from the authors upon request.
Note: Africa does not include Algeria, Libya and Nigeria; Asia does not include the oil-
dominant countries of West Asia. The reported growth rates are period averages. Debt refers
to medium- and long-term debt only. Exports include goods and services.
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developed countries, on the other hand, see their living standards deteriorate
further, together with an increasing debt burden. The regional results reveal a
strong inverse relationship between the debt/GDP ratio and the associated
growth performance. Economic reality, however, is more complex, and one
should not try to reduce the development process to a simple bivariate relation-
ship. Certainly, external financial obligations will continue to be one, if not the
main, constraint on growth in many developing countries, but there are also
other key factors. For instance, the export structure of Latin America and Asia
is largely responsible for their export performance, given the relatively high
world import elasticity for manufactured goods. On the other hand, Western
Europe, Africa's main trading partner, has the lowest growth rates among the
three regions of developed market economies in the baseline scenario. Neverthe-
less, one can agree with the latest report of the Committee for Development
Planning (1986), which stated (referring to the accumulated debt burdens) that
"the debris of the past will continue to impede economic progress in many
developing countries" (p 9).
26.3.2. Alternative scenarios
Starting from the baseline scenario, two alternative scenarios are presented to
show the sensitivity of the projections to changes in the main variables. The
first, scenario A, shows how the debt ratios would change if the developing coun-
tries were to achieve a 1% higher GDP growth in the years 1988-2000. In the
second, scenario B, it is further assumed that the developed market economies
are able to improve their growth performance by one percentage point in the
same period. The results are summarized in Table 26.9.
In the first scenario, the current account balances worsen dramatically in
all regions, leading eventually to increasing debt/export ratios. It is very
unlikely that the external capital required to finance this extra growth would be
available. In comparison with the baseline scenario, the difference in accumu-
lated debt for the total of all three regional groups amounted to about 20 billion
US dollars in 1990, and 10 times and 100 times this amount in 1995 and 2000,
respectively.
In contrast to scenario A, the external balances in scenario B are very close
to those of the baseline scenario. In all regional groupings, with the exception of
the least developed countries, there are improvements in the external financial
indicators throughout the project period. Evidently, the higher import demand
of the developed market economies plays a significant part in improving the
trade balances of the developing countries. In this scenario, exporters of
manufactures would profit the most as the import elasticities for manufactures
are much higher than those for primary commodities. This explains why Asia
and Latin America could improve their external position much more than Africa
and the least developed countries, relative to scenario A. In addition, the
increased demand of the developed market economies generates higher inflation
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Table £6.9. Results of alternative scenarios of GDP growth in the period 1988-2000 (in
%).
Regional group/
variable 1990 1995 £000
A. Developing countries: +1%
Total of regional groupings
Current account balance/exports -10 -20 -35
Interest payments/exports 8 7 10
Debt/ exports 119 119 183
Africa
Current account balance/exports -59 -73 -93
Interest payments/exports 21 27 37
Debt/exports 388 493 655
Asia
Current account balance/exports -4 -17 -33
Interest payments/exports 3 3 7
Debt/exports 54 60 140
Latin America
Current account balance/exports -8 -13 -23
Interest payments/exports 16 12 11
Debt/exports 184 148 155
Least developed countries
Current account balance/exports -75 -106 -154
Interest payments/exports 9 16 34
Debt/exports 384 515 804
B. Developing and developed
market economies: + 1%
Total of regional groupings
Current account balance/exports -5 -7 -9
Interest payments/exports 8 5 4
Debt/exports 108 78 66
Africa
Current account balance/exports -53 -55 -58
Interest payments/exports 20 23 25
Debt/exports 360 389 422
Asia
Current account balance/exports 1 -3 -7
Interest payments/exports 3 1 1
Debt/exports 49 33 33
Latin America
Current account balance/exports -4 -1 -0
Interest payments/exports 16 8 4
Debt/exports 165 93 49
Least developed countries
Current account balance/exports -68 -84 -110
Interest payments/exports 9 12 21
Debt/exports 356 404 537
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations based on SIGMA projections.
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rates in world trade without affecting the price structure of commodity groups.
This leads to a devaluation of the nominal debt stock. The real rate of interest,
however, is kept constant as the nominal LIBOR rate is adjusted for the increase
in inflation. Taken together, one may conclude that under the given assump-
tions, 1% additional GDP growth in the developed market economies would
allow for somewhat more than 1% additional growth in the developing countries
without leading to a deterioration in the latter's external accounts. The impact
would be higher for exporters of manufactures and lower for exporters of pri-
mary commodities.
26.4. Conclusions
The results of the various scenarios presented above show that the external
financial sector is likely to continue to be a critical constraint on the growth of
most developing countries in the medium term. Import demand growth in the
developed market economies seems to be of paramount importance to the growth
prospects of all developing regions, in terms of the latter's ability to earn foreign
exchange to finance their development and to service their debt. The impact of
GDP growth in the developed market economies on the developing countries is
felt more significantly in countries which are exporters of manufactures than
those of primary commodities which face low demand elasticities. The analysis
suggests than an increase in GDP growth of the developed market economies of
1% would enable developing regions to increase their growth by about the same
amount without risking a deterioration in their debt ratios.
It is, however, rather unlikely that GDP growth in the industrialized coun-
tries will rise much above the projected trends, given present demographic pat-
terns. Nevertheless, developing countries will have to earn enough foreign
exchange to maintain adequate rates of output growth while paying their import
bills and servicing their debts. If no growth impulses can be expected from the
international environment, domestic adjustment efforts in developing countries
will have to be continued. Exports promotion may, in some cases, succeed in
expanding trade shares of developing countries. This requires, however, that the
present protectionist trends can be reversed. But, more exports are perhaps not
possible for all countries because of limited demand for their goods facing low
demand elasticities, as is the case with most primary commodities, or because
too much competition would bring down prices. This constellation may force
some countries to replace part of their imports by domestically produced goods.
Import substitution may be a viable strategy for the larger developing countries;
in other cases it may require (regional) economic cooperation among developing
countries. For a number of the poorest developing countries, however, the
outflow of resources due to the accumulated debt burden will have to be reduced,
because it simply can no longer be financed without ruining these countries. In
those cases debt relief and debt write-off may be the only solutions to more
promising growth prospects.
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Appendix 26A. SIGMA Country Groupings
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Code Regional name
ROl North America
R02 Western Europe
R03 Pacific and South Africa
developed market economies
R04 Socialist countries of Eastern Europe
R05 Socialist countries of Asia
ROO Latin America: Eurocurrency countries
R07 Latin America: Others
ROB Africa: Eurocurrency countries
ROO Africa: Least developed countries
Countries
Canada; Puerto Rico; USA
Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Denmark;
Faeroe Islands; Finland; France; Ger-
many, Federal Republic of; Gibraltar;
Greece; Greenland; Iceland; Ireland;
Israel; Italy; Liechtenstein; Luxembourg;
Malta; Netherlands; Norway; Portugal;
Spain; Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands;
Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; United
Kingdom; Yugoslavia
Australia; Japan; New Zealand; South
Africa
Albania; Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia; Ger-
man Democratic Republic; Hungary;
Poland; Romania; USSR
China, People's Republic of; Democratic
Kampuchea; Korea, Democratic People's
Republic of; Mongolia; Viet Nam
Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Colombia;
Peru; Venezuela
Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas; Barba-
dos; Belize; Bermuda; Bolivia; British
Antarctic Territory; British Virgin
Islands; Cayman Islands; Costa Rica;
Cuba; Dominica; Dominican Republic;
Ecuador; EI Salvador; Falkland Islands;
French Guiana; Grenada; Guadaloupe;
Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Jamaica;
Martinique; Montserrat; Netherlands
Antilles; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay;
St. Kitts-Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Pierre and
Miquelon; St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago;
Turks and Caicos Islands; Uruguay
Algeria; Nigeria.
Benin; Botswana: Burkina Faso; Burundi
Cape Verde; Central African Republic;
Chad; Comoros; Equatorial Guinea;
Ethiopia; Djibouti; Gambia; Guinea;
Guinea-Bissau; Lesotho; Malawi; Mali;
Mauritania, Niger; Rwanda; Sao Tome
and Principe; Sierra Leone; Somalia;
Sudan; Togo; Uganda; United Republic
of Tanzania
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Appendix 26A. Continued
Code Regional name
RIO Africa: Others
Rll Asia: Oil-dominant economies
R12 Asia: Eurocurrency countries
R13 Asia: Least developed countries
R14 Asia: Others
R15 Oceania
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Countries
Angola; British Indian Ocean Territory;
Cameroon; Congo; Cote d'Ivoire; Egypt;
French Southern and Antarctic Terri-
tories; Gabon; Ghana; Kenya; Liberia:
Madagascar; Mauritius; Morocco;
Mozambique; Namibia; Reunion; St.
Helena; Senegal; Seychelles; Swaziland;
Tunisia; Western Sahara; Zaire; Zambia;
Zimbabwe
Iraq; Kuwait; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;
Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; United
Arab Emirates
Taiwan Province of China; Hong Kong;
Indonesia; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia;
Philippines
Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bhutan;
Democratic Yemen; Kiribati; Haiti; Lao
People's Democratic Republic; Maldives;
Nepal; Samoa; Tuvalu; Vanuatu; Yemen
Bahrain; Brunei Darussalam; Burma;
East Timor; India; Iran; Jordan;
Lebanon; Macau; Pakistan; Singapore;
Sri Lanka; Syrian Arab Republic; Thai-
land
American Samoa; Canton and Enden-
bury Islands; Christmas Island; Cocos
(Keeling) Islands; Cook Islands; Fiji;
French Polynesia; Guam; Johnston
Island; Nauru; New Caladonia; Niue;
Norfolk Island; Pacific Islands; Papua
New Guinea; Pitcairn; Solomon Islands
Tokelau; Tonga; Wallis and Futuna
Islands

PART IV
Some General and Methodological
Problems Related to Economic Growth
and Structural Change

CHAPTER 27
Structural Change and the Long Wave
S. Menshikov and L. Klimenko
Summary
The structural crisis is seen as a phase in the long wave when structural change
is so intense that a substantial part of previously well-established industries
undergoes a prolonged decline or stagnation, which leads to an overall
macroeconomic slowdown. The intensity of structural change in the US econ-
omy appears to fluctuate periodically with peaks every 25-30 years. This is
demonstrated by a latent variable estimation technique developed by Wold. It is
modified in order to deal with disaggregated total fixed capital investment. It is
split into three components (extensive, productivity-increasing investment and
investment to produce new products) with differing impacts on structural change
and on the cyclical behavior of the economy.
27.1. Periodicity in Structural Change
In a previous paper (Menshikov, 1985) we have indicated that the downward
phase of the long wave coincides with a structural crisis in the economy. The
crisis manifests itself in widespread stagnation of large groups of relatively old
industries which have exhausted their growth potentials, while other, newer
groups continue to flourish and still other industries make their first appearance
on the economic scene. Structural change accompanies all phases of the long
wave; however, it is during the crisis phase that there is not just uneven develop-
ment of different sectors, but long-term stagnation and downturn in many indus-
tries, which in the previous long upturn had served as the backbone and main-
stay of general economic growth, and still account for a major part of overall
output.
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We have also indicated that the principal motive force behind the long
upturns is the opening up of new directions in technology, i.e., technological
revolutions. In the course of such revolutions new sectors and industries are
created, and the spread of new technologies and products brings about substan-
tial change in the structure of the economy. During the period when a new
economic structure is being created, there is a boost to the development of most
industries, though some old industries may be wiped out and disappear com-
pletely in spite of the general boom. In this phase of the long wave, dynamism is
characteristic of most industries, resulting in overall economic acceleration.
As the further development of new technological directions becomes less
radical and more evolutionary in character, and the benefits from such develop-
ment become more marginal, conditions are set for a new long downturn which
ends up in a structural crisis including stagnation of some of the previously
buoyant industries. At the same time the search for new areas of efficiency and
profitability is renewed.
The economic mechanism, by which changes in technology are translated
into long waves and structural change, operates through the rate of profit. As
shown in Menshikov and Klimenko (1985), technological change is reflected in
long-term fluctuations of labor productivity, capital intensity and the
output/capital ratio. The latter tends to rise, starting with the later part of the
structural crisis, and reaches a maximum at the peak of a technological revolu-
tion. The ratio tends to fall when changes in technology become evolutionary
and reaches a trough early in a structural crisis. The average profit rate in the
economy tends to follow the output/capital ratio with a lag. Since the profit rate
is a major determinant of business investment, its fluctuations set off different
patterns of behavior of firms vis-a-vis new technology.
When the profit rate is rising, conditions are favorable for the spread of
new technology. But as the profit rate reaches high levels, the predominant atti-
tude is to give priority to minor improvements in existing technology, rather
than to basic innovations. When the profit rate starts falling from its peak, the
climate for innovations becomes unfavorable. However, when the profit rate
reaches historically low levels, conditions become ripe for a new take-off in basic
innovations. These become widespread as the profit rate resumes the upward
movement from its long-term trough.
Thus, there is an interplay between technological change and the rate of
profit, the first determining the course of the latter through changes in the
output/capital ratio, and the profit rate determining changes in investment
which in turn lead to fluctuations in the output/capital ratio.
In the present chapter we shall: (1) consider statistical evidence of long-
term fluctuations in structural change; and (2) attempt to disaggregate capital
investment into components with different effect on structural change.
27.2. Statistical Evidence of Fluctuations
A number of indices are used to measure the intensity of structural change in the
economy. One of them, recommended by the UN Economic Commission for
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Europe (ECE), is the weighted average annual increment of shares of industries
which, during a given period of time, have expanded faster than the total. This
index is defined as
1= t [s (iT) - s (io)l! q • t
i=l
(27.1)
where S(i) are shares of ith industry in total output (or employment, or capital
stock, etc.); 0 and T indicate the beginning and the end of the period which is
being measured; t = T - 0 is the length of the period; and q is the number of
industries which have increased their share.
We have computed the ECE index for US manufacturing divided into 20
large industries. Figure 27.1 shows changes in the shares in total value added
and employment for 1899-1982. Subperiods roughly correspond to actually
observed business cycles of average duration: 1899-1909, 1909-1921, 1921-1929,
1929-1937, 1937-1947, 1947-1957, 1957-1967, 1967-1973, 1973-1982 (Historical
Statistics... , 1975).
The value-added index has two definite peaks (in 1921-1929 and
1947-1957), and troughs (in 1937-1947 and 1967-1973). The frequency of oscil-
lation in both cases is about 30 years. However, if one considers 1899-1909 as
another trough, the periodicity increases to 40 years.
The index of employment has the same peaks in 1921-1929, 1937-1947,
1957-1967, and troughs in 1929-1937, 1947-1957, 1967-1973. In this case
fluctuation frequency is 20, not 30 years, except for the starting cycle, which is at
least 30 years.
From a methodological viewpoint the ECE index raises a number of ques-
tions. The larger the number of industries with a rising share, the smaller -
other things being equal - the indicator of intensity. The broken lines in Figure
27.1 show the change in the number of such industries. It is obvious that the
number of industries is negatively correlated to the index.
Let us consider, for example, 1899-1909. According to both indices (for
value added and employment), this was a period of relatively little structural
change. However, in that decade a majority of industries (13 out of 20)
increased their shares - a record repeated only in 1909-1921 (another low-
intensity period according to the indices). Among the rising industries there
were machinery and equipment, instruments, chemicals, oil products, rubber and
plastics. Receding were food, tobacco, textiles, leather, and wood. With a few
exceptions there was a widespread move in favor of the relatively new branches
of heavy industry - quite an important structural change by any criterion.
Similar results were obtained by calculating the angle between q-
dimensional vectors of industry shares for different periods of time, as suggested
by Pauly (Chapter 25 in this volume):
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(27.2)
where si t. denotes industry shares in the jth period.
, 1
In this calculation peaks are reached in 1921-1929 and 1947-1957, as in the
ECE index, but troughs occur in both cases immediately following the peaks, i.e.,
in 1929-1937 and 1957-1967.
To take care of these shortcomings of the EEC index, we suggest another
indicator: the total shares of rising industries at the beginning and the end of
each period. These are shown in Figure 27.2. The position of the line in each
period shows the relative weight of industries undergoing expansion, while its
incline shows the relative speed of their expansion.
In 1899--1909 the expanding industries started with a total share of 46.1 %
in value added, and ended with 50.8%. This was closer to the average for all
periods, rather than to the minimum. According to this measure, 1899-1909 was
all but a trough in intensity of structural change. Compare this to 1921-1929,
when only 8 out of 20 industries expanded their shares, increasing the total from
37.1% to 45.4%. The speed of the increase was twice that of 1899-1909 (22.3%
as against 10.0%); but in terms of the total weight of rising industries, structural
change in 1921-1929 was much smaller.
The indicator which measures structural change by total weight of expand-
ing industries in value added singles out 1909-1921, 1937-1947 and 1973-1982 as
peak periods, whereas 1921-1929 and 1957-2967 were troughs. Periodicity
varies between 30 and 40 years.
Figures 27.1 and 27.2 point to qualitatively heterogeneous periods of struc-
tural change. Widespread, but relatively slow expansion of a majority of indus-
tries is characteristic of the late upturn phase in the long wave. The slowness
points to a predominantly evolutionary rise of new industries. This is supported
by some old industries, which are being stimulated by overall growth in the
economy. Contrary to this, fast expansion of a small range of new industries
characterizes the start of a new technological upsurge in the midst of a long
recessIOn.
Thus, there seems to be a double interchange of intensive and extensive
expansion during one long wave of approximately 50 to 60 years. The inter-
change occurs twice within the long wave and points to two qualitatively
different phenomena.
Let us observe the various types of long-term movement of individual
industries. Figure 27.9 shows changes in the share (in value added) of six indus-
tries, which have been expanding throughout the century. These are: electrical
equipment, instruments, nonelectrical machinery, fabricated metal products,
chemicals, rubber and plastics. The most interesting is the case of electrical
machinery, which has also undergone intensive internal structural change in
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output and technology. The 30- to 40-year cycle is apparent here. The same is
true of chemicals, fabricated metal products, and nonelectrical machinery. The
total share of four rising industries (electrical equipment, instruments, plastics
and chemicals, combined), for which statistics exist throughout the whole period,
shows the same pattern.
Another group of industries represented in Figure 27.9 are those which,
after rising for a number of decades, finally became stagnant. Prominent among
these are transport equipment, petroleum products, and paper. There is evi-
dence of a 50-year wave in some of these, but it is not clear-cut.
Figure 27.4 shows long-term dynamics of receding industries. Here textiles
and apparel present the most apparent cases of 30-year periodicity. Lumber and
primary metals are closer to a 20-year fluctuation, possibly associated with the
Kuznets construction cycle.
The general conclusion is the existence of 30- to 40-year periodicities of
structural intensity within the framework of a longer 50- to 60-year wave. This
conclusion is supplemented by the analysis of structural components of business
investment.
27.3. Disaggregation of Capital Investment by
Structural Components
All technological and structural change in the economy has to pass through the
phase of capital investment. Whatever new technology is applied or new prod-
ucts are introduced in the markets, capital has to be invested to achieve this
result. Investment is essential in creating new plants and industries and in
expanding existing production units or infrastructure facilities. In a sense any
given economic structure is based on capital investment which has been physi-
cally materialized and accumulated over time.
Traditionally, total capital investment has been statistically disaggregated
by industry, functional use (plant or equipment), or reproduction role (deprecia-
tion or expansion). To our knowledge, there are no statistical series which
differentiate between investment used to expand existing technologies and prod-
ucts, and investment going into new technologies and products. Statistical data
on research and development expenditure serve as a useful indicator, but they
are not identical with investment in new technology and new products.
An indirect way of disaggregating investment according to this criterion
involves the estimation of latent variables, as developed by Wold (1985). Our
addition to the Wold technique is to use latent variables to break down aggre-
gates into new time series which add up to existing statistical series. Thus, it is
possible to disaggregate statistical series into components which are not to be
found in statistical publications.
For our purposes we have used this technique to break down net capital
investment in the USA from 1889 to 1982 into three parts:
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(1) "Extensive investment" - used to increase the stock of existing technolo-
gies.
(2) "Intensive investment, type 1" - used to introduce technologies which
increase factor productivity in existing plants.
(3) "Intensive investment type 2" - used to create new products or spheres of
production.
All three types of investment serve to bring about structural changes, albeit
in a different way. The most direct result is produced by intensive investment,
type 2, which serves to create new products and industries. The role of intensive
investment, type 1, is first and foremost to accelerate factor productivity growth
and to implement new technologies which promote a general upswing in the
economy. Its eventual result is the spread of new technology across the board,
and the creation of a new structure in the economy, as a whole. Extensive
investment serves to expand existing technology, and in this way supports the
further development of a new economic structure. The most active and revolu-
tionary case is intensive investment of both types, while extensive investment is
more conservative and evolutionary in nature.
In order to estimate latent variables it is necessary to explicitly define their
causal relationships with other variables for which statistical series do exist. The
outcome of the exercise is largely dependent on the hypothesis or criteria used.
We define extensive investment (EK) as investment which is necessary to
expand output:
EK = f (GPDP, GPDPD) (27.3)
where GPDP is current gross private domestic product and GPDPD is the
desired GPDP. All variables are measured in constant prices.
Intensive investment, type 1 (IEK), is investment necessary to expand fac-
tor productivity:
IEK = f (YL, YLD) (27.4)
where YL is existing factor productivity, and YLD is the desired productivity.
Intensive investment, type 2 (IlK), is investment in new products or
spheres of production and is determined by the need to raise the individual rate
of profit of enterprises above the prevailing average:
IlK = f (P, PD) (27.5)
where P is current profit rate, and PD is the desired profit rate.
We assume that the sum of the three types of investment equals total net
capital investment in the economy:
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dPCS = EK + IEK + IlK
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(27.6)
where PCS stands for private capital stock, and d for first differences.
The computation of variables EK, IEK and UK is made in four steps:
(1) Compute latent variables L 1 and L 2 , representing, respectively, accumu-
lated extensive and accumulated total intensive investment (of both types)
based on Wold's partial least squares iteration technique and postulated
functional relationships (see below).
Because latent variables are not directly observable, it is, perhaps,
necessary to explain their economic meaning. L 1 can be interpreted as
fixed capital stock which is necessary to maintain a desired (rising or fall-
ing) output level of existing products with existing technology. L 2 is the
fixed capital stock needed to maintain a desired output level of new prod-
ucts and also to introduce new production technologies.
(2) Compute variables EK and IK (IK = IEK + IlK) by estimating OL8 func-
tion:
(27.7)
where EPS (dPCS) is the random component of dPCS; and assuming that:
(27.8)
(27.9)
dL I and dL 2 are desired investments needed to achieve L 1 and L 2, respec-
tively. Their sum may differ from actual net investments of the extensive
and intensive types (EK and IK), which together are equal to total net
investment into fixed capital:
dPCS = EK + IK (27.10)
The difference between desired and actual net investment is
accounted for by the stochastic element EPS( dPCS) , which is distributed
between EK and IK according to the estimated relative shares a 1 and a 2 of
extensive and intensive investment.
(3) Compute latent variables L3 and L4 , representing intensive investment of
two different types by the same technique as in step (1). We interpret L 3
as the fixed capital stock necessary to maintain a desired rate of introduc-
ing new production technologies, and L 4 as the capital stock needed to
maintain desired output levels of new products and rates of expansion into
new spheres of production.
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(4) Compute variables ElK and IlK by estimating function:
assuming that:
ElK = aadLa + EPS(dIK) • aa/(aa + a4)
IlK = a4dL4 + EPS(dIK) • a4/(aa + a4)
55a
(27.11)
(27.12)
(27.13)
dL a and dL 4 are desired levels of net investments needed to achieve La and
L 4' respectively. They may be different from actual productivity and new
spheres investment (IEK, IlK) which together equal net intensive invest-
ment (IK):
IK = IEK + IlK (27.14)
To compute the latent variables, various functional criteria were tested.
The most significant estimation at step (1) was found to combine:
and
L 1(T) = I[GPDP(T), PCS(T - 1]
L 2(T) = I[YL(T), P(T)]
(27.15)
(27.16)
where YL = labor productivity in period T and P = profit rate in period T.
The estimated equations are [after six iterations in the Wold procedure; six
iterations were necessary to achieve practical convergence of coefficient, values
and measures of statistical significance (R 2, S, D W, F, t-statistics). The criteria
were set at no-change in the first 5 digits of the coefficients and measures. They
were found to converge approximately simultaneously]:
L 1(T) = 1.2295 10-5 GPDP - 1.9758-6 PCS(T - 1)
(23.58) (8.16)
R 2 = 0.989575; F = 4414; D W = 0.336
L 2(T) = 0.01191 YL(T) + 0.0306 P(T)
(47.69) (4.69)
(27.17)
(27.18)
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R 2 = 0.98957; F = 4415.1; D W = 0.339
At step (2) the best results were represented by equation:
dPCS(T) = 70887.72 dL1(T) + 34008.82 dL 2(T)
(2.6) (1.03)
R2 = 0.22; F = 13.9; D W = 0.56
At step (3) the most significant functions were found to be:
L3(T) = f[ YL(T - 1), YL(T - 2)]
L4(T) = I [P(T), P(T - 2)]
The estimated equations (after six iterations) are:
L3 (T) = 0.0376 YL(T - 1) - 0.0268 YL(T - 2)
(2.156) (1.511)
R 2 = 0.728; F = 124; D W = 0.352
L4 (T) = 0.1749 P(T) + 0.1264 P(T - 2)
(4.576) (3.279)
R 2 = 0.728; F = 124; D W = 0.317
At step (4) the best results were represented by equation:
IK( T) = 2576.3 dL 3 + 4552.0 dL 4
(4.70) (9.47)
R 2 = 0.713; F = 115.2; D W = 0.350
(27.19)
(27.20)
(27.21)
(27.22)
(27.23)
(27.24)
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A few comments are in order on the signs of the estimated parameters. In
the equation for L l , we assumed that capital invested in existing technology
would correlate positively with current levels of output and negatively with total
capital stock lagged. The results of the estimation supported this expectation.
• In the equation for L 2, one could expect productivity to have a negative
sign on the assumption that low labor productivity would induce firms to invest
in productivity-improving capital goods, while profits, with a positive sign, would
give the financial means to do that. However, in the estimation both signs were
positive. One has to be reminded that L 2 represents total intensive investment,
which does not necessarily follow this logic. Productivity investment proper (L 3 )
was found to have both a positive correlation (with productivity lagged one
period) and a negative (with productivity lagged two periods). This shows that
the effects of growing productivity on productivity investment are contradictory.
On the one hand, high productivity achieved by the same firm in the past acts as
a constraint on new investment into capital goods improving productivity. On
the other hand, one can argue that, in a highly competitive environment, high
levels of productivity achieved by many firms would induce them to strive for
even better results, so as to gain additional advantages.
Another contradiction is found in the equation for new spheres investment
(L 4), which showed positive correlation with both current and lagged profit
rates. This conforms with the assumption that adequate financing and improv-
ing business serve as conditions for large-scale expansion into new products and
new branches of industry. However, it can also be argued that low or falling
profit rates should induce at least some firms to risk undertaking innovations
with the expectation of higher-than-average returns. In this case, as in the previ-
ous one, further investigation is necessary.
Time series were calculated for EK, IEK and IlK. On the average, exten-
sive investment leading to quantitative growth in existing technologies accounts
for two-thirds of total net investment; investment meant to raise factor produc-
tivity accounts for 12%; and intensive investment in new commodities and
spheres of output, 21 %.
The last share may appear to be larger than expected. This is true only if
such investment is limited to the introduction of new products. However, when
one considers also capital flowing into new branches of industry, where new
plants have to be built, not just old ones modernized, then the figure looks fairly
reasonable. This would also include new technologies used for producing new,
rather than old, commodities. These are, of course, intuitive judgments which
depend on how one defines structural components of investment and their causal
relationships with directly observed variables. This chapter is meant to suggest
a basic principle of disaggregation and a method of estimation, rather than to
reach definite conclusions as to actual values or proportions of investment com-
ponents.
Figures 27.5, 27.6 and 27.7 show deviations of these variables from their
respective time trends. In general, they tend to follow the cyclical pattern of
total net investment, with frequencies of approximately 30-40 years. In EK
long-term peaks occur in 1927 and 1971 (span of 44 years), but shorter-term
fluctuations are also indicated by intermediate peaks in 1913 and 1953, and by
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Figure £7.5. Extensive investment: deviation from second-order trend (moving aver-
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Figure 27.9. Productivity investment: share in intensive accumulated investment.
troughs in 1935 and 1965 (span of 30 years). Productivity investment (IEK) fol-
lows this general pattern with a lag of two to six years. Innovation investment
(IlK), on the contrary, has a tendency to lead both in upswings and downswings.
It is difficult to directly assess the movement of the relative shares of the
components in total net investment, since in downswings they tend to become
negative - either all at once or one at a time. Therefore, at critical points the
shares of EK, IEK and IlK tend to fluctuate wildly from positive to negative
values and vice versa. A better indication of their long-term oscillations is given
by Figures 27.8, 27.9, 27.10, showing the movement of relative shares of accumu-
lated investment in their totals. Accumulated investment is defined as
T
EKK (T) = 0.676 PCS (0) + ~ EK (x)
%=1
and, accordingly,
T
IEKK (T) = 0.117 PCS(o) + ~ IEK (x)
%=1
T
IlKK (T) = 0.207 PCS (0) + ~ IlK (x)
%=1
(27.25)
(27.26)
(27.27)
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Figure £7.10. New spheres investment: share in intensive accumulated investment.
Shares in the starting period are assumed to be equal to their long-time averages.
The share of total accumulated intensive investment reaches local maxima
in 1902, 1935, 1959, and minima in 1913, 1944, 1976. The average periodicity of
these fluctuations is about 30 years. The share of IK grew in the long boom
period which started in the mid-1890s, then fell in the later part of the upswing,
and resumed its long rise from 1913 to 1935 as the long depression developed and
gained force. Falling in the late 1930s and early 1940s, while extensive and
overall investment expanded rapidly, the share of intensive investment then went
on to rise in the late 1940s and early 1950s, as the new upswing gained momen-
tum. It fell again in the 1960s and early 1970s at the late stage of the upswing.
A new turnabout may have occurred around 1976, in the midst of the latest long
recession.
This movement is similar to the 3D-year interchange of intensive and exten-
sive growth evident in indices of structural change in US manufacturing. The
interchange is apparently caused by two upswings in intensive investment - one
characteristic of the recessionary phase and serving to bring about its reversal,
and the second associated with intensive growth at a certain stage of the long
upswing. There are clear differences, though, between the behavior of intensive
investment in the 1920-1930 and the 1970-1980 recessions. The upswing of
intensive investment started much earlier in the 1920-1930 period.
The pattern of the two types of accumulated intensive investment within
their total is very different. It is the share of productivity (not new spheres)
investment that reached a maximum in 1934. During the whole period between
560 'I1Ie Future of~ World Economy
1903 and 1934, except for a temporary decline in 1917-1923, there was a sharp
upturn associated with the advent of new factor-saving technology - the assem-
bly line, Taylorism, Fordism. Productivity investment continued straight into
the Great Depression, adding to mass unemployment of those years. In the late
1930s and during the war years the reintroduction of relatively cheap labor
reduced the importance of labor-saving technology. It regained its importance in
the postwar years as the new production technology spread across the board.
The pause in the 1960s and early 1970s occurred at the later stage of the up-
swing, and did not yet reflect the new era of automation based on the micropro-
cessor and robotics. As to the frequency of oscillations in productivity invest-
ment, there is a 42-year interval between the two major troughs of 1903 and
1945, and, similarly, a 4D-year distance between the two major peaks of 1933 and
1973. Thus, productivity investment brings us closer to the long-term Kondra-
tiev wave.
The share of new spheres investment tends to rise and fall with the general
long-term upswings and downswings. This is not unexpected considering long-
term oscillations in the profit rate. Massive expansion into new markets and
spheres of production has to wait for any improvement in general business condi-
tions in order to take off. This pattern is entirely different from productivity
investment where long periods of low profits tend to generate active interest in
new technology, Thus, one can single out productivity investment as the most
active and leading investment component of structural change in the long wave.
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CHAPTER 28
The Emergence of Service Economics
G. d'Alcantara
Summary
Structural change can be conceived as a process of quantitative economic growth
or as a process of qualitative transformation. Services can be studied under both
perspectives: service industries and standardized service processes, on the one
hand, and creative and regulatory services, on the other hand. Economic regula-
tory mechanisms can be seen as the provision of services. Price regulations, con-
tractual mechanisms, planning procedures or hierarchical organizations are regu-
latory systems with specific properties and fields of implementation. Beyond
economic regulatory mechanisms, other mechanisms, such as psychosomatic, cul-
tural or political regulation, are required to control the socialization process.
The socialization process, which is a prerequisite for economic regulation, is pro-
duced by services. Services produce the cultural consensus and integrate the
ambivalent, both violent and convivial, tendencies of individuals into competitive
and cooperative social equilibria. Economics has to consider these regulatory
functions in a theory of services.
28.1. Structural Change through Service
In economics, services used to be regarded as the appendages of goods. They
were regarded as secondary functions ensuring appropriation, reproduction and
exchange of material objects: distribution and transport of goods, services to
goods-producing companies, education for the purpose of the production process.
The very archaic way in which the quantity and price of services are identified in
national accounting clearly illustrates this view. It reflects a lack of understand-
ing of the nature of services and leads to numerous errors in economic analysis.
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The fact that services now account for a large proportion (55% to 65%) of
economic activity, as measured by employment or by the value of gross domestic
product, has led to increased interest in basic issues of service economics. New
technologies, mainly the combination of computer technologies and telecommuni-
cations, have helped to bring about deep structural changes in the industrialized
economies and to increase the functions of services. New insights and a theory
about services are now necessary.
Strictly speaking, growth is characterized by the increased production of
industrial goods. The division of labor has increased the scale of elementary
tasks and made possible the mass production of identical goods. The tasks and
goods produced are standardized and reproduced in a repetitive way. This has
led to quantitative and materialistic growth.
The increased production of services cannot be measured just in terms of
growth, but rather as the generator of the transformation process of society
itself. Services produce access to goods or other services; the regulation of per-
sonal, cultural, social, economic and political relationships; and the foundation
and development of technologies, preference structures and modes of distribution
of access. Service activity determines a qualitative transformation process of the
nature of both objects and relationships.
So far, services have produced the behavioral patterns which enable indus-
trial economies to reach high levels of standardized material growth. These
behavioral patterns are produced not only by education or professional training,
but also by services, such as religion or legal repression, which produce public
morality and public order, and banking services which determine the criteria for
credibility and worthiness and which issue the securities and financial assets
necessary to get access to resources. Cultural conformity is necessary for the
standardization of social and economic roles implied by the division of labor. It
selectively represses individual creativity and differentiation and controls deviat-
ing behavior through social exclusion. The efficiency of many services is due to
the fact that these cultural patterns result from the agents' self-regulation
according to their belief systems and neura-linguistic programs.
In industrial economies, cultural values are dominated by economic values
symbolized by the criterion of quantitative growth. But these cultural values are
produced by services. In service economies, instead of dividing labor into fixed,
standardized and repetitive tasks, new technologies gradually transform the divi-
sion of labor into an infinite differentiation of work. Telematics, robotics and
new materials allow an infinite differentiation of product qualities and charac-
teristics. It becomes possible to adapt them to each individual culture and per-
son. Previously, most cultures had to adapt themselves to the constraints of
mechanization. Now, technologies and production instruments can be reset so as
to differentiate production according to very varied cultural patterns.
Two opposite developments coexist: on the one hand, standardization due
to increased communication and accelerated diffusion of goods and services and,
on the other hand, diversification due to the increased specialization and
accelerated rhythm of innovation, invention and creation. When the number of
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specialized elements in a system increases, the number of relationships between
these elements increases more than proportionally. The production of relation-
ships requires services and has to be regulated through services.
The shift of employment to the service sector therefore follows two paths at
one and the same time: on the one hand, the growth of service industries, and,
on the other hand, the accelerated differentiation of tasks and their regulation,
bringing about an overall qualitative transformation of society.
The first class of services is industrialized services. Traditional services are
turned into standardized reproducible processes. Good examples here are the
fast-food industries or communication network industries. The second class of
services, such as guidance and advisory services for individuals, companies or
public administrations, is infinitely diversified and made-to-measure in such a
way that these services can be adapted to the preservation of specific identities
and relational transformation. When these services have predominantly regula-
tory and fundamental functions, rather than access functions, they also have a
dominant qualitative nature: the capacity to discover new fields, to explore
society and the universe, to perceive and interpret unknown events and
apparently random phenomena, to face uncertainty, to confront the unreliability
of nature and human beings themselves. The added value of creativity is neces-
sary for survival and can be achieved thanks to an increasingly subtle knowledge
of society and the universe - both the exterior and the interior universe, the
macro-cosmos and the micro-cosmos.
In this field of creativity, diversity guarantees cultural wealth. In the
domain of cultural wealth, what is important is not what is useful and available
in limited quantity, reproducible, exchangeable and appropriable, but rather
what is unique in each human being, in each personal experience, in each culture,
in each combination of an infinite number of characteristics. This can only be
discovered in a climate of attention which is favorable to the free expression of
differences between individuals, firms, regions and so on. The growing number
of soft services present in a service economy help produce this type of climate.
Creative processes, artistic production or research and development, go beyond
the law of competition resulting from mimetic relationships. Their fundamental
function precedes the need for regulation.
28.2. Economic Regulatory Mechanisms Seen as Services
Economic theory is mainly based on an objective conception of preferences and
activities. The essence of services, whether seen as production or consumption,
domestic or marketed, concerns processes of relationships, socialization, organi-
zation and information. In fact, the general theory of competitive equilibrium in
economics implies underlying service systems. They have to be made explicit in
the theory.
This dominant economic paradigm, founded on an accurate mathematical
formula and applicable to market economies as well as planned economies, does
564 'Im Future 0/ the World Economy
not propose any distinction between goods and services. Both are commodities,
produced by firms or consumed by consumers. Under optimizing behavioral
assumptions it is shown that a Pareto optimal equilibrium exists which defines
prices for produced, traded and consumed quantities. This model can be
extended to include intertemporal behavior and uncertainty, without modifying
the basic concepts. It is useful to realize that economics portrays an extremely
powerful regulatory mechanism. This model, however, also needs to be seen as
the description of the provision of a regulatory service. It has been steadily
extended to solve regulatory problems at an economic level.
T. Anderson (1985), for example, distinguishes two kinds of regulatory
mechanism: market-clearing, flexible-price regulation and nonmarket-clearing,
rigid-price, rationing regulation. Beyond these price regulatory mechanisms we
find hierarchical organizations.
28.2.1. Market-clearing or flexible-price regulations
When prices are sufficiently flexible, the interchange of access to one another's
goods and services is agreed upon; in other words, demand and supply meet at ex
post equilibrium prices. Auction theory, for example, studies various alternative
processes through which these equilibrium prices can be reached. As such, the
auction process constitutes a service activity. This process has to be seen as a
regulatory mechanism. This means it regulates competitive access to private
goods. A regulatory mechanism is equivalent to an information exchange pro-
cedure or a revelation mechanism. This is a fundamental theorem of information
economics from which one must start in order to understand economic regula-
tory mechanisms.
Within the class of market-clearing regulation, several alternatives exist
with respect to function and structures of the information streams which deviate
from the perfect information model:
(1) The agents may be separated from one another in space: communication
services can be formalized if one starts from information islands where
different Walrasian auctioneers shift prices toward market equilibrium
without having integrated the different spatial markets from the informa-
tional point of view.
(2) The agents are separated from one another over time: numerous informa-
tion services are related to the fact that information from the past gets lost
and information about the future is subject to the formulation of expecta-
tions. Many markets for future transactions do not exist, in such a way
that future prices are lacking and one has to work with temporary equili-
bria. The flexible price mechanism is a remarkably efficient regulatory
mechanism since, in the purely theoretical case, complete market informa-
tion is reflected by prices. It does require a service to be implemented and
additional services are required to regulate such cases as production
economies of scale or externalities of consumption and production.
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28.2.2. Nonmarket-clearing or fixed-price and rationing regulations
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When prices are not flexible, because of contractual agreements or planning pro-
cedures, for example, market incentives and sanctions are insufficiently or
indirectly perceived. Another regulatory mechanism is needed, since economic
behavior is subjected only to weak external pressure, and markets do not tend
automatically toward equilibrium. This is also the case with public goods and
nonmarket activities, such as services, which are financed by subscriptions, con-
tributions, donations, taxes or budgets, as in large organizations or public
administrations.
When prices are fixed or preset, the explicit formalization of the informa-
tion sets of the agents and information streams between the agents provides vari-
ous regulatory mechanisms to solve the coordination problems between agents.
We distinguish:
(1) Anticipatory price setting, which allows for small deviations with respect to
the perfect information model; contract theory deals with asymmetric infor-
mation structures; a principal agent requires a service from a firm without
knowing the cost structure of the service, which is known to the firm. In
such cases, for example, research and development services in new fields,
the regulatory mechanisms have to deal with such problems as incentives,
commitments, errors and uncertainty (adverse selection and moral hazard).
(2) Centralized price setting, which allows for public goods or natural monopo-
lies. In the case of public transport or communication network monopolies,
the tariffs fixed are not a free reflection of marginal costs or supply-and-
demand conditions, but rather reflect a political consensus about the net-
works supplied, the distribution among users of access to these networks,
the rules which determine priorities in waiting lists, etc. Various public
goods allocation mechanisms have been developed in the literature which
guarantee the desired distribution of access, the information processing
required and the compatibility of economic agents' natural incentives. In
practice, many public goods are regulated on the basis of their private com-
plements. The state can impose something private (an identity card or a
ticket, for example) as a condition of access to the public good or to the
national territory. The nonexcludability principle characterizing public
goods can also be compensated by regulations, threats and controls pro-
duced by the state.
28.2.3. Hierarchical organizations
Incentives, commitments and economic behavior are the results of a socialization
process which requires a large number of services. The properties of price regu-
latory mechanisms rely on such social behavior, which cannot be taken for
granted. Direct control through collection of information and supervision may
be needed to solve the coordination problem when a price system is not sufficient
to induce a competitive equilibrium. The theory of hierarchical organizations
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provides a regulatory mechanism or strategies to deal with human fallibility, ran-
dom errors of the first and the second type, and various forms of moral hazard,
such as shirking, threats to specific asset or free-riding. Shirking consists in a
team member's failure to keep agreements about working programs. This
endangers the team's income without causing a comparable loss to the shirker.
Similarly, specific assets have a value which depends on collaboration or coopera-
tion with another person (agreements on technological standards, quality norms
and reputation linked to labels or brands). An interruption in programmed
cooperation causes considerable marginal costs. Free-riding is a rational strategy
for an agent who can use a public good without bearing its costs.
These three cases require regulatory devices, such as centralized property,
so that all parties share the risks of joint profits or losses, and direct supervision,
which can enforce cooperative behavior because deviations from agreed transac-
tions and programs will be easily detected.
Beyond these mechanisms, which are of an economic nature, there are
other regulatory mechanisms which are part of the socialization process and
which are necessary for the functioning of any economic system: psychosomatic
regulatory modes, cultural regulation, including "habitus" and linguistic
differentiation [see Bourdieu (1982)], political regulation, including the legal and
repressive order of the state [see Enriques (1983)], which has the legitimate
monopoly of and over violence. Psychosomatic, cultural and political regulation
are necessary conditions for the existence of economic regulation.
28.3. A Starting Point for a Systems Theory of Services
The competitive equilibrium paradigm has not yet integrated (assuming it can
do so) those activities which are prerequisites for establishing the existence of the
competitive equilibrium itself. They simply cannot be included as goods of the
utility functions and production functions. To identify a competitive equilib-
rium, one has to presuppose and therefore establish the existence, identity and
conditions of objects and agents and to guarantee a socialization process - in
other words, a cultural consensus.
By cultural consensus we mean the fundamental mechanism that estab-
lishes the existence, stability and consistency of society, from the local to the
global level. This consensus may be conscious or unconscious. It exists when-
ever a social group is able to survive. Survival, however, requires not only that
technologies and resources produce primary necessities, but also the control of
self-destructive processes which, as the anthropologist R. Girard (1978) has
pointed out, threaten any society. The control of self-destructive processes on
the individual and the collective level, is an essential function of services. This
service function is not regulated by the competitive equilibrium mechanism, since
the former is a prerequisite for the latter.
Economic theory has to be made compatible with the fundamental anthro-
pological findings of R. Girard. Authors such as M. Aglietta and A. Orlean
(1982) or P. Dumouchel and J.P. Dupuy (1979, 1983) have already embarked on
this task. We propose to use these ideas to construct a theory of services, by
G. d'Alcantara 567
increasing the integration of economics and of human sciences through a systems
approach.
Thomas More (1516), who, long before Adam Smith, perceived the nation
as an economic order rather than as the moral order of the Platonic tradition,
reminded us that "servire" is related to two different Latin words:
(1) "Servire", which means to be someone's slave.
(2) "Inservire" , which means to be useful to someone.
What is said here is that a service is not an object, but a relationship. A rela-
tionship is the involvement of the lives of two persons, or groups of persons, with
one another. Like life itself, which is {3La (violence) and {3LO~ (animation), ser-
vice carries the ambivalence of violence and conviviality, competition and
cooperation. This is due to the structure of relationships and desire, defined in a
Freudian perspective.
As shown by R. Girard, this structure is inherently two-sided because it is
generated by the dominant mimetic patterns of human behavior and evolution.
The mimetic relationship turns the mimetic model into a mimetic rival. This
happens when the mimesis - the mimetic interaction - is triggered by the
model's move to appropriate or have access to an object. This configuration con-
tains the essential violence of any relationship. Any desire is generated as the
desire for the object of someone else's desire and is therefore violent by nature.
This is the fundamental socialization problem which has to be solved by a regu-
latory mechanism. The origin and founding moment of this mechanism provides
the basis for a social consensus against the auto-destructive process of reciprocal
mimetic violence. This founding moment is the starting point of a self-enforcing
regulatory mechanism. The origin of collective survival, as argued by R. Girard,
is generated by a violent consensus against a projected cause of violence: a
scapegoat. The external projection and exclusion of this cause restores unanim-
ity and peace. At the pivot of the mechanism, brute violence is transformed
qualitatively into more subtle forms of control, such as mythical stories, ritual
practices or modern institutions and ideologies.
The term "violence" is used here in a generic sense. Violence can take
different forms, such as military violence; terrorist or criminal violence; the polit-
ical struggle between states, social classes and interest groups; economic com-
petition and cultural segregation. This violence is transformed according to the
regulatory systems. Culture operates the most refined forms of regulation
through, for example, sports championships, beauty competitions, artistic prizes
or academic debates between scientists, etc. Language is the most powerful cul-
tural regulator. Through language, services extend their regulatory function
within the human unconscious. Services have such a cultural dimension and are
therefore fundamental for the survival of human communities. They recall the
"violent" nature of unanimity and the permanent risk that human rivalry will
degenerate into brute violence. They are also cultural because of their conven-
tional and arbitrary characteristics. These characteristics, however, become
essential to the cultural identity of a human community which defines itself in a
fuzzy way as the reference group of its members.
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The socialization process comprises, on the one hand, the foundation of a
regulatory mechanism which controls access to objects and, on the other hand,
the development of the life-cycle of this regulatory mechanism. After such a
regulatory mechanism has proved its qualities, it diffuses itself and then progres-
sively loses its power to regulate relationships because it itself becomes an object
of desire, competition and violence.
The mimetic complex hypothesis formulated by R. Girard leads to a for-
malization of the inner structure of the human psyche and the socialization pro-
cess required for any economic order. It determines the structure of preferences
and the selection of goods included in its scope. It provides the basis for a
theory connecting individual and collective behavior. It provides a fundamental
structure for the essence of services. This approach to services, within and on
top of the competitive equilibrium framework, provides a methodology for the
solution of problems of social cohesion, such as those, left open by Harsanyi
(1977), of dominant loyalties, reference group boundary or anti-social attitudes.
In service industries, services have become increasingly tradeable on the
national and international level because of economies of scale and cost-reducing
new technologies in the transmission, storage and treatment of information.
This trend explains the pressure for the liberalization of international service
activities, as reflected by GATT's trade negotiation agenda.
For regulating services, however, especially services with dominant regula-
tory functions, tradeability is linked to numerous externalities and spill-overs.
One regulatory system may be neutralizing, contradictory and destructive for
another system of rules. The external effects of such service systems have cul-
tural consequences. Market-service imports can make traditional regulatory
modes obsolete and result in indirect costs, such as increased criminality or polit-
ical violence. This justifies various levels of regulatory protection, up to the pro-
tection of community languages as instruments for the preservation of identity.
28.4. Conclusion
The economic system as described by the competitive equilibrium paradigm is
characterized by an increasing fraction of service activities which have dominant
regulatory and creative functions. These functions cannot be seen as inert argu-
ments of utility functions and production functions. They contribute to produc-
ing the economic system itself: the identity of the agents, the form of the utility
and production functions, the nature of the relationships in this system.
Construction of a theory of services is far beyond the ability of an isolated
researcher. However, concepts from various disciplines can be gathered to form
a framework and to deal with the issue. Recent developments in economic
theory aiming at the integration of micro- and macroeconomics can be combined
with the new bridges between psychology and sociology contained in Girardian
theory. The balance of both the inner individual psyches and social groups is
regulated by interrelated "mechanisms". The study of the interactions between
such mechanisms and the dynamic systems in which they are embedded would
identify both the field and the method for a theory of services.
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CHAPTER 29
Economic Structural Changes:
The Problems of Forecasting
Iouri Tchijov
Summary
An accuracy analysis of several long-term forecasts of the US economy was per-
formed from the structural point of view. More disaggrated industrial levels usu-
ally provide less correct forecasts of structural changes. The main reason for this
is the lack of explicit accounting for technological progress in models used for
prediction. Thus, the problems of structural change forecasting plague the tech-
nological as well as the industrial level.
29.1. Introduction
There are two general approaches to the modeling and forecasting of structural
changes which are known at the present time. The first one is based on moving
down from the macrolevel to the industrial level [Levitsky et aI. (1975); Preston
(1972)]. The problems investigators come across here are connected with the
mechanism of transition - the development of the disaggregation matrix moving
from the macroeconomic level to the industrial one. Practically nobody reaches
a technological level in this way.
The second approach is based on moving up - from the technological level
through the industrial level to the macroeconomic level [Leontief and Duchin
(1986)]. The main problems in this procedure are connected with the estimation
of economic parameters of technological processes such as profitability, based on
competitive advantages, the rate of risk, potential penetration, etc. Another
problem is the estimation of economic system elasticities with respect to techno-
logical changes, such as the influence of a new technology on input-output
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coefficients or labor demand. Practically, the direct impact of any technology on
macroeconomic variables is much lower than in the model used for accuracy esti-
mation.
The first approach has a longer history; a lot of structural forecasts are
available now, and some of them are verifiable. That is why we shall try to
analyze forecasting accuracy from the viewpoint of prediction of economic struc-
tural changes.
29.2. GNP Structure
The main widespread approach to structural disaggregation at the macrolevel is
the division of GNP into its main components - consumption, investment,
government purchases and foreign trade balance. The accuracy analysis of
several long-term forecasts of the US GNP and its components for the 1960s and
1970s [Tchijov (1981)] showed an underestimation of average rates of growth for
the first period as well as an overestimation for the second period. The main
reason for the relatively low accuracy was that real technological progress was
not predicted correctly.
The results of a long-term forecast, developed at Syracuse University (as
shown in Table 29.1), demonstrate that in spite of a very wide range of alterna-
tives, the real dynamics were usually close to either a highest variant (in the case
of the labor force) or to a most pessimistic one (in the case of population and
GNP).
Table e9.1. Forecasted versus real changes in long-term economic growth, USA,
1960-1980 (in %).a
Forecast variant
Variable
Population
Participation rate
Labor force
Labor productivity
GNP in constant prices
Low
+26
-0.8
+34
+42
+92
Medium
+36
-0.2
+40
+51
+110
High
+55
-0.5
+49
+67
+125
Rear
+26
+4.4
+52
+26
+91
:Syracuse University Research Corporation (1964).
Council of Economic Advisers (1986).
The fact that reality follows the lowest variant in the population case and
the highest one in the labor force case is explained by the completely wrong fore-
cast of the participation rate. Similarly, the comparison of the GNP forecast
with that of the labor force reflects a wrong prediction (overestimation) of labor
productivity dynamics - the main variable reflecting technological progress.
From the structural viewpoint (see Table 29.2), incorrect directions of
share changes were predicted in the cases of personal consumption, government
purchases, and construction. This means that in the cases of such long-term
forecasts, the macrostructure of GNP is not quite accurately predicted in spite of
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a rather high stability of the macroshares. This is especially true for forecasts
developed without the use of macroeconomic models, such as input-output
models.
Table ~9.~. Forecasted versus real GNP structure (in constant prices), USA, 1960-1980
(in %).a
Component of GNP
Personal consumption
Investments
Government purchases
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Construction
Services
1960
(real)
65.3
14.3
19.8
19.0
32.1
11.3
37.5
1980
(forecast)
62.3
16.0
22.6
21.6
27.6
12.3
39.2
1980
(real)b
66.8
15.2
15.6
22.9
26.2
8.9
42.6
:Syracuse University Research Corporation (1964).
Council of Economic Advisers (1986).
The forecast made by C. Almon et al. (1985) was almost perfect as far as
the direction of changes was concerned. He predicted the directions correctly for
all GNP components by using his famous input-output model. But the real
dimension of the changes was underestimated in all cases. It reflects the inertia
features of the models of such a type (see Table 29.9)
Table ~9.9. Almon's forecasted versus real GNP structure, USA, 1971-1985 (in %).a
Component of GNP
Personal consumption:
durables
nondurables
services
Gross private domestic
investments:
equipment
structures
Exports
Imports
Government purchases
1971b
(real)
63.3
9.9
26.4
27.0
14.5
6.4
7.7
6.3
-6.2
22.2
19856
(forecast)
64.6
10.5
25.9
28.0
15.9
8.5
6.8
7.4
-6.7
18.8
1985
(real)
65.5
11.5
24.0
30.0
17.0
9.6
7.4
8.5
-9.9
19.1
: Almon et aI. (1985, p. E6).
1971 prices.
c 1972 prices; see Council of Economic Advisers (1986).
The examples can be continued, and the analysis of a wider range of
input-output forecasts permits the conclusion that the forecasts of GNP struc-
ture were closer to its previous values (inertial forecasts) than to its real changes.
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29.3. Production Structure
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Moving down from the macroeconomic level, we come upon the production
structure which relates to the industrial disaggregation of the total product (or
GNP), and in the first place to two-digit industries.
The smooth curves in Figure 29.1 show the long-term dynamics in the
manufacturing structure and, moreover, the tendency toward structural stabili-
zation in consumer-oriented industries (SIC 20-27). Even in high-tech
machinery (SIC 35-37) such a stabilization becomes evident. This means that
technological progress is hidden more deeply than at the two-digit level. Though
the share of electrical machinery was stable in US manufacturing, inside the
industry there was a dramatic shift from traditional electrical equipment to elec-
tronic components. The share of industrial electrical equipment and lighting
fixtures decreased from 21 % of this industry's (SIC 36) shipments in 1972 to 13%
in 1982. At the same time the share of semiconductor devices and electronic
components increased from 19% up to 53% [US Department of Commerce
(1986)]. A dramatic decrease in metal-cutting equipment took place with a
simultaneous growth of NC - metal-cutting machines.
One of the detailed forecasts of the production structure for the US econ-
omy was developed by C. Almon. We have chosen this forecast for our analysis
not because of its accuracy (though it may have possibly been one of the best
among such disaggregated forecasts), but because of its complete availability in
book form [Almon et al. (1985)].
The macroindustry forecast (see Table 29.4) shows, as in the case of GNP
structure, the right directions of the changes, but it is completely wrong from the
viewpoint of the size of change. The huge decrease of the 33rd and 34th indus-
tries' shares was not predicted nor was the dramatic increase of the 36th
industry's share (which was growing due to its "electronic part"). The most
accurate forecast was made for the 35th industry - nonelectrical machinery, but
inside that industry the real structural changes were forecasted incorrectly (see
Table 29.5).
For the traditional four-digit industries, the directions of changes were fore-
casted incorrectly. Instead of the predicted growth, the shares of the mentioned
industries (turbines, metal-cutting and metal-forming machines, etc.) decreased
markedly. These industries were replaced by computing equipment production
within the nonelectrical machinery two-digit industry.
This review of structural forecasts permits us to draw certain common con-
clusions:
(1) Macroeconomic structures are rather stable; that is why their forecasts are
usually close to reality, though cyclical oscillations may sometimes cause
disturbances around a trend.
(2) It is extremely difficult to follow up the impact of modeled technological
progress on macroeconomic structures by using macrolevel structural
models because of a lack of explicit technological parameters in such
models.
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Figure f9.1. The long-term dynamics of the shares of two-digit US manufacturing in-
dustries (value added). I. food and tobacco products (SIC 20+21); II. textile, apparel
and leather products (22+23+31); III. lumber products and furniture (24+25); IV. paper
products and printing (26+27); V. chemical, petroleum and rubber products
(28+29+30); VI. primary metals and fabricated metal products (33+34); VII. nonelectri-
cal machinery and transportation equipment (35+37); VIII. electrical machinery (36);
IX. instruments (38).
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Table 29.~. Almon's forecasted versus real structure of the US metal working industry,
shipments, 1971-1985 (in %).&
SIC
33
34
35
36
37
38
Industry
Primary metals
Fabricated metal products
Nonelectrical machinery
Electrical machinery
Transportation equipment
Instruments
Total shipments, billion $
19716
(real)
17.2
13.8
18.5
15.9
30.3
4.3
300
198f
(forecast)
13.2
13.0
21.6
17.8
28.9
5.5
524
19B5
(real)
5.6
4.7
21.2
38.8
23.4
6.2
516
a Almon et aI. (1985, pp. E26-E27).
b 1971 prices.
c 1972 prices; see US Department of Commerce (1986).
Table 29.5. Almon's forecasted versus real structure of the US nonelectrical machinery
industry, shipments, 1971-1985 (in %).&
19716 19856 19B5
SIC Industry (real) (forecast) (real)
3511, Turbine generator sets,
3519 diesel/other engines 1.72 2.13 0.96
3531- Construction, mining
3533 and oilfield machinery 2.19 2.19 1.43
3541 Metal-cutting machines 0.10 0.53 0.20
3542 Metal-forming machines 0.21 0.22 0.08
3561, Pumps, blowers and
3564 fans 1.01 1.09 0.64
3562 Ball and roller bearings 0.43 0.52 0.25
Total 5.96 6.68 3.56
aAlmon et aI. (1985, pp. E27-E28).
b 1971 prices.
c 1972 prices; US Department of Commerce (1986).
(3) The attempts to forecast industrial structures at a four-digit level were not
successful either, because of the absence of endogenous technological prog-
ress in the industrial relationships even at this level.
29.4. From the Technological Level to the National Economy
Now there is only one known way for incorporating modern technological pro-
gress into model systems, i.e., to describe the latest technologies in economic
terms. The first-order difficulties in this process are connected with the lack of
necessary data on prOduction, consumption, profitability, capital/labor savings,
and unit costs of new technologies. The second-order problems are due to the
low reliability of the estimation of a potential penetration rate, though some
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results have been published for such a case as robotics [Ayres and Miller (1983)].
Moreover, even the statistical information published in several public and special
issues is contradictory because of different definitions and calculation methods.
It is quite obvious that there are a lot of bottlenecks in technological prog-
ress forecasting, based on estimates of concrete new technologies (NT). The first
problem is the preliminary estimation of NT economic parameters and their
comparison with the parameters of traditional technologies. The second one is
the methodology of the development and penetration (or diffusion rate) forecast-
ing. Well-known estimates for long-term tendencies of technological substitu-
tion, usually based on Mansfield's approach (1986), do not take the different
economic aspects into account. The latter are very important, especially for the
expansion phase, and sometimes also for the embryonic phase.
For example, during the embryonic phase [up to 8-10% of the new
technology's share, according to our estimates; see Tchijov (1987)], the NT share
usually declines in recession periods and increases during the expansion phase.
The technology share after saturation usually does not decrease to zero because
of the differences in the products' specific features provided by different technolo-
gies.
The importance of taking economic conditions into account is further
underlined when we estimate the saving possibilities to provide the adequate
investments. Practically, a majority of amortization funds, as well as part of net
investments, are used for traditional technologies reproduction. This means that
only a small share of savings can be used for investments into new technologies;
and this is why the investment climate is an important determinant for NT
diffusion. It is well known that NT demand much heavier expenditures at the
initial stages of their development than the traditional technologies. This means
that two economic conditions are necessary to accept NT: a strong financial
position of the innovative firm and future growth of demand for the product pro-
duced when using NT.
But the most important thing in NT penetration is the relative NT costs
compared with the recognized costs of traditional technologies. In this calcula-
tion the relative importance of different cost elements (capital, labor, material,
including materials, and energy) has to be taken into consideration.
When we deal 'with new technologies, it is necessary to provide different
approaches to the investigation of their diffusion, depending on the phase of their
life cycle. During the embryonic (or childhood) phase, the traditional deter-
minants of NT share dynamics, such as the rate of profitability or relative cost,
are not as important as during the expansion (or adolescence) phase. For exam-
ple, robot production is not yet profitable in the United States [US Department
of Commerce (1986]: their price equals approximately 50% of the production
cost. Nevertheless, an accelerating diffusion of robots is taking place. Negative
profitability of the embryonic technologies is rather typical, and this is why alter-
native explanatory variables should be used for embryonic phase forecasting.
From our viewpoint the most productive way of structural change forecast-
ing, taking into account technological progress, is a combination of the two
approaches mentioned above. The principal scheme of such a combination is
shown in Figure 29.2. Of course, some important details, such as industrial
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Figure ~9.~. Scheme of combination of macroeconomic and technological approaches.
disaggregation, capital/labor ratio, etc., are mlssmg here. But this combined
approach provides the possibility of describing technological progress explicitly
and taking into account interrelationships between technological progress,
economic growth and structural changes.
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CHAPTER 30
Comparison of Gross Domestic Product
and Net Material Product
Jaroslav Ceska
(with an appendix by Rumen Dobrinsky)
Summary
This study deals with the relationship between the corresponding important pro-
duction aggregates used in the System of National Accounts (for market
economies) and the System of Balances of National Economy (for nonmarket
economies). This comparison of the gross domestic product (GDP) and the
national income (NMP) is based on the concept of the economic production
sphere and definitions of the relevant aggregates of both systems of national
accounting. The results of illustrative calculations and other matters of
relevance to the GDP and NMP comparison are discussed.
30.1. Introduction
The study of the relationship between the System of National Accounts (SNA)
used in countries with market economies and the System of Balances of National
Economy (MPS) used in countries with centrally planned economies is needed
for any authoritative comparative analysis of the corresponding national aggre-
gates of these two systems, for the adjustments that need to be made in their
comparison and mutual conversion and for many other specific purposes.
Both SNA and MPS have in the course of their development served many
purposes, among which functioning as a program for international reporting of
comparable national aggregated data is obviously the most important. As the
differences between SNA and MPS are numerous and diverse, this intersystem
comparison is limited to the relevant main production aggregates and related
issues. This is preceded by a short description of both systems.
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30.2. Structure and Main Characteristics of SNA
30.2.1. Matrix representation
The structure, main characteristics and the relationship of the aggregates of
SNA, which provides a comprehensive framework for a systematic and integrated
recording of transaction flows in an economy, is usually described by reference to
a matrix representing the system as a whole, to a set of standard accounts and
tables, and to the applied concepts, definitions and classifications. The following
short description follows the United Nations System of National Accounts. The
matrix provides a symbolic presentation of the SNA system. An example of the
simplified matrix is set out in Table 90.1.
In the above-mentioned matrix the headings of the columns (not shown)
are the same as the headings for the rows. Only the symbol T is used. The first
subscript relates to the row; the second, to the column. The matrix may be
viewed as a set of double entry accounts presenting the different flows in the
economy in a comprehensive fashion. Each row and the corresponding column in
the matrix constitute a separate account: the row represents the receipts or
incomings of the accounts; and the columns, the expenditure or outgoings. In
the system itself each of the headings of the rows and columns is further subdi-
vided according to appropriate classification.
The accounting structure of the United Nations System of National
Accounts covers the production accounts, which are further subdivided into the
commodity accounts, the accounts for other goods and services and the activity
accounts, the income and outlays accounts, the capital finance accounts and the
external transactions account.
For each group of domestic transactions, a production, income and outlay
and capital finance account is distinguished. The production accounts are
presented for transaction groups separately and in consolidated form for the
domestic economy as a whole. In consolidated form they are called the accounts
for gross domestic product and expenditure, the account for national disposable
income and its appropriation and the capital finance account, respectively. In
addition to the accounts for the domestic sector, there is a single account cover-
ing transactions with the rest of the world - the external transactions account.
The contents of the accounts can be specified in terms of matrix elements.
For the commodity accounts, which correspond to rows and columns 1 and 2, the
supply, shown in the columns, consists of commodities produced by domestic
units (T3. l , T 3.2 , T 4 .l , T 4 .2, T 5. l , T 5.2 , T6 .l and T6 .2) and commodities
imported (T20. l , T 20.2 ). Import duties (TlO. l and T lO.2) presented as a com-
ponent of value are added to this.
30.2.2. The main aggregates and their definitions
The definitions are limited to gross output, intermediate consumption and gross
domestic product.
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Gross output. Gross output of goods and services covers both the value of
goods and services produced for sale and the value of goods and services pro-
duced for own use. It includes:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The domestic production of goods and services which are either for sale or
for transfer to others.
Net additions to work in progress valued at cost, and to stocks of finished
goods valued in producers prices.
Products made on own account for government or private consumption or
for gross capital formation.
Rents received on structures, machinery and equipment and imputed rent
for owner-occupied dwellings.
Gross output at producers' value is the initial point of measurement of pro-
duction and can be expressed in the relevant terms of the matrix entries as the
sum of:
(1) Gross output of commodities.
(2) Gross output of noncommodity goods and services.
(3) Import duties.
Intermediate consumption. Intermediate consumption covers nondurable
goods and services used up in production, including repair and maintenance,
research and development and exploration costs. It also includes indirect outlays
on financing capital formation such as flotation costs involved in the purchase
and sale of intangible assets and financial claims. (Intermediate consumption is,
whenever possible, valued at purchasers' prices at the moment of use).
Gross domestic product and value added. The gross domestic product is
equal to the value added for the total of all domestic producers plus import
duties and value added tax. The value added of industries at producers' prices is
equal to the gross output of the industries at producers' prices less the value of
their intermediate consumption at purchasers prices. The gross domestic prod-
uct may alternatively be defined as the sum of final expenditure in the domestic
economy, or as the sum of incomes received in the domestic economy.
30.3. Structure and Main Characteristics of MPS
30.3.1. Tabular representation
The System of Balances of the National Economy is based on a set of mutually
linked tables, each of which covers a certain part (category, field) of the whole
reproduction process in the national economy. The system is presented in the
form of basic source and use tables (referred to as balances) and a certain
number of supplementary tables providing further necessary details.
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The system set out in Basic Principles of the System of Balances of the
National Economy, published by the United Nations, contains the following five
basic tables:
(1) The balance of production, consumption and accumulation of the global
product (the material balance).
(2) The balance of production, distribution, redistribution and final utilization
of the global product and the national income (the financial balance).
(3) The balance of manpower resources.
(4) The balance of fixed capital.
(5) The indicators (balance) of national wealth.
The first two balances, i.e., the material and financial balances, are most
appropriate for the purpose of this survey.
The material balance is a presentation of the volume of the supply of goods
and material services originating in domestically produced global product and
imports and their disposition to consumption, capital formation and exports,
classified by different production activity categories.
The financial balance is a presentation of income flows generated in produc-
tion in the material sphere, their redistribution through transactions in the non-
material sphere and through other transfer flows and finally their disbursement
to consumption and capital formation.
The structure and main characteristics of MPS can be described with refer-
ence to the basic and, if need be, supplementary tables, specifying the contents of
the individual rows and columns and the derived elements.
Although in the MPS some accountancy rules are applied and followed,
source and use approaches to the main aggregates have to be fully balanced and
the system itself makes great use of statistical and accountancy data, there is no
standard system of accounts similar to that of SNA to cover the relevant flows of
transactions.
As these accounts can be derived from MPS balances - namely, from the
financial balance - they are sometimes constructed together with the MPS
matrix. The derived MPS conceptual matrix is then comparable with that of
SNA, and is used together with the description of entries for comparing the
structure of MPS with that of SNA in the relevant comparison and reconciliation
systems studies.
30.3.2. Main production aggregates and their definitions
The definitions below are limited to the MPS main production aggregates paral-
lel to those of SNA shown in Section 30.2.2.
Global product. Global product covers the value of goods and material ser-
vices produced. Deliveries of goods and material services within the same enter-
prise are excluded. Included are the value of own-account constructed capital
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goods and capital repairs of fixed assets, the value of work in progress and the
value of finished goods added to stocks. Also covered is the value of goods and
material services provided free to employees (the services are valued at the
material costs involved). In the contribution to global product by agriculture are
included seeds and feed produced and consumed at the same farm, agricultural
and other goods produced on private plots for individual consumption or for sale,
including the cost of their processing.
Intermediate material consumption including depreciation. Intermediate
material consumption consists of the value of goods and material services used
up in production during the period under review by production units of the
material sphere, including the consumption of fixed assets during the same
period. Consistent with the scope of the gross output of goods and material ser-
vices certain items are included in intermediate consumption, e.g., in agriculture
seeds and animal feed, which are produced and used by the same unit.
The intermediate outputs of raw materials, etc. are valued net of the value
of scrap and wastes originating in the process of production. Purchased items
are valued at purchasers' values, items produced on own account are valued at
cost in the case of state and cooperative enterprises and at average purchasers'
prices in the case of personal plots of households.
Depreciation and consumption of fixed assets include an allowance for nor-
mal wear and tear and foreseen obsolescence of fixed assets used in the material
sphere based on standard rates of depreciation and, furthermore, the difference
between the book value of scrapped fixed assets and their scrap or actual value.
The allowances for depreciation are often based on the original cost of the assets,
which may be periodically adjusted toward replacement costs.
National income (net material product). National income (NMP) can be
defined differently according to the method used. Following the production
approach, net material product is equal to the difference between global product
(gross output) of goods and material services and intermediate material con-
sumption including consumption of fixed assets.
National income from the income side is the sum of primary incomes of the
population (comparable to compensation of employees in the SNA) and primary
incomes of enterprises (comparable to operating surplus in the SNA).
Using the expenditure approach, national income is defined as the sum of
the final uses of goods and material services, i.e., personal consumption, material
consumption of units in the nonmaterial sphere serving individuals and that of
similar units serving the community as a whole, net capital formation, replace-
ment for losses and the balance between exports and imports of goods and
material services.
30.4. Relationship between the SNA and the MPS
Main Production Aggregates
The following survey of the relationship (similarities and differences) between the
main production aggregates used in SNA and MPS is based on the relevant
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concepts and definitions. Its goal is not to provide a basis for complete and
exhaustive comparison of all factors which may influence the actual comparisons,
but which may not be of the same qualitative significance. Some of them are
also dealt with in other parts of this review.
30.4.1. Fundamental conceptual differences
The most important and well-known difference between the SNA and the MPS
concerns the definition of economic production. While in the SNA with a few
exceptions practically all activities relating to the production of goods and the
provision of services are treated as "productive" and embraced by the concept of
economic production, in MPS the production concept is limited to productive
activities in the material production sphere, where national income originates,
i.e., to the industries producing material goods and material services such as
repairs, transportation, communication and distribution of goods. Such activi-
ties as general government services, finance, research and scientific services,
housing, medical and other health services, educational and cultural services are
considered nonmaterial services; they are outside the production sphere and are
therefore included in those branches of the economy where the processes of redis-
tribution and final consumption occur.
Certain activities, e.g., passenger transport, though not strictly falling
under the definition of material services, are for practical reasons also treated as
belonging to material services in some MPS countries. The difference in the con-
cept of economic production has a great impact on comparability of not only
SNA and MPS production aggregates, but also on the categories of consumption,
distribution and redistribution of income. The breakdown of other categories by
type of sphere (productive, nonproductive) and all relevant categories by indus-
trial origin are affected as well.
The activities which are treated differently in SNA and in MPS have to be
specified in terms of the relevant classification when adjusting data of one system
to the concepts of another system, and comparability requirements in this
respect are needed.
The above-mentioned activities are specified in terms of groups of the
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities
(ISIC). They should, in principle, be excluded from the scope of economic pro-
duction in converting SNA data to MPS concepts and vice versa. In addition,
there are some other activities falling under ISIC group being treated as nonma-
terial activities in MPS. Such activities (e.g., tourist agencies and tourist
development services) should, in principle, be treated in the same way as those
previously mentioned. However, as these activities are usually of relatively little
importance, in practical calculations of the relevant aggregates they are not
separately specified along with the corresponding data.
It should be pointed out that the above-mentioned description of the
differences in the concepts of economic production used in SNA and MPS, which
are of considerable importance for actual comparisons of the aggregates, is based
on the relevant documents approved by the UN Statistical Commission and
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published as internationally recommended guidelines and manuals as well as on
other relevant studies.
The description then does not cover the additional differences which could
occur within the individual systems themselves, e.g., between the United Nations
international standards and the recommendations of other international bodies,
or even between these standards and the national systems in the relevant fields.
Although it is not likely that there is a significant difference in the concept of the
production sphere, differences may occur mainly for practical reasons.
The different treatment of transport and communication activities can be
mentioned as an example of the current practice in MPS countries. While sta-
tistical data for Czechoslovakia in the relevant national material production
aggregates include only part of the transport branch (industry), Le., goods
transport, in some other East European countries, owing to practical difficulties
in distinguishing between activities and assets, the whole transport branch is
treated as productive. The quantitative significance of the different practical
treatment of activities in transport and communication services can, to a certain
extent, be judged from the composition of GDP and NMP aggregates by
branches (industries) of national economy shown in the relevant statistical publi-
cations.
From the above-mentioned description of the concepts of production sphere
used in SNA and MPS countries can be deduced that the differences are of real
significance and have to be taken into account in direct comparison of the
corresponding SNA and MPS aggregates.
3004.2. Gross output compared with global product
The MPS global product defined in 30.3.2 is more restrictive as compared with
the gross output in SNA due to the fact that it includes only goods and material
services. Besides this, a certain quantitative difference between these two pro-
duction aggregates appears in the treatment of the output of the catering trades,
waste materials sold by producing units, second-hand goods bought from house-
holds and in the treatment of tips (gratuities).
Without giving a detailed description of the individual points mentioned
above, a conclusion can be made that the differences relating to the treatment of
the catering trades and to the sales of waste materials by producing units affect
only the gross output or the global product, but not the GDP and the NMP
(national income). The differences in the treatment of other issues mentioned
affect both the "gross" and the "net" production aggregates, i.e., also the com-
parison between GDP and NMP (national income). However, as they are likely
to be of little quantitative significance, they can be disregarded.
3004.3. Intermediate consumption aggregates in SNA and MPS
As to the relationship between intermediate consumption and production aggre-
gates, the purpose of the specification of intermediate consumption aggregates is
I
I
I
I
f!
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generally to derive unduplicated production aggregates and their differences
rather than to serve direct comparisons.
In addition to the main difference concerning the sphere of production and
some other differences already mentioned (the catering trades, sales of waste
material), the SNA and MPS intermediate consumption is differently defined
with regard to enterprise expenditures on cultural, sport and similar facilities for
their employees; travel expenses in connection with business; uniforms; fixed
assets used for special purposes and losses of stocks. The first two additional
differences mentioned, Le., different treatment of expenditures on cultural and
other facilities and travel expenses, are probably of some quantitative importance
and should be taken into account in the intersystem comparisons.
Another significant difference results from the treatment of fixed capital
consumption in relation to the scope of the three main aggregates under review.
While in SNA consumption of fixed capital is an element of value added aggre-
gate and gross domestic product, the MPS national income (NMP) is defined as
net, Le., without the consumption of fixed capital which is treated as part of
intermediate consumption.
Concerning capital consumption itself, it is, in principle, treated in the
same way as far as it relates to fixed capital used in the material production
sphere. In MPS the capital consumption in the nonmaterial production sphere is
treated as final consumption. In some specific points there are differences
between SNA and MPS in this respect (e.g., other than normal losses in fixed
assets, differences between the actual and the written-off value of scrapped
assets, valuation of fixed capital consumption). These differences may be of
some quantitative significance, but are usually disregarded in the conceptual
framework for intersystem comparisons.
30.4.4. Gross domestic product and national income
As has already been shown, the gross domestic product (total value added) and
national income (NMP) are defined as gross output or global product minus the
corresponding intermediate consumption which for MPS includes also capital
consumption. The differences between these two most important production
aggregates are therefore those that have already been described in connection
with the concept of the material production sphere and also with the definitions
and comparisons of the previous aggregates (30.3.2 and 30.3.3).
The main difference is apparently that MPS national income (NMP) is
confined to activities and income originating in the material production sphere
whereas gross domestic product (total value added) includes activities and
income which are of material and also nonmaterial character. Another relatively
significant difference arises from the treatment of capital consumption. While
capital consumption is a component of SNA gross domestic product or value
added, in MPS it is considered to be intermediate consumption and therefore it
is not included in the national income (NMP) aggregate. In order to allow for
the adjustments needed for the conversion of SNA national aggregates into the
relevant MPS aggregates and vice versa, the components of various flows which
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are treated differently in both systems must be separated. The construction of
such elementary flows and their groupings or regroupings make it possible to
move from an aggregate of one system to its counterpart of the other system. A
table presenting the adjustments needed for the conversion of MPS global pro-
duct, intermediate material consumption and national income (NMP) into SNA
gross output, intermediate consumption and gross domestic product and vice
versa, based on the differently treated components and elementary flows, is
shown in Table 90.2.
The components or elementary flows shown in adjustment tables are also
identified in terms of the classification of activities, categories of transactions
and/or other instruments adopted in SNA and MPS.
30.4.5. Other issues involved in the systems comparison
The relationship between the SNA and MPS production aggregates discussed in
Subsections 30.4.2, 30.4.3 and 30.4.4 display the main conceptual and methodo-
logical differences which can be encountered in their comparisons. In addition to
these differences and problems involved in the availability of the appropriate sta-
tistical data there are also other issues of some importance which should be
taken into account in an actual intersystems comparison.
There is no identity between the statistical (transaction) units used in SNA
and MPS. While in SNA such a unit is the establishment or equivalent unit, in
MPS a statistical unit used is the enterprise. Enterprises are organized on a
kind-of-activity basis. In some cases an enterprise is engaged in a single kind of
activity, in other cases an enterprise comprises several establishments, for which
separate statistics and accounting records are kept. For enterprises engaged in
more than one activity, the relevant statistical data have to be reported
separately (through special statistical and accountancy questionnaires) to meet
the needs of MPS statistics.
Another problem may arise in connection with territorial or national con-
cepts, if applied differently. In SNA only production taking place in the domestic
territory of a given country is encompassed. In MPS the concept actually used
corresponds to the SNA concept but there are some minor differences.
Both in SNA and MPS the relevant economic activity classifications are
used. However, in SNA the activities are classified in terms of the International
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC); in MPS countries the
classification of Branches of National Economy (CBNE) is used for the relevant
classification of activities and data. The significance of differences, resulting
from the applications of these two classifications in the corresponding SNA and
MPS production aggregates, can be judged from the conversion keys and their
testing. It is, of course, likely that in the case of subaggregates and similar
categories the differences will be relatively more important.
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30.5. Calculations of Gross Domestic Product and
National Income for Selected Countries
The calculations of GDP and national income (NMP) in terms of actual figures
undoubtedly represent one of the most positive contributions to the studies of
comparisons and links between the SNA and MPS and their relevant aggregates.
The objectives of the actual calculations are to serve not only as a basis for
analyzing ratios between the corresponding SNA and MPS aggregates, but also
to test the recommended conversion methodology together with the quantitative
significance of selected items.
The results of experimental illustrative calculations of the GDP and NDP
for selected countries with centrally planned economies and the national income
(NMP) for selected countries with market economies are presented in Table 90.9.
Table 90.9. Relationship between domestic product and net material product (NMP =
100.0) aggregates for selected countries (in %).
Country
USA
United Kingdom
Japan
France
Canada
Hungary
Year
1963a
1967a
1972
1963a
1971a
1972a
1974
1965a
1970a
1975
1976
1976b
1976
Gross domestic product
and net material product
147.0
147.3
152.5
136.1
143.0
144.4
147.5
129.5
126.1
139.0
145.2
151.2
124.9
Net domestic product
and net material product
133.9
134.9
139.0
125.7
130.1
131.1
132.1
112.9
109.7
120.1
136.1
~Previous calculations (from first round).
Preliminary figures.
The experimental illustrative calculations of those and other aggregates
were carried out by the United Nations Statistical Office in close cooperation
with national statistical offices which also provided additional data and assis-
tance in further statistical operations. The illustrative calculations are presented
in the form of ratios referring to the relationships between corresponding produc-
tion aggregates of SNA and MPS. The derivation of GDP and national income
(NMP) has been carried out on the basis of several types of conversion tables
aiming at double-checking estimates obtained through the calculations.
As can be seen from Table 90.9, there are significant differences between
countries regarding their ratios of GDP or NDP to national income (NMP). The
ratio is generally higher in countries with a higher level of economic development
measured in terms of per capita GDP. It should be noted that the calculations
have been made in national currencies and current prices.
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Year-to-year fluctuations in the ratio of gross and net domestic product to
national income are relatively small, but fluctuations over longer periods are
significant and cannot be disregarded. The ratio of gross and net domestic prod-
uct to national income also tends to increase over the years.
In view of significant differences in ratios of the corresponding aggregates
and, of course, of a very limited sample of calculations carried out as yet, we do
not recommend applying the ratio calculations for one country to calculations for
another country, especially if the countries are different in terms of the structure
of their national economies and the level of their economic development.
30.6. Other Projects in the Field of Gross Domestic Product
and National Income Comparison
There are other important projects which should be mentioned in relation to the
comparison of gross domestic product and national income (NMP) aggregates.
30.6.1. International comparison project
Following the consideration by the UN Statistical Commission at it fifteenth ses-
sion on issues relating to international comparison of production, income and
expenditure aggregates, the United Nations International Comparison Project
(ICP) was established in 1968. The long-term objective of ICP was to establish
a worldwide system for detailed comparisons of the purchasing power of curren-
cies and of gross domestic product in terms of these purchasing powers.
The basic methodological approach used in ICP is that the quantity com-
parisons between countries are obtained by means of price comparisons of a
number of carefully specified goods and services covering all categories of final
expenditures on GDP. Final expenditures on GDP are divided into approxi-
mately 150 detailed categories and price relatives are computed and averaged for
each category. These category price relatives show the purchasing power pari-
ties between the countries compared, and they are used to convert the category
expenditures of a given country to the currency units of a country (numeraire
country) undertaking the role of base country. Thus, all expenditure categories
and aggregated summary categories and GDP are directly comparable.
After the development of a methodology for such a comprehensive system
of comparisons, the ICP started its experimental implementation in several suc-
cessive phases.
Following the requested involvement of the UN Regional Commission, the
Conference of European Statisticians included in its work program a project on
"Comparison within the ICP Framework for the European Region" with 1980 as
a reference year. Eighteen European countries divided in two groups agreed to
participate in the project. Twelve countries (Group I) carried out a comparison
under the auspices of the Statistical Office of the European Communities. Group
II is composed of six countries: Austria, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Romania
and Yugoslavia with Austria undertaking the role of a base country.
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According to the accepted program of work in that field by the UN Statisti-
cal Commission, phase IV of ICP extended further the country coverage to 60
countries in a full-scale comparison; 1980 was chosen as reference year. The
report on phase IV containing the results of the group of countries (regions)
comparisons was published in 1985.
In phase V, 16 countries from all of the UN regional commissions and other
major international groups have been asked to assume the role of core countries
for 1985 comparisons. The core countries representing various types of
economies, regions and memberships in international organizations are linked to
groups of countries encompassing all countries participating in the comparisons.
With the UN Statistical Office being responsible for the core country comparis-
ons, in phase V, its results will be issued in greater detail when more countries
have completed their data collection.
30.6.2. Bilateral comparisons in SNA-MPS aggregates
Bilateral comparisons or comparative studies of basic economic aggregates and
other main indicators (structures, prices) between European countries have a
long tradition. They have been carried out either on the basis of cooperation
agreements between the national statistical offices of the countries concerned or
under the auspices of the Conference of European Statisticians or other interna-
tional bodies.
As these comparisons also involve countries with different economic sys-
tems, the numerical results together with the methodological or analytical con-
clusions have made a valuable contribution to the development of intersystem
and intercountry comparisons.
In 1979, France and Hungary agreed to test the conceptual framework for
intersystem (SNA-MPS) comparisons. This original experiment enriched the
recommended methodology for intersystem comparisons. It showed that the sys-
tematic use of input-output tables considerably improved comparison, revealing
the different stages in the conversion of one system into the other and guarantee-
ing that adjustments were made in a balanced manner, both in the general equa-
tion of goods and services and in the equation for primary income distribution.
Another bilateral undertaking was the comparison of prices and gross
domestic expenditure agreed on between Austria and Poland for the years 1975
and 1978. The results of this study, containing the numerical calculations
together with the relevant analytical part and methodological descriptions, were
published by the central statistical offices of Austria and Poland in 1982.
In 1983, the Central Statistical Offices of Bulgaria and Finland agreed to
carry out a bilateral comparison and verification of the conceptual links between
SNA and MPS with 1982 as a base year. According to the agreed approach Bul-
garia converted its aggregates from MPS into SNA categories on the basis of its
national data and, accordingly, Finland converted its national aggregates into
relevant MPS aggregates using its national data. The results of calculations of
the corresponding SNA-MPS production aggregates are shown in Tables 90.4
and 90.5.
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Table 90.4. Bulgaria, 1982 (in %).
MPS categories
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SNA categories
Global product
Intermediate material consumption
including depreciation
Net material product
Table 90.5. Finland, 1982 (in %).
SNA categories
100.0
100.0
100.0
109.7
100.0
128.5
Gross output
Intermediate
consumption
Gross domestic product
MPS categories
Gross output
Intermediate
consumption
Gross domestic product
100.0
100.0
100.0
78.4 Global product
Intermediate material consumption
89.0 including depreciation
67.1 Net material product
The results of the experimental calculations together with the relevant
methodological conclusions were published by the Central Statistical Offices of
Bulgaria and Finland in November 1985.
There are other important SNA-MPS aggregates, which are also a subject
of bilateral comparisons. For example in 1986, Czechoslovakia and Finland
agreed to carry out a comparative study on total consumption by population,
which will contribute to the building up of so-called "common aggregates" in
SNA and MPS systems which play an important role in international statistics.
30.7. Further Development of the SNA-MPS Comparisons
Together with the development of the existing accounting systems and their revi-
sions, great attention is focused on the further improvement of the SNA-MPS
comparisons and links - namely, in their conceptual relationship together with
the revision of the relevant international recommendation documents.
At its twenty-fourth session in 1987, the UN Statistical Commission con-
sidered the report on major results of the study on SNA-MPS links and dis-
cussed the preparatory work of the UN Statistical Office on the revision of the
Comparisons of the System of National Accounts and the System of Balances of
the National Economy in the field of conceptual relationship. The specific propo-
sals cover the construction of an improved version of the conceptual framework
for the SNA-MPS comparison, including the modification of its structure. They
include the drafts of the revised conversion tables designed for the derivation of
GDP for countries with centrally planned economies. The Commission will also
consider the results of experimental calculation of GDP and NMP, which are to
be carried out by both the UN Statistical Office (for the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Netherlands and other countries) and by countries on a bilateral basis.
This is in relation to the recommendation of the Commission that the work on
the revision of the methodological document on SNA-MPS comparisons should
reflect the experience gained through the illustrative calculations.
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Appendix 30A. GDP Estimates for the CMEA countries
in the Bonn-IIASA Project
Rumen Dobrinsky
In accordance with the available statistical data (Dobrinsky, 1986), the CMEA
country models within the Bonn-IIASA Research Project on Economic Growth
and Structural Change were developed in accordance with the MPS concept (see
Chapters 4 and 5). However, the nature of the empirical work within the project
made it necessary to have some means of comparing the results for the CMEA
countries with those for the developed marked economies and the developing
countries whose models are based on the SNA concept. As it is pointed out in
Chapter 30, this is by no means a trivial task. On the other hand, due to the
limited resources of the project, we could not put too much effort into an in-
depth treatment of the problem. Our approach was a rather simplified one, fol-
lowing the practical goals of the project. Accordingly, the GDP figures which
were constructed and used for the CMEA countries within the project should be
regarded only as some rough approximation.
In principle, we tried to base our figures on estimations which were avail-
able in the literature. However, since there do not exist generally accepted data
on this subject, some additional assumptions and adjustments had to be made.
One of the most comprehensive empirical studies in this field is the World
Bank-sponsored project reported in Marer (1985). It served as a basic source for
our estimations. Other sources which were used for checks and comparisons
were the study of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE, 1980); a com-
parison of the level of per capita income in six CMEA countries reported by a
Hungarian economist (Szilagyi, 1978); an estimation of GDP levels in the CMEA
countries in the period 1970-1980 performed by two Bulgarian economists (Kos-
tov and Videnov, 1985) as well as the comparisons of the levels of the national
income in USSR and USA published in the Statistical Yearbooks of the USSR
(Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR, various years).
Two main problems had to be tackled with respect to the needs of the pro-
ject: the problem of static conversion (conversion of NMP figures of certain
years into internationally comparable GDP figures) and the problem of dynamic
conversion (conversion of MNP growth rates into GDP growth rates).
Since the "international" measurement unit for real figures in the project
was the 1975 US$, it was decided to perform the basic static conversion for the
year 1975. The actual GDP figures for this year were based on the GNP per
capita estimations reported in Marer (1985). Using the official population figures
we arrived at the following approximate GDP levels for the seven European
CMEA countries for 1975, in US$ of the same year: Bulgaria - 29.13 billion;
CSSR - 57.54 billion; GDR - 69.25 billion; Hungary - 36.47 billion; Poland -
119.0 billion; Romania - 49.34 billion; USSR - 875.81 billion. In most cases
these figures compare quite favorably with other estimates quoted earlier.
598 7he Future o/IM World Economy
Marer (1985) also reports on the analysis of the implied GNP:NMP ratios,
measured in domestic prices and suggests the following figures for 1980 (pp.
18-19): Bulgaria - 1.32; CSSR - 1.19; GDR - 1.26; Hungary - 1.24; Poland -
1.28; Romania - 1.20; USSR - 1.29. From here, under the assumption that these
ratios do not change substantially over time, we calculated approximate GDP
figures for 1975 in constant domestic prices. The ratio of GDP in domestic
prices to GDP in US$ gives the conversion factor reported in Chapter 2.
The next and much more complex problem was the dynamic conversion. It
is widely argued that NMP growth rates are not directly comparable to GDP
growth rates. One obvious reason for this is the different composition of the two
aggregates. The team of P. Marer claims also that the CMEA methodology of
calculating NMP by the "double deflation method" (the values of gross output
and secondary inputs are both deflated separately) leads to an upward bias in
the estimated rates of growth of NMP as compared to the relevant GDP growth
rates. Instead, they propose an "adjusted factor cost approach" by which they
reestimate the NMP growth rates in a way which, they claim, makes them com-
parable to the GDP growth rates. On the basis of their recalculation for the
period 1970-1980 they suggest the following ratios between NMP growth rates
and comparable GDP growth rates for this period (Marer, 1985, pp. 184-185):
Bulgaria - 2.1; CSSR - 1.6; GDR - 1.5; Hungary - 1.5; Poland - 1.4; Romania -
1.6; USSR - 1.5. This approach is not indisputable with respect to the
economies of the CMEA countries (the adjusted factor cost approach is based on
the assumption that the factor prices are proportional to the marginal factor pro-
ductivities - an assumption which is usually rejected on methodological grounds;
see Chapter 5). However, the quoted ratios are not very different from the ones
which can be derived from other estimations.
Due to these statistical and methodological problems, we decided to use
within the project two different estimates for the GDP dynamics in the case of
the CMEA countries. The first one (which we refer to as GDP type 1) is calcu-
lated from the quoted 1975 US$ GDP figures, by multiplying the latter by the
NMP index of growth. Thus the rate of growth of GDP type 1 is the same as
the rates of growth of the corresponding NMP. The second one (which we refer
to as GDP type 2) is calculated in a similar way from the 1975 figures but using
an adjusted index of growth. The adjustment factor was the approximate ratio
linking NMP growth rates to GDP growth rates. The actual ratios which we
used were: USSR and Poland - 1.3; CSSR, GDR and Hungary - 1.5; Bulgaria
and Romania - 1.8. They were taken on the basis of the ratios quoted above
with some corrections stemming from other available estimations.
The two estimates, GDP type 1 and type 2, can be regarded as upper and
lower limits of the corresponding GDP figures in dynamics.
Finally, we would like to repeat that, due to the very crude (and probably
mechanical) nature of this approach, the resulting figures should be treated
rather cautiously.
Ru~n Dobri,.,q,
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Coding for Countries and
Country Groups
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Codes Names of Countries or Groups
Main industrialized countries
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IMF
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
81
82
09
10
80
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
192
11
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States of America
Federal Republic of Germany
Japan
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium/Luxembourg, i.e.
Belgium
Luxembourg
Canada
Other developed market economies (= other DMEs)
Sweden
Norway
Finland
Denmark
Ireland
Spain
South Africa
Switzerland
Austria
Australia
New Zealand
Oil-exporting developing countries
Saudi Arabia
Indonesia
Venezuela
Iran
Nigeria
Libya
Algeria
Iraq
Kuwait
111
134
158
132
112
136
1 38
124
1 24
1 37
156
1 44
142
172
128
178
184
199
146
122
193
196
456
536
299
429
694
672
612
433
443
121 Developing Asian countries without India
30 Korea
31 Hong Kong
32 Singapore
33 Malaysia
35
I
Thailand
36 Philippif'es
34 - India
13 Developing African countries
40 Cameroon
41 Gabon
42 Tanzania
542
532
576
548
578
566
534
622
646
738
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Codes Names of Countries or Groups IMF
43 Zambia 754
44 Togo 742
45 Ivory Coast 662
46 Zaire 636
47 Kenya 664
1 4 Developing Latin American countries
50 Chile 228
51 Colombia 233
52 Ecuador 248
53 Peru 293
54 Uruguay 298
55 Trinidad & Tobago 369
15 Further developed Latin American countries
60 Mexico 273
61 Brazil 223
62 Argentina 213
16 I Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 974
1 7) USSR plus the other European CMEA countries
70) European CMEA countries without USSR, i. e.
71 Bulgaria 918
72 Czechoslovakia 934
73 German Democratic Republic 938
74 Hungary 944
75 Poland 964
76 Romania 968
1 8 Other Mid-East & North African developipg countries
38 Egypt 469
39 Syrian Arab Republic 463
48 Tunisia 744
49 Morocco 686
00)\ Sum of the countries and groups 01 - 18
97) I Rest of the world with respect to 01 - 1 8 (including the
P.R. of China
99) I World total 001
Note: Separate models were built for all countries or country groups whose codes are
put in the first column with the exception of the last three groups (00, 97,99).

Annex 2
Outline of the
Bonn-IIASA World Model
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Editor'8 note:
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We present here the general approach of the model, using somewhat simpler
notation than that found in some chapters of the book. See specific chapters
for details.
1. We subdivide the world economy into
9 OECD countries + remainder (= other industrialized market
economies) ,
7 CMEA countries + remainder (= other centrally planned economies) ,
7 developing countries (or groups of developing countries)
+ remainder1 ) •
Details: see Annex 1.
2. We assume a production function
for each country or group of countries:
y*
or
where
T 1/ a
La.
i 1.
and Y* = total production minus secondary domestic inputs
(for developing countries Y* is
defined as total production minus domestic secondary inputs minus
production Y'MIN of the oil sector), Y = real GOP for
OECD countries, Y = NMP + AD = net material product NMP plus
1) The P.R. of China is still among this remainder. It is a
task for the future to deal with this nation separately.
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depreciation AD of real fixed assets for CMEA countries,
Y = GOP - M'MIN for developing countries, IM R = real
imports of secondary inputs, P'IMR = price of these imports
in local currency, p'y = price level of Y, L = labor employed
(for CMEA countries: employed in the material sphere), K =
capital, 1 = index of the state of technology (Hicks-neutral
technical progress), 1* = index of the state of technology
(Harrod-neutral technical progress). All prices are in domestic
currency if not otherwise indicated. In fact , as an approxi-
mation we assumed P'IMR P'Y. Therefore the last equation
above can be substituted by
Y* Y + IMR
The imports IMR of secondary inputs are related to total imports
1M by
IMR = Il R . 1M ,
where Il R = const. for CMEA and developing countries and a func-
tion for OECD countries (see below). We estimated a 1 , ••• ,a 3 by
assuming a linear trend for the rate w1 of technical progress
1 )
in the reference period, usually 1960 - 1983, i.e.
and (for OECD countries) by assuming that a 1 , ••• ,a 3 is related
to the average of the relative shares of labor, capital and
imports in the value of production Y*; for details see
chapter 3. For CMEA countries a special estimating procedure
is used, see chapter 5.
if x is discrete in time.
Le. w
x
(xw
x
1) We use the notation w for the growth rate of a variable x,
x
~/x if x is continuous in time, and
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3. For GECD and developing countries capital accumulation
is determined by
K = K_ 1 (1-d) + I'F_ 1
where d = rate of depreciation (exogenous, see below), I'F =
gross fixed investment. I'F is determined by the investment
ratio s:
I'F s·Y
s exogenous (see below).
Since real exports EX and real imports 1M are explained by
export and import functions (see below), real consumption C
follows from the GOP identity:
C Y - I - EX + 1M
where I = gross investment and is related to I'F by
I = I'IF . I'F, I'IF exogenous.
4. For CMEA countries capital accumulation
is basically explained in the same way. But the above concepts
have to be related to the official national accounting figures
based on the NMP concept. This yields:
o D'K· K
where D= "depreciation" (= sorting out) of fixed assets, D'K is the
rate of sorting out of fixed assets (given exogenously), and
ACD ACD'I· I
where ACD
and ACD'I
ment in the
gross accumulation (according to the NMP concept)
factor relating gross accumulation to gross invest-
NMP concept (exogenous). Consumption is determined
Anmxf
by the NMP identity:
C Y - ACD - EX + 1M .
5. For OECD countries, the domestic price level p'y
is determined by Fisher's equation:
p'y v·M/Y
where v = velocity of money, M = the money supply M2
(exogenous, see below). The velocity of money is explained
for each country by a variant of the function
609
v
where CCA = accumulated current account deficits or surpluses.
Thus CCA/Y is the relative foreign debt or surplus position
of the country.
The nominal rate of interest r is explained by a variant of
the function
where r USA = rate of interest in the USA and FX = "foreign
exchange" = exchange rate to the $ = price of US $ in domestic
currency.
The exchange rate FX of domestic currency to the $ is derived
from an exchange rate index 1'FX by
FX FX'C· 1'FX
where FX'C const. exchange rate in the base year 1975.
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The exchange rate index (1975 = 1) is forecast on the basis
of purchasing power parity theory!
I'FX I'FX
-1 [
1+Wp ,y 1
1 + W p ' Y (USA)
where wp'Y(USA) is the rate of inflation in the USA. 1 )
From this follows the nominal GOP in domestic currency:
Y'N y. P'Y
in current US $:
Y'$N Y'N/FX
and real GOP in $ of the base year:
Y'$ Y/FX'C
6. For CMEA countries
Thedomestic price index P'Y (which is identified with the price
level of finai material productY) is determined by the ratio of
the nominal wage rate W'N to the real wage rate W
P'Y W'N/W
The nominal wage rate is determined by political authorities
and is exogenous (see below). The real wage rate is estimated by
1) Unfortunately we could not use the originally planned and
much more refined approach to exchange rate determination
put forward in chapter 8 by Dr. Welsch,where all exchange
rates are determined simultaneously. In the time available
for our research we were unable to get a solution for this much
more complicated system. Thus we had to simplify the ex-
change rate equations.
where R is the primary income of enterprises per unit of fixed
assets (which may be considered as an analog to the rate of
interest) :
R = (Y - W·L)/K
The "GDP-exchange rate" FX to the $ is derived from an ex-
change rate index in the same way as for the GECD countries:
611
FX FX'C . 1'FX see above.
The exchange rate index is estimated by a function which can
be understood by a variant of purchasing power parity
theory:
1'FX
where
a
( I 'FX ) 1 [I' FX
-1 -1
$FT = (EX$N + 1M$N)/(EX$ + 1M$)
is the ratio of nominal exports and imports in $ to the real
exports and imports in $. This approach has been chosen
because CMEA countries use different exchange rates for
imports and exports. We determine the export exchange rate
index 1'FXDE by
1'FXDE = 1'FXDE_ 1 (1 + wFX )
and the import exchange rate index 1'FXD1 by
1'FXD1 = 1'FXD1_ 1 (1 + wFX )
The export and import exchange rates themselves are explained by
FXDE FXDE'C . 1'FXDE and FXD1 FXD1'C . 1'FXD1 ,
where FXDE'C and FXD1'C are the constant export and import
exchange rates, respectively, in the base year.
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From this follows Y or NMP in domestic prices:
Y'N Y . p'y and NMP'N NMP . p'y
as well as "GOP type 1" in constant $ prices: 1 )
Y'$ NMP' P'NMP75/FX'C
where P'NMP75 is the price level in the base year 1975 and
FX'C is the exchange rate in the same year. "GOP type 1" in
current $ is defined by
Y'$N GOp d P'Y/P'NMP75
p l'FX
7. For developing countries
we first have to estimate the production Y'MIN of the oil sector
in order to get GOP of the oil-exporting countries from the
equation GOP = Y* + Y'MIN - IM R , see section 2 above. We explain
this in a preliminary way as a function of the exports:
Y'MIN
We derive the price level p'y for some groups of countries by
export and import prices:
a
P 'Y = a 1 (p' 1M) 2
a
(p' Y ) 3
-1
a
(P'EX) 4 2)
for other countries in the same way as for the OECO countries
by money supply and the velocity of money:
1) GOP "type 1" refers to the official figures which appear
in the statistical yearbooks of the CMEA countries and are
based on NMP national accounting. These figures are not
directly comparable to the GOP figures of the OECO and
developing countries. For comparison one has to modify them.
This yields GOP "type 2" for CMEA countries, see
chapters 2 and 5.
2) P'lM and P'EX are explained below.
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P'Y v • M/Y
The velocity of money is estimated as
For investment goods a special price index has been estimated
by:
a
P'I = a 1 (p'Y) 2
Thus we get for nominal GOP and nominal investment
Y'N Y . p'y and I 'N I . p'y
For the groups of developing countries we use an artificial
currency the exchange rate of which, with respect to the $, is
one in 1975. Therefore:
Y = Y'$ in 1975.
a
(I'FX ) 1
-1I'FX
For the same reason we only need an exchange rate index I'FX,
i.e. I'FX = FX. It is explained by
p'$Y /p'Y a 2
-1 -1
(p'$Y/P'Y ) . a 3
where
p'$Y IM'$N + EX'$N1M + EX world market price level,
IM'$N and EX'$N = import and export values, respectively,
in $ (see below).
The nominal GOP in $ is defined by
yl$N Y/I I FX
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8. Aggregation over countries yields:
a) for OECD countries (= "World 1"):
GOP of OECD countries in current $:
The Future of the World Economy
i
Y'$NW1 L Y'N./FX.
l l
i OECD country i.
GOP of OECD countries in constant $:
Y'$W1 = L Y./FX'C.
ill
Price level in OECD countries:
P' $W1 Y'$NW1/Y'$W1
b) for CMEA countries (= "World 2"):
Y'$NW2
Y'$W2 L Y'$.
. l
l
i cr1EA country i,
P'$W2 = Y'$NW2/Y'$W2
c) for developing countries (= "World 3"):
an equivalent formula is used as for the OECD countries.
d) for the whole world (= "World 0") :
3
Y'$NWO L Y'$NWi
i=1
3
Y'$WO L Y'$Wi
i=1
p'$WO Y'$NWO/Y'$WO
Annex I!
We now turn to foreign trade. This links the economies of
the different countries to an interdependent system. The
foreign trade part of the model is constructed in such a way
that the adding up constraints are fully preserved with
respect to real as well as nominal imports
and exports, i.e.: total real imports = total real exports
and total nominal imports = total nominal exports on the
world level.
9. Real imports
(in domestic currency) are explained by a dynamic version
of the linear expenditure system. We use variants of the
equation:
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1M Y'N + IM'N - EX'N EX'Na 1 IM_ 1 + a 2 P'IM + a 4 P'IM
p'y
P'IH
1)
where P'IM = price level of imports (in domestic currency),
l'N = nominal investment, EX'N = nominal exports.
Real imports in $ are defined by
IM'$ IM/FX'C 2)
used: 1M
where FX'C = the $ exchange rate in the base year 1975.
The price level of imports P'IM in domestic currency is
explained by the import price level P'$IM in $ and the ex-
change rate index I'FX:
1) For developing countries a simplified version was
l'N EX'N Y'N_ 1
a 1 IM_ 1 + a 2 P'IM + a 3 P'IM + a 4 P'IM
2) For CMEA countries the index FXDI'C of the $ exchange
rate used for imports in the base year has to be applied.
Therefore another scaling factor P'IMD must be introduced.
The above equation then becorres: 1M' $ = 1M . P' IMD/FXD I ' C .
616
P'IM P'$IM . I'FX 1) .
The Future of the World Economy
The price level P'$IM is related to the estimated price index
P'$MM of imports in $ by a scaling factor D'P$IM which is
equal for all countries and very near to one and is exactly
one if the foreign trade statistics are consistent in real
terms. In order to make the model consistent, i.e. in order
to assure that total exports equal total imports also in real
terms, adapt all import prices as they are forecast in the
import price equations by the common factor D'P$IM (see below).
Thus we have
PI$IM P'$MM . D'P$IM .
The price index PI$MM is basically explained by the average $
export price index PIM$EX abroad. A variant of the following
equation is used:
P'$MM
where
PIM$EX
P'IM
a 1 I'F~1 + a 2 PIM$EX + a 3 P'M$EX_ 1
I'FX
-1
+ a 4 I'FX + as
3
6 SMW.. P'$EXW.
i=1 ~ ~
SMW. = the appropriate weight for
~
index of $ exports of "World
the imports in current $:
"World in, P'$EXWi = price
in, see below. Thus we get for
1) For CMEA countries this equation must be modified to
P'IM - P'$IM . P'IMD . I'FXDI for the reason indicated in
footnote (1).
Annez 1:1
IM'$N IM'$ . P'$IM 1)
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and for the current value of imports in domestic currency
IM'N = 1M . P'IM
10. Import aggregation
over countries yields:
a) Imports of "World i" in current $ values:
IM'$NWi l:
j EJ (i)
IM'$N.
J
i 1,2,3,
where J(i) = set of all countries belonging to "World in.
b) Imports of "World i" in constant $ values:
IM'$Wi l:
jEJ(i)
1M' $.
J
i 1 ,2,3 .
c) Price index of imports of "World in:
P'$IMWi IM'$NWi/IM'$Wi i 1 ,2,3 .
d) World Totals (= "World 0") :
3
IM'$NWO l: IM'$NWi
i=1
3
IM'$WO l: IM'$Wi
i=1
P'$IMWO IM'$NWO/IM'$WO
Of course, total world imports in real as well as in nominal
terms must be equal to exports in real or nominal terms,
respectively. This implies that the total world import price
level equals the total world export price level.
1) For developing countries 1M
tries we calculate in $.
IM$ since for these coun-
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11. For OECD countries nominal exports
EX'$N in current $ are explained by a dynamic version of the
linear expenditure system. Because of their large role
in world trade, the USA (= country 1), the FRG (= country 2)
and Japan (= country 3) will be treated separately. For these
countries we estimate:
a 1 P'$EXi . EX'$i,_1 + a 2 (IM'$NWO + IM'$NWR)
3
L
j=1
j~i
b. P'$EX .. EX'$. - a P'$EXW1AJ J J ,-1 3
3
. EX'$W1A_ 1 - L c J' P'$EXWj . EX'$Wj_1j=2
export price of country j, EX'$. is
J
P'$EXWj is the export price of
and "World 1A" includes all OECD countries other than"World j",
where P'$EX. is the $
J
the export volume (in $),
the USA, FRG and Japan. IM'$NWR denotes those imports (in
current $) which are not explained by total exports. If the
statistics were consistent IM'$NWR would be zero. We put
it to zero in the forecasts.
For the other OECD countries which are treated as individual
countries we relate the exports to the exports of the rest
of the OECD :
a 1 P'EX i . EX'$i -1 + a 2 EX'$NW1a,
b. P'$EX .. EX'$.
J J J
j 4, •.• ,10 .
The nominal exports of the rest of the OECD countries which
are not considered individually (= country 10) are estimated
as a residual:
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9
EX'$NW1A - L EX'$N ii=4
The aggregated exports (in current $ value) of the OEeD
countries except the USA, FRG and Japan are estimated by
EX'$NW1A a 1 P'$EXW1A . EX'$W1A_ 1
+ a 2 (1M'$NWO + 1M'$NWR)
3 3
L b. P'$EX .. EX'$. - L P'$EXWi· EX'$Wi .
j=1 J J J i=2
Of course in real terms
10
EX'$W1A L EX'$i
i=4
Therefore
P'$EXW1A EX'$NW1A/EX'$W1A .
The export prices in domestic currency are determined by
P'EX
a
(p 'y) 1
a
(P'1M) 2
a
(P'1M ) 3
-1
a
(P'EX ) 4
-1 . as .
The $ export prices are
P'$EX P'EX/1'FX
Thus we get the nominal and real exports in domestic
currency by
EX'N = EX'$N . FX and EX EX'N/P'EX , respectively.
The balance of trade in current $ value is:
EX'$1M EX'$N - 1M'$N
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The export totals for OECD countries (= "World 1") follow as:
EX'$NW1
3
Z EX'$N. + EX'$NW1
i=1 l
EX'$W1 similarly, and P'$EXW1 EX'$NW1/EX'$W1
12. For the exports of CMEA countries
(in current $ value) basically the same approach is used.
The exports of CMEA country i (with the exception of
Romania) are explained as a function of the total exports
of all CMEA countries:
a 1 P'$EX .. EX'$. 1 + a 2 EX'$NW2l l,-
Z
jli
P'$EX.
J
EX'$.
J
where j refers to CMEA countries and EX'$NW2 means the $ value
of the exports of all CMEA countries (= "World 2"). It is
estimated as a function of total world imports, of the exports
of the US (= country 1), the FRG (= country 2) and Japan
(= country 3), of the exports of all other OECD countries
(W1A) and of all developing countries (W3):
EX'$NW2 a 1 P'$EXW2 . EX'W2_ 1 + a 2 (IM'$NWO + IM'$NWR)
3
Z b. P'$EX .. EX'$.
i=1 l l l
- a 3 P'$EXW1A . EX'$W1A_ 1 - a 3 P'$EXW3 . EX'$W3_ 1 .
The exports EX'$R of Romania are explained as a residual:
EX'$ = EX'$NW2 - Z EX'$N.
R ilR l
where i refers to all CMEA countries.
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The export prices are estimated in current $ value basically
as a function of the $ export prices of OECD countries:
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P'$EX
a
(P'$EX ) 1
-1
a
(P'$EXW1) 2. a 3
From this we get the real exports in $:
EX'$ EX'$N/P'$EX
and the nominal and real exports in domestic currency:
EX'N EX'$N . FXDE EX EX'N/P'EX
The export price in domestic currency and in $ are related
by:
P'EX P'$EX . I'FXDE
The balance of trade is defined as for OECD countries. The
total real exports of all CMEA countries (in constant $) are
EX'$W2 L: EX'$.
j J
where j refers to CMEA countries.
The price level of these exports is
P'$EXW2 EX'$NW2/EX'$W2
13. The exports of developing countries
(in current $) with the exception of the exports of North
Africa and the Middle East (= country 18) are explained
similarly as the exports of OECD and CMEA countries, but
by a simpler equation. They are related to total world 3
exports by:
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where EX = EX'$ and i refers to all developing countries
or groups of countries without the group of countries 18.
For this group the exports are explained as a residual:
EX'$NW3 - L EX'$N.
j;;i18 l
where j refers to all developing countries.
The nominal exports of "World 3" are also determined as a
residual from total world exports minus the exports of
"World 1" and "World 2":
EX'$NW3 EX'$NWO - EX'$NW1 - EX'$NW2
For total world exports EX'$NWO, see the next section.
The export prices (in $) of developing countries i (with the
exception of the oil-exporting countries i = group 11) are
basically explained by the import prices of OECD countries:
a
P'$EX. = (P'$EX. ) 1l l,-1
a
(P''''IMW1) 2p • a 3 i ;;i 11 .
For the oil-exporting countries (group 11), the export price
level is related to the import price level P'$MFLW1 of
minerals and fuels of OECD countries which is estimated
separately for the forecasts. This price is exogenous in this
model. We estimate it by:
a a
(P'$MFLW1) 2 (P'$MFLW1_ 1 ) 3. a4
The nominal exports EX'N in domestic prices are for each
country
EX'N EX'$N . I'FXDA
and the real exports:
EX EX'$N/P'$EX.
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The trade balance in $ is, as usual, defined by
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EX'$IM EX'$N - IM'$N
From this we get the totals for "World 3":
i
EX'$W3 L: EX.
1
where i refers to developing countries and
P'EXW3 EX'$NW3/EX$W3
14. The grand totals of foreign trade are:
EX'$NWO IM'$NWO + IM'$NWR
Total world exports (in current $) equal total imports (in
current $), but there is a small statistical discrepancy
IM'$NWR which we put to zero in the forecasts. This guaran-
tees that the foreign trade model is consistent in value
terms.
Total real exports (in $) are
EX'$WO
3
L: EX'$Wi
i=l
The world export price level (in $) follows from
P'$EXWO EX'$NWO/EX'$WO
Now we have to define the scaling factor D'P$IM for all $
import prices which will guarantee consistency also in
real terms. We put
D'P$IM
IM'$N iL: / D'P$M . EX'$WOi P'$MM i
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where D'P$M is a correction factor for statistical discre-
pancies defined by
D'P$M . EX'$WO IM'$WO
In the reference period this correction factor is aro~nd .97.
We put it to one for forecasting. This guarantees consistency1)
and completes the model.
15. The total aggregated model
consists of 1069 equations and as many endogenous
variables. It is controlled by relatively few exogenous
variables. They have to be estimated separately for the
forecasting period and are the driving forces of economic
development. For each country (or group of countries) we
have to specify for the forecasting period:
2)
a. the labor force L ,
b. the state of technology, or the rate of technical
3)progress w,
1) This is sufficient to guarantee consistency also in real
terms. By construction of the model we have for the fore-
casting periods:
EX'$NWO = IM'$NWO .
Therefore EX'$WO EX'$NWOP'$EXWO will be equal to
IM'$WO = IM'$NWO if P'$EXWO = P'$IMWO. In fact there isP'$IMWO
EX'$WO
IM'$WO
EX'$WO
EX'$NWO/EX'$WO
IM'$NWO/IM'$WO
A = P'$EXWO
P'$IMWO
a discrepancy if we apply our price forecasting formulae
wi thout adaptation, i. e. we get
P'$EXWO = A . P'$IMWO A t 1 in general (though not
very different from one). But if we adapt all import prices
for forecasting by the common factor
we get consistency also in real terms. For forecasting:
A = D'P$IM.
2) For countries where no statistical forecasts of the labor
force were available we put L = L_ 1 (1 + wL) and forecast
wL from the past observations.
3) We put, = '-1 (1 + w,) and forecast w (see chapter 2-6) .,
Anmx2
1 )
c. the investment ratio s ,
. . d 2 )d. the rate of depreclatlon ,
e. the ratio ~R of secondary factor imports to total imports 3),
f. the money supply M or (for CMEA countries) the nominal
wage rate (see chapter 2).
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In addition, we have to forecast exogenously the $ import
price P'$MFLW1 of fuels and related products. The oil price is
subject to political decisions which should be taken as exogenous
forces. ~he forecasts are given in chapter 2.
16. The commodity structure
of GOP or NMP and of exports and imports was estimated
by relating the structure to the variables estimated in the
aggregated model. For details see chapters 2-6.
1) For OECD countries we put s = \s_1 + (1-\) 5, \ = .9. For
5 and the medium scenario we took the average value of s
from 1975-1984:
Rest
OECD
s in % 23.0
In the pessimistic scenario,s is 25% lower, in the opti-
mistic scenario 25% higher.
For CMEA and developing countries, s is exogenous, see
chapter 2.
2) For OECD countries we put d = \d_1+(1-\)d, \ = .9,
d = average value of d for 1975-1984:
d in %
Rest
OECD
2.9
Rest
OECD
These figures were ~sed for all three scenarios. For CMEA
and developing countries, d is exogenous , see chapter 2.
3) ~or OECD countries we put ~R = \~R -1 + (1-\)~R' \ = .9,
wR estimated on the basis of past o~servations as:
~R in % 13.0
These figures were used for all scenarios. For CMEA and
developing countries wR is exogenous, see chapter 2.
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Annex 4
Main Results of the
Bonn-IIASA Research Project
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Annez Table -4.1. Growth rates of GDP, GEeD countries, medium scenario (to 1981:
observations; 1982-1984: adjusted forecasts; 1985-1999: trend forecasts).
Perl ad
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
1
USA I
I
5.5421
4.0481
5.2721
6.0751
5.8281
2.7641
4.0471
2.8311
-0.2831
3.0601
5.4041
5.5101
-0.6561
-0.6941
4.8861
5.2411
4.6811
2.3501
-0.2231
2.9011
-2.1941
1. 7741
4.3711
2.2111
2.2181
2.2211
2.2231
2.2251
2.2281
2.2301
2.2321
2.2341
2.2361
2.2371
2.2381
2.2391
2.2401
2.2411
I
FRG I
I
4.5011
3.1631
6.6731
5.4881
2.7351
0.0201
5.7301
7.4001
5.2341
3.2691
4.1571
4.4681
0.6321
-1.5811
5.3271
3.0951
3.1131
4.0741
1.9171
0.0951
0.9981
1.3271
2.1081
2.8501
2.8981
2.9201
2.9311
2.9391
2.9471
2.9501
2.9521
2.9521
2.9521
2.9511
2.9511
2.9511
2.9511
2.9511
I
Japan 1
I
7.0541
10.5041
13.1961
5.1321
10.5871
10.7691
12.7521
12.2531
9.8051
4.6051
8.8121
8.8011
-1.0341
2.3441
5.2961
5.2511
5.0321
5.1341
4.931 I
4.1991
0.5461
4.0451
3.5181
4.2141
4.4311
4.4071
4.3621
4.3231
4.2921
4.2601
4.2291
4.2001
4.1751
4.1531
4.1341
4.1181
4.1041
4.0931
I
France I
I
6.6141
5.3991
6.3091
4.8821
5.0631
4.7251
4.2211
6.7041
5.6571
5.5261
5.7011
5.1851
3.1251
0.7101
4.8171
3.0031
3.7741
3.0881
0.9911
0.6401
1.8161
1.1671
2.5211
2.8031
2.8081
2.7921
2.7831
2.7861
2.7981
2.8081
2.8171
2.8241
2.8311
2.8361
2.8411
2.8441
2.8461
2.8481
I
UK I
I
1.0511
4.0511
5.2651
2.4011
1.8981
2.8061
4.0351
1.1531
2.111 I
2.4271
1.8371
7.4621
-0.9441
-0.8661
3.6891
1.2271
3.5081
1.7801
-2.5711
-2.1851
1.8521
0.1441
2.1941
1.1451
1.1471
1.1401
1. 1361
1.1321
1.1291
1.1251
1.1211
1.1151
1.1091
1.1021
1.0951
1.0881
1.0801
1.0721
I
1. 6341
1. 590:
scenario:
1
3.7191
3.823:
Optimistic
1 I
3.8851 5.5791
3.989: 5.374:
comparison.
1
2.768:
2.862 1
For
1
I
I
I
1990
1999
1990
1999
Pessimistic
1.687: 2.672:
1. 560: 1. 860:
scenario:
3.086:
2.833:
1. 995:
1.821:
Annex Table 4-1. Continued.
I 1 1 1 1
Period Italy INetherlandll1 BelglUIII! I Canada 1 Othe r lltoElll
1 1 Luxembourg 1 1 1
1 1 I I 1
62 5.8561 4.1461 5.0821 5.3301 6.2761
63 4.9001 3.7531 4.3331 5.7091 5.3741
64 2.6911 8.0661 6.9011 6.9371 6.2141
65 3.1411 5.4451 3.5241 6.4941 3.853\
66 5.7391 2.8951 3.1021 7.3751 4.6761
67 7.1351 5.3711 3.8321 4.1241 3.7661
68 6.3151 6.5081 4.0351 5.3811 5.5111
69 5.9151 6.1201 6.5511 4.2001 6.0031
70 5.1711 6.7631 6.1051 4.945\ 4.9171
71 1.1021 4.3371 2.8131 7.1961 3.6121
72 2.8221 3.4151 5.2851 4.8751 5.0631
73 7.8181 5.4221 6.3481 7.0661 4.6351
74 4.2601 3.3401 4.4331 2.4201 3.1321
75 -4.6111 -0.5201 -2.0841 1.9651 1.4391
76 6.4551 5.0331 5.3911 6.1531 2.6291
77 1.5081 2.6241 0.6271 3.0681 1.3511
78 2.2821 2.4941 3.2021 3.5641 2.7511
79 4.7741 2.5011 2.5281 2.7351 2.5231
80 4.4581 0.8771 3.1541 1.5121 3.1741
81 3.0021 -0.5801 -0.9101 3.6341 1.0731
82 -2.6891 0.541 1 1.6271 -2.9141 0.7791
83 0.3601 -0.9751 2.0111 1.4601 2.9401
84 -0.5891 2.0221 2.5161 1. 7331 3.0681
85 2.9671 2.0571 2.6491 2.4441 3.0351
86 2.9541 2.0851 2.6961 2.4801 3.0291
87 2.9011 2.0961 2.7311 2.5071 2.9691
88 2.8811 2.1041 2.7531 2.527\ 2.9191
89 2.8761 2.1121 2.7801 2.5441 2.8891
90 2.8791 2.1231 2.8201 2.5591 2.8771
91 2.8791 2.1261 2.8451 2.5701 2.8691
92 2.8771 2.1271 2.8671 2.5801 2.8651
93 2.8751 2.1251 2.8821 2.5871 2.8631
94 2.8741 2.1231 2.8991 2.5931 2.8641
95 2.8731 2.1201 2.9101 2.5981 2.8651
96 2.8721 2.1171 2.9221 2.6011 2.8681
97 2.8711 2.1141 2.9311 2.602\ 2.8711
98 2.8701 2.1101 2.9411 2.6031 2.8741
99 2.8701 2.1061 2.9481 2.6021 2.8771
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1 I 1 I 1 11990 1 4.3851 3.4071 3.7161 3.4401 3.9481
1999 1 4.421: 3.552: 3.873: 3.624: 4.058 :1
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 1.812: 1.018: 1. 995 1 1. 749: 1.820 \
1999 1. 715\ 0.8201 1.8621 1.6101 1.63611 1 1 1 1
633
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Annex Table ,r!!. Growth rates of NMP (GDP type "1"), CMEA countries, medium
scenario (to 1981: observations; 1982-1985: adjusted forecasts; 1986-1999: trend fore-
casts).
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Per I od
1 1 1 1 1 I I
Bulgaria 1 CSSR 1 GDR 1 Hungary I Poland I Romania I USSR 1
----+----=----+I------il------+I---=--=----=-----tl------+-I-----tl-----I
6.2091 1.4021 2.6951 5.8541 2.1051 9.765/ 5.7811
7.5181 -2.4151 3.5501 5.5811 6.9481 9.2391 3.6431
9.8481 0.8551 4.9371 4.2191 6.7281 8.6921 8.9141
7.0351 3.4271 4.6471 0.558/ 7.0091 9.4381 7.3781
11.0661 9.1501 4.8801 8.0061 7.1071 7.5711 9.4471
9.3741 5.2761 5.3971 8.1411 5.6901 7.6501 8.8771
6.1891 7.186/ 5.1011 5.0711 9.4981 6.5951 8.2431
10.0331 7.3111 5.2031 7.8051 2.4381 7.1471 4.8271
7.0381 5.6781 5.6031 5.2821 5.1981 6.9691 8.6941
6.7961 5.4961 4.4371 5.9141 8.1011 12.9831 5.6251
7.7701 5.7491 5.6511 6.6191 10.5681 10.6261 2.5931
8.1081 5.1991 5.6031 7.3551 10.8161 10.3871 9.4031
7.6151 5.9091 6.4681 6.1661 10.4471 13.0521 5.3301
8.8061 6.2371 4.8741 6.5311 7.1951 10.2631 2.9541
6.5231 3.6561 3.4561 2.9801 6.8461 9.2801 5.1991
6.3151 4.1961 5.0491 8.2351 5.0091 9.062/ 5.3201
5.5751 4.1091 3.6981 4.5001 3.0021 7.3101 4.7441
6.5991 3.0531 4.0481 2.3301 -2.2861 6.3681 2.521/
5.7111 2.9161 4.4151 -0.651/ -6.0001 2.9831 3.4381
4.9931 -0.1091 4.8171 2.5171 -11.9941 2.4911 2.5161
4.1431 1.8201 3.2181 1.6631 3.3981 3.3781 5.0731
3.9571 2.202/ 5.0931 1.6481 -1.2261 5.6871 2.2781
4.0821 2.1471 4.3331 2.1091 4.1071 5.4161 3.9621
2.0791 3.0701 4.731! -0.0811 3.1081 5.6981 3.4791
4.4851 2.7411 4.3421 2.4801 2.5611 5.0931 5.0611
5.0451 3.1171 4.5101 2.9321 2.6461 5.5891 4.1371
4.9561 3.0341 4.4161 2.8281 2.5411 5.3891 4.0701
4.9431 3.0181 4.4071 2.8091 2.5021 5.3141 4.0231
4.9171 3.0021 4.4091 2.7901 2.4731 5.2521 3.9811
4.8911 3.0231 4.4151 2.7791 3.3981 5.1991 3.9411
4.8651 2.9681 4.4231 2.7721 3.4061 5.1571 3.9041
4.8391 2.9491 4.4321 2.7611 3.4291 5.1211 3.8671
4.8151 2.9301 4.4411 2.7441 3.4491 5.0901 3.8331
4.7931 2.9121 4.4491 2.730/ 3.4591 5.0681 3.7991
4.7701 2.8921 4.4541 2.7191 3.4831 5.0471 3.7661
4.7511 2.8741 4.4601 2.6981 3.500/ 5.0331 3.7351
4.7301 2.893/ 4.4641 2.6841 3.5131 5.0171 3.7041
4.7111 2.8381 4.4691 2.6591 3.5221 5.0021 3.6741
1990
1999
1990
1999
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
, I I I I I I
6.223 I 4.3941 5.3711 4.3581 3.7041 7.021: 5.217:
6.107 : 4.339: 5.5d 4.421: 4.733: 6.967. 5.0051
Pessimistic scenario:
3.612 : 1. 773: 3.602: 1.513: 1.220: 3.285: 2.757:
3.317 I 1. 5421 3.5811 1.315: 2.2001 2. 76~ 2.345:
I I I I
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Annex Table +,9. Growth rates of GDP type "2", CMEA countries, medium scenario
(observations and forecasts as in Table .-1-2).
Per I od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I
Bulgaria I
I
3.4491
4.1771
5.4711
3.9081
6.1481
5.2081
3.4381
5.5741
3.9101
3.7751
4.3171
4.5051
4.2311
4.8921
3.6241
3.5081
3.0971
3.6661
3.1731
2.7741
2.3021
2.1981
2.2681
1.1551
2.4921
2.8021
2.7531
2.7461
2.7321
2.7171
2.7031
2.6881
2.6751
2.6631
2.6501
2.6391
2.6281
2.6171
I
CSSR I
I
0.9351
-1.6101
0.5701
2.2851
6.1001
3.5171
4.7901
4.8741
3.7851
3.6641
3.8321
3.4661
3.9401
4.1581
2.4371
2.7971
2.7391
2.0351
1.9441
-0.0721
1.2141
1.4681
1.4311
2.0471
1.8281
2.0781
2.0231
2.0121
2.0011
2.0151
1.9791
1.9661
1.9541
1.9411
1.9281
1.9161
1.9281
1.8921
I
GDR I
I
1.7971
2.3661
3.2911
3.0981
3.2531
3.598\
3.4011
3.4691
3.7351
2.9581
3.7671
3.7351
4.3121
3.2491
2.3041
3.3661
2.4651
2.6991
2.9441
3.2111
2.1451
3.3951
2.8891
3.1541
2.8951
3.0071
2.9441
2.9381
2.9391
2.9431
2.9491
2.9551
2.9601
2.9661
2.9691
2.9731
2.9761
2.9791
3.9021
3.7211
2.8131
0.3721
5.3371
5.4271
3.3811
5.2041
3.5211
3.9421
4.4121
4.9031
4.1111
4.3541
1.9871
5.4901
3.0001
1.5531
-0.4341
1.6781
1.1081
1.0981
1.4061
-0.0541
1.6541
1.9541
1.8851
1.8731
1.8601
1.8521
1.8481
1.8411
1.8291
1.8201
1.8131
1.7991
1.7891
1.7721
1
Poland I
I
1.6191
5.3451
5.1761
5.3911
5.4671
4.3771
7.3061
1.8761
3.9991
6.2311
8.1291
8.3201
8.0361
5.5351
5.267/
3.8531
2.3091
-1.7581
-4.6151
-9.2261
2.6141
-0.9431
3.1591
2.3911
1.9701
2.0351
1.9551
1.9251
1.9021
2.6141
2.6201
2.6381
2.6531
2.6611
2.6791
2.6921
2.7031
2.7101
I
R()fIlanla I
I
5.4251
5.1331
4.8291
5.2431
4.2061
4.2501
3.6641
3.9701
3.8711
7.213/
5.9031
5.7711
7.2511
5.7011
5.1561
5.0341
4.0611
3.5381
1.6571
1.3841
1.8771
3.1601
3.0091
3.1651
2.8291
3.1051
2.9941
2.9521
2.9181
2.8891
2.8651
2.8451
2.8281
2.8151
2.8041
2.7961
2.7871
2.7791
I
USSR I
I
4.4471
2.8031
6.8571
5.6751
7.2671
6.8281
6.3411
3.7131
6.6881
4.3271
1.9951
7.2331
4.1001
2.2721
3.9991
4.0921
3.6491
1.9401
2.6451
1.9361
3.9031
1.7521
3.0481
2.6761
3.8931
3.1821
3.1311
3.0951
3.0631
3.0321
3.0031
2.9751
2.9481
2.9221
2.8971
2.8731
2.8491
2.8261
1990
1999
For comparison. Optimistic
2.929: 3.580: 2.905:
2.893: 3.675: 2.947:
scenario:
2.849:
3.641:
4.013 :
3.850 I
I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990
1999
2.0061
1.843:
I
1.1821
1. 029:
I
2.4021
2.387:
I
1.0081
0.877:
I
0.9391
1.692:
I
1.8251
1.53~
I
2.121 I
1. 804 :
I
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Annex Table .r.r Growth rates of GDP, developing countries, medium scenariO (to
1981: observations; 1982-1999: trend forecasts).
Oll-Ex-
porting
countries
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Per i od
1 1 I 1 1 1 1
1 A.lan I India I Black I latl~ 1 Mexico 1 Mld-£a.t I
1 countrle. 1 I Africa I Mer 1 Brazil 1 I: 1
I without 1 I 1 without I Argentina 1 North I
I India 1 11M.,B. ,A. I 1 Africa I
t----+------jlt----------j-I------jl-----+I------jlt-------+I---- I
5.4571 7.3451 3.8681 9.5631 5.3351 3.4251 13.231 I
7.4051 10.0871 7.3011 4.7371 3.5171 2.5761 10.2201
9.7121 6.7971 7.1961 6.0051 6.0771 7.5621 9.6851
8.1031 6.7281 -4.1271 5.8661 3.9561 5.2171 -2.7421
4.5071 8.6831 -2.2541 4.5071 6.4751 4.0271 6.3341
1.5641 6.5471 8.4161 5.1171 3.0361 5.1071 5.9831
11.0851 7.6701 3.3941 8.3241 3.6191 8.6571 5.8221
9.3861 9.5401 6.7561 6.1991 3.8651 8.2261 5.7161
9.2061 6.9561 5.7431 7.4041 5.6241 7.5661 5.9971
8.4541 7.1721 2.4481 4.6841 5.1531 7.5011 6.0761
6.5231 7.5571 -0.7561 4.1511 4.0551 8.4921 5.9411
9.4081 11.5891 3.9311 6.6071 4.4341 10.0341 5.3971
6.0211 6.0421 0.3371 7.2341 4.3701 7.2311 4.9341
-0.1291 5.7741 9.6941 2.0311 1.3821 4.8661 6.5671
10.3981 12.0371 1.4421 5.4341 4.7231 6.5021 7.8131
5.4231 9.3961 8.0111 0.3581 3.5151 5.2771 7.5291
-0.4481 8.5311 6.5331 4.9801 5.0191 4.6741 7.7501
7.5831 7.6381 -4.5841 0.7421 5.0751 7.6511 7.3261
-2.3731 4.5371 7.1151 2.8951 3.8611 7.3481 7.4541
-6.9281 7.8801 5.3601 2.1851 3.1071 1.1751 8.2351
-0.7571 3.8401 1.0211 3.6091 6.2121 4.2501 10.1111
-0.6471 4.2441 1.7701 1.4701 3.0931 2.8521 4.8701
3.2131 3.8691 3.2141 1.0251 2.8121 2.6831 4.6091
-0.2141 3.8671 3.6511 1.2831 3.2731 5.6241 4.4451
5.6871 4.0591 4.6041 1.7881 4.7661 5.6801 5.2441
8.5391 4.0531 3.4081 2.5101 5.3491 5.7911 5.5981
5.9751 4.1071 3.5251 2.4051 5.2981 6.1061 6.0001
5.9401 4.3851 3.5011 2.8471 5.1061 5.9201 6.1221
6.8801 4.2381 3.5431 2.9191 5.0961 7.5641 6.8641
7.0341 4.7101 3.7071 3.6111 5.5081 6.4321 6.5201
6.9061 4.6621 3.6741 3.7321 5.2561 7.3761 7.0191
6.9191 4.6831 3.6351 3.9551 5.3571 6.0461 6.9881
6.7501 4.5921 3.5841 3.8531 5.3011 7.3031 6.4701
6.5811 4.4331 3.5461 3.8391 5.2541 6.251 I 6.9311
6.3031 4.3901 3.5101 3.8241 4.9021 6.831 I 6.5951
6.1701 4.2711 3.4891 3.8071 5.1671 6.3461 6.7211
6.1521 4.1401 3.4391 3.7091 4.8331 6.6211 6.5461
5.9961 3.9951 3.4041 3.7731 5.0871 6.4071 6.6631
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
:1990 9.738: 5.819: 4.387: 4.132: 5.971 : 8.152 7.892 :
:1999 7.405: 5.257: 4.316: 4.539: 5.896 : 7.342 7.568 :
Pessimistic scenario:
1 I 1 1 1 I 1
11990 3.4621 3.0821 3.368: 1.542: 3.8441 5.853 5.934 :
:1999 3.620: 2. 673~ 3.1951 2.7631 4.050: 5.289 2.9681
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Annex Table 4.5. Growth rates of GDP, world regions, medium scenario (observations
and forecasts as in Table.4.4).
GOP type"l" :with GOP type"l": GOP
Ifor CMEA countr.1
,.-' It
with GOP type"2"
for CMEA countr.
type"2": I
- -'\, .~
Per I od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
OECD I
countries I
total I
1
I
5.3511
4.7981
6.2601
5.1341
5.3731
3.7711
5.4361
5.1491
3.3281
3.5671
5.2411
5.9491
0.7051
-0.1551
4.7561
3.7191
3.9591
3.0641
1.411 I
2.0111
-0.545/
1.9171
3.1791
2.7041
2.7511
2.7471
2.7421
2.7411
2.7451
2.7481
2.7501
2.7521
2.7551
2.7581
2.7611
2.7641
2.7681
2.7721
I
CIolEA I
countries I
total I
/
I
5.1051
3.8771
7.8821
6.8121
8.8661
8.1631
7.9241
5.0241
7.8861
6.0131
4.0691
9.0571
6.2281
4.1171
5.3171
5.4861
4.6111
2.4301
2.5231
1.3751
4.4961
2.3681
3.9351
3.4801
4.6631
4.0801
4.0031
3.9641
3.9301
3.9611
3.9311
3.9051
3.8801
3.8561
3.8331
3.8111
3.7901
3.7681
less
developed
countries
total
5.1201
5.7981
7.9961
4.4771
3.5711
4.2991
8.031/
8.1771
7.4711
6.7851
6.0071
8.4351
5.7181
3.9251
7.6231
5.8031
3.8771
5.8451
3.6371
0.3031
2.8611
2.0641
3.0951
3.3581
5.1781
5.8791
5.4061
5.3731
6.2721
5.9971
6.3421
5.8561
6.2571
5.8191
5.9321
5.7251
5.7891
5.6781
Wor Id I
total 1
I
I
I
5.2851
4.7531
6.7131
5.3401
5.7641
4.5861
6.1551
5.4521
4.6091
4.3881
5.1081
6.8221
2.3571
1.1941
5.2321
4.3491
4.0831
3.2941
1.9381
1.6471
0.9541
2.0341
3.3301
2.9611
3.4981
3.4751
3.3991
3.3941
3.5311
3.5121
3.5741
3.5071
3.5811
3.5191
3.5481
3.5221
3.5421
3.5311
I
CIolEA 1
countries 1
total 1
I
I
3.8051
2.8971
5.8791
5.0741
6.5851
6.0671
5.9091
3.6931
5.8761
4.4561
2.9771
6.7591
4.5851
2.9751
3.9311
4.0341
3.3971
1.7241
1.8361
0.933/
3.3771
1.6731
2.9101
2.5631
3.4631
2.9951
2.9401
2.9101
2.8831
2.9121
2.8891
2.8691
2.8491
2.8301
2.8121
2.7951
2.7781
2.7601
World I
total 1
/
1
I
5.0211
4.5281
6.3671
5.0531
5.4171
4.2721
5.7971
5.1801
4.2731
4.1021
4.8791
6.3951
2.0561
0.9711
4.9481
4.0521
3.8351
3.1591
1.7961
1.5621
0.6921
1.8881
3.1131
2.7661
3.2331
3.2421
3.1701
3.1671
3.3091
3.2881
3.3541
3.2881
3.3661
3.3041
3.3361
3.3111
3.3351
3.3251
1990
1999
For comparison.
3.629: 5.194:
3.762: 5.132:
Optimistic scenarlO:
7.738: 4.629: 3.813
6.805: 4.684: 3.758
4.340
4.401
2.301
2.236
1.968
1.769
2.453
2.365
scenario:
I
4.444:
4.3431
Pessimistic
I
2.688 :
2.416 I
I
1. 928 :
1.787 I
1990
1999
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Annex Table -/.6. GDP per capita (in 1,000 $, 1975 value), GEeD countries, medium
scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table -/.2).
Peri od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
USA 1
1
5.4121
5.5501
5.7621
6.0371
6.3151
6.4191
6.6121
6.7341
6.6371
6.7541
7.0431
7.3611
7.2461
7.1251
7.4021
7.7121
7.9881
8.0861
7.9731
8.1231
7.8651
7.9301
8.2021
8.3001
8.4001
8.5021
8.6051
8.7091
8.8151
8.9231
9.0321
9.1421
9.2541
9.3671
9.4821
9.5981
9.7161
9.8361
I
FRG 1
1
4.6191
4.7111
4.9671
5.1741
5.2721
5.2401
5.5131
5.8941
6.1751
6.3171
6.5391
6.7981
6.8331
6.7481
7.1451
7.3791
7.620/
7.9131
8.0491
8.0431
8.1271
8.2641
8.4721
8.7301
9.0011
9.2831
9.5741
9.8751
10.1871
10.5081
10.8401
11.1831
11.5361
11.9001
12.2761
12.6631
13.063/
13.4751
1
Japan 1
I
1.8531
2.0271
2.2711
2.3621
2.5891
2.838/
3.1641
3.5101
3.8111
3.9351
4.2231
4.5301
4.4241
4.4711
4.6571
4.8551
5.0531
5.2681
5.4851
5.6731
5.6651
5.8541
6.0221
6.2381
6.4761
6.721/
6.9721
7.2301
7.4961
7.7681
8.0491
8.3371
8.6331
8.9381
9.2521
9.5751
9.9091
10.2531
I
France 1
1
3.8941
4.0341
4.2451
4.4111
4.5971
4.7761
4.9421
5.2301
5.4771
5.7251
5.9991
6.2581
6.4091
6.4181
6.715/
6.8921
7.1111
7.3001
7.3351
7.3411
7.4331
7.4861
7.6441
7.8341
8.0301
8.2301
8.4341
8.6431
8.8581
9.0791
9.3071
9.5411
9.7821
10.0301
10.284/
10.5441
10.8121
11.0871
1
UK I
I
3.1411
3.2521
3.4031
3.4641
3.5091
3.5881
3.7151
3.7431
3.8121
3.8911
3.9511
4.2361
4.1951
4.1601
4.3141
4.3701
4.5241
4.6021
4.4781
4.3491
4.4301
4.4331
4.5221
4.5781
4.6351
4.6931
4.7511
4.8091
4.8691
4.9281
4.9881
5.0491
5.1101
5.1721
5.2341
5.2961
5.3581
5.4211
1990
1999
For comparison. Optimistic
9.045: 10.704: 8.039:
10.6441 15.4621 12.2921
1 1 I
scenario:
9.312:
12.684:
4.994:
5.831 :
1990
1999
Pessimistic
8.592: 9.738:
9.062 : 11. 794 :
scenario:
7.025 :
8.621 :
18.4971
9.802:
I4.745 I
5.014 :
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Annex Table 4.6. Continued.
I 1 1
Per lad I tal y INether lands 1 Belglum/ I Canada I Other l:N:sl
1 1 Luxembourg I / I
1 I I 1 1
62 2.3011 4.0821 3.9261 4.5111 3.0171
63 2.3691 4.1751 4.0651 4.6801 3.1341
64 2.4141 4.4561 4.3041 4.9091 3.2751
65 2.4701 4.6331 4.4171 5.1351 3.3221
66 2.5951 4.7061 4.5211 5.4121 3.4311
67 2.7621 4.9001 4.6701 5.5361 3.5111
68 2.919/ 5.1691 4.8381 5.744/ 3.6561
69 3.0721 5.4221 5.1381 5.9001 3.8241
70 3.2111 5.7181 5.4451 6.1071 3.9581
71 3.2251 5.8931 5.5921 6.4651 4.0421
72 3.2921 6.0301 5.8621 6.7051 4.1861
73 3.5171 6.3051 6.2131 7.1011 4.3231
74 3.6331 6.4681 6.4661 7.1661 4.4001
75 3.4401 6.3821 6.3111 7.2011 4.4151
76 3.6401 6.6451 6.6371 7.5441 4.4831
77 3.6761 6.7801 6.6711 7.6921 4.4881
78 3.7821 6.9041 6.877/ 7.8951 4.5551
79 3.9511 7.0321 7.0441 8.0391 4.6151
80 4.1181 7.0381 7.2581 8.0721 4.7091
81 4.2351 6.9431 7.1981 8.2351 4.7051
82 4.1111 6.9521 7.3151 7.9011 4.6811
83 4.111 1 6.8601 7.4551 7.9321 4.7611
84 4.0771 6.9691 7.6271 7.9931 4.8491
85 4.1861 7.0841 7.8211 8.0751 4.9371
86 4.2961 7.2031 8.0241 8.1611 5.0271
87 4.4081 7.3251 8.2351 8.250/ 5.1141
88 4.521 I 7.4491 8.4531 8.3421 5.2011
89 4.6371 7.5761 8.6801 8.4361 5.2881
90 4.7571 7.7061 8.9161 8.5321 5.3761
91 4.8791 7.8391 9.1601 8.6311 5.4641
92 5.0041 7.9741 9.4131 8.7311 5.5541
93 5.1331 8.111 1 9.6751 8.8341 5.6461
94 5.2641 8.2501 9.9451 8.9371 5.7381
95 5.399/ 8.3911 10.2251 9.0431 5.8331
96 5.5381 8.5351 10.5131 9.1501 5.9291
97 5.6801 8.6801 10.8101 9.2591 6.0271
98 5.8251 8.8281 11.1171 9.3681 6.1271
99 5.9751 8.9781 11.4331 9.4791 6.2281
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
I I I I I 1
1990 I 5.185 : 8.272 I 9.384 I 8.914 : 5.783 :I I 13.046 :1999 I 7.443 I 10.884 I 10.796 I 7.404 I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 4.477 : 7.258 I 8.535 : 8.200 : 5.001 :I
1999 5.098 : 7.593 I 10.059 : 8.390 : 5.229 :I
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Annex Table i~ 7. GDP type "I" per capita (in 1,000 $, 1975 value), CMEA countries,
medium scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table i.2).
Per lod
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I
Bulgaria I
1
1.3011
1.3881
1.5121
1.6051
1. 7701
1.9231
2.0281
2.2161
2.3551
2.5021
2.6811
2.8831
3.0871
3.3401
3.5431
3.7471
3.9521
4.2011
4.4291
4.6351
4.8131
4.9921
5.1861
5.2851
5.5151
5.7871
6.0701
6.3671
6.6711
6.9871
7.3151
7.6581
8.0141
8.3851
8.7711
9.1741
9.5931
10.0301
CSSR 1
1
2.2131
2.1441
2.1451
2.2031
2.4001
2.5191
2.6951
2.8831
3.0401
3.1861
3.3481
3.5001
3.6821
3.8871
3.9981
4.1351
4.2741
4.3811
4.4821
4.4741
4.5411
4.6261
4.7101
4.8361
4.9521
5.0901
5.2281
5.3691
5.5121
5.6571
5.8071
5.9601
6.1151
6.2731
6.4351
6.5991
6.7651
6.9361
1
CDR I
1
2.1151
2.1951
2.3101
2.4231
2.5401
2.6751
2.8121
2.9561
3.1201
3.2661
3.4611
3.6631
3.9101
4.1101
4.2681
4.4891
4.6581
4.8491
5.0661
5.3101
5.4941
5.7701
6.0161
6.2971
6.5661
6.8571
7.1551
7.4661
7.7901
8.1281
8.4821
8.8531
9.2401
9.6441
10.0671
10.5091
10.9711
11.4541
1
Hungary 1
I
1.7171
1.8061
1.8771
1.8811
2.0241
2.1801
2.2841
2.4531
2.5731
2.7141
2.8831
3.0831
3.2601
3.4601
3.5431
3.8181
3.9761
4.0621
4.0321
4.133\
4.2041
4.2781
4.3731
4.3741
4.4871
4.624\
4.7601
4.8991
5.0411
5.1871
5.3361
5.4891
5.6461
5.8071
5.9711
6.1391
6.3111
6.4861
1
Poland 1
I
1.5341
1.6201
1.7071
1.8041
1.9191
2.0161
2.1931
2.2321
2.3331
2.4991
2.7391
3.0081
3.2921
3.4981
3.7001
3.8481
3.9281
3.8081
3.5501
3.0961
3.1731
3.1141
3.2201
3.2991
3.3621
3.4291
3.4941
3.5591
3.6241
3.7241
3.8281
3.9341
4.0451
4.1601
4.2791
4.4031
4.5301
4.6621
I
R()I'Ilanla 1
1
0.8371
0.9081
0.9801
1.0661
1.1321
1.2041
1.2671
1.3411
1.4171
1.5851
1.7371
1.8991
2.1271
2.3221
2.5141
2.7151
2.8871
3.0471
3.1141
3.1701
3.2581
3.4161
3.5791
3.7601
3.9291
4.1261
4.3261
4.5341
4.7491
4.9741
5.2081
5.4531
5.7081
5.9761
6.2551
6.548\
6.8541
7.1741
1
USSR I
I
1.7321
1. 7681
1.8971
2.0071
2.1751
2.3441
2.5131
2.6081
2.8061
2.936\
2.9841
3.2341
3.3751
3.4421
3.5881
3.7461
3.8901
3.9561
4.0591
4.1271
4.2991
4.3711
4.5071
4.6261
4.8241
4.9881
5.1571
5.3321
5.5141
5.7021
5.8971
6.1001
6.3091
6.5261
6.7501
6.9821
7.2221
7.4691
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 : 7.063 : 5.879 : 8.131 : 5.426 : 3.838 : 5.136 5.830
1999 : 11.926: 8.395 : 13 .039 : 8.082 : 5.489 : 9.110 8.829
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 : 6.292 : 5.203 7.513 : 4.743 : 3.419 4.349 5.213
1999 : 8.410 I 5.853 10.265 : 5.429 \ 3.928 5.467 6.312I
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Annex Table ~.8. GDP type "2" per capita (in 1,000 $, 1975 value)' CMEA countries,
medium scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table ~.2).
I 1 1 1 1
Per Iad Bulgaria I CSSR I GDR 1 Hungary I Poland 1 Romania 1 USSR I
I I I I I 1 1
62 2.0351 2.7181 2.6141 2.1921 1.8931 1.3781 2.086\
63 2.1021 2.6551 2.6821 2.2651 1.9691 1.4381 2.1131
64 2.1991 2.6491 2.7791 2.3221 2.0451 1.4971 2.2241
65 2.2661 2.6911 2.8711 2.3231 2.1281 1.5661 2.3151
66 2.3891 2.8491 2.9631 2.4381 2.2301 1. 61 1 I 2.4591
67 2.4961 2.9401 3.0681 2.5601 2.3131 1.6591 2.601 I
68 2.5641 3.0751 3.1721 2.6391 2.4661 1.6991 2.7381
69 2.6881 3.2161 3.2801 2.7651 2.4961 1. 7451 2.8121
70 2.7741 3.3291 3.4011 2.8521 2.5791 1.7901 2.9701
71 2.8631 3.4281 3.5101 2.9531 2.7151 1.9001 3.0691
72 2.9711 3.5381 3.6531 3.071 I 2.9091 1. 9941 3.1011
73 3.0881 3.6381 3.7981 3.2091 3.1231 2.0881 3.2941
74 3.2021 3.755\ 3.9711 3.3281 3.3441 2.2191 3.3971
75 3.3401 3.8871 4.1101 3.4601 3.4981 2.3221 3.4421
76 3.4461 3.9511 4.221 I 3.5091 3.6451 2.4191 3.5471
77 3.5491 4.0311 4.3681 3.6851 3.7491 2.5161 3.6601
78 3.6551 4.1121 4.4781 3.7821 3.8021 2.5951 3.761 I
79 3.7781 4.1731 4.6021 3.8361 3.7051 2.6651 3.8031
80 3.8881 4.2291 4.7401 3.8151 3.5061 2.6891 3.8721
81 3.9831 4.2241 4.8921 3.8791 3.1531 2.7071 3.9151
82 4.0621 4.261 I 5.0091 3.9241 3.2071 2.7431 4.0331
83 4.1431 4.3091 5.1761 3.9711 3.1561 2.8071 4.0791
84 4.2281 4.3571 5.3221 4.0311 3.2341 2.8731 4.1691
85 4.2701 4.4291 5.4861 4.0331 3.2901 2.9461 4.2461
86 4.371 I 4.4951 5.6411 4.1051 3.3341 3.0131 4.3781
87 4.4881 4.5741 5.8071 4.1901 3.3801 3.0891 4.4851
88 4.6091 4.6521 5.9741 4.2731 3.4251 3.1651 4.5951
89 4.7341 4.7301 6.1451 4.3581 3.4681 3.243\ 4.7091
90 4.8571 4.8101 6.3221 4.4441 3.5131 3.3221 4.8271
91 4.9811 4.8881 6.5031 4.5311 3.5821 3.4031 4.9481
92 5.1071 4.9691 8.6911 4.6201 3.6531 3.4851 5.0731
93 5.2371 5.0511 6.8841 4.7101 3.7271 3.5701 5.2021
94 5.3681 5.1341 7.0831 4.8011 3.8021 3.6571 5.3351
95 5.5031 5.2171 7.2881 4.8941 3.8801 3.7461 5.4721
96 5.6401 5.3011 7.5001 4.9881 3.9601 3.8371 5.6121
97 5.7801 5.3861 7.7181 5.0841 4.0421 3.931 I 5.7571
98 5.9231 5.4691 7.9421 5.1801 4.1271 4.0281 5.9051
99 6.0681 5.5561 8.1741 5.2781 4.2141 4.1271 6.0571
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 : 5.017 : 5.023 : fi.508 : 4.670 1 3.672 3.473 5.0411
1999 : 6.697: 6.319 : 8.923 : 6.122 I 4.783 4.729 6.898I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 : 4.698 : 4.627 : 6.169 : 4.265 3.358 3.160 4.621
1999 : 5.493 : 4.957 : 7.590 : 4.684 3.691 3.539 5.317
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Annex Table -l.9. GDP per capita (in 1,000 $, 1975 value), developing countries, medi-
um scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table -l.-l).
I 1 1 1 I
Oi I-Ex- I A.lan I India I Black I Loti". 1 "exlca I "I~a.t I
part i ng 1 cauntrie. I 1 At r I co I Amer I Brazil I II: I
Per I ad cauntrle. I wi thout I 1 I wi thout 1 Argentina I North I
I India I 1 I ... ,B. ,A. I I At r I co I
I I I I I I I
62 0.4921 0.2841 0.1221 0.2061 0.6451 0.8121 0.3171
63 0.5141 0.3041 0.1281 0.2101 0.648/ 0.8101 0.3401
64 0.5511 0.3151 0.1341 0.2171 0.6701 0.8471 0.3651
65 0.5811 0.3281 0.1261 0.2251 0.6781 0.8681 0.3641
66 0.5911 0.3461 0.1201 0.2291 0.7031 0.8781 0.3491
67 0.5841 0.3591 0.1271 0.2331 0.7061 0.8961 0.3461
68 0.6321 0.3761 0.1281 0.2461 0.7111 0.9481 0.3591
69 0.6741 0.4021 0.1341 0.2541 0.7231 0.9991 0.3851
70 0.7181 0.4191 0.1381 0.2661 0.7431 1.0471 0.3911
71 0.7571 0.4371 0.1381 0.2691 0.7641 1.0961 0.4041
72 0.7841 0.4581 0.1341 0.2721 0.7781 1.1581 0.4151
73 0.8361 0.4991 0.1361 0.2821 0.7941 1.2411 0.4131
74 0.8641 0.5161 0.1341 0.2941 0.8101 1.2971 0.4301
75 0.8401 0.5341 0.1441 0.2911 0.8091 1.3271 0.4811
76 0.9031 0.5831 0.1431 0.2971 0.8251 1.3771 0.5081
77 0.9271 0.6231 0.1511 0.2891 0.8351 1.4151 0.5201
78 0.9001 0.6601 0.1581 0.2941 0.8571 1.445 1 0.5541
79 0.9441 0.6951 0.1471 0.2881 0.8811 1.5181 0.5761
80 0.8991 0.7111 0.1551 0.2871 0.8951 1.5921 0.6011
81 0.8141 0.7491 0.1601 0.2841 0.9041 1.5721 0.6111
82 0.7871 0.7611 0.1581 0.2851 0.9361 1.6011 0.6541
83 0.7621 0.7771 0.1581 0.2791 0.9421 1.6081 0.6671
84 0.7671 0.7891 0.1601 0.2741 0.9461 1.6131 0.6801
85 0.7471 0.8031 0.1631 0.2691 0.9571 1.6671 0.6911
86 0.7681 0.8181 0.1681 0.2641 0.9801 1.7201 0.7071
87 0.8131 0.8341 0.1701 0.2621 1.008/ 1. 7791 0.7271
88 0.8401 0.8511 0.1731 0.2601 1.0361 1.8461 0.7511
89 0.8681 0.8721 0.1761 0.2591 1.0661 1.9141 0.7761
90 0.9061 0.8921 0.1801 0.2591 1.0961 2.0151 0.8081
91 0.9451 0.9171 0.1831 0.2591 1.1321 2.0981 0.8401
92 0.9861 0.9411 0.1871 0.2601 1.1641 2.2061 0.8761
93 1.0291 0.9681 0.1901 0.2621 1.2011 2.2911 0.9141
94 1.0731 0.9951 0.1941 0.2641 1.2381 2.4091 0.9501
95 1.1171 1.0211 0.1981 0.2661 1.2741 2.5101 0.9931
96 1.1601 1.0501 0.2011 0.2671 1.3091 2.6281 1.0321
97 1.2031 1.0771 0.2051 0.2681 1.3511 2.7401 1.0771
98 1.2481 1.1031 0.2091 0.2701 1.3881 2.8651 1.1201
99 1.2941 1.1301 0.2131 0.2711 1.4281 2.9931 1.1671
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 : 1.168 : 1.005 : 0.192 : 0.286 I 1.176 2.256 0.879I
1999 : 1. 937 : 1.423 : 0.246 : 0.321 I 1.648 3.619 1. 374I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 : 0.735 : 0.835 : 0.174 : 0.238 1. 012 1.841 0.761
1999 : 0.837 : 0.942 : 0.203 : 0.222 1.196 2.519 1.037
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I
1.7061
1.7491
1.8261
1.883/
1.9481
1.9951
2.0731
2.1431
2.1961
2.2431
2.3101
2.4141
2.4221
2.4041
2.4801
2.5371
2.5911
2.6301
2.634/
2.6291
2.6041
2.6101
2.6491
2.6791
2.7211
2.7651
2.8091
2.8531
2.9031
2.9521
3.0041
3.0561
3.1121
3.1681
3.2261
3.284/
3.3461
3.408:
I
World I
total I
I
1
I
2.0841
2.1181
2.2151
2.2981
2.4281
2.5531
2.6811
2.7551
2.8921
2.9951
3.0591
3.2381
3.3581
3.4291
3.5341
3.6471
3.7411
3.7781
3.8191
3.8281
3.9281
3.9711
4.0581
4.1341
4.2491
4.3501
4.4521
4.5571
4.6651
4.7791
4.8961
5.0161
5.1401
5.2671
5.3981
5.5321
5.6691
5.8101
1
aAEA I
countries 1
total I
I
I
1.6431
1.6881
1.7681
1.8281
1.8981
1.9491
2.0331
2.1061
2.1651
2.2181
2.2891
2.4021
2.4161
2.4041
2.4871
2.551/
2.6121
2.6541
2.6621
2.6601
2.6411
2.6511
2.6961
2.7321
2.7821
2.8331
2.8841
2.9361
2.9941
3.0511
3.112/
3.1721
3.2371
3.3021
3.3691
3.4371
3.5091
3.5811
1
World I
total 1
I
1
1
0.3341
0.3451
0.3641
0.371 I
0.3741
0.3801
0.4011
0.4231
0.4441
0.4621
0.4781
0.5051
0.5221
0.5301
0.5561
0.5751
0.5831
0.6041
0.6121
0.599/
0.6021
0.601/
0.6061
0.6131
0.6301
0.6531
0.6741
0.6951
0.7241
0.7511
0.7821
0.8111
0.8451
0.8771
0.9111
0.9441
0.980/
1.0171
Less
developed
count ri es
total
I
1.8911
1.7351
1.8481
1.9501
2.1041
2.2561
2.4141
2.5131
2.6871
2.8251
2.9151
3.1531
3.3211
3.4291
3.5811
3.7471
3.8891
3.9551
4.0251
4.0511
4.2021
4.2781
4.4151
4.5371
4.7181
4.881/
5.0471
5.2191
5.3971
5.5851
5.7801
5.9811
6.1911
6.4071
6.6311
6.8631
7.1031
7.3511
1
aAEA 1
countries I
total 1
I
I
3.7941
3.9241
4.1201
4.2751
4.4591
4.5811
4.7851
4.9851
5.1001
5.2241
5.4411
5.7101
5.6991
5.6441
5.8711
6.0441
6.2401
6.381 I
6.4201
6.4971
6.4151
6.4941
6.6561
6.7901
6.9301
7.0711
7.2161
7.3621
7.5131
7.6661
7.8221
7.981/
8.1441
8.3101
8.4801
8.6531
8.829\
9.0101
OECD
count rles
total
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Per lod
Anne~ Table ".10. GDP per capita (in 1,000 $, 1975 value)' world regions, medium
scenario (to 1981: observations; 1982-1983: forecasts; 1984-1999: trend forecasts).
with GOP type"2"
jwith GOP type"l": for CMEA CO,untr.
GOP type "I" I for CMEA Countr.:GDP type"2".
~ 1_-
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 7.881 I 5.715 I 0.836 I 3.195
I 4.868 3.090I I I I
1999 10.279 I 8.724 I 1. 305 I 4.218 I 6.519 3.980I I I I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 7.190 I 5.099 0.650 I 2.830 4.472 2.753I I
1999 7.951 I 6.197 0.812 , 3.072 5.120 2.951I I
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Annex Table ,r11. GDP per employed person ~ labor productivity (in 1,000 $, 1975
value), DEeD countries, medium scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table 4.2).
Per i ad
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I
USA 1
1
15.1341
15.5011
15.9541
16.4991
17.0281
17.1511
17.4811
17.5191
17.2971
17.6721
17.9951
18.3371
17.8531
17.9251
18.1851
18.4591
18.5131
18.4151
18.2861
18.6111
18.3501
18.4351
18.4871
18.5971
18.710\
18.8231
18.9381
19.0541
19.1711
19.2891
19.4081
19.5291
19.6501
19.772\
19.8961
20.0201
20.1451
20.2721
1
FRG 1
1
10.0041
10.3091
11.0061
11.5571
11.9171
12.3221
13.0131
13.7701
14.3261
14.7111
15.3831
15.9511
16.2811
16.5011
17.5371
18.1121
18.5611
19.0611
19.2281
19.3841
19.942\
20.5321
21.0111
21.6101
22.2361
22.8861
23.5571
24.2501
24.9651
25.7021
26.461 I
27.2421
28.0461
28.8741
29.7271
30.6041
31.5081
32.4381
1
Japan 1
I
3.8991
4.2721
4.7731
4.9381
5.3511
5.8161
6.4501
7.1851
7.8061
8.1231
8.8301
9.3641
9.3061
9.5501
9.9641
10.3481
10.7361
11.1411
11.5701
11.9581
11.9051
12.1791
12.5351
12.9851
13.4801
13.9901
14.5131
15.0501
15.6031
16.1701
16.7541
17.3531
17.9701
18.6041
19.2581
19.9311
20.6261
21.3421
I
France I
I
9.7251
10.0861
10.5471
10.9961
11.4591
11.9631
12.5011
13.117\
13.6691
14.3571
15.0911
15.6741
16.0521
16.3571
17.0281
17.3891
17.980\
18.5311
18.7071
18.9851
19.2831
19.6071
20.0571
20.6201
21.1991
21.792\
22.3991
23.0231
23.6681
24.3331
25.0191
25.7261
26.4541
27.2051
27.979\
28.7751
29.5941
30.4381
1
UK 1
I
6.9191
7.1861
7.4741
7.575\
7.6701
8.0021
8.3701
8.4541
8.6651
8.9631
9.1371
9.5891
9.464\
9.4131
9.8451
9.9491
10.2361
10.2811
10.0751
10.2881
10.6491
10.761\
10.7971
10.9541
11.1131
11.2741
11.4371
11.6011
11. 7681
11.9361
12.1071
12.2791
12.4521
12.6281
12.8051
12.9831
13.1631
13.3451
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 :
1999 1
I
19.670: 26.232: 16.733: 24.880:
21.9371 37.2201 25.5861 34.823 111 1 1
Pessimistic scenario:
12.071
14.354
1990 :
1999 1
1
18.685:
18.677 1
I
23.866
28.392
14.623
17.944
22.703 :
26.909 1
1
11.470
12.343
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Annex Table 4.11. Continued.
1 I
Italy INetherlandsl
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Per I od
1 1 I
BelglUM/ 1 Canada 1 Other OWEs I
I 1 Luxe~bourgl 1 1
t------+------r-------tI------:..,.I-------+I-----11
5.7021 11.1281 10.2071 13.4861 7.3471
6.0681 11.3911 10.5741 13.9201 7.6401
6.2561 12.0971 11.1501 14.3591 7.9931
6.6091 12.6481 11.5031 14.7281 8.1901
7.1111 12.9141 11.8131 15.1301 8.4821
7.5321 13.6501 12.3271 15.2301 8.7331
8.0161 14.4041 13.1501 15.6811 9.1421
8.5711 15.0361 13.7531 15.8411 9.5421
8.9651 15.864\ 14.3091 16.4421 9.8331
9.0841 16.4541 14.5541 17 .2231 10.0561
9.4891 17.1651 15.3311 17.5431 10.4401
10.1331 18.0881 16.0911 17.8891 10.7111
10.3411 18.6841 16.5541 17.5911 10.9021
9.8011 18.7751 16.4171 17.6291 11.0751
10.3561 19.6611 17.4401 18.3291 11.3361
10.4031 19.9371 17.5811 18.5601 11.4211
10.5901 20.2321 18.1441 18.5971 11.7441
10.9741 20.4631 18.3891 18.3741 11.9361
11.3041 20.1781 18.9791 18.1521 12.2531
11.5981 20.1021 19.2041 18.3331 12.3881
11.3201 20.2931 19.7431 18.3871 12.2731
11.361 I 20.4841 20.3061 18.5071 12.5341
11.3761 20.2411 20.9121 18.2601 12.8171
11.6551 20.5761 21.5101 18.3571 13.1021
11.9401 20.9221 22.1351 18.4601 13.3921
12.2251 21.2771 22.7851 18.5701 13.6811
12.5151 21.6381 23.4601 18.6841 13.9691
12.8111 22.0081 24.1621 18.8011 14.2591
13.1151 22.3871 24.8931 18.9221 14.5541
13.4261 22.7721 25.6541 19.0461 14.8531
13.7441 23.1651 26.4431 19.1721 15.1581
14.0691 23.5641 27.2611 19.3011 15.4691
14.4011 23.9691 28.1081 19.4321 15.7871
14.7421 24.381 I 28.9851 19.5641 16.1111
15.0901 24.7991 29.8931 19.6981 16.4421
15.4461 25.2231 30.8321 19.8331 16.7811
15.8111 25.6531 31.8031 19.9691 17.1271
16.184\ 26.0901 32.8071 20.1061 17.4811
15.658
20.782
19.768 :
22.898 I
I
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
14.296: 24.029: 26.202:
20.162 I 31.628 I 37.435 I
I I I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 :
1999 I
I
1990 :
1999 :
12.344
13.809
21.084
22.064
23.831
28.864
18.185
17.796
13.540
14.678
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Annex Table ~.12. GDP type "1" per employed person ~ labor productivity type "1"
(in 1,000 $, 1975 value)' CMEA countries, medium scenario (observations and forecasts
as in Table {2).
Per I od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
1
Bu I gar I a I
I
3.3101
3.5031
3.7951
4.0061
4.3891
4.7441
4.9781
5.4081
5.7271
5.9751
6.3081
6.7221
7.1001
7.5941
7.9831
8.5221
8.9401
9.4071
9.8171
10.1751
10.5441
10.9051
11.2941
11.4751
11.9381
12.4901
13.0611
13.6611
14.2701
14.9001
15.5541
16.2331
16.9381
17.6691
18.4281
19.2161
20.0341
20.8841
I
CSSR 1
1
4.9391
4.7911
4.8031
4.8981
5.2391
5.4501
5.7521
6.0671
6.3421
6.6691
7.0441
7.3701
7.7291
8.1501
8.4081
8.6931
8.9701
9.1541
9.3261
9.2551
9.3871
9.5531
9.7171
9.9661
10.1961
10.4701
10.7431
11.0211
11.3041
11.5901
11.8851
12.1851
12.4901
12.8011
13.1171
13.4391
13.7631
14.0961
I
GDR I
I
4.7211
4.9121
5.1461
5.3721
5.6291
5.9091
6.2121
6.5071
6.8511
7.1311
7.5191
7.9071
8.3551
8.7131
8.9351
9.3401
9.6141
9.9221
10.3091
10.7131
10.9621
11.4791
11.9321
12.4511
12.9451
13.4791
14.0231
14.5881
15.1751
15.7881
16.4261
17.0911
17.7851
18.5091
19.2631
20.0491
20.8671
21.7211
1
Hungary I
I
3.7981
3.9881
4.0971
4.1071
4.4211
4.7351
4.9161
5.1701
5.3411
5.6231
5.9611
6.3711
6.7481
7.1711
7.3741
8.0001
8.3801
8.5551
8.5121
8.8291
8.9981
9.1611
9.3691
9.3761
9.6241
9.9221
10.2181
10.5221
10.8331
11.1521
11.4791
11.8141
12.1581
12.5101
12.8701
13.2391
13.6161
14.0011
1
Poland I
1
3.4541
3.6301
3.8421
4.0131
4.2091
4.2811
4.5891
4.6111
4.8101
5.1121
5.5261
6.0061
6.5281
6.9571
7.4521
7.7931
8.0381
7.9041
7.2921
6.3821
6.7631
6.4241
6.6511
6.8201
6.9571
7.1031
7.2451
7.3871
7.5301
7.7461
7.9681
8.1991
8.4381
8.6871
8.9441
9.2121
9.4881
9.7741
I
ROlIIanla I
I
1.6291
1. 7701
1.9151
2.0941
2.2211
2.3801
2.5271
2.7131
2.9051
3.2611
3.5961
3.9501
4.4441
4.8611
5.2721
5.7291
6.1331
6.5041
6.6791
6.8281
7.0241
7.3791
7.7451
8.1541
8.5381
8.9831
9.4381
9.9101
10.4031
10.9171
11.4541
12.0151
12.6041
13.2211
13.8671
14.5441
15.2551
16.0001
I
USSR ,
1
3.9751
4.0781
4.3871
4.6351
4.9881
5.3271
5.6511
5.8031
6.1821
6.4021
6.4471
6.9331
7.1671
7.2741
7.5521
7.8321
8.1511
8.2371
8.4141
8.5591
8.9241
9.0861
9.3821
9.6461
10.0721
10.4311
10.8001
11.1841
11.5821
11.9961
12.4261
12.8721
13.3341
13.8131
14.3091
14.8231
15.3541
15.9031
7.974 :
11.507 :
1990:
1999:
For comparison. Optimistic
15.107: 12.056: 15.841:
24.832: 17.061: 24.725:
scenario:
11.659:
17.445 :
11.250
20.318
12.247
18.799
13.459:
17.512:
1990:
1999 :
Pessimistic scenario:
10.671: 14.636: 10.192
11.896: 19.465: 11.719
7.104
8.235
9.525
12.193
10.951
13.441
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Annex Table ~.19. GDP type "2" per employed person ~ labor productivity type "2"
(in 1,000 $, 1975 value), CMEA countries, medium scenario (observations and forecasts
as in Table ~.2).
Period
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
1
Bulgorlo I
I
5.1761
5.3081
5.5201
5.6581
5.9241
6.1591
6.2961
6.5621
6.7461
6.8391
6.9891
7.1991
7.365\
7.5941
7.7661
8.0721
8.2681
8.4611
8.6181
8.7431
8.9001
9.0491
9.2081
9.2711
9.4621
9.6881
9.9181
10.1561
10.3881
10.6221
10.8601
11.1011
11.3471
11.5961
11.8491
12.1071
12.3691
12.6351
I
CSSR I
I
6.0661
5.9331
5.9301
5.9811
6.2191
6.3621
6.5631
6.7661
6.9461
7.1771
7.4441
7.6601
7.8831
8.1501
8.3091
8.4761
8.6311
8.7201
8.8011
8.7361
8.8091
8.9001
8.9891
9.1281
9.2561
9.4091
9.5591
9.7101
9.864/
10.0141
10.1701
10.3271
10.4851
10.6451
10.8061
10.9681
11.1271
11.2911
I
COR I
I
5.8361
6.0021
6.1901
6.3671
6.5671
6.7771
7.0091
7.2201
7.4681
7.6631
7.9351
8.1971
8.4871
8.7131
8.8361
9.0881
9.2431
9.4161
9.6451
9.8691
9.9941
10.2961
10.5551
10.8481
11.1211
11.4141
11.7071
12.0071
12.3151
12.6311
12.9561
13.2911
13.6341
13.9881
14.3501
14.7231
15.1061
15.5001
I
Hungory I
I
4.8491
5.0011
5.0691
5.0721
5.3241
5.5601
5.6791
5.8281
5.9201
6.1171
6.3511
6.6321
6.888/
7.1711
7.3031
7.7221
7.9731
8.0771
8.0541
8.2861
8.3991
8.5041
8.6371
8.6461
8.8031
8.9901
9.1731
9.3601
9.5491
9.7421
9.9371
10.1361
10.3381
10.5441
10.7511
10.9631
11 .1761
11.3931
I
Polond I
I
4.2621
4.4131
4.603\
4.7351
4.8901
4.9111
5.1601
5.1561
5.3171
5.5531
5.8711
6.2371
6.6311
6.9571
7.3421
7.5931
7.7801
7.6911
7.1991
6.4991
6.8351
6.5111
6.6801
6.8021
6.8991
7.0021
7.1011
7.1991
7.2981
7.4501
7.6061
7.7661
7.9311
8.1021
8.2771
8.4581
8.6441
8.8341
I
ROIIlonlo I
I
2.6821
2.8051
2.9261
3.0771
3.1621
3.2801
3.3881
3.5291
3.6701
3.9091
4.1271
4.3431
4.6361
4.8611
5.0731
5.3091
5.5111
5.6901
5.7E71
5.8331
5.9121
6.0631
6.218/
6.3891
6.5461
6.7261
6.9061
7.0891
7.2761
7.4681
7.6641
7.8661
8.0741
8.2871
8.5071
8.7321
8.9641
9.2031
I
USSR I
I
4.7881
4.8711
5.1421
5.3471
5.6401
5.9081
6.1581
6.2571
6.5421
6.6921
6.7001
7.0611
7.2141
7.2741
7.4661
7.6521
7.8811
7.9191
8.0271
8.1191
8.3711
8.4791
8.6781
8.8531
9.1421
9.3801
9.6251
9.878/
10.1391
10.4101
10.6901
10.9781
11.2751
11.5811
11.8971
12.2211
12.5551
12.898\
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 : 10.731 I 10.301 I 12.678 I 10.035 I 7.629 7.608 10.589I I I I1999 I 13.943 I 12.843 : 16.921 I 13.215 I 10.027 10.546 14.689
I I 1 I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 : 10.050 9.489 12.098 9.166 : 6.976 6.922 9.708
1999 I 11.438 10.075 14.393 10.111 I 7.737 7.892 11. 321
I I
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Annex Table 4.14. GDP per economically active population ~ labor productivity (in
1,000 $, 1975 value)' developing countries, medium scenario (observations and forecasts
as in Table 4.4).
Per i od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Oll-Ex-
porting
countrle.
1
1.3851
1.4591
1.5711
1.6671
1.7021
1.6891
1.8351
1.9641
2.1001
2.2261
2.3191
2.4831
2.5771
2.5211
2.7211
2.8051
2.7331
2.8781
2.752\
2.5011
2.4241
2.3521
2.3731
2.3181
2.3871
2.5311
2.6181
2.7141
2.8351
2.9461
3.0711
3.1971
3.3231
3.4461
3.5781
3.7111
3.8401
3.9781
"'.Ion
countrle.
.1 thout
Indio
I
0.7031
0.7561
0.7901
0.8251
0.8751
0.9101
0.9571
1.0241
1.0711
1.1181
1.1731
1.2771
1.3221
1.3661
1.4941
1.5961
1.6921
1.7811
1.8211
1.9191
1.9521
1.9881
2.0211
2.0501
2.0931
2.1281
2.1731
2.2191
2.2731
2.3211
2.3741
2.4301
2.4861
2,5431
2.5991
2.6551
2.7091
2.7621
I
Ind I a I
1
1
1
1
0.2871
0.3041
0.3211
0.3041
0.2911
0.3101
0.3151
0.3311
0.3441
0.3461
0.3371
0.3451
0.3401
0.3661
0.3661
0.3891
0.408\
0.3831
0.4041
0.4181
0.4161
0.4161
0.4231
0.4311
0.4431
0.4511
0.4601
0.4681
0.4771
0.4851
0.4931
0.5011
0.5091
0.5171
0.5251
0.5331
0.5421
0.5511
1
Block 1
At r I co 1
I
1
1
0.4431
0.4541
0.4721
0.4901
0.5001
0.5131
0.5431
0.5641
0.5921
0.6051
0.6151
0.6401
0.6711
0.6691
0.6881
0.6741
0.6911
0.6801
0.6841
0.6811
0.6881
0.6801
0.6721
0.6641
0.6601
0.6561
0.6551
0.6561
0.6601
0.6611
0.6651
0.6701
0.6761
0.6831
0.6901
0.6981
0.7071
0.7151
Lot I It
Arne r
.1 thout
M. ,B •• "'.
1
2.0581
2.0991
2.1641
2.2021
2.2971
2.3191
2.3561
2.3851
2.4871
2.5361
2.5761
2.6581
2.6951
2.6871
2.7071
2.7141
2.7781
2.8751
2.9271
2.9311
3.0121
3.0211
3.0251
3.0441
3.1091
3.1821
3.2591
3.3461
3.4371
3.5081
3.5881
3.6641
3.7421
3.8251
3.9241
4.0121
4.1181
4.2141
Mexico
Brozi 1
Argent I no
1
2.5161
2.5181
2.6501
2.7241
2.7631
2.8231
2.9891
3.1491
3.3061
3.4571
3.6521
3.9151
4.0861
4.1741
4.3331
4.4351
4.5311
4.7491
4.9751
4.9001
4.9701
4.9841
4.9801
5.1291
5.2751
5.4351
5.6141
5.7991
6.0801
6.2851
6.5471
6.7541
7.0351
7.2831
7.5721
7.8561
8.1631
8.4771
MI d-Eo.t
~
North
At rIco
1
1.1151
1.2061
1.2981
1.3071
1.2591
1.2561
1.3111
1.4131
1.4411
1.4921
1.5321
1.5301
1.5921
1. 7841
1.8791
1.9231
2.0451
2.1251
2.2151
2.2531
2.4021
2.4531
2.5001
2.5351
2.5921
2.6511
2.7351
2.8381
2.9341
3.0481
3.1511
3.2601
3.3931
3.5151
3.6561
3.7981
3.9531
4.1091
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 3.655 : 2.562 I 0.511 0.728 : 3.687 6.807 3.189I
1999 5.953 : 3.479 I 0.636 0,847 : 4.862 10.253 4.836I I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 : 2.299 : 2.129 0.464 : 0.605 : 3.172 5.555 2.760
1999 : 2.571 : 2.303 0.524 : 0.586 : 3.528 7.136 3.652
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Annex Table 4.15. GDP per employed person or economically active population Rj labor
productivity (in 1,000 $, 1975 value), world regions, medium scenario (observations and
forecasts as in Table 4.10).
type"2"
Countr.
,
I
type"2"1___I
with GDP
for CMEA
type"l "]
Countr.1 GDP
_..J
GDP type"l"
,--A---..
Per I od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I I I I I
OECD 1 CMEA I Less World I CMEA I World I
countries 1 countries I developed total I countries I total 1
total I total I countries I total I I
I I tota I 1 I I
,---------r---------r-I--------rl-------r-I-------r-I-----1,------1
9.2941 3.8281 0.8661 4.0881 4.7181 4.2441
9.6531 3.9391 0.9001 4.2241 4.8091 4.3771
10. 1151 4.2041 0.9551 4.4391 5.0371 4.5851
10.4981 4.4251 0.9811 4.6041 5.2161 4.7421
10.9191 4.7421 0.9951 4.7851 5.4721 4.9121
11.2471 5.0341 1.0161 4.9231 5.6961 5.0391
11. 7431 5.3381 1.0751 5.1411 5.9281 5.2441
12.1711 5.5061 1.1401 5.3241 6.0381 5.4171
12.4451 5.8451 1.2021 5.4811 6.290\ 5.5581
12.8091 6.0941 1.2551 5.6291 6.4601 5.6931
13.326: 6.2401 1.3021 5.8141 6.5471 5.8671
13.7891 6.7031 1.3841 6.0841 6.8841 6.1161
13.7541 7.0051 1 .4321 6. 1241 7.0831 6.1381
13.8281 7.2071 1 .4591 6. 1321 7.2071 6.1321
14.3131 7.5111 1.5371 6.3471 7.4121 6.3301
14.6061 7.8291 1.5931 6.5051 7.6201 6.4691
14.9121 8.1471 1.6221 6.6571 7.8371 6.6041
15. 1081 8.2551 1 .6831 6.7571 7.8861 6.6951
15.2191 8.364\ 1.7111 6.7911 7.9371 6.7191
15.5061 8.4221 1 .6801 6.812 I 7.9571 6.7341
15.4561 8.7651 1.6911 6.7971 8.1921 6.702
15.6581 8.9041 1.6901 6.8351 8.2661 6.730
15.8751 9.1981 1.7071 6.9421 8.4551 6.821
16.1701 9.4631 1.7291 7.0441 8.6211 6.908
16. 4771 9 . 851 I 1 . 780 1 7. 181 I 8 . 8721 7.025
16.7881 10.2011 1.8451 7.3181 9.0911 7.143
17.1041 10.5601 1.9041 7.4561 9.3151 7.261
17.4241 10.9311 1.9671 7.5991 9.5451 7.383
17.7511 11.3171 2.0491 7.7551 9.781\ 7.519
18.083 I 11 . 7231 2. 1181 7. 8881 10 . 030 I 7. 632
18.4221 12. 1441 2. 1981 8.0331 10.2871 7.755
18.7661 12.5811 2.2711 8.1751 10.5511 7.876
19.1161 13.0351 2.3571 8.3291 10.8231 8.007
19.4721 13.5051 2.4371 8.4821 11.1021 8.138
19.8351 13.9921 2.5251 8.6461 11.3901 8.2781
20.2041 14.4971 2.6121 8.8121 11.6851 8.4201
20.5801 15.0201 2.7051 8.9841 11 .9881 8.5671
20.9631 15.560: 2.7991 9.1601 12.2991 8.7181
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 : 18.622 1J.. 982 : 2.365 : 8.276 : 10.207: 8.003 :
1999 : 23.996 18.467 : 3.591 : 10.790 : 13.969 : 10.180 :
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 : 16.990 10.691 : 1.839 : 7.331 : 9.377 : 7.129
1999 : 18.500 13.118 : 2.236 : 7.858 : 10.837 : 7.548
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Annex Table 4.16. Imports (in billions $, 1975 value), OEeD countries, medium
scenario (to 1981: observations; 1982-1984: adjusted forecasts; 1985-1999: trend fore-
casts).
Per i od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I
USA I
I
60.3621
62.1211
65.5251
72.7801
83.908/
89.8061
103.6641
109.7701
113.9881
121.2761
134.6831
140.9821
136.5791
119.7541
143.8661
156.2771
173.5871
176.4471
170.7971
181.1711
184.0211
204.4691
259.6001
265.4571
272.5641
280.2301
288.3351
296.9401
306.1621
315.9871
326.4361
337.5091
349.2501
361.6701
374.8101
388.6951
403.3671
418.8591
I
FRG I
I
36.7491
38.5601
42.1361
48.2051
49.4691
48.8761
55.4841
64.5931
74.3231
81.6131
86.8001
90.3911
90.8961
93.2741
103.5741
106.9951
113.4571
124.1921
129.0711
125.3281
126.0381
127.8151
132.3531
138.2331
144.9811
152.2281
159.8201
167.7151
175.9771
184.5241
193.3371
202.3841
211.6941
221.2631
231.1221
241.2871
251. 7941
262.6671
1
Japan 1
1
15.3181
18.0821
20.6341
22.0851
24.8251
30.9041
34.2291
38.5941
47.0411
49.2411
54.1301
67.0741
70.4621
63.7451
67.8931
71.2851
76.4571
86.4351
80.5241
81.9121
79.1881
81.0561
83.9351
88.7371
95.9401
103.5511
111.3381
119.3191
127.5651
136.0151
144.6661
153.5041
162.5721
171.8841
181.4881
191.4221
201.7421
212.491 I
1
France 1
I
19.3401
22.0631
25.3991
25.9701
28.7121
31.0911
35.1011
41.9551
44.5831
48.6521
56.4221
64.9771
68.3291
63.8471
76.8131
79.0271
83.2581
92.4751
98.9311
100.5091
100.7961
101.2771
108.4301
114.9731
121.4781
127.3111
132.6671
137.9011
143.4171
149.2031
155.3101
161. 7221
168.5121
175.6521
183.1831
191.0941
199.4111
208.1321
1
UK 1
I
36.8931
38.4041
42.3661
42.6861
43.5731
46.8081
50.2101
51.5171
53.9511
56.7981
62.0921
69.3871
70.0361
65.0961
67.7811
68.3701
70.8671
78.2651
75.2831
72.6961
76.4141
77 .0721
80.8421
83.5011
86.4661
89.4971
92.6531
95.9931
99.5881
103.4251
107.5081
111.8241
116.3851
121.1821
126.2251
131.5151
137.0631
142.8741
1990
1999
For comparison. Optimistic
I 1 1 I
I 109.472 I 76.522 1 70.95611 1 1 1
I 206.1581 138.013 1 124.45()
scenario:
1
79.807:
146.8211
1
286.381:
484.6011
1
56.5581
63.167:
1990
1999
Pessimistic
75.107: 53.336:
84.614: 59.219:
scenario:
I49.5411
50.283:
I
219.5481
240.075:
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Annex Table 4.16. Continued.
651
I I
Italy INetherlandslPeriod
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
17.1131
20.9701
19.6811
20.0741
22.8911
25.9781
27.5051
32.8121
38.0651
39.0451
43.3301
47.7721
48.3621
43.6671
50.0901
50.0731
54.1391
61.4691
66.6241
63.221 I
60.6551
61. 703 I
63.6061
68.3671
73.300/
77.5561
81.6051
85.7111
90.0461
94.5451
99.2041
103.9961
108.9591
114.0871
119.4141
124.949/
130.7201
136.7401
15.2671
16.7661
19.2571
20.4351
21.8741
23.2621
26.291 I
30.0081
34.3691
36.473/
38.3631
42.5551
42.0961
40.3721
44.5241
45.8051
48.6851
51.6201
51.3921
48.3831
48.020/
46.8971
49.3421
51.3411
53.5701
55.9091
58.3481
60.9161
63.6751
66.5671
69.5731
72.668/
75.8651
79.1541
82.5501
86.0551
89.6851
93.4471
1
Belgium/ 1
Luxembourgl
I
14.1801
15.3531
16.7731
17.8461
19.4531
19.6801
21.9551
25.2991
27.3371
28.3651
30.9091
36.4741
38.1661
34.9351
39.0971
40.8071
42.125/
46.0391
46.8001
46.1031
45.9661
46.5991
48.8991
50.3291
51.9001
53.5741
55.3051
57.134/
59.1531
61.3051
63.5831
65.9661
68.4781
71.1011
73.8531
76.7271
79.7351
82.8781
1
Canada 1
1
I
14.2111
14.6191
16.5081
18.5981
21.1561
22.2601
24.3801
27.6771
27.1011
29.1171
32.9371
37.7591
42.0761
40.6121
43.9631
44.1791
45.3911
48.5271
47.0561
48.1461
42.7531
44.5571
47.6391
50.6401
53.871 I
57.2171
60.5311
63.7881
67.0721
70.3641
73.6961
77.0841
80.5741
84.1721
87.9081
91. 7881
95.8311
100.0421
I
Other DIlEs 1
1
1
57.4381
62.1911
70.4241
77.0501
80.9261
84.4421
88.9381
99.0761
109.5401
111.6331
117 .0891
133.2691
140.9601
133.8191
145.9851
145.5871
145.6801
156.9121
163.4951
165.0521
165.365\
173.4451
185.3511
197.167/
209.5971
220.8351
230.931 I
240.3811
249.7381
259.1311
268.7161
278.5571
288.7861
299.4301
310.5681
322.2281
334.4631
347.2991
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990: 109.472: 76.522: 70.956: 79.807:
1999: 206.158: 138.450: 124.450: 146.821:
Pessimistic scenario:
286.381
484.601
1990 :
1999 1
1
75.107:
84.6141
1
53.336 :
59.219 I
I
49.541 :
50.2831
1
56.558:
63.1671
I
219.548
240.075
!
I
I
jl
-i
'[
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Annex Table 4-17. Imports (in billions $, 1975 value), CMEA countries, medium
scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table 4- 2).
Per I ad
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
1
Bu Igar I a I
I
1.5591
1.8131
2.0451
2.2221
2.6291
2.9301
3.3081
3.311 ,
3.4881
3.4101
3.8881
4.035\
4.7191
5.3931
5.2021
5.2621
5.6741
5.7351
5.7221
6.6071
6.5021
6.5561
6.7331
6.7481
7.3181
7.8031
8.2181
8.6171
9.0321
9.4701
9.9351
10.4291
10.9541
11.5091
12.0961
12.7161
13.3701
14.0601
1
CSSR 1
1
3.4871
3.6121
3.9961
4.4751
4.6631
4.5991
5.3211
5.6131
6.1381
6.6881
6.9591
7.6351
8.4151
8.4881
9.2431
9.4271
9.5551
9.5851
9.6041
8.9391
9.0221
9.1411
9.3321
9.6411
9.9511
10.2921
10.6621
11.0681
11.5141
12.0031
12.5271
13.0901
13.6891
14.3241
14.9941
15.6981
16.4391
17.2121
1
GDR I
I
5.4181
5.2131
5.6581
6.0981
6.5501
6.9761
7.1491
8.2961
9.1501
9.6151
10.3291
11.0051
11.4791
11.2651
12.0391
12.3241
11.8071
11.3971
11.5021
11.4061
11.5951
11.8621
12.0891
12.3971
12.4171
12.5131
12.6591
12.8791
13.1801
13.5581
14.0041
14.5141
15.0811
15.7021
16.3741
17.0941
17.8621
18.6761
1
Hungary 1
1
1.7241
1.9591
2.2301
2.2791
2.3041
2.5931
2.7031
2.9061
3.9711
4.7221
4.4841
4.6251
5.4361
5.7161
5.8701
6.4591
7.2961
6.9901
6.9091
6.9221
7.0231
7.0061
7.2281
7.0981
7.5541
8.0521
8.5311
8.9941
9.4481
9.9011
10.3591
10.8231
11.2971
11.7861
12.2951
12.8251
13.3811
13.9631
1
Poland 1
1
3.1971
3.3761
3.4831
4.0111
4.3331
4.6591
5.0501
5.5011
6.1821
7.0261
8.5581
10.4861
11 .9971
12.5481
13.7631
13.7521
13.9251
13.7591
13.4781
11.1421
11.3911
11.0641
12.1001
12.9371
13.7661
14.5401
15.1561
15.6671
16.1321
16.6161
17.1481
17.7491
18.435\
19.2131
20.0971
21.0931
22.2051
23.4381
1
ROIIIanla 1
I
1.9021
2.0531
2.2861
2.1531
2.4291
3.1341
3.3131
3.5501
3.8701
3.9841
4.4201
4.7531
5.6301
5.3301
5.6581
6.2211
6.7241
6.8381
6.8931
6.6831
5.5931
6.1491
6.5751
7.0011
7.2141
7.4031
7.5541
7.6921
7.8341
7.9871
8.1591
8.3521
8.5701
8.8141
9.0851
9.3851
9.7141
10.0731
1
USSR I
1
11.4961
12.5791
13.6221
14.5191
14.0711
15.7641
17.5191
19.3901
21.2381
22.3971
25.6141
26.5951
27.7941
35.7181
36.4301
36.7311
39.0271
38.5561
40.4111
45.6531
47.7041
49.373\
51.0391
52.7251
54.4971
56.0071
57.5451
59.2341
61.1341
63.2501
65.5891
68.1481
70.9301
73.9271
77.1411
80.5681
84.2091
88.0661
1990
1999
For comparison.
10.071: 12.431
17.867: 21.042
Optimistic scenario:
14.128: 11.098: 18.397:
22.744: 19.420: 32.638:
9.014
14.104
66.594:
113.679:
10.763
14.251
1990
1999
8.148
11.107
Pessimistic scenario:
I I
12.402: 8.128:
15.424 1 10.0231
1
14.178:
16.2441
6.718
6.767
1
56.5921
67.812:
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Annex Table 4.18. Imports (in billions $, 1975 value), developing countries, medium
scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table 4.4).
Per I od
62
6.3
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
7.3
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
8.3
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
9.3
94
95
96
97
98
99
Oll-Ex-
porting
countries
12.9401
12.5941
14.6891
15.7951
16.2921
17.7121
19.8951
22.6071
24.5501
27.5571
.30.2171
.35.9.391
51.1671
67.6101
78.0081
9.3.6901
94.18.31
92.2901
100.9081
111.7901
109.6151
104.5461
101.6971
95.2141
86.5991
84.0.391
8.3 . .3511
85.4541
90.2621
95.8111
101.5961
107.5141
11.3.4881
119.4781
125.4441
1.31.4051
1.37.4.361
14.3.5161
Aalan
countriea
without
India
11.6621
12.5201
12.06.31
1.3.7101
15.6981
17.1661
19.7071
22.2041
24.1181
26.2611
27.4221
.32.12.31
.34.8651
.34.2.311
.39.2071
44.7251
52.7541
60.4451
64.5.321
69 . .3.321
71.29.31
74.0061
77.00.31
81.1.381
85.90.31
90 . .3.341
94.7.311
99 . .3211
104.0401
108.9771
114.1681
119.6.301
125 . .3851
1.31.4191
1.37.7541
144 . .3821
151 . .3061
158.5211
Ind I a 1
1
1
1
I
.3 . .34.31
.3.6061
.3.9221
.3.6.321
.3.7901
.3.8161
.3 . .3691
.3.0791
.3 . .3161
4.5921
4.5921
.3.55.31
6.2141
6.7781
5.9951
4.99.31
5.4661
5.8.311
6 . .3771
6.9241
6.1821
5.9251
5.7441
6 . .3061
7.2111
8.0601
8.9751
9.86.31
10.7521
11.5711
12 . .3.311
1.3.0601
1.3.7781
14.5011
15.2401
16.00.31
16.7901
17.6051
1
Black 1
Atrlca 1
1
1
1
.3.7891
.3.8.3.31
4 . .3.311
4.4151
5.0961
5.5.361
5.9091
6.1741
6.91.31
7.6981
7.7291
7.6691
8.9651
8.5.321
9.4121
11.0.391
10.10.31
9.0681
10.1601
9.6001
9.6.361
9.45.31
9.1811
9 . .3951
9.6721
9.9971
10.2581
10.668\
10.9961
11..3461
11.7201
12.1251
12.54.31
12.9771
1.3.4291
1.3.8991
14 . .3811
14.8861
Lot lit
Anler
without
.... ,B. ,A.
5.0961
5.11.3 1
5.7011
5.6701
6.6761
6.6521
6.8241
7.2521
8.0071
8 . .3721
8.1621
8.5.351
10.4191
9.9251
9.5041
10.91.31
11.1.3.3 I
12.4411
14.8991
16.2621
14.78.31
12.9991
11.9181
11.4751
11.8801
1.3.0061
14 . .3591
15.9901
17.4721
18.8711
20.2111
21.5571
22.9271
24 . .3.391
25.7691
27.2751
28.81.31
.30.44.31
"'ex/ca
Braz II
Argentina
9 . .3111
8.9401
9.1.37\
9.1971
10.0451
10.66.31
12.1041
1.3 . .37.3 1
14.8791
16.4.321
18 . .3781
21.1261
26.2181
25.79.31
24.86.3 1
2.3.6.311
25.5871
.30.9221
.36.8161
.37.0661
.31.9481
28.7061
25.8.351
28.4651
.30.917/
.34.2901
.37.7971
40.9611
46.22.31
49.86.31
5.3.5501
56.4401
60.12.31
6.3.2.36/
66.9.3.31
70.4441
74 . .36.31
78.2941
"'Id--Eaat
I:
North
At r I eo
4.9401
5.1481
4.9641
5.1551
5.0.301
5.1BJI
5 •.3011
6.2121
6.67.31
6.76.3 1
7 . .3651
7.5411
9.4491
11.2251
11.5001
12.9841
12.5781
1.3.6791
1.3.7.301
15 . .3011
1.3.8.341
12.4671
11.5541
10.4861
9.9.3.31
9.7.371
9.9.3.31
10 . .3721
10.9921
11.6411
12 . .3461
1.3.1071
1.3.9121
14.7791
15.6911
16.6511
17.6511
18.6961
1 I
22.0481 63.0751
34.965: 116.462:
1990
1999
For comparison.
1 1
131.0531 118.7041
256.262: 214.779:
Optimistic scenario:
I 1
13.8491 12.7281
22.877 : 19.541:
1
14.269 I
28.581 :
Pessimistic scenario:
1990
1999
61.626:
74.7131
1
92.890:
116.2291
I
8.431 :
14.220 :
8.605:
10.107:
11.612:
17 .230:
32.628:
50.558:
8.177
11.477
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A nnex Table 4,19. Imports (in billions $, 1975 value), world regions, medium scenario
(observations and forecasts as in Table flO).
Period
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I
OECD I
count r i ee I
total I
I
1
286.8701
309.1271
338.7021
365.7291
396.7871
423.1051
467.7561
521.3011
570.2981
602.2121
656.7541
730.6391
747.9611
699.1191
783.5841
808.4041
853.6461
922.3801
929.9721
932.5201
929.2161
964.8901
1059.9961
1108.7451
1163.6691
1217.9071
1271.5311
1325.7981
1382.3941
1441.0661
1502.0301
1565.2141
1631.0751
1699.5971
1771.1211
1845.7601
1923.8111
2005.4291
CMEA
countries
total
28.7831
30.6051
33.3201
35.7581
36.9791
40.6551
44.3631
48.5671
54.0361
57.8421
64.2521
69.1331
75.4711
84.4591
88.2051
90.1751
94.0081
92.8601
94.5181
97.3531
98.8311
101.1521
105.0971
108.5471
112.7161
116.6101
120.3251
124.1511
128.2741
132.7861
137.7221
143.1051
148.9561
155.2751
162.0831
169.3791
177.181\
185.4871
Len
developed
countries
total
51.0821
51.7531
54.8071
57.5741
62.6271
66.7281
73.1091
80.9031
88.4571
97.6761
103.8651
116.4861
147.2971
164.0941
178.4891
201.9761
211.8051
224.6751
247.4231
266.2761
257.2911
248.1041
242.9311
242.4781
242.1151
249.4641
259.4031
272.6291
290.7381
308.0811
325.9221
343.4321
362.1571
380.7291
400.2601
420.0591
440.7401
461.9591
I
World I
total I
I
I
I
366.7351
391.4851
426.8281
459.0611
496.3931
530.4881
585.2291
650.7711
712.7911
757.7301
824.8701
916.2581
970.7291
947.6721
1050.2791
1100.5541
1159.4581
1239.9141
1271.9121
1296.1491
1285.338\
1314.1451
1408.0231
1459.7701
1518.4991
1583.9811
1651.2591
1722.5771
1801.4061
1881.9321
1965.6741
2051.7501
2142.1881
2235.6011
2333.4641
2435.1981
2541.7321
2652.8761
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1 1 1 1 11990 1 1598.2961 141.7341 375.7261 2115.7551
1999 : 2847.664: 241.494: 701.233: 3790.391:
Pessimistic scenario:
1990
1999
1204.414:
1333.2041
1
116.930:
141.6281
1
223.969: 1545.313:
294.5331 1769.3651
1 1
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Annex Table 4.£0. Exports (in billions $, 1975 value)' CMEA countries, medium
scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table {E).
Period
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
1
Bulgaria I
I
1.2291
1.3281
1.5611
1.8271
2.0921
2.4241
2.7901
2.9791
3.0101
3.3181
3.6421
3.9741
4.1851
4.6791
4.9101
5.6051
6.0221
6.8091
7.4211
7.5651
7.9871
8.501 I
9.1391
9.5781
10.0881
10.6051
11.1351
11.6881
12.2751
12.8911
13.5401
14.2251
14.9501
15.7161
16.5291
17 .3891
18.3021
19.2681
I
CSSR I
I
3.4341
3.779/
3.9751
4.2341
4.4941
4.6231
4.8611
5.3101
5.9741
6.4541
6.8401
7.0861
7.3881
7.8091
8.3961
9.1451
9.5751
10.0151
10.1231
10.2151
10.6071
11.1001
11.7441
12.1401
12.6261
13.1211
13.6331
14.1741
14.7581
15.3771
16.0361
16.7361
17.4851
18.2821
19.1331
20.0381
21.0041
22.0301
1
GDR I
I
4.3181
4.7931
5.1151
5.3951
5.6271
6.1321
6.7191
7.2961
7.6431
8.3201
9.1421
9.4251
9.8651
10.0661
10.1401
10.3851
10.4671
10.7031
10.5421
11.5861
12.0871
12.7011
13.4691
14.0351
14.7601
15.5461
16.3861
17.2891
18.2641
19.3021
20.4071
21.5821
22.8351
24.1651
25.5831
27.0891
28.6941
30.4001
1
Hungary I
I
1.4071
1.5411
1.6781
1.8561
1.9971
2.0231
2.193/
2.6331
3.0381
3.2591
3.8841
4.4511
4.6061
4.8071
5.1321
5.8641
5.9691
6.6351
6.6861
6.8661
7.1751
7.5441
7.9971
8.3281
8.7071
9.1001
9.5141
9.9591
10.4441
10.9691
11.5381
12.1541
12.8271
13.5561
14.3501
15.2121
16.1501
17.1671
1
Poland I
I
2.9491
3.0861
3.6441
3.9341
4.0971
4.5711
5.2731
5.6651
6.1561
6.5651
7.5811
8.4681
9.5101
10.2881
10.4441
11.2781
11.9271
12.7331
12.1961
9.8761
10.3131
10.8791
11.6081
12.1061
12.6971
13.3121
13.9591
14.6531
15.4071
16.2151
17.0831
18.0111
19.0101
20.0781
21.225/
22.4501
23.7631
25.1641
I
ROIIlanla I
1
1.6741
1.8531
1.9641
2.0841
2.1881
2.7331
2.9251
3.2051
3.4821
3.7921
4.2991
4.9371
5.4251
5.3301
5.6881
6.4021
6.4071
6.3351
6.5101
7.6361
7.3831
7.2801
7.3461
7.2511
7.3211
7.4261
7.5581
7.7251
7.9321
8.1681
8.4331
8.7251
9.0471
9.3951
9.7731
10.1771
10.6121
11.0741
I
USSR I
I
12.4131
13.2421
13.2711
15.2801
16.9821
20.1841
22.5121
25.5391
26.9211
28.5071
28.5661
30.8501
31.7521
32.1891
34.1831
37.7481
38.4461
38.6941
38.1551
43.8741
43.2381
43.6541
45.3991
45.3731
46.2831
47.5751
49.0221
50.6141
52.3901
54.242/
56.1761
58.1721
60.2661
62.4151
64.6621
66.9801
69.3941
71.8901
15.923:
27.614.
I
1990
1999
For comparison.
I
13.236:
23.9791
Optimistic scenario:
19.572: 11.074: 16.575:
27.792: 16.437: 28.877:
8.794 :
14.702:
59.329 :
98.999 :
1990
1999
11.490 :
15.510 :
Pessimistic scenario:
13.806: 17.195: 9.928:
17.582: 24.901: 14.407:
14.451 :
20.379:
7.227
8.197
I
46.730 :
50.808 I
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Annex Table 4.£1. Exports (in billions $, 1975 value), GEeD countries, medium
scenario (to 1981: observations: 1982-1985: adjusted forecasts; 1986-1999: trend fore-
casts).
Peri od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
:
USA 1
I
54.6381
58.3181
65.3721
66.9211
71.7561
74.8441
80.6721
84.5831
92.6441
93.5161
102.3011
122.2231
133.1551
131.4291
136.6081
139.4111
152.5501
165.8951
182.7091
180.6971
178.8991
181.9091
190.2751
189.7331
193.2231
197.4101
201.8931
206.8251
212.4781
218.3681
224.5971
231.0801
237.9581
245.107\
252.6221
260.4431
268.6231
277 .1311
1
FRG 1
I
41.0401
44.3041
48.0091
51.1401
56.3171
60.6311
68.4281
74.6511
79.0351
83.7611
89.6301
99.1361
111 .2321
104.4631
115.6791
120.3021
124.3411
130.1431
137.1871
147.8051
145.0531
151.9131
171.4151
171.9951
179.3621
186.8341
193.8161
200.7441
208.1901
215.3071
222.3891
229.3491
236.5061
243.6691
251.0481
258.5551
266.3011
274.2461
Japan I
I
11.3861
12.220:
14.7901
18.1261
20.9321
22.1311
27.2481
32.584\
38.0571
44.4671
46.7821
50.1391
61.5021
63.9581
76.2341
85.6081
85.6081
89.0791
105.660\
120.6701
121.9601
128.3141
140.8271
144.3091
153.2051
162.9391
172.9721
183.5191
194.9611
206.7011
218.9221
231.5521
244.8381
258.6511
273.1761
288.3731
304.3641
321.1491
France 1
I
20.2831
21.714\
23.1591
25.8261
27.5321
29.5381
32.3201
37.4041
43.4341
48.216\
54.4461
60.8901
67.1981
66.2211
73.2161
79.7861
85.0211
90.9081
93.0681
97.861 I
94.698\
97.2891
105.8401
104.3441
106.8041
109.7621
112.9521
116.5741
120.8891
125.3831
130.1641
135.1381
140.4471
145.9671
151.7831
157.8411
164.1891
170.8011
UK 1
1
32.1391
33.5901
34.8751
36.4521
37.9171
38.5161
43.1491
47.0291
49.3191
52.6261
52.9891
59.0721
63.0941
61.3821
66.689\
70.7021
71.8741
74.5511
74.3631
73.0241
71.8931
73.1781
77.4921
78.1831
80.2441
82.597\
85.0911
87.7801
90.7751
93.8871
97.1471
100.5161
104.0491
107.6981
111.5001
115.4361
119.5291
123.7721
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 242.979: 251.760: 228.373: 144.082: 104.892:
1999 390.454: 411.301: 446.589: 253.076\ 178.254:
I
79.4211
83.190:
1
101. 726 I
108.131 :
scenario:
1
167.434:
218.921,
Pessimistic
1 1
187.8231 172.8501
192.323: 171.460:
1990
1999
Period
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Anne:z:4
Annex Table 4.21. Continued.
I I
Italy INetherlandsl Belgium/ I Canada Other DMEsl
I I Luxembourgl I 1
/------j------tI-------1Ir-------=-t-1-----tl-----I
13.9771 15.2121 13.9901 15.6901 58.331 I
14.8841 16.1211 15.0941 17.1261 62.9141
16.4921 17.9441 16.5601 19.2831 67.7441
19.7871 19.3001 17.5671 20.1621 71.4091
22.0001 20.3081 18.8151 22.9881 76.3981
23.5771 21.6531 19.5901 25.4831 79.8051
26.8471 24.4211 21.9621 28.5181 87.0691
30.0031 28.0701 25.3051 30.9731 96.5231
31.7501 31.5221 27.8521 33.7031 103.8831
33.9631 34.9741 29.1131 35.3921 109.3741
37.5661 38.7471 32.2021 37.8401 118.0451
38.8131 43.5551 36.7701 41.7881 125.2891
42.0941 44.6421 38.4031 40.9711 128.8751
43.6991 43.2901 35.2541 38.1831 125.2321
49.1311 47.6631 39.5881 42.1841 135.6801
53.3241 46.8091 40.5101 45.4201 143.3261
58.7391 48.3541 41.6021 50.0001 152.5011
64.2961 51.9351 44.9031 51.5511 161.3091
61.3501 52.7191 46.6101 52.0511 165.0671
63.8581 53.5331 47.9511 53.7531 169.9891
61.9911 51.5191 45.9801 53.6421 172.5551
63.5461 52.3341 48.0731 55.0901 178.3581
69.1611 56.6691 54.1981 59.0061 188.3431
69.4471 56.5771 52.8641 59.8681 191.6201
73.2171 58.9901 54.5391 62.0191 197.3481
77.6051 61.8101 56.322/ 64.3031 203.0261
82.0351 64.7591 58.0821 66.5891 208.6671
86.5701 67.9001 60.0161 68.9661 214.5691
91.4451 71.3711 62.3251 71.5791 221.0551
96.3431 74.8741 64.6271 74.2451 227.7971
101.3991 78.4761 67.0351 77.0201 234.891 I
106.5911 82.1301 69.4961 79.8751 242.2801
112.0681 85.9321 72.1241 82.8741 250.0841
117.7621 89.8231 74.8261 85.9731 258.223\
123.7661 93.8671 77.6731 89.2121 266.771 I
130.0581 98.0461 80.625/ 92.5711 275.6971
136.6931 102.4021 83.722\ 96.0741 285.0431
143.6661 106.9321 86.9431 99.712: 294.8001
657
1990
1999
For comparison. Optimistic
1 I 1 11109.8451 85.6851 76.2941
: 209.760: 156.874: 132.188:
scenario:
84.356: 251.731
146.022: 414.305
Pessimistic scenario:
1990
1999
76.428:
91.838 1
I
59.708 :
68.1181
1
50.959:
52.9761
I
1
61.250: 196.303
64.8571 205.078
658 '17Ie Future 0/ the World Economy
A nnex Table i .22. Exports (in billions $, 1975 value)' developing countries, medium
scenario (to 1981: observations; 1982-1999: trend forecasts).
Per 1od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I
Oll-£x- 1
port! ng I
countrle. I
I
I
48.0901
51. 7051
58.6831
65.6981
70.4521
72.1991
81.4501
90.1861
99.4381
106.4191
110.905\
122.3281
120.0291
107.9481
118.6111
122.9181
116.4721
124.8541
114.8721
97.6161
81.0061
75.5971
79.4711
74.9131
86.9671
100.5411
114.0941
128.0701
143.0391
157.7731
172.5701
187.2251
202.1781
217.1601
232.5311
248.1991
264.4291
281.2081
A.lon
countrle.
without
Indio
I
9.8111
10.9051
10.9311
12.2791
13.9791
15.3221
17.0751
18.9681
20.5681
22.2781
25.0781
29.4531
29.1911
30.4261
37.4501
42.5751
47.2551
52.1311
58.3771
65.5371
68.5691
71.9591
76.5851
79.1171
81.6361
84.4021
87.4361
90.7881
94.5521
98.6441
103.0791
107.8361
112.9421
118.3661
124.1301
130.2141
136.6351
143.3891
I
Indio I
I
1
1
I
3.5451
4.1821
4.2621
3.7101
3.791\
4.0001
4.3551
4.2021
3.9521
3.9071
4.3981
4.5771
4.9791
5.7601
6.9211
6.6531
5.7601
7.0781
8.4621
8.5291
7.821 I
7.5871
8.0511
7.3101
6.9231
6.9251
7.1711
7.5851
8.1481
8.7711
9.4501
10.1681
10.9351
11.7331
12.5751
13.4491
14.3671
15.3271
1
Block I
Africa 1
I
I
I
3.6351
3.7521
4.3331
4.1451
4.2701
4.5471
5.0371
5.5381
5.6471
5.7431
6.5061
6.4791
7.0511
6.7841
8.1781
8.0361
8.1601
7.6441
7.9561
8.1181
8.1441
8.2221
8.4431
8.4411
8.4471
8.4941
8.5831
8.7181
8.9101
9.1471
9.4321
9.7621
10.1381
10.5571
11.0221
11.5291
12.0801
12.6751
Lot In-
Aner
without
W•• 8. ,A.
1
5.8661
5.8201
6.2741
6.5971
6.7641
7.0881
7.9301
7.7381
7.8541
7.6971
8.1341
8.0101
8.1441
8.4231
8.8481
8.9721
10.0391
11.0551
11.2031
10.8561
10.7031
10.6871
10.9881
10.8511
10.7681
10.7771
10.8681
11.0411
11.3051
11.628\
12.0071
12.4301
12.8961
13.3931
13.9221
14.4761
15.0541
15.6541
Wexlco
Brazil
Argentino
8.6241
9.2661
9.2351
10.1021
10.9661
10.6061
11.6441
13.6241
14.2401
14.0911
16.9571
20.2651
18.6261
18.3571
21.4331
25.2431
26.2571
27.2511
30.2851
35.0081
36.4031
37.9821
40.1781
41.3201
42.4531
43.7171
45.1261
46.7081
48.5121
50.4981
52.6781
55.0411
57.6041
60.3551
63.3041
66.4451
69.7881
73.3331
WI d-Eo.t
~
North
At r I co
4.4821
4.7761
4.9741
4.8931
5.0871
4.2901
4.7931
5.3821
6.0601
6.1991
7.2391
7.0111
6.9591
7.0951
7.8271
9.2861
9.5611
10.6301
10.4231
10.6631
10.2771
10.1211
10.3761
10.0711
9.8741
9.8341
9.9151
10.1041
10.4041
10.7741
11.2041
11.6771
'12.1941
12.7381
13.3111
13.9041
14.5171
15.1481
1990
1999
For comparison. Optimistic
184.715: 105.826: 10.573:
413.888: 195.479: 23.925:
scenario:
10.019: 13.374 :
17.663: 23.608:
54.086 :
99.442:
12.662
23.448
Pessimistic scenario:
1990
1999
108.713:
168.6211
1
85.454:
103.1611
I
6.173 :
8.5501
1
I
8.013 :
8.7831
1
9.641 :
9.6561
1
44.008 :
53.041,
8.582
8.878
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Annex Table ,/.29. Exports (in billions $, 1975 value), world regions, medium scenario
(observations and forecasts as in Table ./.16).
1 1 I I
I OECD I OWEA 1 Less 1 World I
1 Period countries 1 countries 1 developed I total 1
I total I total 1 countries I I
1 I 1 tota I 1 1
,-----r------jlr--------rl------;-I-------jl
62 276.6851 27.4251 84.0521 388.1621
63 296.2851 29.6221 90.4071 416.3141
64 324.2271 31.2091 98.6931 454.1281
65 346.6901 34.6101 107.4251 488.724/
66 374.962\ 37.4761 115.3081 527.7461
67 395.7671 42.6891 118.0521 556.5091
68 440.6341 47.2721 132.2841 620.1901
69 487.1241 52.6271 145.6381 685.3891
70 531.1971 56.2241 157.7591 745.1801
71 565.4021 60.2161 166.3351 791.9521
72 610.5471 63.9541 179.2171 853.7181
73 677.6751 69.1911 198.1221 944.987\
74 731.1651 72.7311 194.9781 998.8751
75 713.1101 75.1681 184.7951 973.0731
76 782.6721 78.8931 209.270/ 1070.834/
77 825.1981 86.4281 223.6841 1135.3101
78 870.589/ 88.8111 223.5041 1182.9041
79 924.5681 91.9251 240.6411 1257.1341
80 970.7811 91.6341 241.5771 1303.9911
81 1009.1401 97.6181 236.3281 1343.0851
82 998.1881 98.7871 222.92111319.8961
83 1030.0231 101.6511 222.1611 1353.8341
84 1113.2431 106.6941 234.0991 1454.0361
85 1118.9401 108.8101 232.02211459.7721
86 1158.9501 112.4821 247.06811518.5001
87 1202.6071 116.6841 264.6891 1583.9801
88 1246.8551 121.2091 283.1941 1651.2581
89 1293.4631 126.1001 303.0141 1722.5761
90 1345.0611 131.4761 324.8711 1801.4081
91 1397.5331 137.1621 347.2361 1881.9311
92 1452.0421 143.2111 370.42211965.6751
93 1508.0061 149.6051 394.1411 2051.7521
94 1566.8811 156.4191 418.8861 2142.1861
95 1627.6881 163.6091 444.3211 2235.6191
96 1691.4141 171.2561 470.79512333.4661
97 1757.6381 179.3401 498.2281 2435.2071
98 1826.9421 187.9151 526.8721 2541.7301
99 1899.1521 196.9921 556.7301 2652.8741
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 : 1579.998: 144.503: 391.254: 2115.756:
1999: 2738.824: 254.111: 797.454: 3790.389:
1990
1999
Pessimistic scenario:
1 1 I
1153.9011 120.828 I 270.5841
1256.889: 151.786: 360.692:
I1545.3141
1769.367 :
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A nnez Table .r2.r Current trade balance (in billion $), including services, GECD coun-
tries, medium scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table 4.21).
1 Per i od 1 USA FRG I Japan France UK 1
I---------- --+-- ~---+-- ------1------- 1 1
62 3.3481 1.1451 0.111 I 0.6921 -0.0921
63 4.1811 1.4701 -0.5611 0.280: -0.2801
64 5.943: 1.6201 -0.1501 -0.1941 -1.5261
65 4.5501 0.3251 1.2781 0.8721 -0.6971
66 2.7611 2.0631 1.6581 0.277/ -0.0671
67 2.4191 4.4971 0.2781 0.2981 -1.0471
68 0.0701 4.8301 1.6421 -0.0941 -0.7011
69 -0.095\ 4.2431 2.7531 -0.7791 0.6741
70 2.061 : 3.7511 2.6141 0.7181 1.2501
71 -1.5141 3.9221 6.2921 1.5401 2.1801
72 -5.6701 5.1871 7.039/ 1.8541 0.0701
73 1.0101 10.0991 0.1101 1.4931 -4.1771
74 -4.5731 16.5861 -3.4201 -3.8201 -9.7111
75 11.6751 11 .1901 0.212: 2.3741 -3.7141
76 -6.3271 10.1991 4.5021 -4.0491 -2.2211
77 -27.247: 12.3121 11.3251 -1.0801 2.2081
78 -30.4831 16.2151 16.8931 4.6421 4.771 :
79 -28.8941 4.5231 -9.1361 0.8111 1.7541
80 -20.6051 -4.0991 -9.4781 -11.5441 13.2001
81 -21.5861 6.0821 9.2951 -9.0531 15.6951
82 -6.3711 -1.1731 5.4131 -14.2771 5.8511
83 -24.7391 1.5621 13.2181 -12.5741 3.3341
84 -84.3691 10.1341 24.2241 -11.7671 0.6341
85 -62.7141 8.745\ 24.4681 -13.3811 3.4221
86 -47.8951 13.4271 29.5861 -13.2951 5.0501
87 -43.9071 15.3861 29.7821 -15.6921 5.2541
88 -42.3811 16.2971 29.7731 -17.8351 5.700\
89 -40.9961 16.9761 30.1121 -19.3831 6.4241
90 -39.1041 18.1911 31.0441 -20.3531 7.4951
91 -37.7781 18.7731 31.7541 -21.5151 8.5261
92 -36.6051 19.1691 32.4491 -22.7381 9.5951
93 -35.7651 19.2381 32.9741 -24.1711 10.6271
94 -34.7831 19.5111 33.6141 -25.6441 11.7431
95 -33.9671 19.6501 34.1111 -27.3641 12.8421
96 -32.9811 20.0481 34.6561 -29.2161 14.0081
97 -31.947: 20.5371 35.1091 -31.2931 15.2021
98 -30.6771 21.358: 35.5521 -33.5411 16.4741
99 -29.2761 22.4191 35.8511 -36.0261 17.7991
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
I
-23.244: 37.672: 44.919 : -31.289: 12.3521990 I
1999 I -14.256: 66.726 : 88.473 : -100.068 : 27.622I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 -50.809: 2.402 : 20.1021 -11.4961 4.056 I
1999 -28.3221 -9.4491 -9.276 : 29.824 : 13.940:
I I I I I
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Italy INetherlandslPeri od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
-0.1811
-1.1811
0.1861
1.6431
1.4301
0.971 I
1.9631
1.5121
0.5391
1.2241
1.1641
-3.2561
-7.6781
0.0321
-2.3611
2.7571
6.7731
4.3451
-11.4301
-6.7021
-3.0851
-0.6281
3.6231
2.0061
2.1461
0.1011
-0.9381
-1.3971
-1.4911
-1.7871
-2.1441
-2.6251
-3.0571
-3.5691
-4.0561
-4.5771
-5.0861
-5.6351
0.051 :
-0.1061
-0.3661
-0.1321
-0.3011
-0.2121
-0.0041
-0.0591
-0.5761
-0.1171
1.3241
2.0181
2.0351
2.9181
3.2301
1.361 :
0.0511
-0.8131
-0.9101
4.9621
2.8831
5.5801
7.2291
5.1771
5.5701
5.8461
6.1971
6.7121
7.509\
8.2141
8.9511
9.6801
10.5431
11.4531
12.5081
13.6751
15.0171
16.5181
Belgium/ 1
Luxembourgl
1
-0.0211
-0.1591
-0.0791
-0.0251
-0.1431
0.1081
0.1401
0.3471
0.7501
0.6501
1.2881
1.2161
0.7831
0.3201
0.3101
-0.5481
-0.8931
-1.7981
-3.3261
-2.4501
-5.1951
-4.2481
-0.7121
-3.9421
-3.7441
-3.8111
-4.0541
-4.2211
-4.1401
-4.2881
-4.4911
-4.8141
-5.0961
-5.4811
-5.8631
-6.3091
-6.7641
-7.2691
Canada I
I
I
-0.0371
0.3271
0.4611
-0.1291
-0.0611
0.6461
0.8881
0.1681
2.2331
1. 7321
0.8901
1.5881
0.3461
-2.4291
-0.9711
0.0051
1.0431
1.6501
4.9781
3.4271
10.8021
10.5341
12.0911
9.3921
9.8571
10.2491
10.5591
10.9491
11.5921
12.3111
13.2011
14.2391
15.5021
16.9301
18.5761
20.4191
22.4981
24.8111
Other Dt.lEsl
1
1
-0.2651
0.0631
-1.3121
-2.4631
-1.7701
-1.8521
-0.2221
-0.4551
-2.6201
-1.1271
3.2001
0.0791
-11.7251
-8.5871
-12.0431
-8.5641
4.9581
1.8621
-9.7361
-11.4101
-8.4911
-5.7671
-0.3711
-0.8591
-0.7191
-3.6171
-6.4781
-8.6271
-9.9891
-11.2631
-12.3891
-13.5311
-14.5571
-15.6581
-16.7481
-17 .9091
-19.1031
-20.3941
1990
1999
For comparison. Optimistic
1 1 1 1
1 -2.2721 9.1331 -2.5761
1 I 1 7 1
I -14.9401 21.784 1 -7.83 1
scenario:
I
11.4321 -13.074
24.510: -35.716
Pessimistic scenario:
1990
1999
-1.794 :
1.175 I
1
6.019 :
11.976 I
1
-5.487 :
-3.6591
1
11.979:
27.792 1
1
-6.849
-3.471
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A nnez Table f 25. Current trade balance (in billion $), including services, CMEA coun-
tries, medium scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table 1.21).
Per 1od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I
Bu I gar 10 I
I
-0.0121
-0.0981
-0.0811
-0.0031
-0.1731
-0.1141
-0.1661
0.0451
0.1731
0.0601
0.0611
0.0301
-0.4901
-0.7141
-0.2461
-0.0171
-0.1661
0.3491
0.7251
0.2161
0.4471
0.6501
0.8481
1.5261
1. I 671
1.0101
0.9741
1.0071
1.0801
1.1671
1.2641
1.3651
1.4721
1.5821
1.6971
1.8161
1.9391
2.0661
I
CSSR I
I
0.1121
0.3021
0.2391
0.0161
0.0071
0.1851
-0.0721
0.0251
0.0971
0.1681
0.2541
-0.0821
-0.4651
-0.6791
-0.6431
-0.8281
-0.7651
-1.0191
-0.2601
-1.0211
-0.7301
-0.6431
-0.5801
-0.4431
-0.4801
-0.4381
-0.3731
-0.2821
-0.1651
-0.0521
0.0691
0.1871
0.3071
0.4241
0.5451
0.6691
0.7941
0.9371
I
GDR I
I
-0.0121
0.3961
0.3101
0.2601
-0.0081
0.1741
0.4031
0.0471
-0.2651
0.0961
0.2831
-0.3331
-0.8951
-1.1991
-1.8251
-2.3021
-1.3641
-1.2301
-1. 7691
0.9741
1.1941
1.0771
1.2131
1.1731
0.7181
0.6721
0.8571
1.1561
1.5241
1.9271
2.3631
2.8331
3.3501
3.9141
4.5381
5.2281
5.9941
6.8451
I
Hungary I
I
-0.1091
-0.119\
-0.1981
-0.0251
-0.0051
-0.1161
-0.0111
0.1341
-0.1981
-0.5531
O. I 141
0.3751
-0.3771
-0.9091
-0.5961
-0.6901
-1.5561
-0.7371
-0.5591
-0.4171
0.0651
0.6181
0.9331
1.9061
1.8621
1. 7371
1.6071
1.5101
1.4581
1.4381
1.4491
1.4891
1.5641
1.6691
1.8061
1.9801
2.1891
2.4401
I
Poland I
I
-0.2401
-0.2101
0.0231
-0.1121
-0.221 I
-0.1181
0.0071
-0.0661
-0.0601
-0.1701
-0.3991
-1.431 I
-2.171 I
-2.2601
-2.8491
-2.3571
-1.9751
-1.3381
-2.0901
-2.2261
-0.9071
0.5971
0.5441
1.1261
1.2001
0.9601
0.6651
0.5121
0.5251
0.6241
0.7841
0.9711
1.1731
1.3681
1.5361
1.6661
1. 7451
1.7591
I
ROlIlanla I
I
-0.1231
-0.1071
-0.1671
0.0241
-0.0261
-0.1531
-0.1401
-0.1081
-0.1091
-0.0041
-0.0171
0.2301
-0.2681
-0.0001
0.0391
0.0141
-v.6561
-1.1481
-0.9731
-0.3941
2.2321
1.5791
0.9751
0.7191
0.3331
0.081 I
-0.021 I
-0.0281
0.0321
0.1221
0.2371
0.3691
0.5201
0.6801
0.8541
1.0371
1.2321
1.4371
I
USSR I
I
0.4661
0.2121
-0.0541
0.1181
0.9411
1.1191
1.2221
1.3351
1.0681
1.3341
-0.6871
0.3451
2.5521
-3.5291
-0.9421
4.2241
1.5451
6.5911
7.9321
4.3511
1.2751
-0.6711
-1.0481
-0.9871
-1.4391
-3.0201
-3.1401
-2.6861
-1.9491
-1.1901
-0.4051
0.3471
1.1301
1.8511
2.5851
3.2821
3.9801
4.6481
1990
1999
For
I
I
1
1
comparison. Optimistic
0.554: -0.228: 1.715:
1.121: 1.578: 9.093:
scenario:
0.283: -0.420:
-0.571: -2.051:
-0.421 :
0.345 :
1.892 :
17.607 :
Pessimistic scenario:
1990
1999
1.598:
2.859 1
1
-0.096:
0.2361
1
1. 380:
4.9611
I
2.399 :
4.343 I
I
1.430 :
5.0091
1
0.652 :
2.8171
1
-5.035:
-7.4291
1
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Annex Table ~.116. Current trade balance (in billion $), including services, developing
countries, medium scenario (observations and forecasts as in Table ~. 1111).
Oll-£x-
parting
countrle,
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Per I ad
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 A,lan 1 India 1 Black Latin I Mexlca I "'d-Ea,t I
1 cauntrle, 1 1 Africa Amer I Brazil 1 ~ I
I wi thaut 1 I wi thout \ Argent Ina I North 1
I India 1M.,B .•A. 1 1 Africa I
t---------+------tl-----+I----t--------+-I-----tl------+-I------ll
2.3401 -0.4011 -0.7851 0.1631 -0.2561 -0.1221 -0.4041
3.5811 -0.6181 -0.7941 0.2771 -0.1151 0.5001 -0.4471
3.1021 -0.5621 -1.0731 0.3171 0.0361 0.3641 -0.2341
3.2191 -0.3741 -1.1171 0.1561 0.1751 0.8341 -0.3621
3.2051 -0.3831 -1.2421 0.1921 -0.0951 0.7881 -0.2231
2.9391 -0.7061 -0.9241 0.1971 0.0011 0.4571 -0.4911
3.4901 -1.1391 -0.4001 0.2731 0.0891 0.0691 -0.2701
3.3461 -1.1201 -0.1631 0.8821 0.2351 0.3701 -0.4351
4.0511 -1.2491 -0.0671 0.2331 0.0901 -0.1771 -0.612/
7.2341 -1.9721 -0.2271 -0.5811 -0.5561 -0.6491 -0.6271
8.0491 -0.9641 0.2241 -0.5661 -0.5151 -0.4711 -0.5991
15.7831 0.0531 -0.4521 0.0621 0.1371 0.4431 -0.6511
59.9021 -3.6781 -1.1731 -0.2251 -0.1421 -6.1901 -1.5941
40.339\ -3.8051 -1.0181 ~1.7481 -1.5021 -7.4351 -4.1301
43.9001 -0.5141 0.5921 -0.3341 0.2061 -?.5281 -4.8221
33.7621 -0.5261 0.1371 -1.3971 0.0041 0.5091 -6.1951
13.6831 -3.6821 -0.3911 -1.8351 0.2161 -0.3981 -7.0421
53.4231 -6.5891 -1.8221 -0.9201 1.7331 -6.0571 -6.7631
84.5121 -9.2221 -6.1571 -2.0991 -0.6251 -10.4381 -6.6301
53.1171 -10.5971 -5.3351 -2.3711 -5.8241 -7.3351 -9.0781
27.1091 -7.2071 -3.0681 -0.4331 -4.5511 6.5581 -8.3441
11.0431 -4.2221 -2.0751 0.0361 -1.5951 14.5941 -7.2591
21.3291 -1.6221 -0.7011 0.6851 0.6601 22.2171 -6.1711
9.7441 -1.4261 -1.9451 0.6801 0.8171 20.0251 -5.2301
-10.2181 -2.1231 -3.5441 0.2601 -0.0631 17.5601 -5.2161
1.9951 -3.9961 -5.4181 -0.4301 -1.3931 13.9851 -5.3361
14.2101 -5.5311 -7.2491 -0.9061 -2.9691 10.9161 -5.8811
22.7631 -6.9691 -8.9061 -1.4871 -4.9631 8.5431 -6.7191
28.7211 -8.1291 -10.4901 -1.8931 -6.7111 3.0261 -7.7841
33.9121 -9.3181 -12.0081 -2.2991 -8.3521 -0.0701 -8.8491
39.1541 -10.5391 -13.4721 -2.7091 -9.9341 -3.2631 -9.9981
44.5361 -11.8781 -14.9781 -3.1451 -11.5801 -5.0921 -11.2761
50.4531 -13.3041 -16.5421 -3.5731 -13.3311 -8.3161 -12.6781
56.7021 -14.8681 -18.2511 -4.0071 -15.2481 -10.4701 -14.2961
63.7881 -16.5611 -20.1081 -4.4451 -17.2901 -13.7641 -16.1171
71.3711 -18.4141 -22.1711 -4.8931 -19.6101 -16.6781 -18.1901
79.7211 -20.4031 -24.4381 -5.3331 -22.1301 -20.5041 -20.521/
88.9271 -22.5401 -26.9471 -5.7911 -25.0141 -24.3951 -23.1701
1990
1999
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
16.780: -12.142: -12.933: -2.469: -10.163:-14.188
80.650: -25.722: -23.015: -3.635: -28.888: -49.386
-11.312
-33.391
1990
1999
31.574 :
54.287 :
Pessimistic scenario:
-5.909: -8.853: 0.010:
-24.343: -34.448: -5.047:
-0.274
-11.857
17 .503
-6.000
-4.503
-15.920
664 The FutlJl'e of the World Economy
Annex Table -1.27. Current trade balance (in billion $), including services, world re-
gions, medium scenario. (For details, see Tables -1.19 and -1.29).
Peri od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
OECD
countries
totol
4.7521
4.0341
4.5821
5.2231
5.8461
6.1071
8.5111
8.3101
10.7201
14.7821
16.3461
10.180 I
-21.1781
13.9911
-9.7311
-7.4711
23.9701
-25.6961
-52.9491
-11.7411
-13.6431
-13.7281
-39.2831
-27.6861
-0.0161
-0.4091
-3.1601
-3.4511
0.7551
2.9471
4.9981
5.8511
7.776\
8.9471
10.9341
12.9061
15.7301
18.797:
CI.lEA I
countries I
totol I
I
1
0.0821
0.3751
0.0721
0.2781
0.5141
0.9771
1.2421
1.4121
0.7061
0.9321
-0.391\
-0.8661
-2.1131
-9.2911
-7.0621
-1.9561
-4.9381
1.4691
3.0061
1.4831
3.5771
3.2071
2.8871
5.0191
3.3611
1.0021
0.5681
1. 1881
2.5051
4.0371
5.7621
7.5611
9.5161
11.4881
13.5621
15.6761
17.874\
20.130:
Less
developed
countries
totol
1. 3111
2.3841
1.9501
2.5311
2.2411
1.4731
2.1111
3.1161
2.2691
2.6221
5.1581
15.3741
46.8991
20.7011
36.498\
26.2931
0.5511
33.0041
49.3401
12.5771
10.0661
10.5211
36.3961
22.6671
-3.3451
-0.5931
2.5911
2.2621
-3.2601
-6.9841
-10.7601
-13.4121
-17.2921
-20.4381
-24.4971
-28.5851
-33.607:
-38.930:
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 :
1999 :
43.053
56.262
3.374 :
27.122:
-46.427
-83.387
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 :
1999 :
-31.876
30.529
2.329
12.796
29.547
-43.328
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Annex Table 4.28. Index of the dollar exchange rate (1975 = 1), CMEA countries, medi-
um scenario. (For details, see Tables 4.17 and 4-20).
Per i od
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I
Bulgaria I
I
1.4551
1.4521
1.4401
1.4311
1.4131
1.4051
1.4011
1.3851
1.3361
1.3091
1.1811
1.0431
1.0211
1.0001
0.9791
0.9621
0.8921
0.8491
0.7951
0.8511
0.8571
0.8621
0.8701
0.8861
0.895/
0.9011
0.9021
0.9011
0.8981
0.8941
0.8901
0.8851
0.8791
0.8731
0.8671
0.8611
0.8551
0.8501
I
CSSR 1
I
1.1271
1.1371
1.1301
1.1581
1.1591
1.1271
1.1301
1.2131
1.2401
1.2481
1.1381
1.0251
1.0221
1.0001
1.0031
0.9911
0.9371
0.9131
0.8801
1.0021
1.0381
1.0591
1.0921
1.1231
1.1311
1.1341
1.1321
1.1271
1.1221
1.1161
1.1101
1.1041
1.0991
1.0941
1.0891
1.0851
1.0821
1.0791
GDR I
I
1.4211
1.4111
1.3961
1.3621
1.3421
1.3281
1.3151
1.3061
1.2881
1.2801
1.1891
1.0571
1.0491
1.0001
0.9871
0.9961
0.9291
0.9061
0.9221
0.9261
0.9511
0.9681
0.9841
1.0171
1.0531
1.0781
1.0931
1.1031
1.1091
1.1121
1.1131
1.1131
1.1121
1.1091
1.1071
1.1041
1.101/
1.0981
I
Hungary I
I
0.9351
0.9291
0.9511
0.9681
0.9681
0.9591
0.9301
0.952/
0.9661
0.9711
0.9911
1.0231
1.0671
1.0001
0.9911
0.9911
0.9221
0.8541
0.7791
0.8371
0.8701
0.8981
0.9301
0.9801
1.0071
1.0341
1.0591
1.0841
1.1081
1.1311
1.1541
1.1771
1.2011
1.2241
1.2471
1.2711
1.2951
1.3201
I
Pol and I
I
1.1101
1.1061
1.1091
1.1091
1.1411
1.1511
1.1761
1.1241
1.1011
1.1411
1.0601
0.9831
1.0161
1.0001
0.9151
0.9081
0.8641
0.8451
0.8921
0.9861
1.7541
2.0111
2.2731
2.6331
2.8471
3.0011
3.1361
3.2661
3.3971
3.4851
3.5721
3.6571
3.7431
3.8271
3.9121
3.9971
4.0831
4.1701
I
ROIIIanla I
I
1.2051
1.2041
1.2061
1.2051
1.2051
1.2051
1.2061
1.2051
1.2051
1.2051
1.1081
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
0.9991
0.9621
0.9::>11
0.8481
0.648/
0.7041
0.7261
0.7411
0.7681
0.7931
0.8041
0.8121
0.8171
0.8211
0.8231
0.8251
0.8261
0.8271
0.8271
0.8271
0.8261
0.8261
0.8261
1
USSR 1
1
1.0751
1.0971
1.0981
1.1271
1.1431
1.1991
1.1961
1.2291
1.2181
1.2461
1.1461
1.0151
1.0071
1.0001
1.0111
1.0071
0.9551
0.9351
0.9451
0.9591
0.9791
0.9871
0.9991
1.0181
1.0371
1.0501
1.0531
1.0531
1.0521
1.0491
1.0451
1.0401
1.0351
1.0301
1.0241
1.0191
1.0141
1.0091
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 0.893 1 1.120 I 1.094 1 1.081 I 3.325 0.810 1.047I 1 I 1
1999 0.851 I 1.081 1 1.079 1 1.178 1 3.969 0.807 1.008I I I I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 0.904 1.123 1.120 I 1.130 3.472 0.834 1.056I
1999 0.842 1. 069 1.104 I 1. 386 4.347 0.845 1.004I
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Annex Table 4.e9. Index of the dollar exchange rate, DEeD countries, medium
scenario. (For details, see Tables 4.16 and 4.e1).
DM/$ 100 ¥/$: FFR/$
I
I
t/$
Period
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
1
USA 1
1
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1.0001
1
FRG I
1
4.0001
4.0001
4.0001
4.0001
4.0001
4.0001
4.0001
3.9431
3.6601
3.4911
3.1891
2.6731
2.588\
2.4601
2.5181
2.3221
2.0091
1.8331
1.8181
2.2601
2.4271
2.5531
2.8461
2.8681
2.8651
2.8601
2.8221
2.7581
2.6761
2.5811
2.4781
2.3701
2.2601
2.1511
2.0431
1.9391
1.8391
1. 7431
1
Japan 1
1
0.3601
0.3601
0.3601
0.3601
0.3601
0.3601
0.3601
0.3601
0.3601
0.3491
0.3031
0.2721
0.2921
0.2971
0.2971
0.2691
0.2101
0.2191
0.2271
0.2211
0.2491
0.2381
0.2381
0.2471
0.2561
0.2671
0.2721
0.2741
0.2731
0.2701
0.2661
0.2611
0.2551
0.2491
0.2421
0.2361
0.2291
0.2231
1
France 1
1
4.9371
4.9371
4.9371
4.9371
4.9371
4.9371
4.9371
5.1941
5.5541
5.5431
5.0441
4.4541
4.8101
4.2861
4.7801
4.9131
4.5131
4.2541
4.2261
5.4351
6.5721
7.6211
8.7391
9.2391
9.6031
9.9321
10.2011
10.4161
10.5861
10.7171
10.8171
10.8911
10.9471
10.9881
11.0191
11.0431
11.0631
11.0801
1
UK 1
I
0.3571
0.3571
0.3571
0.3571
0.3571
0.3621
0.4171
0.4171
0.4171
0.4111
0.4001
0.4081
0.4281
0.4521
0.5571
0.5731
0.5221
0.4721
0.4301
0.4981
0.5721
0.6591
0.7<481
0.7821
0.8181
0.8621
0.9071
0.9521
0.9961
1.0401
1.0811
1.1221
1. 1611
1.1981
1.2351
1.2701
1.3051
1.3401
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990: 1. 000: 2.653 : 0.267 : 10.020 : 1.001
1999 I 1.0001 1. 750 I 0.224 I 10.797 : 1.476
I I I I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990: 1.000 : 2.698 : 0.278 : 11.051 : 0.994
1999: 1.000 : 1.683 : 0.215 : 10.955: 1.193
Annex-4
Annex Table ~.1!9. Continued.
1000 LIR/$l FL/$
I
BFR/$ I 1I Can $/$ I <p currency Rest/$ I
-~ J
_____ ,
I I I I I
Per Iod Italy INether londe 1 BelglUlll/ I Canada I Other DlolE.1
I I Luxellbourgl I I
I I I I I
62 0.6251 3.6201 50.0001 1.0701 1.2001
63 0.6251 3.6201 50.0001 1.0811 1.1971
64 0.6251 3.6201 50.0001 1.0811 1.1961
65 0.6251 3.6201 50.0001 1.0811 1.1941
66 0.6251 3.6201 50.0001 1.0811 1.1931
67 0.6251 3.6201 50.0001 1.0811 1.2041
68 0.6251 3.6201 50.0001 1.0811 1.2601
69 0.6251 3.6201 50.0001 1.081/ 1.2581
70 0.6251 3.6201 50.0001 1.0481 1.2591
71 0.6201 3.5021 48.8701 1.0101 1.2391
72 0.5831 3.2101 44.0151 0.9901 1.1741
73 0.5831 2.7961 38.9771 1.0001 1.0291
74 0.6501 2.6881 38.9521 0.9781 1.0111
75 0.6531 2.5291 36.7791 1.0171 1.0001
76 0.8321 2.6441 38.6051 0.9861 1.0811
77 0.8821 2.4541 35.8431 1.0631 1.1281
78 0.8491 2.1641 31.4921 1. 1411 1.0751
79 0.8311 2.0061 29.3191 1.1711 1.0201
80 0.8561 1.9881 29.2431 1.1691 1.0301
81 1.1371 2.4951 37.1311 1.1991 1. 2111
82 1.3531 2.6701 45.6911 1.2341 1.4011
83 1.5191 2.8541 51.1321 1.2321 1.4461
84 1. 7571 3.2091 57.7841 1.2951 1.4951
85 1.9101 3.2841 58.8491 1.3781 1.6091
86 2.0711 3.3771 59.0721 1.4471 1.6941
87 2.2731 3.4881 59.2041 1.5181 1.7751
88 2.4641 3.5891 58.8711 1.5801 1.8431
89 2.6461 3.6791 58.1631 1.6341 1.9011
90 2.8221 3.7581 57.161/ 1.6821 1.9541
91 2.9951 3.8261 55.9431 1.7241 2.0031
92 3.1651 3.8831 54.5731 1.7621 2.0491
93 3.3361 3.9291 53.1011 1.7971 2.0941
94 3.5091 3.9651 51.5671 1.8291 2.1381
95 3.6861 3.9921 50.0021 1.8801 2.1821
96 3.8681 4.0101 48.4301 1.8881 2.2271
97 4.0561 4.0221 46.8711 1.9171 2.271 I
98 4.2531 4.0281 45.3361 1.9441 2.3171
99 4.4581 4.0281 43.8371 1.9721 2.3631
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990: 2.760 : 3.696 : 56.489: 1. 662 : 1.892 :
1999 : 4.233: 3.997 I 46.142: 2.039 : 2.334 :
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 : 2.855 : 3.806 : 57.625: 1. 700 : 2.019\
1999 : 4.346 : 3.875 : 40.472 : 1.850 : 2.334 :
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Annex Table 4.90. Index of the dollar exchange rate (1975 = 1), developing countries,
average, medium scenario. (For details, see Tables 4.18 and 4.22).
I I I I I
Oll-Ex- I Aaian I India I Black I Latin I Wexico 1 Wid-Eaat I
port i ng I countrlea I I At rica I Amer I Brazi I I ~ I
Pe r i od countriea I without I I I without I Argentina I North I
I India I I \ 101 .• B. ,A. I I At rl co I
I I I I 1 1 I
62 0.2881 0.8971 0.5691 0.5841 0.0231 0.1001 1.0891
63 0.3571 0.8841 0.5691 0.6461 0.0381 0.1251 1.1301
64 0.4311 0.9261 0.5691 0.8481 0.0451 0.2001 1.1361
65 0.5481 0.9401 0.5691 0.8101 0.0461 0.2451 1.1541
66 0.9461 0.9261 0.7591 0.8111 0.0631 0.2831 1.1531
67 0.9841 0.9141 0.8951 0.9901 0.0731 0.3261 1.1541
68 1.0761 0.9091 0.8951 1.0611 0.0911 0.3721 1.1551
69 1.0861 0.9091 0.8951 1.0791 0.0981 0.4011 1.1531
70 1.1081 0.9631 0.8951 1.0991 0.1141 0.445\ 1.1551
71 1.1231 0.9821 0.8961 1.0971 0.0981 0.4891 1.1541
72 1.0841 0.9921 0.9071 1.0661 0.1091 0.6261 1.1161
73 1.0231 0.9791 0.9241 1.0021 0.2881 0.6321 1.0211
74 1.0091 0.9731 0.9671 1.0371 0.5731 0.6471 1.0341
75 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001
76 1.016\ 1.0071 1.0701 1.1881 1.4461 1.5591 1.0371
77 1.0201 1.0011 1.0431 1.2221 1.8631 2.3801 1.0431
78 1.0141 0.9941 0.9781 1.1631 2.2931 3.1241 1.0201
79 1.0401 0.9931 0.9701 1.2641 2.7431 4.7581 1.2271
80 1.0251 1.0341 0.9391 1.3001 3.1481 7.3921 1.2481
81 1.0821 1.0801 1.0341 1.6151 3.6551 9.3321 1.4061
82 1.1521 1.2621 1.2011 1.8721 4.7751 12.2031 1.5331
83 1.1941 1.4371 1.3981 2.2721 6.2631 16.9211 1.7361
84 1.1881 1.6421 1.5951 2.7511 8.5151 23.9091 1.9851
85 1.2051 1.9981 1.8151 3.5201 12.4631 35.2681 2.3911
86 1.2721 2.3451 1.991\ 4.2731 17.4461 50.2311 2.7881
87 1.2411 2.6241 2.0961 4.9181 23.4371 69.4531 3.1561
88 1.2201 2.8981 2.2111 5.6121 31.0061 95.3451 3.5061
89 1.2101 3.1691 2.3471 6.3401 40.7581 130.1231 3.858/
90 1.2041 3.4521 2.4941 7.1111 53.2591 175.6681 4.1961
91 1.1991 3.7251 2.6411 7.8941 69.1021 236.1951 4.5611
92 1.1971 4.0071 2.7871 8.7131 89.5341 315.6031 4.9231
93 1.1951 4.2961 2.9341 9.5611 115.725/ 421.8831 5.3041
94 1.1941 4.6021 3.0861 10.4701 149.3981 561.4441 5.7301
95 1.1941 4.9291 3.2451 11.4421 192.6881 747.8331 6.1551
96 1.1941 5.2761 3.4121 12.4901 248.866\ 994.4551 6.6251
97 1.1941 5.6521 3.5891 13.6231 320.6841 1323.5221 7.1171
98 1.1941 6.0601 3.7751 14.8571 413.8831 1760.6041 7.6531
99 1.1951 6.5061 3.9721 16.1921 533.3621 2343.4031 8.2181
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 1.193 I 3.074 I 2.247 : 6.110 I 48.348 I 161.277 3.846I I I I
1999 1.178 I 5.561 I 3.514 : 13.488 I 478.690 :2109.562 7.533I I I
Pessimistic scenario:
1990 1.215 I 3.643 I 2.576 : 8.143 59.548 I 186.794 4.472I I I
1999 1.217 I 7.017 I 3.653 : 20.652 613.846 :2496.158 8.313I I
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Annex Table -/.91. Change rate of the general price level = inflation rate (%), CMEA
countries, medium scenario. (For details, see Table .{17).
Period
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I
Bulgaria I
I
2.3141
2.0871
-0.3521
-0.2951
-1.1191
-1.1341
2.0811
-0.3631
4.2941
-6.5261
0.1241
0.0831
0.1691
0.2351
-0.4811
-3.2641
-0.0471
1.1781
9.9861
1.3611
-0.0971
0.7521
1.400 I
1.2001
1.3451
1.3571
1.3251
1.3061
1.2941
1.2841
1.2751
1.2651
1.2551
1.2441
1.2341
1.2231
1.2121
1.2021
I
CSSR I
I
0.4171
0.5971
-1.9701
-1.0171
-0.3711
15.3501
2.6351
5.3421
1.2781
-0.3721
-0.5741
-0.3341
1. 1611
-0.9431
-0.9921
-5.0291
1.0001
1. 7951
2.3521
-2.1741
4.2031
1.8851
4.5471
2.682/
1.1521
1.1681
1. 1691
1.1701
1.1721
1.1761
1.1821
1.1871
1.1921
1.1991
1.2061
1.2141
1.2221
1.2331
I
CDR I
I
-0.5921
-0.338/
-0.1341
-1. 7081
0.4401
0.4011
0.6531
0.8571
1.4921
-1.3701
0.2551
0.6391
-0.8861
0.1661
1.6651
-0.2491
0.9351
2.1801
3.1611
2.7251
1.8921
0.1911
0.1971
0.1981
1.2821
1.3891
1.4001
1.3941
1.3751
1.3481
1.3181
1.2871
1.2581
1.230 I
1.2031
1.1781
1.1551
1.1321
I
Hungary 1
I
-0.5011
-0.3771
0.7671
-1.9541
2.8051
0.6851
5.1711
4.0711
3.4271
1.6021
1.6131
2.5841
-1.5471
0.8101
6.2531
2.0031
3.4481
4.9371
5.1751
6.4291
5.4821
5.0091
5.9571
7.4901
4.3531
4.7751
5.0031
5.1301
5.2021
5.2451
5.2771
5.3001
5.3161
5.3321
5.3511
5.3671
5.3871
5.4061
1
Poland I
1
0.8431
1.1511
1.6851
-0.2631
-0.5201
0.1731
0.8661
0.5321
2.2831
5.4021
0.7861
0.6781
2.2841
5.6101
9.4911
3.9821
7.0961
8.4021
11.692/
22.3811
111.5141
17.4261
16.0761
17.6801
9.7751
8.2691
8.4951
8.6441
8.7351
6.8411
6.8631
6.8701
6.8651
6.8511
6.8371
6.8211
6.8071
6.7951
I
ROlian I a I
I
-3.5221
0.2031
0.9901
1. 7041
2.0951
-0.3991
0.241 I
0.7431
0.8871
-0.4611
-0.7381
0.1621
-0.4511
1.0711
1.1431
-0.9541
0.2931
0.9781
-0.5291
1.5981
14.780 I
1.3711
0.5831
0.4821
0.9801
1.0751
1.1731
1.2551
1.3201
1.3751
1.4201
1.4571
1.4881
1.5141
1.5381
1.5581
1.5781
1.5971
1
USSR I
I
1.9301
-1.5091
-1.5031
-0.3931
-0.8751
0.1391
-0.0691
2.2241
1.5681
-0.4171
-0.5511
-0.9981
-0.8931
-1.1111
-0.1981
0.2731
0.0321
0.1921
-0.3911
1.0051
3.8911
1.0581
1.5011
1.2141
3.4361
2.4751
1.3221
1.2791
1.2391
1.2041
1.1731
1.1461
1.1231
1.1041
1.0891
1.078/
1.0701
1.0651
For comparison. Optimistic scenario.
1990 0.765 I 0.749 I 0.446 I 3.848 7.657 0.015 0.476I I I1999 0.636 I 0.434 I 0.181 I 3.799 5.629 0.146 0.166
I I I
Pessimistic scenario.
1990 1.818 1.534 I 2.132 I 6.329 9.842 2.817 2.001I I
1999 1. 740 1.886 I 1. 961 I 6.646 8.069 3.247 1.959I I
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Annex Table -1.92. Change rate of the general price level = inflation rate (%), DECD
countries, medium scenario. (For details, see Table -1.16).
Period
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
I
USA I
I
2.0221
1.4391
1.5131
2.1421
3.4121
2.9341
4.9241
5.0991
5.4201
5.3241
4.3131
5.6451
8.7411
9.0561
5.6951
6.0021
7.4441
8.7411
9.3261
9.4221
6.0701
5.6911
6.3171
3.1441
4.4541
4.5361
5.2791
5.8761
6.3471
6.7181
7.0061
7.2291
7.3981
7.5241
7.6141
7.6761
7.7151
7.7361
FRG
1
4.0791
2.7341
3.0141
3.5941
3.4981
1.2331
2.0281
4.2261
7.4981
7.6261
5.3701
6.5921
6.6641
5.9341
3.5601
3.6181
4.2001
4.1091
4.3831
3.7761
2.6961
3.1901
2.3331
3.9291
4.3391
4.3481
3.9581
3.6331
3.3681
3.1611
2.9971
2.8681
2.7671
2.6891
2.6301
2.5851
2.5521
2.5281
I
Japan I
I
3.6021
4.5011
4.4431
5.0771
5.0021
5.7991
5.1801
4.8051
7.3331
5.1821
5.2101
11.9361
20.5951
7.8061
6.4021
5.6721
4.5911
2.6161
2.8411
2.8641
4.1791
-0.1691
2.8341
7.2121
8.1721
8.4931
7.3301
6.5021
5.9961
5.6801
5.4671
5.3141
5.2011
5.1171
5.0541
5.0041
4.9651
4.9341
I
France 1
1
4.7301
6.3621
4.3521
2.6331
3.0411
3.1451
4.2871
6.8591
5.7041
5.6471
6.3911
7.9671
11.252\
12.8121
10.2281
9.0391
9.4791
10.6521
12.1121
11.6581
12.6321
9.0551
6.0291
8.8691
8.3951
7.9611
7.9821
7.9901
7.9751
7.9561
7.9351
7.9211
7.9091
7.9021
7.8961
7.8941
7.8931
7.8941
I
UK 1
I
3.5351
2.1861
3.6051
4.899\
4.5441
2.8911
4.2581
5.5911
7.4181
9.5841
8.6431
7.2901
14.9011
27.1481
14.9271
13.8561
11.1041
14.7581
19.7431
12.9981
7.0791
8.4341
3.9001
7.6881
9.0091
9.9181
10.4991
10.8381
11.0041
11.0551
11.0311
10.9611
10.8681
10.7641
10.6581
10.5581
10.4661
10.3831
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
1990 : 5.345 : 2.175 I 4.597 : 6.438 : 10.453I
1999 : 5.792: 0.990 I 3.673 I 6.725 : 9.819I
Pessimis tic scenario:
1990 : 7.319 : 4.496 : 7.322 : 9.352 : 11.574
1999 : 10.373: 4.105 : 6.240 : 9.247 : 11.058
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A nnex Table -4.9£. Continued.
Period
I 1
Italy INetherlandsl
1 1
1
BelglUIII! 1
Luxembourg'
Canada
1
Other ONEs I
1
62
63
6.
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
7.
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
9.
95
96
97
98
99
6.1361 3.5571
9.1921 •. 6851
6.6001 8.5451
•. 3251 6.0551
2 .•691 5.9731
2.8171 4.1.21
1.95.1 •. 1131
•. 2311 6.3831
7.0071 5.5~1
7.7611 8.5721
6.6.51 9.3791
10.8011 8 .•501
18.3281 9.3021
18.71.' 11.1961
17.3711 8.8911
19.5351 6.3161
1•. 3161 5.4021
16.0331 3.7851
20.0181 5.6501
15.09.1 5.3951
20.3961 3.9741
1•. 1511 3.6081
14.2.31 2.2711
11.8.51 5.5061
12.9081 7.2731
1•. 2581 7.8161
13.6881 8.1821
13.2761 8.3951
13.0031 8 .•951
12.8261 8.5181
12.7081 8.~1
12.6321 8 .•131
12.58.1 8.3151
12.5591 8.2031
12.5.81 8.0861
12.5~1 7.9681
12.55.1 7.85.1
12.5651 7.7.61
1.5171
3.0521
•. 7511
•. 9901
•. 1.61
2.9661
2.95.1
•. 2651
•. 9661
6.2681
6.1961
7.109\
12.41.'
11.9951
7.5271
6.9971
4.2021
•. 2061
•. 4521
5.2671
7.0~1
•. 3831
4.3891
•. 9881
•. 8321
•. 7601
•. 7161
4.67.1
•. 62.1
•. 5881
•. 5571
•. 5331
..5081
4.~91
•.•711
•. 4561
•.~21
•.•301
2.1331
1.5811
2 .•2.1
3.6931
3.9511
2.9.21
3.4171
•. 7571
3.3221
3 .•501
5.1971
9 .•661
16.3081
10.1061
10.1.91
7.0051
6 .•321
10.8551
10.3531
11.6001
9.2501
6.2091
6.4081
9.56.1
9 .•791
9.4091
9.3531
9.3081
9.2711
9.2421
9.2181
9.2001
9.1861
9.1771
9.1701
9.1661
9.16.1
9.1641
2.8261
•.•341
•. 390\
5.8221
4.8821
•. 76.1
3.3781
•.•531
6 .•931
7.878\
8.2101
10.7191
13.3181
12.67.1
11.0081
11.796\
10.5101
10.9551
11.0371
11.33.1
10.3681
8.8621
9.7321
10.nll
9.7891
9.2921
9.1031
9.0511
9.1071
9.21.1
9.3281
9 .•291
9.5131
9.5821
9.6371
9.6801
9.7121
9.7371
10.502
11.169
14.186 :
14.120:
For comparison. Optimistic scenario:
11.466: 7.341: 3.760: 8.279: 7.683
10.522: 6.061: 3.426: 8.001: 8.325
Pessimistic scenario.
9.515 : 5.434: 10.206
9.253: 5.574: 10.324
1990 :
1999 :
1990 :
1999 :
672 The Future of the World Economy
A nnex Table -1.39. Change rate of the general price level = inflation rate (%), develop-
ing countries, medium scenario. (For details, see Table -1.18).
Oll-£x-
porting
count r les
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Per I od
1 1 I I I 1 1
I Asian I India 1 Black I Latin I Mexico 1 Mld-East 1
1 countries 1 1 Africa 1 NlJer I Brazil I ~ 1
I wi thout 1 I 1 wi thout 1 Argent Ina I North I
I India 1 1 I M. ,8 •• A. 1 I Africa I
l-------t-------tl------rl----;-,-----;-1-----tl-----;-I----I
22.5221 -7.7561 3.0371 -0.0541 7.3291 30.0971 0.9781
24.2711 4.4181 7.1321 12.7521 53.1541 39.5941 1.5731
12.6221 1.1461 9.3661 29.4961 29.7761 44.1331 1.7081
26.7251 1.9251 9.1381 3.6181 6.4371 33.7141 4.7671
68.2031 3.5371 17.3731 8.5651 33.4731 27.0671 3.2301
9.3941 4.4431 7.6761 14.1261 17.3561 19.6571 2.3101
10.8321 2.5371 -0.3321 12.4561 19.8831 15.1461 2.0091
4.0901 4.5331 3.7251 7.6131 16.1441 12.8031 -0.9371
5.2631 1.9341 3.3181 -0.6831 21.7961 17.9571 2.3331
10.2101 4.1291 5.1281 1.0461 -6.3791 15.3291 3.367\
7.7341 8.3101 11.4251 7.0441 21.7681 30.5921 2.1661
18.5881 19.3711 18.3851 15.4001 173.5581 21.4341 9.9551
66.397\ 22.2731 17.6361 18.2501 132.6751 27.9841 18.5401
14.7821 4.3901 -2.6091 6.7711 76.4491 56.8801 1.6381
12.3011 8.8681 6.0201 28.0181 52.4071 70.9061 10.2641
12.5921 9.5241 3.7551 20.5741 47.4061 50.4121 11.0761
7.2981 12.7811 2.1381 9.8331 25.7741 50.6881 7.9251
15.8881 15.4401 15.0351 21.4161 45.2871 78.3431 9.0481
26.9991 10.9791 11.7861 10.9671 40.8301 80.5061 18.9701
16.8711 5.7881 9.0661 8.8981 29.0831 37.7471 16.1531
8.7151 12.5981 13.8461 19.9851 25.8821 35.0601 9.4991
2.5601 12.4621 15.1821 20.6231 31.2251 37.5111 15.2101
-1.1481 13.0481 12.4411 20.4931 35.1511 40.0561 15.6831
-5.5801 13.1731 9.3011 19.8921 36.8841 37.8221 16.0521
-8.6911 12.9641 6.3031 18.8631 35.4911 38.9981 15.1851
-5.5781 13.0141 7.0441 17.8021 34.4451 40.6741 14.8131
-2.2611 12.9451 8.3481 17.5761 34.4461 40.6911 14.2921
0.1781 12.6411 9.4501 16.7611 34.8201 40.6881 14.0621
1.7901 12.7741 9.8751 16.3411 35.0451 39.8511 13.2681
2.9331 12.2861 9.7961 15.5911 34.9371 39.9241 13.5971
3.7791 12.3401 9.6661 15.2291 35.4021 39.5001 13.1171
4.4021 12.3181 9.6301 14.8221 35.5781 39.9251 13.1841
4.8681 12.4251 9.7001 14.7661 35.7851 39.5601 13.7161
5.2011 12.6041 9.8141 14.6791 35.9431 39.8811 13.2731
5.4451 12.6691 9.9241 14.6261 36.3411 39.7901 13.6391
5.6031 12.8161 9.9991 14.5941 36.1591 39.9901 13.5371
5.7001 12.9781 10.0721 14.6151 36.4701 39.9781 13.7401
5.7521 13.1561 10.1321 14.5441 36.3111 40.0871 13.6491
For comparison. Optimistic scenario.
1990 : 1. 355 : 10.863 : 8.473 : 13.910 33.467 : 38.270 : 11. 999
1999 : 4.780 : 11.719 : 8.797 : 13.398 35.144 : 38.523 : 12.676
Pessimistic scenario.
1990 : 2.133 14.227 : 10.047 : 19.465 37.880 : 41.643 14.478
1999 : 3.569 14.790: 10.409 : 16.589 38.052 : 42.062 14.434
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Annex Table ~.95. Sectoral composition (%) of GDP, DEeD countries (1962 and 1984:
actual figures for share of value added; 1999: forecasts based on the individual country
models).
Agric. Min. & Quar, Manuf. Public a I Construct. servicesServices
USA 1962 4.3 3.0 23.9 2.2 6.6 59.91984 3.0 2.5 24.0 2.7 4.9 63.1
r~m 2.1 2.1 25.9 2.6 3.3 64.51999 scen.:rr~o.
peSSlllIlStic 2.3 2.2 24.9 2.0 3.3 65.8scenario
FRG 1962 4.0 3.0 36.3 1.8 8.4 46.61984
I
2.7 .9 36.4 2.9 5.9 52.2
rum 1.2 .5 35.9 3.6 5.8 54.11999 scen.:rr~o,
peSSlllIlStic 1.5 .6 36.5 3.5 4.8 53.1scenario
Japan 1962 11 .9 1.1 22.9 1.9 7.9 54.31984 4.8 .7 30.4 2.2 9.7 52.3
r~m 4.3 .5 34.3 2.3 10.5 49.71999 scen.:rr~o.
peSSlllIlStiC 5.4 .5 34.3 2.1 9.9 49.6scenario
France 1962 8.9 2.1 26.8 1.3 7.7 53.21984 4.5 .7 28.7 2.1 5.5 58.4t-m 3.2 .4 30.0 2.2 6.1 57.41999 scen.:rr~o.peSSlllIlStl.C 3.5 .5 26.9 2.2 4.2 62.6
scenario
UK 1962 2.7 3.1 27.2 2.2 8.4 56.41984 2.9 3.0 25.3 3.3 6.3 59.1{_m 2.9 3.3 25.4 3.7 5.4 55.2
1999 scen~io.
peSSlllIlStiC 3.2 7.9 22.6 3.5 4.6 54.3
scenario
Italy 1962 10.6 2.5 25.2 3.9 12.0 45.71984 7.4 2.4 31.2 5.0 7.3 46.9
rdim 6.1 2.2 31.1 5.9 6.6 47.01999 scen.:rr~o.peSSlllIlStiC 6.8 2.4 34.5 4.8 5.9 46.6scenario
Canada 1962 7.6 4.3 21.3 1.8 8.6 56.41984 4.4 3.0 19.5 3.5 6.6 62.3
u-m 3.8 3.1 18.6 4.2 6.5 64.81999 scen.:rr~o.peSSlllIlstl.C 4.2 3.0 19.2 3.3 6.1 63.7
I
scenario
aElectricity, water, and gas.
676 The Future 0/ the World Ecorwmy
Annex Table _1.96. Sectoral composition (%) of NMP, CMEA countries (1960 and 1985:
observed figures; 1999: forecasts based on the individual country models).
Traffic I
Agric. roou'tt. Construct. Trade Carmun. Others--
,"SSR 1960 38.3 37.4 11.5 7.8 5.0 I1985 14.5 60.3 10.4 8.3 6.4 I
[~dim 6.9 67.7 10.3 -~~ ~: I1999 sceru;rr~o.peSSlllUSt~c 7.9 68.3 9.3 Iscenario ~-
Bulg. 1960 57.5 24.3 6.3 3.1 3.9 5.01985 19.9 48.4 9.1 10.7 8.4 3.5
[~mm 14.3 52.6 9.8 11.2 9.0 3.0
1999 sceru;rr~o.
peSSlllUSt~c 16.2 51.1 9.3 11. 4 8.9 3.0
scenario
--
c-_
CSSR 1960 16.9 51.4 11.0 15.2 4.9 .61985 9.8 55.4 12.5 16.8 4.7 .7
f~m 8.6 55.5 13.0 17.6 4.6 .71999 scen~~o.
peSSlllUSt~c 9.0 Sma 15.6 4.7 I 1.0scenario
GDR 1960 17.6 58.2 5.9 10.5 5.1 2.71985 7.4 69.7 5.4 10.1 4.5 3.0
C~im 5.2 71.0 5.9 10.1 4.3 3.41999 sceru;rr~o.
peSSlllUSt~c 5.3 71. 3 5.7 10.0 4.3 3.3
scenario
Hung. 1960 35.5 36.7 10.5 12.3 4.8 .41985 17.9 52.2 10.3 13.0 5.7 1.0
{~m 15.4 52.8 11. 3 12.3 6.6 1.61999 sceru;rr~o.
peSSlllUst~c 17.4 54.2 11.0 9.2 6.9 1.4
scenario
Poland 1960 38.2 31.9 13.2 13.1 3.0 .71985 18.2 48.9 12.3 15.0 4.4 1.3
[~m I11.9 53.1 12.7 16.0 ! 4.8 1.51999 sceru;rr~o. !I pess~st~c 9.5 54.4 13.1 16.5 I 4.8 1.7
i
scenar~o
1960 53.2 22.9 8.7 8.2 i 4.0 3.0Ran. 1985 22.0 54.3 7.8 6.0 7.7 2.2
rmm 16.0 60.1 7.5 6.2 7.8 2.31999 sceru;rr~o. IpeSSlllUst~c 14.0 61.4 6.5 6.4 8.6 3.1scenario I! !
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Annex Table -l.97. Sectoral composition (%) of GDP, developing countries (1960 and
1982: observed figures; 2000: medium scenario forecasts based on the individual coun-
try models).
Hin. & I Public
IAgric. Quarr. Manuf . services Construct. services
Group 11 1960 41 .9 / 9.9 .6 7.3 40.4
(oil- exporting 1982 19.0 / 12.5 1.3 13.9 53.3
developing countries) 2000 20.5 / 11. 7 1.5 15.0 51.2
Group 121 1960 34.6 2.2 14.5 .7 4.0 43.9
(Asian dev. 1982 18.2 1.7 27.4 1.5 6.0 45.2
countries,
without India) 2000 12.8 1 .1 33.8 1 .9
I
5.2 45.3
1960 50.8 1.1 13.2 .5 I 4.7 29.7
India 1982 40.4 1 .3
I
16.7 1.3 4.7 35.3
2000 34.8 1.3 18.0 2.1 3.5 40.2
Group 13 1960 36.5 10.3 7.2 1 .3 4.8 40.0
(Black Africa) 1982 27.1 6.9 11 .5 2.7 6.9 44.9
2CCO 27.1 8.8 I 11.0 1.6 I
7.4 44.0
I
Group 14 1960 18.9 6.3 21.0 .8 4.1 48.9
(Latin Arrerica 1982 14.6 6.3 23.0 1 .4 3.6 51.1
without M. ,B. ,A., 2000 11. 7 7.4 23.2 1 .8 2.7 53.2
Group 15 1960 16.3 1.3 23.7 1.1 6.3 51.3
(Mexi=, Brazil 1982 10.4 1 .8 29.3 2.2 4.9 51.4
Argentina) 2000 6.6 1 .7 28.5 3.8 6.0 53.4
Group 18 1960 30.2 5.3 15.6 .7 3.7 44.5
(lo\iddle East, 1982 18.4 8.5 14.8 1 .6 5.3 51.5
North Africa) 2000 19.4 6.8 16.1 2.4 5.2 50.0
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